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Preface

Since World War II, Germany has always looked to Washington for
both connections and protection, wanting to insure that the United
States remains tightly bound to Europe and European security. The
American presence keeps not only French ambitions in check, but
German ones too—something of a relief to those Germans who are
suspicious of their own impulses.1

,

n the midst of the Second World War, a group of British sociologists and
literary scholars met to discuss the “German Mind and Outlook.” Their
lectures and discussions were documented in a volume that appeared in
1945. The appearance of such a scholarly work was not the rule during wartime, as evidenced by the stamp “Book Production War Economy Standard”
opposite the table of contents.2 In his foreword, G. P. Gooch stated that the
project was meant to “aid in the understanding of the gifted, ef¤cient, hardworking, disciplined, romantic, unstable, in¶ammable and formidable nation
with which for the second time in a generation we ¤nd ourselves at war.”3 He
went on to stress that “German culture is at least as interesting and important
a theme as the German state.”4 This is as true today as it was then. In 1989, a
new chapter in the long history of this culture began. Reuni¤ed Germany is of
course not a “new” country, but rather the latest of myriad geographical and
political con¤gurations. As can be expected, the culture—including the political culture—of the Bundesrepublik Deutschland contains elements whose origins lie in the period before 1945. The present study will concern itself with
one of these elements, namely the cultural conceptions and political views of
right-wing intellectuals. Very little of the pertinent material is available in English, so one of the purposes of this exercise is to enable those who do not know
German to familiarize themselves with a contemporary sociocultural phenomenon of some signi¤cance. The main focus will be on literary ¤gures, but
it will be necessary to speak of nonliterary intellectuals as well.
///

ix
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In the nineteenth century, and well into the twentieth, Germany was often characterized as the “land of poets and thinkers.” With the advent of the
mass media, digital culture, and ubiquitous visual images, one might well
ask if the literary sphere still carries signi¤cant weight in the European
Union’s most populous country. Although the demise of high culture is regularly bemoaned by German authors and critics, there is a core of support
for such culture that has yet to disappear (although it is clearly a minority affair). Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, and to a certain extent even before that
momentous event, the advocates of elite culture have been situated on the
right, even the far right of the political spectrum. Before 1989, they were not
afforded much attention, since blatantly right-wing views had been marginalized in postfascist West Germany. (Such views were of course—
of¤cially—nonexistent in East Germany.) This began to change in the
course of the Historians’ Debate5 of the 1980s, and the Literature Debate6
of the early 1990s initiated an assault against the literary left that continues
to this day. Simultaneously, a quite different kind of assault has become all
too commonplace on German streets, i.e., vicious attacks against non-Germans. Although there is no direct connection between the conservative cultural criticism analyzed in this study and xenophobic violence, the two can
be seen as manifestations of a general malaise, a disorientation that may last
for quite some time. Migration from impoverished regions to the prosperous West,7 rising unemployment in Germany (and much of Europe), the
much-discussed globalization of the world economy, and the questioning—
some would say erosion—of traditional values have helped create a climate
of anxiety and apprehension. After reading about this climate for years, I
spent six months in Berlin (July 1997 to January 1998) in order to experience it ¤rsthand. While ¶ying back to the United States, I read the banner
headline shared by several German newspapers: “German Unemployment
Reaches Record Postwar High.”
What follows is not a characterization of the Germans per se, but rather
an attempt to describe one subgroup in contemporary German society. It remains to be seen whether this subgroup will attain considerable in¶uence in
the coming years. One can well imagine, however, that this will depend primarily on the future economic health of Germany. (As of this writing,
record unemployment stands in sharp contrast to record highs at the German Stock Exchange.) The anxiety found in today’s Germany is at least in
part a reaction to the disruptions and (largely self-in¶icted) losses suffered
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by the German people in this century. Roy Pascal, one of the most eminent
“foreign” observers of German affairs in our time, wrote an assessment of a
central ¤gure in German culture that is an appropriate motto for my own
ruminations:
In peace-time, in a time when social con¶icts were not too acute, Nietzsche
could inspire an aristocratic seclusion and devotion to the personal life. The
brutality of his doctrine could remain as an undercurrent. In times of stress it
became an all-powerful swirling torrent.8

Such differentiation is clearly more fruitful than a blanket condemnation of
the German character before 1945 and a concomitant clean bill of (democratic) health for the subsequent period.9 The most accurate description of
the German nation that I have encountered to date is “stubborn transiency,”10
a term rejected vigorously by those who believe that a state of normalcy has
been attained. I do not proceed from the premise that “Germany will try it
again,”11 but I ¤rmly believe that it would be irresponsible to ignore certain
disquieting trends beginning to make an impact between the Rhine and the
Oder-Neisse.12
The original motivation for this book was my reaction to the appearance of Botho Strauß’s polemical essay “Anschwellender Bocksgesang” (“Impending Tragedy”) in 1993. I was amazed to discover a number of themes
and concerns of the cultural and political right in a text written by a writer
long associated with the left. In the process of contextualizing this essay, I
turned to the general condition of German intellectuals in the 1980s and
1990s. This in turn led to a look back at the origins and development of conservative-elitist literature in Germany since Romanticism. All this would
be more than suf¤cient to warrant an exercise in literary analysis and cultural history. Over and above such intellectual phenomena, however, it was
the abovementioned manifestations of xenophobia in post-1989 Germany
that provided a strong motivation to put pen to paper. The availability of the
German press via the Internet made it possible to follow developments on
a day-to-day basis from abroad. As a non-German who has lived in Germany for extended periods of time over the course of the past thirty years, I
have reacted not only intellectually and politically, but also emotionally to
each incident of violence, be it the burning of a home for asylum seekers or
the beating of a foreigner on a commuter train. In the context of such atrocities, the attempts of right-wing intellectuals to rede¤ne German identity and reinterpret the course of recent German history deserve attention—
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especially since problematic exercises in mysti¤cation and obfuscation are
not limited to Germany, or even Europe.
The characterization of the intellectuals in question as “right wing”—as
opposed to “conservative” or “neoconservative”—needs some clari¤cation.
In the context of contemporary German politics, it should be taken to mean
a position to the right of the Christian Democrats, even to the right of the
(Bavarian) Christian Social Union. Although certain representatives of the
German New Right have attempted to transform the Free Democratic Party
into a conservative nationalist grouping,13 most of the ¤gures discussed below situate themselves outside the spectrum of the traditional conservative
parties in Germany. These people do not, as a rule, cultivate contacts with
far-right parties like the National Democratic Party (NPD), the German
People’s Union (DVU), or the Republicans, either. They form, instead, an
extraparliamentary cultural and intellectual opposition. In this they are following in the footsteps of the Conservative Revolution of the Weimar era.
They hope to set the stage for a cultural shift that will eventually lead to fundamental changes in the political system and the structure of society.14 In an
essay published in 1983, Jürgen Habermas offered a critique of such agendas.15 A mere seven years later, the cultural program he analyzed could take
on an overtly nationalistic dimension, given that the “German question”
had been ¤nally laid to rest. It is reuni¤cation that separates the New Right
from the “old” neoconservatives: A new self-con¤dence and openly displayed sense of national pride, unthinkable in the divided country, are now
the order of the day.16 The campaign against a kind of national inferiority
complex—the result of Germany’s defeat in World War II and the subsequent cultural and political reorientation imposed on the country—would
of course be unthinkable in Britain or France. The current situation in Germany is thus sui generis.
Since this study is mainly concerned with members of the literary intelligentsia, the construction of an intellectual genealogy is essential. This will
be done in abbreviated form, since the emphasis is on contemporary developments. The survey begins with the Romantic poet and political theorist
Novalis, whose verses and ideas hold a strong attraction almost two hundred
years after their formulation. After an encounter with Nietzsche, we will
turn to the messianic poet and prophet Stefan George, a self-styled Führer
in the cultural sphere of the early twentieth century. Thereafter, Thomas
Mann’s Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen (Re¶ections of a non-political
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man) and the much-discussed Conservative Revolution will be examined.
Special attention will be given to the aspect of change, or transformation:
Where did these writers begin, and where did they conclude their literary
(and political) journeys? Their attitudes toward Western democracy and authoritarianism will be of special interest. Although space will not permit a
broadening of this section beyond the German context, the reader may well
discover commonalities with authors like Knut Hamsum, Ezra Pound, or
Louis Ferdinand Céline. With regard to England, John Carey’s provocative
The Intellectuals and the Masses 17 provides a fascinating comparison with collateral developments in Germany.
The second chapter focuses on the unique partnership of former East
German dissident Ulrich Schacht and West German critic Heimo Schwilk
as an example of cultural reuni¤cation with a decidedly conservative ¶avor.
These two relatively unknown ¤gures achieved a degree of notoriety as editors of the controversial 1994 anthology Die selbstbewußte Nation (The selfcon¤dent/self-aware nation), and they are now the leading younger representatives of the “literary right.” Chapter 3 analyzes the rightward drift of
two prominent authors, namely Botho Strauß and Peter Handke. Their recent exercises in cultural and political criticism—revolving around the role
of the mass media and the growing dominance of the super¤cial and the trivial in society as a whole—are the latest salvos in a German debate that began
in the Wilhelminian era. An excursus examines the anti-American strain
characteristic of the German New Right and discusses one rather questionable method of defending the American—and Western—model. The study
originally concluded with an assessment of the present state and future prospects of the neonationalist cultural project in Germany and beyond, but important political events and cultural debates (especially those involving
Martin Walser and Peter Handke) necessitated the addition of an epilogue
covering the period from September 1998 to May 1999.
Unless otherwise noted, all translations from the German are my own.
I would like to thank Keith Bullivant, Edith Clowes, and Elliot Neaman
for their careful reading of the manuscript. Initial thoughts and early versions of my approach to the subject were put in print by Valters Nollendorfs
(Monatshefte), Klaus Bohnen (Text & Kontext), and Keith Bullivant (as editor of the volume Beyond 1989). Free time for writing was provided by the
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National Endowment for the Humanities and Purdue University. ErnstUllrich Pinkert gave me a public forum for airing my views by inviting me
to lecture at Aalborg University. Ulrich Pro¤tlich made me feel welcome at
the Freie Universität Berlin during my research semester there in 1997–98.
Helpful comments and encouragement were given by Michael Geisler,
Marc Silberman, Beate Allert, Mechthild Hart, Matthias Konzett, Anton
Kaes, Martin Jay, Sibylle Tönnies, Christiane Lemke and Antonia Grunenberg. Margaret Hunt guided me through the various stages of publication at
the Purdue University Press, and John McGuigan and Bruce Carpenter
made valuable editorial suggestions. I am grateful to the members of my
family for their willingness to spend six months in Berlin. Needless to say, I
alone am responsible for any errors or misassessments that might be found
in the present volume.

Chap_one.fm Page 3 Friday, August 25, 2000 1:14 PM

Chapter One
Predecessors and Predilections: A Problematic Legacy

%

he Enlightenment and the French Revolution were the beginnings of

the modern world, and Romanticism was the ¤rst reaction to this
world. In this ¤rst postrevolutionary era, both the idea of conservatism and the image of the writer as ¤rst and foremost a unique individual
with a highly developed subjectivity made their appearance. At ¤rst glance,
the two phenomena not only have little to do with each other, they even
seem to be diametrically opposed. The single-minded path taken by the
modern writer is, after all, hardly an expression of an homage to customs and
traditions that evolved over time. The protected and at the same time monitored position of the writer at court in the days of the ancien régime was, in
the course of the nineteenth century, consigned to the dustbin of history.
Due to censorship and, in some cases, criminal prosecution, not a few wordsmiths had to ply their trade in exile. Making a virtue of necessity, the exiles
initiated, or at least accelerated, the process of intercultural communication.
The German Romantics, who were reacting to a revolution not at home, but
abroad, also went into a kind of exile. They sought out a realm of fantasy in
which their spirits could take ¶ight, unfettered by history or politics. One
cannot ignore a strain of prorevolutionary radicalism in the early years, embodied by such ¤gures as Friederich Schlegel or Joseph Görres, but these
two—and others like them—later became advocates of the repressive restoration system constructed by Metternich. The “turn to the right” has, at least
until recently, put its stamp on the perception of the entire movement, making it the Romantics’ fate to have their image “fade extremely one-sidedly
into the past.”1 In the context of this study, the Romantic with the most enduring impact is Friederich von Hardenberg, called Novalis (1772–1801).
///

3

Chap_one.fm Page 4 Friday, August 25, 2000 1:14 PM

4

///

Literary Skinheads?

Novalis, an aristocrat and landowner’s son, studied philosophy with
Fichte, law, and mining engineering. His ties with everyday reality were actually quite strong compared to many of those who strove to emulate him:
“It is this combination of an active life and poetical contemplation that lends
to his work a peculiar tension.”2 Although his views on history and society
can be culled from purely literary works such as the novel Heinrich von Ofterdingen (1802), it seems expedient to concentrate on his non¤ctional writings, namely Miscellaneous Observations/Pollen (Vermischte Bemerkungen/
Blüthenstaub, 1797/98), Belief and Love (Glauben und Liebe, 1798), Political Aphorisms (Politische Aphorismen, 1798), Universal Sketches (Das Allgemeine Brouillon, 1798/99) and Christendom or Europe (Die Christenheit
oder Europa, 1799).3 One should keep in mind that Novalis did not live to
see Napoleon as the imperialist emperor and occupier of Germany and much
of continental Europe. He was thus re¶ecting upon the course of the revolution in France, not upon its later transmutation. As in the case of Georg
Büchner, we are dealing with the observations of a rather young author.
Already in Miscellaneous Observations/Pollen, one encounters motifs and
beliefs that are, even today, part and parcel of the conservative cultural scene.
The poet, for example, is given a special status—or rather, it is lamented that
such a status has been lost:
Poets and priests were originally one, and only later times separated them. The
true poet is, however, always a priest, just as the true priest has always remained a poet. And should not the future reinstate the old ways? (Bst, no. 71,
255 and 257)

The elevation of the poet goes hand in hand with the assertion that most
princes, or monarchs, are representatives of the genius of their time (Bst, no.
76). One might assume that this would be considered the pinnacle of civilization, but Novalis leaves no doubt that the poet is one step higher, since
he has the potential to be “a perfect representative of the genius of humankind” (Bst, no. 76, 261), placing him clearly beyond the bounds—and
bonds—of any one epoch. Although Edmund Burke is praised, Novalis
does not call for a return to pre-1789 conditions. The ideal here is the “poetic state,” the only one seen as true and perfect (VB, no. 122, 282). This
state is a juxtaposition of democracy and monarchy, and it is the poetic spirit
which mediates between the masses and the prince. Such a model might be
taken for constitutional monarchy or enlightened absolutism, but it is in
fact neither, since it contains a utopian element. The poetic spirit is given
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the task of uniting the past and the future, and the locus of said uni¤cation
is “the atmosphere of the poet” (Bst, no. 109, 283). What might this future
be? When it said that children represent a “Golden Age” (Bst, no. 97, 273),
the implication is that the young, not yet completely integrated into organized society, carry with them not only the shape of the future, but a knowledge of our most ancient origins.4 One should note that the antithesis of the
utopian, i.e., the philistine, also makes an appearance in this work. Novalis
makes his disdain for this type utterly clear. The philistine never transcends
everyday life, he has little use for poetry, and his religion is little more than
an “opiate” (Bst, no. 77, 263). The worst of these are apparently the ultramaterialist “revolutionary philistines.” The French Revolution is hence set
in opposition to the glories of the poetic spirit.
Belief and Love, an apotheosis of King Friedrich Wilhelm III of Prussia
and especially of Queen Luise, continues this sort of nonpolitical critique of
political developments (underlined by the collection of short poems printed
at the beginning). Even more than in Pollen,5 the Germans are portrayed as
the saviors of European civilization: “A land that satis¤es heart and mind
could well be a German invention . . . ” (GuL, no. 7, 291). To counter the
democratic fetish of the philistines (“miserable philistines, devoid of spirit
and lacking in heart”—no. 23, 296), Novalis envisions a revitalized—in actuality thoroughly idealized—monarchy. He is not blind to the injustices
committed by reigning monarchs, but he is also afraid of majority rule, at
least rule by the existing majority. The solution is to have the masses
educated by the king until they reach the point where they are all “capable
of ruling” (no. 18, 294). This would lead to authentic republicanism, characterized by “general participation in all affairs of state, close contact and
harmony of all members of the state” (no. 37, 302). As a poetic vision, this
is not overly controversial, but there are some aspects that are troublesome.
The belief that identi¤cation with the state can more than compensate for
such trivial concerns as suf¤cient nourishment (no. 8, 291), and the notion
that medals and uniforms should be used to demonstrate that each and every
person is a citizen—i.e., someone whose identity is derived primarily from
his association with the state (no. 19, 295)—were transformed into social
reality during the Third Reich.6 It is easy to overlook such details, given that
the prince is seen as the chief artist in a nation of artists striving to reach the
above-mentioned “Golden Age” (nos. 39 and 41, 303f). The mixing of art
and politics is alternatively intriguing and maddening.
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The Political Aphorisms revolve around similar themes, placing love and
the family at the center of the state. Novalis restates his fear that the majority—given the less than ¶attering name “the large crowd” (PA, no. 67,
308)—will be manipulated by narrow-minded populist demagogues. Pre¤gurations of Tocqueville’s analysis of American democracy abound. Speci¤c recommendations are only provided in the vaguest form, however: The
nature of the state would be irrelevant if only we would be ruled by the original laws of humankind (no. 67, 309). It is never made clear what these laws
might be. Those who seek more clarity in Universal Sketches will be disappointed. Once again, the high status of the poet, the centrality of religion,
and the role of the family are emphasized. It is only in Christendom or Europe
that a historical dimension is introduced, in the shape of medieval Europe.
As many have remarked, this dimension is in reality no more than a facade. Novalis’s portrait of the Middle Ages is no less idealized than his image
of monarchy. It is a plea for belief and art set against skepticism and critical
thinking, formulated in the hope that the Golden Age (CoE, 745), the “holy
time of eternal peace” (750), will not forever remain a dream. Surely it is no
accident that the words “childlike” and “childish“ appear on the ¤rst few
pages, linked to such words as “trust,” “dream,” and “innocence.” On the
path to true humanity, one must rid oneself of the trappings of everyday reality, and this can be most easily accomplished by children—or the “childlike,” e.g., the artist—who have not yet been entwined in a web of pragmatic
considerations.7 This smacks of escapism, but it is only one facet of the essay.
Novalis is not blind to the conditions that led to the Reformation (clerical
laxity and decadence, for example), and he also does not condemn outright
the forces of revolution active in his own time. He recognizes that the old
politics will no longer suf¤ce, so he proposes a compromise, namely religion
as mediator between the political adversaries. His description of the two
camps is of no little interest here:
The old world and the new are battling each other, the de¤ciencies and insuf¤ciencies of the previous state institutions have become obvious in the form
of terrible phenomena. . . . Both sides have great, necessary claims which they
must make, driven by the spirit of the world and of humankind. Both are indestructible powers in the human breast; here the reverence toward the ancient,
the devotion to that which has evolved over time, the love for the monuments
of the forefathers and for the glorious old national family, and friends of obedience; there the rapturous feeling of freedom, the boundless expectation of
grand areas of activity, the pleasure in the new and the young, the casual contact
with all fellow citizens, the pride in the general validity of humanity, the enjoy-
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ment of personal rights and of common property, and the powerful sentiment
of citizenship. (CoE, 748)8

This is anything but a conservative manifesto, but it does not stand alone.
When one reads that nature (“so wondrous and incomprehensible, so poetic
and endless”—742) resists all attempts to “modernize” it, and that it is foolish to attempt to “model” history and humanity (744), one wonders if the
holder of such views and the author of the just-quoted passage are one and
the same.
Taken as a whole, Christendom or Europe is a confusing conglomerate
bound to frustrate those who would divine one single thrust from it. In one
regard, however, it is possible to establish a line of continuity from the earlier
aphorisms and observations to this work. Once again, it is the Germans who
have been chosen to implement the highest aspirations of the human race. It
is in Germany, Novalis proclaims, that signs of a new world (744) can already
be discerned, whereas the other European lands are still involved in useless
disputes. These disputes are “war, ¤nancial speculation, and partisanship”
(744). The Germans, in contrast, are occupied with history, the arts, and science, and their endeavors are blessed with “an incomparable diversity, a wonderful profundity. . . , broad knowledge, and a rich fantasy” (745). Marx
could have been thinking of these words when he wrote his “Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right” in 1843 (although his assessment of Germany’s lot
was quite different). There is no doubt that Novalis was idealizing his countrymen, but he was far from nationalist chauvinism. We will never know
whether he would have gone in this direction if he had lived until 1815. It was
left to others to interpret his fragmentary and often cryptic writings.
The process of interpretation—sometimes reencryption—has been
evolving for almost two centuries. Hermann Kurzke has convincingly demonstrated that the use and abuse of Novalis for various kinds of conservative
causes is based on a fundamental—whether intentional or not—misreading, one that ignores the utopian impulse of his writings. Even Kurzke,
though, admits that the unsystematic nature of Novalis’s œuvre lends itself
to misinterpretation: The fascination with the irrational is not an end in
itself (it is subordinated to the recreation of a Golden Age), but it must be
seen as one of the many building blocks of later fascist or totalitarian ideologies.9 From a liberal perspective, this has been con¤rmed but excused as the
product of a mainly poetic mind-set.10 From an orthodox Marxist perspective, Novalis is a minor player in the wave of irrationalism that swept Europe
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for over a century.11 In the standard collection of the political writings of the
German Romantics, Novalis appears as a utopian dreamer who refused to
participate in traditional politics—in contrast to some of his contemporaries, who served the cause of restoration rather than utopia.12 This debate will
doubtless continue for some time. For our purposes, it is perhaps most important to place emphasis on two points. First of all, Novalis chose—after
the rejection of Belief and Love—to ignore the possibility of political activity
or change in the framework of the system that existed in his own time. Second, when he did ponder the nature of society and history, he did not separate such themes from his identity as a poet. Since the poet, as we have seen,
was placed at the pinnacle of the cultural and social hierarchy, his views were
meant to be prescriptive. This is a model that can be encountered again and
again in the evolution of modern German culture.
The literary periods following Romanticism contributed little to the genesis of twentieth-century cultural conservatism. This is clearly the case with
regard to the representatives of “Junges Deutschland” or the “Vormärz,” but
it also holds true for the “Biedermeier,” a time generally described as conservative. Even a work like Adalbert Stifter’s voluminous novel Indian Summer
(1857), an attempt to defend ethics and idealism against the encroachment of
a modern age characterized by industrialism, materialism, and urbanization,
was ultimately too escapist and quietistic.13 The proponents of “Poetic Realism” in the second half of the nineteenth century vacillated between rather
mild social criticism and resignation. Not surprisingly, then, the next torchbearer was a not really a literary ¤gure at all, but rather a philosopher who occasionally wrote poetry, namely Friedrich Nietzsche. One must of course
speak not of Nietzsche, but of the many Nietzsches.14 It is dif¤cult to dispute
the fact that Nietzsche in¶uenced almost everyone to some degree,15 but, as
in the case of Novalis, many readers—and a number of nonreaders as well16—
selected certain ideas and simply ignored others. Like Stifter, Nietzsche was
reacting to inchoate mass society, albeit in a diametrically opposed manner.
His extreme individualism, loathing for conformity, and preference for an
existence on the margins of society were the products of a combative, not
quiescent nature. Instead of dedicating himself to the preservation of the
artifacts and practices of an idealized past, he chose to construct a mode of
thinking and living appropriate to the future—as he envisioned it. It is not
immediately apparent how the parameters of such a project would jibe with
conservatism.
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According to Lukács, Nietzsche’s “whole life’s work was a continuous
polemic against Marxism and socialism.”17 This was carried out in a rather
roundabout manner, since, as Lukács himself points out, Nietzsche did not
read Marx. Said polemic was directed in general terms toward anything that
might promote democracy and hinder the rule of the elite. The “democratic
movement” is seen as the “heir of the Christian movement,”18 and Christianity was the target of Nietzsche’s most biting comments. This religion,
with its “resentment against life” and its promotion of guilt and the “herd
animal morality,”19 was his mortal enemy. One dilemma for most conservative readers is already clear: the critique of democracy and socialism must be
divorced from the rejection of the Christian religion. The masses must also
be convinced that the “master’s morality” must guide the cultural and societal elite, whereas they themselves will have to submit to the tenets of the
“slave morality.” No mean feat!
One method of uniting the elite and the masses would be to place them
under the umbrella of the nation or “Volk.” This was unexpectedly successful in 1914, for example. Nietzsche’s works are, once again, of limited usefulness for such an endeavor. He castigated the cultural decline that
accompanied the economic and political ascendancy of the Reich, lamented
the “nationalistic squandering of power” after 1871,20 termed Goethe, the
country’s greatest writer, “not a German event, but a European one,”21 often
boasted of his purported ancestors in the Polish aristocracy, and spent extended periods of time abroad. He did, however make a disturbing connection between the democratization of Europe and a “physiological process”
by which the Europeans would become more alike, gradually losing their
ties to the milieu and conditions that had molded them for centuries.22 This
could easily be read as a warning against racial mixing and a justi¤cation for
ethnocentrism, but it is not a major theme found in a number of his works.
The question remains: Which Nietzsche mesmerized German conservative
writers—and not a few of their left-leaning colleagues as well?
There seem to be two answers to this. First of all, especially in the years before the First World War, the incomparable aura surrounding Nietzsche was
attributable less to his writings than to his life. It was as “an exemplary personality”23 that he had the most impact. He became known as the ultimate rebel,
the outsider utterly disgusted with the trappings of bourgeois society—and
one willing to forego the comforts and perquisites of that society. He was part
of European decadence, but he strove to overcome it. The “generation of
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1914,” disgusted with the self-satisfaction of the establishment and the unheroic nature of life, felt a strong af¤nity with him (or at least with the myth of
his life that was being created). When he taught that destruction was not to be
feared, but welcomed as a liberation of creative energies, this was what
many—especially the young—wanted to hear. The danger inherent in praising the “proud and well-developed human being” and in the same breath detesting the misguided intercession on behalf of “all that is weak, sick, failure,
suffering from itself—all that ought to perish”24 only became apparent much
later. Secondly, Nietzsche, like Novalis, placed the elite intellectual—whether
in his manifestation as philosopher or artist/poet—on a pedestal. (The fact
that Nietzsche rejected Romanticism in his later years does not mean that he
bade farewell to this particular aspect.) Those who felt a similar calling within
themselves could ¤nd ample vindication for their strivings in his works. Beginning with the early formulation in the Birth of Tragedy (“[I]t is only as an
aesthetic phenomenon that existence and the world are eternally justi¤ed”25),
and continuing until the very end (“Art is the great stimulus to life”26 ),
Nietzsche outlined the contours of a new aristocracy. A number of Germans
felt that they deserved to be given an entry in the Gotha of that select group.
One of the ¤rst was the poet Stefan George (1868–1933). In contrast to
the creator of Zarathustra, who did not recruit “believers” and feared that he
would be “canonized,”27 George cultivated the image of the prophet and endeavored to surround himself with a circle of disciples. One observer chose
the adjective “zarathustraähnlich” (similar to Zarathustra)28 to describe him.
In his poem “Nietzsche,” George refers to his mentor as the “thunderer,” the
“redeemer,” and even the Christ-like leader (“führer mit der blutigen krone”).
Adulation does not preclude criticism, however: Nietzsche’s solitude is contrasted with George’s own need to be surrounded by a group, and the philosopher’s preference for polemics over poetry is lamented.29 The differences
between the two can be attributed at least in part to the changing times.
Whereas Nietzsche lived during the most bombastic and self-congratulatory
phase of the Kaiserreich, George came of age in a period when symptoms of
the crisis that would lead to the outbreak of the First World War were dif¤cult
to overlook. Initially, George dealt with these symptoms from an exclusively
esthetic perspective—to such a great extent, in fact, that he has been termed
the ultimate practitioner of the “esthetic evaluation of social conditions.”30
George’s career is usually divided into two parts. During the ¤rst phase,
which lasted until the beginning of the twentieth century, he pursued a pro-
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gram of pure estheticism borrowed mainly from Baudelaire and Mallarmé.
Traversing Europe in search of poetic perfection and kindred spirits, he
strove to renew German as a language of beauty. (It can hardly be denied that
this project was a necessary one, since German poetry in the late Wilhelminian era was wallowing in an imitative backwater.) Due to the efforts of
George, his sometime collaborator Hugo von Hofmannsthal, and others,
German poetry did regain its former status. This proved to be merely a prelude to a broader cultural mission, however. The purely artistic group originally associated with the journal Art News (Blätter für die Kunst) was
transformed into a fellowship dedicated to a general cultural renewal. The
shift is re¶ected in the title of the new journal Yearbooks for the Spiritual
Movement (Jahrbücher für die geistige Bewegung), which appeared from
1910 to 1912. Art was supplanted by a much more ambitious reformational
thrust. A new aristocracy was to transform society by means of high culture.
After a quasi-religious episode involving the worship of young Maximilian
Kronberger as an incarnation of beauty, youth, and the Hellenic ideal—an
episode that scandalized many—George and his circle worked to lay the
groundwork for a new heroic age set in opposition to degeneracy, democracy,
and materialism. Their ideology of “power, service, fellowship, and empire”31
was not meant to be overtly political, but it was undeniably interpreted that
way by those youthful sympathizers who volunteered in 1914 to demonstrate that they were worthy to serve.
George himself did not come out in favor of the war, but he did not denounce it publicly either. His long 1917 poem “War” (“Der Krieg”) composed in typically hermetic language, is a mirror of this ambivalence. On the
one hand, the prophet (“Seher”) declares that the war is merely the external
manifestation and culmination of those currents that only he was capable of
feeling. He also shows no enthusiasm for “domestic [i.e., German] virtue”
and no disdain for “foreign treachery.”32 In both camps, he asserts, no one
senses what is at stake, since both are preoccupied with petty concerns. The
only shimmer of hope lies in the reception of the prophet’s message about a
future on a higher level of being. Unfortunately, the sublimity of the message is marred by a reference to the desecration of the blood and the warning
that those who engage in it deserve to be exterminated—unless they are redeemed by the actions of the elite.33
Even though these lines were written over eighty years ago, it is still
chilling to read them in light of what was to follow. After 1918, George came
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to believe that the Germans, having been cleansed by defeat, were the only
people capable of transcending the abominations of the modern age (including feminism and plutocracy). Is this not a modern version of Novalis’s
dreams for then-“backward” Germany?34 As has often been pointed out,
George was anything but a Nazi (although his elitist rejection of National
Socialism had more to do with his disdain for vulgarity and the unwashed
masses than with morality or politics).35 To his credit, he refused to be associated in any way with the NSDAP, turning down the presidency of the “Poets’ Academy” in the Prussian Academy of Arts and choosing to die abroad.
He was also untainted by anti-Semitism, although it is ironic that his Jewish
disciples tended to be more German than the Germans themselves when it
came to glorifying Germany’s cultural mission. The antidemocratic bias of
his circle—which included a streak of anti-Americanism,36 common to
most of the sworn enemies of the Weimar Republic—doubtless contributed
to the climate that facilitated Hitler’s seizure of power. In the end, he was one
of the many who were used by the Nazis and then discarded as soon as real
power was within reach.37 George did not have to reconsider the rami¤cations of his political naiveté, as he died before the fascist atrocities reached
their peak (just as Novalis did not see the rise of German nationalism and
Francophobia and Nietzsche did not experience World War I ¤rsthand).
Three of the writers considered in the next section did live long enough to
engage in retrospective reevaluation.
One of the major reference points for contemporary Germany’s New
Right is the so-called Conservative Revolution. This movement, once considered a historical footnote to the rise of Nazism, has received much attention in recent years. The ongoing attempts to rehabilitate its representatives
and divorce its ideas from the Third Reich will be discussed in chapter 2 of
this study. At this juncture, a pro¤le of four major authors will be presented.
The term itself was ¤rst used by Thomas Mann in his Russian Anthology of
1921, after the struggle of conservative intellectuals against the Weimar Republic had begun. In his analysis of Nazism, Karl Dietrich Bracher delineates the cultural and political parameters of a world view to which a rather
heterogeneous collection of individuals adhered:
. . . the topos of the incomparable uniqueness and higher quality of German nationalism, its anti-Western mission in the battle against the supposedly subversive effect of liberalism and capitalism with regard to state and community,
against miscegenation and emancipation, international socialism, paci¤sm,
and bourgeoisi¤cation.38
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These are the marching orders for the cultural variant of the infamous German “special path” (Sonderweg), which left its indelible stamp on the course
of the twentieth century.39 The outlines of this path were discernible in the
late nineteenth century, but it was the experience of World War I that
brought them to the forefront. In the course of that war, an extended essay
on literature and politics was written, one that amazed not only many readers, but also the author himself.
When the guns of August sounded, Thomas Mann was a well-respected
writer and ¤nancially secure member of the upper middle class. Up until that
time, he had been known as the quintessential homme de lettres, albeit one
who enjoyed a level of material prosperity rarely seen in literary circles. His
emergence as a tribune of German nationalism—not the only one from the
intellectual elite, to be sure—had two root causes. First of all, he was appalled
by the vicious propaganda unleashed by the Allies against Germany. This
propaganda in effect situated the homeland of Dürer, Goethe, and Beethoven beyond the pale of civilized (i.e., Western) society. Secondly, Mann’s
older brother Heinrich, especially in his essay “Zola” (1915), criticized the
excessive chauvinism of the Germans in general and (without naming him
directly) of Thomas Mann in particular. The Francophile Heinrich not only
advocated the politicization of literature, castigated “capitalist militarism”
and agitated against the tyranny of the “ultra-patriotic good-for-nothings,”
he also expressed his disgust for those “creatures of luxury” who live mainly
the life of the soul and de¤ned estheticism as “a product of hopeless times,
hopeless states.”40 Such epithets were directed not only at Thomas: they were
also an exercise in self-criticism, since Heinrich had espoused estheticism,
monarchism, and anti-Semitism well into the 1890s. At the time, no one
could have imagined that the author of venomous tracts against Jews, liberals, socialists, and suffragettes would later become the leading spokesman of
the German literary left.41 His more famous brother went through a similar
(but not identical) transformation, but it occurred much later. On the way,
he penned the Re¶ections of a Nonpolitical Man (Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen).42
As a writer, the extremely erudite Thomas Mann had much to say. Unfortunately, he also tended to say too much. In the case of the Re¶ections,
there are mitigating circumstances, however. This book was less of a literary
exercise than a kind of exorcism. The author had reached a crossroads, and
the inability to choose a future direction led to a personal crisis, one that was
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exacerbated by the war. Mann describes the process of writing the Re¶ections
as a “more than two-year intellectual military service” (1). If he suffered ill
effects from the war, they lay mainly in the inability to create imaginative
works. He thus describes his long essay as an “artist’s work” as opposed to a
“work of art” (2). His thoughts are directed to a speci¤c audience, namely
the “educated bourgeois public sphere” (11), meaning that he is engaging in
a dialogue with the intellectual elite of the nation. Most of this elite—including such imposing ¤gures as the philosopher Max Scheler, the economist Werner Sombart, the philosopher and sociologist Georg Simmel, and
Rudolf Eucken, winner of the 1908 Nobel Prize for Literature—was clearly,
even rabidly in favor of the war. Thomas Mann was no different—or was he?
This self-described “child of the nineteenth century” engaged in a lifelong dialogue with the icons of that era, namely “Romanticism, nationalism, middle-class culture and identity (“Bürgerlichkeit”), music, pessimism,
and humor” (13–14). There are obviously some icons missing from this list,
e.g., industrialization, the idea of progress, and revolution—and that is not
an oversight on Mann’s part: these are phenomena that not only do not belong to his world, but even militate against it. The opposing forces are masterfully portrayed in the 1901 novel Buddenbrooks, where the author’s
sympathies clearly lie with the older, humanistically educated middle class
(Bildungsbürgertum). This stratum is doomed by the rise of the new entrepreneurs, the poorly educated parvenus.43 One could say that Mann never
truly accepted the inevitability of this process, even though he was capable
of accurately portraying it. In the Re¶ections, he attempted a tour de force:
the already marginalized “old” bourgeoisie was to be put forward as one of
the bulwarks of the nation. Since it did not produce the weapons of mass destruction needed for modern warfare, it had to produce something less tangible, albeit equally necessary, i.e., ideology. The necessary prerequisite for
this enterprise was the bridging of the gap between culture and politics
(“Geist und Macht”) in Germany (246, 281). To effect this, Mann pursues
a two-pronged strategy.
On the one hand, he becomes a mouthpiece for some of the most distasteful propaganda and prejudice gushing forth from Germany at the
time. He has no trouble justifying the violation of Belgian sovereignty
(142, 178), he stands behind unlimited submarine warfare and has no
sympathy for the victims of the sinking of the Lusitania (330, 417, 445),
wishes for a Europe disgusted by “Negro-like sybaritism” (480),44 deplores
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the in¶uence of the Jews (443, 462, 520), recommends the feudal system
(!) as an appropriate bulwark against the West (426), and even offers some
inane biologistic prattle concerning the drop in the German birth rate as
a direct result of the in¶ux of Western “civilization” into Germany (577–
578). Should one laugh or cry when one reads that in 1876, the year in
which German fertility reached its peak, “there lived in Germany Bismarck, Moltke, Helmholtz, Nietzsche, Wagner, Fontane” (578)? Mann
does not hesitate to leave behind the bastions of high culture in search of
allies, as evidenced by his praise for Houston Stewart Chamberlain, the
British-German advocate of Aryan superiority (554) and his multiple references to the middle-brow fanatic Paul de Lagarde, one of the founders of
the Volkish movement.45 It is shocking enough that Mann would lower
himself to de Lagarde’s level, but even more incredible that he would term
him one of the great men of Germany, on the same plane as Nietzsche and
Wagner (268). These passages can surely be regarded as the absolute nadir
of Mann’s career.
On the other hand, the titanic struggle against Western democracy and
civilization that makes up the bulk of the Re¶ections is a half-hearted effort
at best. Even though considerable polemical energy is expended countering
the alleged “stulti¤cation” (Verdummung) of the Germans and their transformation into “social and political [as opposed to cultural] animals” in the
process of “de-Germanization” (264), Thomas Mann does not really believe
that Germany will win the war. He hastens to distance himself from bloodthirsty “war panegyrists” like D’Annunzio, emphasizing that, far from propagating war, he seeks to support the German people in this con¶ict that has
become its fate (569).46 (A similar mentality was equally alive and well during World War II, long after Mann had rid himself of it.) The fate of the
masses, especially of the troops at the front, is not the main concern, however. The real motivation behind much of Mann’s rhetoric is the fear that the
coming of democracy will inevitably lead to a culture of mediocrity and with
it to the end of the privileged status of the elites. When Mann warns of the
demise of the “great man,” it is signi¤cant that he inserts an excerpt from a
poem by Stefan George in which it is asserted that the “noblest of the noble”
only ¶ourish in Germany (357). Those who ask wherein this nobility might
lie can ¤nd the answer in Mann’s vision of the peoples of postwar Europe.
He imagines an exchange of material and spiritual goods among “the handsome Englishman, the polished Frenchman, the humane Russian and the
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wise German” (481; my emphasis). In this same passage, Mann also dreams
of a time when his soul will be “cleansed of politics” (481). Now we have
come full circle—back to the “nonpolitical man” of the title. The higher
pursuits of the human race have been assigned to the Germans (actually: the
German elites), and the nature and organization of life in society are mere
bagatelles that distract them from their sublime mission. By the end of the
Re¶ections, Mann has retracted almost everything, denying that he is a militarist or nationalist, even claiming that he is not a conservative (577)—after
he has argued at length that conservative Russia (as represented by Dostoevsky) is the only true soul mate of Germany. At least Mann did not become
afraid of his own courage, as the Germans say. After he had ¤nished his military service with the pen, he shocked everyone and dismayed his erstwhile
comrades by transforming himself into perhaps the most prominent supporter of the Weimar Republic.
The nature of this transformation is thrown into relief in the 1922
public address “On German Democracy.”47 In a preface written after the
fact, Mann declares that he has not had a change of heart. In the speech
itself, he repeats this claim, choosing language close to that of Martin
Luther: “I retract nothing. I do not take back anything substantial” (829).
He had of course already done so in the Re¶ections. (Perhaps he thought that
very few Germans had actually read all six hundred pages of that work!) “On
German Democracy” is dedicated to the author Gerhart Hauptmann on his
sixtieth birthday. Hauptmann had received the Nobel Prize for Literature in
1912, and Mann addresses him here as a “people’s king . . . a king of the republic” (812). This is not exactly what one would expect in a text designed
to make democracy appealing to the German people. In fact, the main
witness called by Mann to defend the idea of democracy is none other
than the Romantic Novalis, a “special kind of royalist” who believed that
there could be no king without a republic and vice versa (812). There is
also praise for Stefan George, who has, according to Mann, transcended
his Francophile origins and become a “purely national affair” (814). The
Social Democrat president of the republic, Friedrich Ebert, is given the title “father” (i.e., of the nation), but there is no doubt that Mann wishes
to provide his listeners primarily, yet again, with an apotheosis of the
writer. Literature is, he asserts, “a heroic act, a sancti¤ed life, an overcoming of human frailty, a renunciation of everything conventional and a
struggle against it” (823). In a strangely undemocratic manner, then,
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Mann has set himself up as a prophet, one who now must preach the doctrine of democracy, a sort of brainwashed Zarathustra. In this role, he
actually does criticize Nietzsche: the master race, the blond beast, and the
rejection of Christianity are now outdated (836). More signi¤cantly, war
is rejected as a basis of nationalism. If the Germans are to save the remnants of their national identity, they must, according to Mann, posit as its
essence not the “mystical-poetical” element of war, but a “cult of peace”
(816). It took no little courage to utter such sentiments in a chaotic time,
and Mann risked his prestige as a prominent cultural ¤gure by doing so.
One cannot ignore the fact, however, that he couched his remarks in such
a way as to make them absolutely inaccessible to the majority of the German
people. The symbiotic brew of Hellenic culture, Goethe, Novalis, Nietzsche,
and even Walt Whitman that was to yield a “Third Reich of religious
humanity under the aegis of Eros” (846–847)48 could hardly have held an
attraction for the disoriented masses thirsting for a way out of the postVersailles dilemma.
The Re¶ections remain controversial to this day, and this can be attributed to a great extent to the international recognition of Mann as a central
¤gure of world literature in the twentieth century. One observer believes
that the book is not a document of the Conservative Revolution,49 whereas
another ¤nds it very signi¤cant because of Mann’s conscious effort to defend
his conservatism while distancing himself from the “radical right.”50 The author of a monumental biography of Mann characterizes the “innermost essence” of the Re¶ections as “the announcement of the revolt of irrationality
that was to hurl Germany and Europe into the abyss.”51 The debate will
doubtless continue for years to come.
Another text, the one that contributed greatly to the popularization of
the term Conservative Revolution, has remained relatively unknown, at
least beyond literary circles.52 It was thus something of a sensation when, in
1997, German of¤cials from the Of¤ce for the Protection of the Constitution not only referred to the author of this text as the originator of the Conservative Revolution, but did so in the context of a report about right-wing
radicalism in today’s Germany.53 They were referring to a speech entitled
“Literature as the Spiritual Sphere of the Nation” that was given by the Austrian author Hugo von Hofmannsthal (1874–1929) at the University of
Munich in 1927. Can one imagine the creator of Everyman and Der Rosenkavalier and cofounder of the Salzburg Festival as an extremist?
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If one reads Hofmannsthal’s speech after ¤nishing Mann’s Re¶ections, the
¤rst impression is that the tone and temperament are quite different. Mann is
aggressive, combative, and irritated. A cultural manifesto is juxtaposed with a
personal vendetta. None of this is evident in Hofmannsthal’s 1927 speech, delivered just two years before the author’s death. This is an end point, not a
phase in intellectual development. Hofmannsthal, an esthete and precocious
poet in his youth (Stefan George had attempted without success to win him
over for his project of elitist cultural renewal), had gradually turned toward
“the idea of Austria” as a model for cultural dialogue, cross-fertilization, and
reconciliation. It has not escaped most observers that much of that “idea” was
the stuff of myth, but to this day, many Austrians do not share that assessment.
During the early years of World War I, Hofmannsthal produced some pieces
of patriotic propaganda that were totally out of character for a polyglot reader
and critic of world literature.54 The outcome of the war signaled the end of the
old Greater Austria—the one that he had hoped would be a model for all of
Europe. He became increasingly conservative and resigned to the eclipse of
long-held dreams. The only antidote to resignation was to transfer previous visions from the political to the cultural—especially literary—sphere.
In 1923, Hofmannsthal edited a German Reader, a selection of prose
written between 1750 and 1850. At the beginning of his preface, he offered
a justi¤cation for this project that speaks volumes about the construction of
German identity:
It is not insigni¤cant whether or not a nation possesses a keen literary conscience, and this is especially true for our nation, for we do not have a history
that could bind us together. As recently as the sixteenth century, there were no
deeds and suffering shared by all parts of the people, and even the cultural heritage that stands behind the suffering and could turn it into a common possession is not a common heritage. The distant past, that of the Middle Ages, is too
hazy: old fairy tales cannot bind a nation together. It is only in literature that
we ¤nd our physiognomy. Behind every individual face that gazes upon us
meaningfully and honestly, the enigmatic face of the nation appears.55

As so often in German56 history, the clearest contrast can be found in France,
and Hofmannsthal speaks admiringly of the self-awareness of the French,
whose language has a legitimate claim to global supremacy. This was rather
daring at a time when Germany’s eternal enemy (“Erbfeind”) was reaping
the bene¤ts of the hated Treaty of Versailles. In “Literature as the Spiritual
Sphere of the Nation,” the comparison with France once again is a central
component in the analysis of the German condition.
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Neither in the preface to the Reader nor in the speech does one ¤nd a
call to imitate the French model, however. Just as the French have created a
culture that is suitable for this “most gregarious of nations,”57 a culture that
meshes well with their skepticism and orientation toward the here and now
(394), the Germans must strike out on their own. Their primary focus, according to Hofmannsthal, is not the national society, but instead “the refutation of the societal” (397). The “deepest of instincts” counters the mixing
of the life of the mind and the life in society in Germany (395). One must
keep in mind that this instinct holds sway exclusively in an elite of “seekers”
who realize that Germany is a nation with a “tragic bent” (400). The impossibility of constructing a civil society founded upon instinct and the tragic
apparently did not occur to Hofmannsthal. He puts forth Nietzsche as a
prototypical seeker who rails against the super¤ciality of the half-educated
philistines. The danger, as portrayed here, lies in the possibility that the Germans might lose their “originality” and their dreams (392).58 If limited to
the cultural sphere, this view might well merit serious discussion. Amazingly, Hofmannsthal goes on—despite what he has said previously—to link
reverie with the political. An individual ¤gure who emerges from the
“chaos” with a claim to the of¤ces of teacher and leader (“Lehrerschaft und
Führerschaft”) begins to recruit comrades for his “crusade” (401). This
¤gure is not only a true German, but also an “absolutist” with a “titanic”
project. He (a “she” would be inconceivable in this context) has a “dangerously hybrid nature” capable of love and hate, teaching and seduction (402).
Anyone who has read these citations—but not the entire text—might think
of Hitler, who was already a force on the national scene when the speech was
written. Hofmannsthal does speak of a “prophet,” but this prophet is also a
poet who intuitively understands the “healing power of language” (401–
402). That description ¤ts a Stefan George better than a Hitler. The image
of the prophet eventually gives way to a vision of various elite groups (together more in a spiritual sense than a physical one) who can see into the future, embodying the “[instinctually] perceptive, premonitory German
essence” (406).59 We are now on dangerous ground. Where might this intentionally irrational crusade lead?
If Thomas Mann sought to make democracy attractive to his conservative audience by tracing it back to Novalis and Romanticism, Hofmannsthal chose a very different strategy. Although he did not deny that both the
Storm and Stress movement of the 1780s and Romanticism were important
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initiatives, he distanced himself from these predecessors. He rejected the
“confusing hodgepodge of conceptual ephemera” and the “cult of feeling”
and was especially critical of the “irresponsible nature” of the ¤rst Enlightenment critics (407–408). He called for a “stricter, more manly behavior”
and declared that the new seekers were not searching for freedom, but
rather commitment (408). Instead of ¶eeing from life, as the Romantics
did, he proclaimed, life is not worth living without “valid ties” (411). At
this point in the speech, the listeners must have been at the edge of their
seats. Would Hofmannsthal announce a new political movement? Would
he declare his allegiance to an existing grouping? In the end, neither happened. The speaker chose to forego concrete proposals, although it is clear
that his conclusions could only appeal to one part of the political spectrum.
Referring disparagingly to the “convulsions” of the Enlightenment era, he
glori¤ed opposition to the Reformation and the Renaissance, an opposition
that he named “a conservative revolution” (413). Even though he referred
to the goal of such a movement as “a new German reality,” there was nothing innovative about it. Like Novalis before him, Hofmannsthal looked
back to the medieval period for inspiration. In actuality, his antimodernist
fantasies were so hopelessly vague that they precluded any union of culture
and politics in the turbulent 1920s. It was left to other, more practically oriented Germans to use his terminology and promotion of German alterity
as a facade for an upheaval that led not to the elevation, but the destruction
of the old cultural elite. The case of Hofmannsthal demonstrates that
encyclopedic learning and cosmopolitanism are no guarantee against selfdelusion and political naiveté.60 It is worthy of mention that this cosmopolitanism had an unexpected, but not inexplicable lacuna. In the 1920s,
Hofmannsthal did write a series of articles for the American magazine The
Dial, but he claimed at the very beginning of his 1927 speech that the
United States was nothing like Europe. To him, it was an outwardly powerful young state lacking both an inner sense of spiritual community and a
historically rich language transcending everyday communication. There is
no doubt that an attitude like this contributed to the German elite’s rejection
of Enlightenment rationality and political democracy. It would be exaggerated, however, to assert that Hofmannsthal “popularized” the Conservative
Revolution.61 After the war, he was too isolated to exert lasting in¶uence. It
was a charismatic ¤gure from the next generation who was destined to take
center stage.
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The generational dimension appears to be a decisive one vis-à-vis the degree of ferocity with which the conservative cultural critics attacked the Weimar Republic. It has been maintained that Hofmannsthal’s image of his time
was dominated by the impression that the individual was increasingly helpless
in the face of entities and mechanisms beyond his control.62 This may well
have been a feeling characteristic of most of his contemporaries, who had
grown up in a relatively stable world. The “angry young men” (once again,
women are peripheral to this phenomenon) that followed were born into societies already marked by signs of crisis. The representative of that group who
deserves our attention here is Ernst Jünger (1895–1998). Placing Hofmannsthal in a line that leads to Jünger is misleading at best.63 The younger man’s involvement in the events of his age was much more intimate, especially in the
military sphere. George did not serve in uniform, and neither Thomas Mann
nor Hofmannsthal experienced combat,64 but Jünger was one of the most
highly decorated German soldiers in World War I. He not only spent extended periods at the front, but also went on to mythologize his experiences
in several books. These writings, from Storm of Steel (1920) and Battle as an
Inner Experience (1922) to Copse 125 (1925), Fire and Blood (1925), Total Mobilization (1931), and beyond, shaped his public image as a writer, even
though many volumes were to follow. This observer has great dif¤culty casting an impartial eye on the man who demonstrated a keen intelligence, gift for
language, and ruthlessness bordering on barbarism in these early works. Having said that, I should provide some examples of what disturbs me the most.
Already in the preface to Storm of Steel, Jünger takes a position of great
distance from the reality of war—and not only war:
Did it not seem then that life itself was speaking out of the con¤dence of its savage and visionary heart, knowing very well that in its more secret and essential
depths it had nothing to fear from even the deadliest of wars, and going its way
quite unaffected by the super¤cial interchange of peace and war? 65

On the surface of it, this is just one more expression of the “vitalist” philosophy embodied by Nietzsche and (on a more primitive level) Ludwig Klages.
There is one crucial difference, however: Jünger’s musings were not merely
academic, but rather a reaction to combat. As he goes on to say on the page
just cited, “[T]he war, for all its destructiveness, was an incomparable schooling of the heart.” This “schooling” was actually a hardening or at least a
con¤rmation of a hardness already there. Jünger, like many (mainly male, one
imagines) Europeans of his generation, felt restless in the “long period of law
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and order” and felt “a real craving for the abnormal” (21). Such sentiments
were not foreign to Hermann Hesse, for example, but he chose to spend the
war in Swiss exile. Others, like Jünger, sought out combat, only to die or to
live to regret their fantasies. Very few men with Jünger’s intelligence could
look back at life in the trenches and declare: “What is more sublime than to
face death at the head of a hundred men?” (25). There are many such noteworthy phrases in Storm of Steel that cannot be inventoried here. For our purposes it must suf¤ce to point out that the ¤nal passages praise life in the
service of ideals and posit war as “an ideal preparation for life” (282). Like
Thomas Mann, Jünger asserts that “bodily suffering always increases the sensitivity of the inner being” (280), but unlike him, he pays homage to a “feeling that dwells in the blood” (283). As an aside, one might ponder that until
1999, the German citizenship law was a ius sanguinis.
In his ¤rst book, Jünger tried to depict “the experience of war purely.”
In the second, he turned to the “psychology” of war.66 The essence of this
“psychology” is apparent in the introduction and the ¤rst chapter—entitled
“Blood.” We are told that in war, man (and in this case, the translation of
“Mensch” as man—as opposed to human being—is accurate67) makes up
for everything that he has missed out on. His drives, no longer held in check
by society and its laws, now become not only all that matters, but even
something holy.68 This sounds almost Freudian, except for one minor detail:
Jünger celebrates the “wild orgy” of instinct, whereas Freud recognizes it as
a distinct possibility and fears it. Freud feels ambivalent about the constraints placed upon individuals in the name of civilization, but Jünger absolutely revels in the “animalistic,” the unbridled “Urmensch,” the “cave
dweller” (15). No Mann or Hofmannsthal could have written such things.
It should be clear that the term “protofascistic” is meaningless if applied to
Jünger and his predecessors. The older writers, for all of their patriotism,
would hardly have praised modern warriors as “a completely new race . . .
magni¤cent predators . . . the keenest juxtaposition of the body, intelligence,
the will, and the senses” (37). When one reads that battle is “the male form
of procreation” (50), there is no doubt that the zenith (nadir?) of irrationalism has been reached. Perhaps that is an overstatement, since there were
many writers much less intelligent than Jünger who espoused such sentiments. In their cases, later enlistment in the Nazi cause was quite logical (if
one may use the term in this context). This is exactly what Jünger did not
do, and for that reason he remains a fascinating ¤gure.69
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Ernst Jünger died while this chapter was being written. There was an
astonishing number of responses to his death, and the critical literature examining his life and works ¤lls many volumes.70 The image of Jünger—especially the current one—will be examined in chapter 2 as well as in the
conclusion. He is indubitably one of the key mentors of the contemporary
intellectual New Right. As far as the nature of that mentorship is concerned, he appears to play a role similar to the one that Nietzsche played for
those born in the 1890s. His works are read, to be sure (albeit selectively),
but it is his image as an outsider that exerts the strongest attraction.71 This
is a bit paradoxical, since it is practically impossible to reconcile the stance
of the “great refuser” with enthusiastic participation in war. (Nietzsche, like
Hemingway, tended to the wounded.72) The solution to the puzzle lies in
many observers’ tendency—whether conscious or not—to concentrate primarily on Jünger’s inner life as an aristocratic observer, an elitist “Anarch,”
as he would say. His turn away from militarism, which most discern in the
World War II years, was not accompanied by an embrace of democratic principles or any sudden af¤nity with the masses. In addition, he accomplished
the impressive feat of concealing a strong anti-bourgeois animus within a
thoroughly bourgeois facade.73 In this, he was not unlike the chameleonlike François Mitterand, who congratulated him on his one hundredth
birthday.74
Before turning to the present scene, it would be instructive to contrast
Jünger with the poet Gottfried Benn (1886–1956). Although he was at least
as elitist as Jünger, Benn made a fatal miscalculation, one destined to make
him a ¤xture in studies of intellectuals and tyranny:75 He lent his considerable
reputation to the Nazi cause in 1933. Most literary scholars treat his shortterm infatuation with fascism as an aberration or a misunderstanding that did
not taint the core of his poetic production.76 There is something to be said for
this viewpoint, but by the same token, one could say that Benn also “misunderstood” Nietzsche as a prophet of pure estheticism. For all of his destructiveness, Nietzsche did believe that new ideals must be found after the overcoming
of the old, whereas Benn was too much of a nihilist to believe in the necessity
or possibility of such a project (except in 1933!). He also was capable of praising Stefan George,77 although the later George subscribed to fundamental cultural renewal in a way that was foreign to him. The procedure was the same as
the one he used when writing laudatory prose about Heinrich Mann: the early
l’art pour l’art phase was posited as a constant, rather than a stage later rejected
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by the politically engaged author.78 Such myopia had few direct consequences
beyond the republic of letters, but Benn’s blind spots or distorted vision regarding the nature of the NSDAP enhanced—albeit brie¶y—the prestige of a
regime that he himself came to despise.
On April 24, 1933, not quite two months after the burning of the
Reichstag in Berlin, Benn gave a radio speech entitled “The New State and
the Intellectuals.” The text was published the next day in the Berliner Börsenzeitung. Benn begins with a salvo against the “intellectuals,” i.e., the leftist intellectuals, who are incapable of seeing that the new system of National
Socialism is “anthropologically deeper,” since it is making the transition from
the “economic to the mythical collective.”79 (This is set up in contrast to the
Soviet Union, which is condemned as a “tyrant state” (442), following a line
of argument not unknown in the post-1945 period.) It is made very clear
that the new state has come into being in opposition to the intellectuals, and
Benn applauds that. History, he asserts, is not democratic, but “elemental,”
and it works by means of a “new biological type” (444). Nietzsche’s largely
symbolic “blond beast” has apparently become a creature of ¶esh and blood.
This beast has no need of freedom of speech, for “everything that has made
the West famous” was created in “slave states” (446–447), claims Benn. Our
striving must be directed toward the “absolute” and the “irrational,” that is,
“that which has not yet been formally destroyed by thought” [“zerdacht”]
(448–449). What is strange about such postulates is that they are juxtaposed
with sarcastic comments about those who have ¶ed the new state. These émigrés are portrayed as interested only in material possessions, e.g., villas and
Mercedes automobiles (449). Benn uses a term to describe their wealth (“das
Erraffte”—that which has been “grabbed” in a sinister manner) that was central to the Nazi polemics against Jewish capitalists. Did Benn, who was not
anti-Semitic and even defended Jewish Expressionists against Nazi cultural
functionaries, simply “misunderstand” the Nazi term? He seems to ¤t a disconcerting pattern of hyperintellectuality and selective perception of social
reality common to a certain type of German writer.
A few weeks after Benn’s polemic, one of the émigrés, Thomas Mann’s
son Klaus, responded in the form of a letter to his attacker.80 The response
was not another polemic, but rather an attempt by an “impassioned and
faithful admirer” of Benn’s works (74) to understand how a writer as great
as Benn could succumb to the lures of fascism. As Peter de Mendelssohn has
argued, when a major ¤gure errs, everyone takes notice, and such ¤gures
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cannot escape this fate.81 Klaus Mann, for one, could not imagine that
Benn, of all people, could make his peace with the barbarians:
What could have caused you to put your name—that has been for us the embodiment of high standards and a simply fanatical purity—at the disposal of
those whose lack of standards is absolutely without parallel in European history
and from whose moral impurity the world turns away with disgust? (75)

In the framework of this study, it is important to note that Klaus Mann himself—herein very much his father’s son—expresses his own sympathy with the
irrational and speaks of its “seductive power” (76). Despite this sympathy, he
reaches an insight that recalls the words of Roy Pascal cited above in the preface:
Today, it seems to be almost an inevitability that an overly strong sympathy
with the irrational leads to political reaction, if one does not really watch out.
First comes the great gesture against “civilization”—a gesture that, as I can attest, holds a strong attraction for intellectuals—; suddenly one arrives at the
cult of violence, and then in no time at Adolf Hitler. (76–77)

Mann pleads with Benn to divorce himself from “hysterical brutality,”
prophesying that the life of the mind will have no place in the Third Reich.
He was right about that, but he was wrong when he claimed that those who
did not come out unequivocally against the Nazis would “no longer” be part
of the civilized world.
Benn chose to publish Mann’s personal letter, using it as a platform to
savage the antifascist émigré community. In his “Response to the Literary
Émigrés,”82 he pre¤gured the postwar debate between those writers who left
Nazi Germany and those who chose to remain when he claimed that only
those who have experienced “German events” in Germany were capable of
comprehending them (239). He repeated his earlier views about a new man
arising from the “inexhaustible fount of the race” and declared proudly: “Of
course, this view of history is not enlightened or humanistic, but metaphysical, and my conception of man is even more so” (241). Incredibly, Benn attacked the émigrés in exactly the same manner as Thomas Mann had railed
against his “democratic” brother in his Re¶ections almost twenty years earlier,
dubbing them “amateurs of civilization and troubadours of Western
progress” (242–243). Benn had great respect for Thomas Mann, but once
again, he was able to engage in a one-sided reception of his works, ignoring
the democratic shift of the 1920s. Despite his thoroughgoing antimaterialism and alienation from the masses, he even went so far as to proclaim that
German workers were much better off than before, because the socialist
project had been put into practice in Nazi Germany (244–245). The new
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homeland (“Heimat”) was a bulwark against “the metropolis, industrialism,
and intellectualism” (246). This was dangerous nonsense, but one prophecy
did almost come true: Benn stated that the entire German people was willing
to sacri¤ce itself (“untergangsbereit”) for the Nazi cause (247).
Was all this intellectual and moral confusion the product of thought processes (muddled as they might have been), or was it nothing but opportunism? The “decadent” Benn was ostracized by the Nazi cultural functionaries
in the 1930s83 (he had already emphasized in his “Response” that he did not
belong to the NSDAP and had no relationship with its leaders), and as it became apparent that Germany would not win World War II, Benn began
searching for ways to change his image. In his autobiography, he expressed
amazement at the fact that the younger Klaus Mann had understood the nature of National Socialism better than he.84 Just the same, he pointed out that
his 1933 essay, despite being “Romantic, effusive, melodramatic,” contained
issues that were still “acute” after 1945 (74). In hardly convincing fashion (at
least from the perspective of this reader), Benn argued that he had not been
an advocate for the Nazis but instead for something akin to the self-determination of nations (80). As a witness, he called none other than Thomas
Mann, comparing his own loyalty to the German people with Mann’s patriotism in the Re¶ections (83–84). There is some truth to this, but had history
stood still since 1917? Benn portrays the artist and intellectual as one “drawn
into the maelstrom” (84). This does not prevent him, however, from criticizing the émigrés (who were, after all, artists and intellectuals themselves) for
not saving Germany from the “disaster” (90) before it was too late. The apparent belief that literary intellectuals could have preserved Weimar democracy would be comical if it were not pathetic. (Their efforts to undermine
democracy were not insigni¤cant, however.) Even after the collapse of the
Third Reich, Benn failed to come to grips with his own irrationalism or the
relationship between politics, economics, and culture.85 Despite this, he was
eventually given exalted status as a paragon of true art, one rigorously divorced from history, society, or any considerations not situated on the metaphysical plane. To be sure, this status was limited to West Germany. The
representatives of antifascist culture, those who had been vili¤ed by Benn and
other “inner émigrés,” were generally not welcome in the Western zones of
occupation.86 Many of them settled in the East, and some, like Thomas
Mann, never lived in Germany again. They were the heirs of the “other” German tradition,87 the one beyond the scope of this book.
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fter the collapse of the Third Reich, conservative writers found

themselves in a dif¤cult—and not wholly undeserved—predicament. Those who had supported the Nazi cause were banned for a
time, and those who had remained in Germany but retreated into a tenuous
“inner emigration” attempted to portray themselves as patriots and guardians of true culture. (One widely publicized dispute involved attacks on the
antifascist Thomas Mann by the relatively unknown “inner émigrés” Walter
von Molo and Frank Thiess.1) The German literary right might well have
disappeared altogether if it had not been for the Cold War. As the Soviet
Union went from wartime ally to mortal enemy of the West, anticommunism became not only acceptable, but de rigueur—long before Nikita Khrushchev’s 1956 “secret speech” about Stalinist atrocities. The course of
thoroughgoing Western orientation set by West Germany’s ¤rst chancellor,
Konrad Adenauer, allowed former Nazis to delude themselves into believing
that they had been part of a crusade to save the occidental heritage. Ironically, many of the antifascist writers who settled in the Soviet zone of occupation, later to become the German Democratic Republic, were Jewish.2
(Among them were Anna Seghers, Friedrich Wolf, Stephan Hermlin, Stefan
Heym, and Arnold Zweig.) They had avoided death in the concentration
camps, only to be declared enemies of the West by some of the same “colleagues” who had gloried in the prospect of an Aryanized German culture.
Benn’s ¤rst postwar book publication came in 1948, and Jünger was prohibited from publishing until 1949, mainly because he had refused to provide
information to the Allies in the course of de-Nazi¤cation.3 A surprising number of “second-rank” Nazi writers (if such a term is conceivable) went on to
///
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publish in West Germany, avoiding any blatantly pro-Nazi sentiments. These
included Werner Beumelburg, Hans Friedrich Blunck, Edwin Erich Dwinger,
Hanns Johst, Erwin Guido Kolbenheyer, and Kurt Ziesel, who achieved dubious postwar notoriety by accusing Günter Grass of purveying “the worst
kind of pornographic ¤lth”4 and leading a campaign against muckraker
Günter Wallraff.5 Even Hans Grimm, the author of the (in-)famous 1926
novel Volk ohne Raum (People without space), continued to publish until his
death in 1959. A group of traditional conservative writers (e.g., Hans Carossa,
Werner Bergengruen, Ernst Wiechert, Reinhold Schneider, Rudolf Hagelstange, and Gertrud von Le Fort) also formed part of the postwar literary
scene. Since they wrote mainly poetry—the least-read genre—and prose from
a religious or ethical perspective, their in¶uence was rather limited. During the
postwar reconstruction period, introspection and meditation about guilt and
personal responsibility held little attraction. As I have argued elsewhere,6 conservative literature was mainly ignored by literary scholars until the fall of the
Berlin Wall. The young West German writers who began their careers after
World War II by no means viewed themselves primarily as representatives of
the left (even in the East, “critical bourgeois humanism” was tolerated in the
immediate postwar period), but they generally had no af¤nity with fascism
and cultivated a kind of skeptical individualism.7 Af¤liations with the political
left were mainly a product of the social upheavals of the 1960s. Conservative
writers who went beyond purportedly timeless ethical humanism or literary
expressions of religious faith inhabited a cultural Diaspora for decades. When
the Diaspora came to an abrupt and unexpected end in 1989, there remained
only one inhabitant, none other than Ernst Jünger.
Up until now, we have focused on literary ¤gures. Their Weltanschauungen of course did not evolve in a vacuum, as was demonstrated with reference to Nietzsche. One could easily devote an entire chapter to the in¶uence
of Oswald Spengler’s Der Untergang des Abendlandes (The decline of the
West, 1918–22) on Thomas Mann, Jünger, and others. The same is true of
the philosopher Martin Heidegger, who not only engaged in a dialogue with
Jünger but also became a major force in postwar French culture. Of late, an
entire scholarly industry has arisen around the analysis of Heidegger’s actions and thoughts in Nazi Germany.8 The legal theorist Carl Schmitt, who
depicted Hitler as the “protector of the law” and praised the 1935 Nuremberg Laws, and the anthropologist Arnold Gehlen, “the most single-minded
theorist of counter-Enlightenment institutionalism”9 as a crutch for fragile
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human beings, are signi¤cant ¤gures as well. All four—Spengler, Heidegger,
Schmitt, and Gehlen—have the status of intellectual mentors of the post1989 New Right. This status is re¶ected in the pivotal volume The SelfCon¤dent Nation, which will be presented below. One way to broach the discussion of the relationship between literature and other areas of human inquiry is to turn to a compelling study originally written in the 1950s and
reissued after German reuni¤cation.
In 1958, Christian Graf von Krockow, who has since gone on to become
one of the most proli¤c and discussed writers on twentieth-century German
political and intellectual history, published a book entitled Decision: A Study
of Ernst Jünger, Carl Schmitt, and Martin Heidegger.10 Although this was a
scholarly book, Krockow emphasized that the “decisionism” that he described
had proved to be in error and should not be tried again (159). The “decisionism” (“Dezisionismus”) that he found in the works of the imaginative writer,
the legal theorist, and the philosopher is characterized by a separation from
material reality, a separation linked to the “general disorientation” of the German populace in the wake of late—but highly accelerated—industrialization
and its social consequences (the so-called “special path”11 ) and the lack of exemplary social and political models, especially after 1918 (5). According to
Krockow, the nineteenth-century German bourgeoisie, incapable of obtaining political power comparable to its economic in¶uence, committed “ideological class suicide” by turning against the Enlightenment principles that had
enabled it to ¶ourish (28). In order to demonstrate the extent of this phenomenon, Krockow points to the antibourgeois stance in Thomas Mann’s Re¶ections, a work by an “arch-bourgeois writer” (41).
To illustrate Jünger’s perspective, Krockow cites a phrase from Combat
as an Inner Experience: “It is not what we ¤ght for that is important, but how
we ¤ght.”12 A second, more concrete citation from the 1932 work The
Worker (Der Arbeiter) provides even more insight into Jünger’s thought processes: “The more life is led in a cynical, Spartan, Prussian or Bolshevistic
manner, the better it will be.”13 In other words, anything that contributes to
the destruction of the supposedly antivitalist bourgeois way of life is to be
welcomed, even if it is “foreign”—in the geographical and philosophical
sense of the word. Krockow discovers similar assertions in Schmitt, who
views the dichotomy of “friend and foe” as the basis of all politics. The
identi¤cation of the foe cannot be accomplished by endless parliamentary
discussions; only the leadership elite can make that determination. Even
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though Krockow traces the in¶uence of counterrevolutionary theorists like
Bonald, de Maistre, and Donoso Cortés on Schmitt, he still seems astounded that a ¤gure of such intelligence could describe dictatorship as
“true democracy” in the Germany of 1932 (65). If Heidegger offers a philosophical foundation for Jünger and Schmitt, the latter two provide an “ideological and political commentary” for the philosopher (77). By maintaining
that true history, or rather, historicity (“Geschichtlichkeit”) takes place
without regard for barren, unre¶ective everyday reality, Heidegger lends an
authoritative aura to the real actions and decisions of Jünger (e.g., the apotheosis of combat as one path to true self-knowledge) and Schmitt (the exaltation of dictatorship).
Although Krockow does not fail to mention that all three thinkers distanced themselves from their earlier positions, he is skeptical of such selfinterpretations. He ¤nds no room for objectivity in the hermit-like later
Jünger (112–115), rejects Schmitt’s revamping of irrational dictatorship
into an “enlightened, ideology-free” version à la Hobbes (106), and worries
about Heidegger’s emphasis on the special mission of the “metaphysical”
Germans caught between the technology fetishism of the Americans and the
social engineering of the Soviets (125). In the earlier and later writings of
this unlikely troika, he discovers the internal contradiction of a class that
wishes to halt developments at a certain stage and hinder the realization of
possibilities that it had once brought forth itself. Krockow’s term for this
mind-set is “conservative revolution” (157–158). He states bluntly that this
way of thinking is faced with two alternatives, neither of which bode well for
the future: “ideological ¶ight from reality” or “totalitarian terror” (159).
The postwar fantasies of the self-proclaimed elitist Jünger are one illustration of the former, whereas the latter manifested itself—albeit indirectly—
both in Schmitt’s legal work for the Nazis (who, as in the case of Benn, abandoned him later) and in Heidegger’s 1933 speech as rector of the University
of Freiburg.
Krockow’s point of view was not the only one articulated in the postwar
years. Already in 1949, Armin Mohler (b. 1920), who was Ernst Jünger’s
private secretary from 1949 to 1953, ¤nished a dissertation on the Conservative Revolution.14 It was published as a book in 1950, and it is still, after
two revised editions, the most voluminous work on the subject.15 In the
original version, Mohler criticizes the German intellectual elite for failing to
come to terms with what occurred in the ¤rst year of the Third Reich, a
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time, he claims, when it was not possible to clearly separate good from evil
(7). By this he means that the Conservative Revolution, although not without responsibility for what was to follow, was in the end distinct from National Socialism. One problem with this view is that Mohler cannot decide
what the Conservative Revolution actually was. In the 1950 preface, he provides the following de¤nition:
[T]hat movement of intellectual renewal that attempted to clean up the ¤eld of
rubble left behind by the 19th century and to create a new order in life. . . . [I]t
already began in the Age of Goethe, and it has not been interrupted by what has
happened thus far, but rather has continued on various paths. (8)

This is a vast canvas, and it is indeed stated that it is a phenomenon found not
only in Germany, but also in other European countries “and even in some
non-European ones” (8).16 Put this way, it is simply a reaction to modernity.
Mohler tries to be more precise by setting the French Revolution as the beginning point, but he must add that not all the counterrevolutionaries are
part of his subject, because he is interested only in those who “attack the foundations of the century of progress but do not simply want to restore some Ancien Régime.”17 It turns out that the German version is at the source after all,
not only because the intellectual roots of the entire enterprise are to be found
in the period “between Herder and German Romanticism,”18 but also because the German revolt has proved to be the most violent (14).
Mohler makes another distinction which has great relevance for the current situation in Germany: Since the Germans never saw themselves as a nation in the Western European sense—the term refers more to a “frame of
mind” (seelischer Zustand) than to politics—the struggle against the French
Revolution and the Enlightenment was also a struggle against foreign domination (“Überfremdung”) and part of a search for a German, Central European, Nordic, or Germanic identity (15). Mohler does not seem to realize
that he is walking a ¤ne line here (like the one between the symbolic blond
beast and the biologistic one): Where is the point of transition from exhibiting runic inscriptions to undertaking cranial measurements? His solution—
a questionable one—is to limit himself to the Conservative Revolution as expressed in political thought (12). This limitation unfortunately makes the
material much drier than it really is, since Mohler admits that parallel manifestations can be found “in all areas of life,” including theology, physics, music,
urban planning, family structure, bodily care, and the construction of machines (12). (How can one read this list without visualizing the Third Reich,
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with its German physics, German Christians, new cities courtesy of Albert
Speer, and emphasis on physical ¤tness?) In addition, Mohler himself asserts
that the Weltanschauung typical of this movement is not produced by philosophers, but by “a new type of author” who is “neither a pure philosopher nor
a pure poet . . . a kind of ‘poet-thinker,’ just as his language is a mixture of the
conceptual and the visual” (17). As we will see below, this title was recently
bestowed on Jünger by the New Right.
To his credit, Mohler does not avoid an essential fact: The Conservative
Revolution, this paradoxical movement of “intellectual anti-intellectualism”19
driven by the “anti-bourgeois bourgeoisie,” has few victories to its credit (19–
20). Perhaps its most impressive one to date lies in its contribution to the destruction of the Weimar Republic. Unfortunately, or rather predictably,
Mohler chooses to dodge this issue by stating that it is not the purpose of his
book “to analyze the weaknesses of the Weimar Republic.” He merely informs us that the subjects of his study did not take the republic seriously as
an “independent entity” and at times only took it be to the last gasp of the
hated Wilhelminian state (38). With such wording, Mohler unwittingly
gives up any claim to objectivity. One further example of his af¤nity with the
ideas of the Conservative Revolution deserves to be cited here. In the 1950
conclusion, which is not superseded later, he speaks of our age as an “interregnum” between the collapse of the previous uni¤ed worldview of prerevolutionary Christian Europe and a new synthesis that has yet to appear. Instead
of terming this view (which he attributes to the Conservative Revolution) a
hypothesis or theory, he simply calls it an “insight” (203–204). This is more
than an intellectual issue, for Mohler has not remained in his study in recent
years: He was an advisor of Franz Josef Strauß, the legendary head of the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU), and he has also written for right-wing
tabloids like the Deutsche National-Zeitung and the Junge Freiheit. In a 1995
interview,20 he openly expressed his sympathy with Italian and Spanish fascism. If this is the kind of new synthesis that he had in mind in 1950, his attempt to salvage the intellectual reputation of the Conservative Revolution
was at the very least disingenuous.21
A very different and for that reason possibly more disturbing book was
published in the early 1960s. Hans-Peter Schwarz, a conservative academic
with impeccable credentials, produced a monograph on Jünger with the
bland title The Conservative Anarchist: Ernst Jünger’s Politics and Cultural
Criticism.22 This monograph is a prime example of the “Yes, but . . .” school
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of criticism. Schwarz examines practically every detail of Jünger’s œuvre
through 1960, and he makes no attempt to camou¶age the most distasteful
aspects. Right at the outset, Schwarz postulates that for decades, the German reading public had considered Jünger to be the “authorized speaker for
the Zeitgeist,” a role that he did not relinquish until around 1950, when the
paths of the author and the Germans apparently separated (11, 13). After
that time, he represented only those who stood in opposition to postwar
(West) German society (13). In other words, he was transformed into a
voice of the “Ewiggestrige,” those who could not come to terms with the
German defeat. After 1945, there seemed to be few prospects of reviving the
failed project, so Jünger’s stance became that of a lonely prophet clinging to
his post in hopeless times. Schwarz speaks of a transformation from the
“militarist activist” to the “liberal, if not democratic conservative”23 (15),
but he hastens to add that this transformation did not affect the fundament
of Jünger’s thinking, namely the “deeply seated enmity of the spiritualist
metaphysician toward contemporary society” (15). This formulation lends
almost a tragic grandeur to a mode of thinking that has in reality been quite
calamitous in the context of recent German history.
Here are some of the characteristics of that thinking as elucidated by
Schwarz:
1. Transforming history into metaphysics (16).
2. A turn away from empiricism and rationality as products of the hated
nineteenth century (23).
3. A fascination with magic, witchcraft, and demonology as witnesses
to powers at work beyond our normal perception (30).
4. Plumbing the depths of existence, be it in the ecstasy of battle or
creative writing or in quiet contemplation (35).
5. Transcending of the intellect as the hindrance of the kind of holistic
experience propagated by the Romantics (42).
6. The propagation of revolutionary elites dedicated to creating the
“aristocracy of the future” (104).
7. The theoretical curiosity of a distanced observer (162).
8. Belief in a qualitative difference between the elite and the masses
(185).
9. Glori¤cation of “natural” life, small communities, patriarchal order
and autarky (186).
10. View of history from the perspective of the ruling classes (220).
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This is not a complete list, but these ten points lead inexorably to one question: Must one evaluate this worldview as mere speculation, or is one allowed to ponder its consequences for history and society? Schwarz decides,
in the end, to evade this question. He claims that Jünger was basically a
nonpolitical man who by chance wandered into the political arena in the
1920s (130). Since he is a “great writer” (126), however, Schwarz feels incapable of judging his impact on politics and society, although he does believe that there is much to learn from Jünger’s errors (242). He is absolutely
convinced that Jünger will have no successors, so he can strike a conciliatory note at the end: “Let’s take him for what he is—not a democrat, but a
gentleman with fantasy and character.24 . . . One is learning and will learn
to see him as one of the great eccentrics and outsiders of our literature”
(242, 244).25 Given this degree of sympathy for his subject, it is incredible
that Schwarz dares to call Armin Mohler an “apologist” (242). His book is
part of a pattern that can be discerned in German scholarship—and society!26—throughout this century. If a controversial ¤gure belongs even peripherally to the conservative camp, almost anything can be forgiven.
Leftist cultural ¤gures are by de¤nition suspect and often seen as foreign
elements27 in Germany. The “Literature Debate” of the 1990s, in which the
literary left was excoriated, dwarfs the controversies involving rightist authors after 1945.
A month before the ¤ftieth anniversary of the capitulation of the Nazi regime, a political advertisement appeared in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.28 The brief text began with a quote from Theodor Heuss, a liberal who
had been the ¤rst president of the Federal Republic. Heuss is quoted as saying that May 8, 1945, was “the most tragic and problematic paradox” for all
Germans. The reason was that the Germans had been “saved and destroyed”
at the same time. After the citation, whose context is not provided, the rest
of the text consists of an attack on “the media and politicians” who speak of
May 8 as a day of “liberation.” Instead, we are told, “the end of the National
Socialist reign of terror” (this is substituted for “liberation”) was also the beginning of “the terror of expulsion,” new oppression in the East, and the division of Germany. These are not new themes, but the effect of the
juxtaposition is to create a nation of victims. In the context of the advertisement, this is rather odd, because the purpose of the exercise is to create the
basis for “the self-concept of a self-aware and self-con¤dent nation,” which

Chap_two.fm Page 35 Friday, August 25, 2000 1:20 PM

Reuni¤cation and the Right’s Quest for Respectability

/// 35

the postwar Germans have allegedly yet to become. Only such a nation
could do its part, one reads, to exclude the possibility of “comparable catastrophes” in the future. Which catastrophes are meant actually? There is no
reference to the Holocaust in the text,29 only to the fate of the Germans.
Similar views had been purveyed for years, albeit mainly in small journals
and newspapers seen only by the already convinced. This particular undertaking was clearly an attempt to get out of the closet and make an impression
on the nation as a whole. The publication contains a list of dozens of signatories, two of whom are of special interest in this chapter: Ulrich Schacht
and Heimo Schwilk. Their compatriots are politicians from the Christian
Democratic Union (CDU), Christian Social Union (CSU), Free Democratic Party (FDP), German Social Union (DSU) (a new right-wing party),30
one sitting and one former cabinet minister, a former federal prosecutor, active
and retired military of¤cers, representatives of the Germans expelled from the
East in 1945, a handful of aristocrats (including Prince Ferdinand von Bismarck), and no fewer than eleven of the contributors to the anthology Die
selbstbewußte Nation, edited by Schacht and Schwilk. Readers are asked to
contribute to a so-called “Special Account for Democracy” care of Heimo
Schwilk. Aside from the former East German dissident Siegmar Faust, none of
the other representatives of the literary sphere have any name recognition.
What is unusual about this action is that two conservative literati, Schacht and
Schwilk, played a major role in its organization. This would have been inconceivable before 1989, and it harks back to the Weimar Republic.
This has not remained an isolated incident.31 On May 5, 1995, another
advertisement appeared in the Frankfurter Allgemeine, decrying the fact that
a memorial service planned for May 7, with Christian Democrat Alfred
Dregger as the keynote speaker, had had to be canceled due to “an aggressive
[defamation] campaign by the leftist media.” The ¤ve signatories, once
again including Schacht and Schwilk, celebrated a sort of victory in defeat,
claiming that one of their main goals, namely to break through the allencompassing rhetoric about the “liberation,” had been accomplished.
They also stated that they had had expressions of support from all sectors of
German society. Their struggle for “freedom of thought” would continue
despite defamation campaigns, they assured their adversaries. The word
“selbstbewußt” (self-aware, self-con¤dent) is used twice in this brief passage.
The group took an almost identical line in yet another advertisement placed
in the Frankfurter Allgemeine on June 10, 1995. In this case, the bone of
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contention was the image of June 17, 1953, the day on which the (or rather,
some) East Germans rose up against the Communist government and its
Soviet backers. The sponsors of the advertisement, among them Schacht
and Schwilk, called for the retention of a national holiday on June 17, railed
against deserters and paci¤sts, and linked the 1953 revolt to the 1944 plot
against Hitler. In place of Heuss, they chose to quote French historian Joseph Rovan, who believes that the East German patriots belong in the pantheon of the most important Germans. One new element here is the
portrayal of National Socialists and Communists as the enemies of democracy.32 We are thus dealing with quite an ephemeral entity here, namely a
New Right enamored of democracy and untainted by any association with
totalitarianism. Before turning to the hitherto most ambitious attempt to
set the parameters of this project, the 1994 book Die selbstbewußte Nation,
light must be shed on the intellectual development of East German poet and
essayist Ulrich Schacht and West German critic and sometime prose writer
Heimo Schwilk.
Ulrich Schacht (b. 1951) could probably not have become a “nonpolitical man” even if he had wanted to. His mother was a political prisoner in
the GDR, and he was born in the women’s prison Hoheneck in Stollberg,
Saxony. (One of his books presents the life stories of women imprisoned for
political reasons in that penal institution.33) The reason for her imprisonment was her relationship with a Soviet of¤cer, Schacht’s father, who was
sentenced to hard labor and disappeared in the Gulag. When Schacht was
seventeen, his opposition to the East German system was crystallized in
Prague, where he witnessed the crushing of the “Prague Spring” by Soviet
tanks. He became an activist in oppositional groups centered around the
Lutheran Church, and his activities led to his arrest in 1973. In 1976, he was
released and sent to the West after the government of the Federal Republic
had intervened in his behalf. He refers to 1976 as the “year of his second
birth.”34 His biography is a German story that would have been very different if his mother had lived in the American zone of occupation and given
birth to the child of a G.I. Like many East German dissidents, Schacht studied Lutheran theology at the university. In the West, he turned to political
science and philosophy. His writings are eminently political (although his
poetry is generally not overtly so35), and they are anchored by a strong sense
of morality. This is a combination not often found in the West German literary scene, except in the works of “exiled” GDR writers like poet Reiner
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Kunze. Like Kunze, Schacht often extols freedom of expression and action
with reference to the ideas of Albert Camus.
During the East German “thaw” of the early 1970s, a number of established writers felt able to take more risks with regard to esthetic experimentation and political/social content than before. In contrast to this seeming
liberalization, the Socialist Unity Party (SED) gave no quarter to young
would-be writers who were involved—however minimally—in underground oppositional politics. The best-known member of this younger
group was Jürgen Fuchs (1950–1999), who was arrested after the expatriation of poet-balladeer-social critic Wolf Biermann in 1976. Under duress,
Fuchs agreed to leave for the West in 1977. Ulrich Schacht was a known
quantity to the Stasi (secret police) before he became a writer, so he had no
chance of ever publishing in the East.36 The older GDR writers who were allowed to leave the country after 197637 were, in most cases, fairly well
known in the West, and they succeeded in continuing their writing careers.
Newcomers like Schacht were in limbo from the start. East German dissidents of the stridently anticommunist variety were not popular ¤gures in the
West Germany of the 1970s and even 1980s,38 and such people were more
often than not simply ignored, in part because most West Germans were not
overly interested in their neighbors to the east. (The gradual “normalization”
of relations between the two Germanies and ongoing attempts at rapprochement were also a major factor.) To this day, Schacht, who has published several volumes of poetry and prose and has been awarded literary prizes for his
efforts, is an absolute outsider in the German cultural scene. Like other
former dissidents, he has been away from the former GDR too long to be a
true Easterner (“Ossi”), and Western critics generally disregard him. Few of
the leading lexica of literature contain an entry on him, most literary histories mention only that he was one of the many to leave the GDR, and his
books are rarely reviewed.39 One way to gauge a German author’s standing
in the cultural sphere is to examine the unique annual surveys of contemporary German literature published by Reclam. A perusal of the ten yearbooks
published from 1988 to 1997 40 yields the following: None of these volumes
contains a review of a book by Schacht. The only piece by him is the reprint
of a 1995 polemic against Günter Grass and his novel Ein weites Feld.41 In
most cases, the references to him do not go beyond bibliographical information about a publication or a brief quotation. The high point is the survey
of 1993, in which the volume Die selbstbewußte Nation is discussed. Even
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there, one ¤nds such formulations as “author in the brown [=Nazi] net,”42
referring not to Schacht, but to Botho Strauß. To put this “limbo” in perspective: In the ten volumes in question, there are over one hundred references to Günter Grass, and almost as many to Peter Handke, Botho Strauß,
and Christa Wolf. In recent years, Schacht has been dealing with this situation by moving from literary texts to political essays (in other words, the opposite of the path taken by Jünger in the course of his career).
The development of Schacht’s perspective on culture and society can best
be traced by analyzing the volume Gewissen ist Macht (Conscience is power),
which contains essays, speeches, and portraits of contemporary authors
(mostly from the GDR) originally published between 1980 and 1991 in
newspapers43 and elsewhere. The back cover provides, in the form of two
quotations, an ideological framework for these writings. The ¤rst, from
1983, calls for a nonviolent “process of decolonialization” in the “Soviet
sphere of in¶uence” as well as “documentary work of mourning” meant to
demonstrate the necessity of such decolonialization. The second, from 1989,
sounds a triumphant note: “It was worthwhile to believe in the power of the
spirit and to deny reverence to the ideology of the status quo.” On the one
hand, Schacht represents himself as someone who shares a dif¤cult background with many members of his generation, but on the other hand, he
states that the East German Lutheran Church was the major in¶uence on his
life (30). The latter was typical only of a relatively small number of East Germans, and these people were one of the foci of the opposition.44 (In West Germany, the—until reuni¤cation mainly leftist—opposition to the system was
rarely in¶uenced by the established churches, although the peace movement
did have a spiritual dimension.) According to Schacht, in the case of any serious poet, “biographical stages” are the “fundamental element” of poetic existence (250). This attitude is far removed from the practice of postmodern
identity construction or deconstruction popular in the West, and it explains
at least in part the breakdown in communication between the Germans from
the “old” and “new” Federal States. To the East Germans, biography—not
biology—is fate. Many West Germans, especially those who strive to be
“good Europeans,” hope that at some point their Germanness will simply be
overlooked.
Conscience Is Power has much to say about German cultural and historical identity, although contradictions abound. For example, Schacht writes
in 1984 that only part of Germany has been given the chance to prove that
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Germans can learn from the past and will not be depraved (“verworfen”)
forever (38). In the same passage, the GDR is seen as continuing the “barbarism” of the recent past, i.e., German incorrigibility and perniciousness
(“Ungeist”). This smacks of the “special path” hypothesis, as does the assertion that for centuries, the Germans’ longing for a “perfect world” (heile
Welt) has lain at the root of their problems (59). One could imagine Günter
Grass making such utterances, but there is a fundamental difference between him and Schacht, who does not at all accept the view that the division
of Germany is an appropriate atonement for crimes against humanity. Such
crimes, says Schacht, do not, in the long run, justify the perpetuation of
Yalta (344–345). In itself, this is not an extremely conservative position (although it was considered to be so before 1989). Another word that Schacht
seems to be extremely fond of, however, is a staple of German irredentism,
namely “Central Germany” (Mitteldeutschland). The use of this word in
postwar Germany—with respect to the territory of the GDR45—implies
that there is another eastern part of the country that will someday return to
the fold.46 In 1981, Schacht relates the change in his attitude toward Willy
Brandt’s Ostpolitik—from enthusiasm to skepticism—but he declares in the
same text that he is still a social democrat (25). On the same page, he uses
the term “Central Germans” instead of “East Germans.” Anyone who could
do that was clearly still searching for a political identity as a West German.47
His brand of social democracy (or democratic socialism—the two are interchangeable for him) was a throwback to the immediate postwar years, when
his idol Kurt Schumacher combined patriotism and a passion for democracy
(162). Schacht often refers to the Germans’ “inability to mourn” (a concept
introduced by the psychoanalysts Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich48),
but unlike the West German left, he links it not only to the inability to come
to terms with Nazi atrocities, but also with the division of Germany after
1945 (169). His longing for national unity is complemented with a sense of
homeland (“Heimat”), another phenomenon long ignored by the left (or
rather, consciously avoided, since it was considered to be a smoke screen for
nationalist reawakening).49
In general, the author of Conscience Is Power does not appear to be a candidate for later New Right notoriety. With the bene¤t of hindsight, however, one can discern a number of incipient indicators. In his rejection of
literature as a vehicle for political consciousness-raising (e.g., 231, 240), he is
a precursor of the “Literature Debate” of the 1990s. He advocates rationality
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and Enlightenment (58–59), but almost simultaneously believes that
“myths and legends” can tell us more about human beings than any “exact
formula” or “ideological de¤nition” (221). He does not deny German
“shame,” but he characterizes it (years before the “Historians’ Debate”) as
“historical”—albeit “fraught with consequences” (157). He criticizes the homogenizing (“nivellierend”) effects of cosmopolitanism (134) and rejects an
“aggressive feminism” that thrives on denunciation—an example of “dogmatic self-delusion” (275). Like many anti-Hegelians before him, he repudiates any theory of history that does not place the individual human being
at its center (101, 108).50 In an interview from the year 1990, Schacht even
slips into the mantle of the prophet: “That which was seen by me as possible
ten, ¤ve, or two years ago has now been real for over a year” (199). In the
meantime, he has turned, with his compatriot Heimo Schwilk (b. 1952), to
other possibilities.
Schwilk’s background is as different from Schacht’s as it could possibly
be, and it re¶ects to no small degree the undramatic biography of most West
Germans of his generation, who were never forced to make the kind of existential decisions almost unavoidable for their counterparts in the East.51
Schwilk was born in Stuttgart, and he studied philosophy, German literature,
and history in idyllic Tübingen (¤nishing with a teacher’s certi¤cation). From
1972 to 1976, he was a paratroop of¤cer in the Bundeswehr. Like Schacht,
he has been a journalist at Die Welt for the last few years. Whereas Schacht
works in the area of cultural affairs at Die Welt, Schwilk has been assigned to
the “Berlin and the New Federal States” desk. This ¤ts in well with his interest
in the future of the entire German nation. He has written and edited books
about Ernst Jünger52 and published articles on literature for the conservative
newspaper Rheinischer Merkur. The best way to familiarize oneself with his
outlook is to analyze the 1991 volume Wendezeit—Zeitenwende,53 which is a
collection of essays on contemporary German authors. Most of the essays,
written between 1986 and 1991, originally appeared in the Rheinischer
Merkur. In his preface, Schwilk describes Germany of the 1980s as a “phenomenal success story,” one overshadowed, however, by a diffuse anxiety
(11). Normally, he says, it would have been the task of culture to thematize
such contradictions, but instead, culture became “an object and playground
of postmodern arbitrariness, for whom every truth is acceptable, as long as it
can be marketed” (11). Despite the “shimmering surface” of consumerism, a
cultural crisis could not be overlooked (12). Although the apocalyptic mur-
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muring of established writers perturbs Schwilk, he clearly is most disgusted
with “West German poet-dandies” who purvey cynicism and narcissism
(13). In this, he sounds much like a young disciple of William Bennett or Allan Bloom.
The lead essay, “Mediocrity and the Culinary: A Look Back at the West
German Idyll” (from the summer of 1989), dispels this impression immediately. We are very far from the American variety of cultural conservatism. Although Schwilk does express his disdain for the postmodern German
retreating into his “Procrustean bed of enjoyment and egocentrism” (18), he
bolsters his critique of this state of affairs with references to the Dialectics of
Enlightenment by the leftist icons Adorno and Horkheimer, Hans Magnus
Enzensberger’s analysis of the “levelling out of values” in West German society, and Freud’s Civilization and Its Discontents (18–19, 26). Heidegger
and Jünger, as well as the dif¤cult-to-categorize thinker Peter Sloterdijk, are
called upon also, leading to a mixed message. When Schwilk decries the role
of the mass media and their stultifying effect on the intelligence of the populace, he mentions not only the conservative—and sensationalistic—tabloid Bild, but also Der Spiegel, the famous left-liberal weekly read by the
educated elite (20). Thanks to the “destruction of meaning” undertaken day
after day by television (especially the talk show, an American import), all distinctions are being eliminated, including those between “left and right, art
and kitsch, action and painting” (23). Unlike American neoliberals, Schwilk
does not hesitate to indict the economic system as one of the perpetrators of
this travesty. “Irresponsible managers” take advantage of the industriousness, decency, and solidarity of the workers, engaging in shadowy deals like
the sale of poison gas factories to Libya and Iraq (19). The fetishization of an
ever-higher material standard of living leads to “destruction of the environment and the plundering of natural resources,” in a time when “abortion on
a mass scale” is systematically destroying life (19). What is most intriguing
about this philippic is what is missing, namely a political vision. The politicians are depicted as mere puppets of a system gone wild, who share their ritualized survival behavior with intellectuals (23). The economic elite are the
“true politicians and social engineers” of the republic (25). It is an almost automatic re¶ex to refer to such people as conservatives, and Schwilk also does
so—correcting himself immediately: they are actually “Besitzkonservative,”
i.e., conservatives whose worldview is not determined by a value system, but
instead by the drive to retain and increase wealth (25). Without using the
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term, Schwilk has placed himself squarely in line with the tradition of the
Conservative Revolution, collecting some unlikely allies along the way.
After this initial tour de force, the rest of volume offers in the main evidence for the theses put forth. A visit to the mammoth Frankfurt Book Fair
con¤rms Schwilk’s suspicion that, in this “era of decline” (Spätzeit, 29),54
there is no place for serious con¶icts, which might darken the mood of the
visitors to the literary amusement park. One such con¶ict would be the
question of national unity, and in an essay about this, Schwilk demonstrates
how only a few members of the West German cultural elite, like ¤lmmaker
Werner Herzog, novelist Martin Walser (who is often quoted by Schacht),
or Botho Strauß, dared to challenge the seeming impossibility of reuni¤cation. His own program for post-1989 Germany (the essay was ¤rst printed
in the Rheinischer Merkur of September 29, 1989) is not at all what one
might expect. Without renouncing Germany’s Western “value orientation,”
he makes the case for a neutral country without arsenals of mass-destruction
weapons55 that could potentially be the main “peace power” in Europe
(126). This country would also rid itself of something else, namely “U.S.
plastic culture” (127). Cultural self-determination must divorce itself, however, from “saber-rattling visions of German power and importance” à la
Fichte, Görres, and others (127). Germany could lead the way in two areas,
i.e., “ecological solidarity” (beginning with a cleanup of the polluted areas in
the former GDR) and mediation between East and West based on a “free life
of the mind” (127–128). The latter formulation is taken from Otto Schily,
a former Green who is now a leading—if controversial—Social Democrat.
Once again, Schwilk endeavors to build (unlikely) coalitions for the future.
Two portraits of contemporary authors warrant special scrutiny. The
¤rst concerns the “neo-Romanticism” of Botho Strauß, whose essay “Impending Tragedy” was to become the centerpiece of Die selbstbewußte Nation.
Schwilk de¤nes Strauß’s project as the construction of an “anarchic” sphere
of literature in opposition to a social dynamic that aims at “the selfliquidation of the humane through its technologization and computerization”
(141–142). This recalls Heidegger’s aversions as well as the self-imposed
isolation of the later Jünger (whose name is dropped). Strauß’s often
opaque language is praised as a counterweight to “jargon and party small
talk” (142), and his return to the mystical atmosphere of Novalis is seen as
a struggle against the dis-enchantment (“Entzauberung”) of the world, a
process that has made great strides since the time of the Romantics (143).
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The question of the accessibility of a literature so consciously and militantly
divorced from the communicative strategies of most “ordinary” people is
apparently not an issue for Schwilk. To a certain extent, he accepts a division of labor in literature, and the “other side” is extolled in his portrait of
Ulrich Schacht. In reviewing the stories in Schacht’s Brandenburg Concertos, Schwilk applauds the author for not propagating a form of “escapism
that would like to ¶ee from reality to the realm of dreams” (176). The harsh
life in a GDR prison is minutely described (and compared to the Third
Reich), and Schacht’s protagonist Bornholm ponders the nature of human
existence in an absurd world—not unlike Camus and Kafka. Since Schacht
chooses the parable as the appropriate form for his meditations, the reader
may well relate them to similar extreme situations throughout human history. Schwilk clearly approves of this, and his approval is a sign that his conservatism does not entail a return to some imagined premodern idyll. This
too is a characteristic stance of the Conservative Revolution (in an updated
version for the 1990s).
To date, the coalition-building project initiated by Schwilk and Schacht
has had, in terms of impact on the public sphere, one notable success story,
namely the publication of the anthology Die selbstbewußte Nation in 1994.
The reason for giving this title in the original German is that it has—as has
been indicated above—a double meaning. In the ¤rst sense of “selbstbewußt,” the Germans are to become aware of their true cultural identity. This
is necessary because of postwar “reeducation” in the wake of American predominance in the West. In the second sense, the authors hope that self-awareness will lead to a new self-con¤dence, allowing Germany to play a greater role
in world affairs, one be¤tting its size (the country with the largest population
in Europe) and economic might.56 This was regarded as a taboo until 1989,
both because of Germany’s tarnished image in the postfascist era and due to
the desire to do nothing that might endanger reuni¤cation. The two editors
of Die selbstbewußte Nation 57 demonstrate the kind of self-con¤dence for
which they are striving by printing reactions to their book on the dust cover.
The left-liberal camp is represented by citations from the Frankfurter Rundschau and Die Zeit. The Rundschau reporter speaks in a tone of warning of the
“moment of self-creation of the intellectual right in Germany,” whereas the
Zeit commentator views the book as “a declaration of war on the basic consensus of the old Federal Republic.” A reporter from Schwilk’s Rheinischer Merkur
declares that the book “deserves real attention,” and the political scientist
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Arnulf Baring contrasts the authors favorably with “lame leftist public opinion leaders.” A blurb from the news magazine Focus, the new conservative
competitor of Der Spiegel, expresses less the real situation than the aspirations
of the editors: “The anthology Die selbstbewußte Nation is shaking up the
German cultural landscape.”
When the thirty contributors to this anthology are grouped together in
generational cohorts, one ¤nds that fully one-third belong to the “generation
of 1968,” the makers of the student revolt that shook German society. Eight
were born before the Second World War (of these, three during the Weimar
period), meaning that they have some direct memory of National Socialism.
Eight (including the editors) were born in the 1950s, three in the 1960s, and
one in 1970. The composition of the group as a whole makes one wonder just
how “new” this New Right is. Another statistic casts doubt on the supposedly
forward-looking character of the enterprise: only one of the authors is female,
namely Brigitte Seebacher-Brandt, the controversial widow of the most popular postwar German Social Democrat, Willy Brandt. (The Conservative
Revolution of Weimar vintage was also almost exclusively a male domain.58)
Twenty-¤ve of the contributors are West Germans (or have spent most of
their lives west of the Elbe), whereas only four are from the former GDR. The
only “outsiders” are Austrian Roland Bubik, who works in Berlin, and
Michael Wolffsohn, who was born in Tel Aviv and writes on German-Jewish
relations. The predominance of Westerners is a re¶ection of a general cultural
trend since reuni¤cation: very few Easterners have a voice in national concerns. They are accepted primarily as “experts” on life in the GDR, not as fellow citizens from whom all Germans could learn valuable lessons. In terms of
education and profession, the group of thirty comes close to the pro¤le of
what Fritz Ringer has called “the mandarin intellectuals.”59 They are all university trained, and the ¤elds of study listed most often are history, literary
studies, philosophy, and political science. Journalists form the largest group,
followed by free-lance writers, professors, lawyers, civil servants, and teachers.
(There are four creative artists: the dramatist Hartmut Lange, the poet Ulrich
Schacht, prominent writer Botho Strauß, and the ¤lmmaker Hans Jürgen
Syberberg.) To paraphrase Ringer, their status is tied to their academic preparation or cultural production, not to money or prestige passed down through
the generations. Their humanistic orientation, that of the Bildungsbürgertum,
has been under siege since the late nineteenth century and is now relegated to
the periphery of a fast-paced consumerist society.
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Many of the contributions are reactions to, or continuations of, the polemic “Impending Tragedy” by Botho Strauß (which is reprinted at the beginning of the volume). That particular piece will be scrutinized in the
context of Strauß’s career in chapter 3 below. (Aside from facilitating a contextualization of “Impending Tragedy,” this will direct more attention to the
“other twenty-nine” contributors to the volume, who have, taken together,
been discussed much less than Strauß.) A logical entry point into the complex of ideas and emotions found in Die selbstbewußte Nation can be found
in the essays by Schacht and Schwilk, as well as in the introduction that they
coauthored. The dedication, to the “patriots of 20 July 1944 and 17 June
1953,” re¶ects the view of recent German history found in the political advertisements discussed above. At the beginning of the introduction—
bolstered by a motto about national sentiments from Camus—Schacht and
Schwilk provide a de¤nition of “Selbstbewußtsein” that serves as a justi¤cation for the entire volume. It is, one learns, an inwardly directed process of
¤nding the “familiar form” of human presence. Individuals who have found
self-knowledge can master the future based on their origins and their present
existence. The same is true for the “realm of experience and identity” of the
family and the nation (11). Such phrases are hardly original or ominous in
and of themselves, but this changes when they are tied to the Nazi period.
Self-knowledge cannot be obtained without self-con¤dence (“Selbstvertrauen”), and it is exactly this that today’s Germans lack. Why is this the
case? Why are they different from other modern nations? The answer lies in
the perpetration of the Holocaust, a word that is not used. Instead, the editors speak of an “evil reason” behind the destruction of German selfcon¤dence, related to the “temporary, not lasting German transgression”
(11).60 This is a roundabout way of summarizing the “Historians’ Debate”
and the attempted historicization of the Holocaust. Speci¤cally, the “transgression” involved allowing the “order-seeking longing for the metaphysical” supposedly so central to German identity to degenerate61 into
“unbounded pursuit of power.” It is emphasized that the normalcy of a
“selbstbewußte Nation” will not be attainable until the Germans attain
deeper self-knowledge and through it “self-puri¤cation” (11–12). Now that
the postwar status quo has been brought to a conclusion, this goal can be attained, assert Schacht and Schwilk. The manner in which this status quo is
described makes it absolutely clear that the message is not directed toward
the average German. Instead of simply saying that, in the postwar era, the
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Germans were not allowed to be masters of their own affairs because of the
crimes that they had committed, the editors state:
With the 1989 collapse [of the Soviet system], this normalcy, via the irreversible
destruction of the postwar status quo, which in turn was attributable to a symbiosis of alienation from self and foreign domination caused by the course of
events, has become a historical basis from which one must proceed. (12)

Such rhetorical ¶ourishes, or rather obfuscations, serve no purpose other
than to avoid painful historical memories and give the intended elite readership a feeling of superiority. A call for “self-puri¤cation” is also much less disruptive than an appeal for regret and remorse.
With amazing panache, Schacht and Schwilk not only declare their opposition to the Enlightenment, but at the same time claim that the political
clique running Germany has an understanding of “democracy and civil society” that is limited to staying in power and keeping order by means of
increasing prosperity. Allowing free rein to individuals’ “self-grati¤cation62
complex” instead of promoting “nonmaterial values” is not social (see the social welfare state) but asocial (12). The introduction contains no elucidation
of these values, concentrating instead on negativa like the “hypermoralistic”
mass media (Heidegger’s “Letter on Humanism” is proffered as a starting
point for criticizing such media), ritualized antifascism (that has also been
critiqued from a liberal perspective63), and contemporary conformism (14–
15). The ¤nal paragraph has no little import for the entire anthology, however. The two editors emphasize that the “time of German special paths” is
over, meaning that the Germans can ¤nally dare once again to go their own
way (17). This could be interpreted as a rejection of the cultural and political
developments of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and an appeal to the
Germans to return to Romanticism and post-Romantic critiques of the status quo as sources of national identity and spirituality. There is another
possible interpretation, but it is not completely convincing. If the “special
paths” are taken to be National Socialism and Communism, then the ¤nal
paragraph postulates a return to conditions prior to 1933. Within the logic
of the Conservative Revolution, this would make little sense, since both the
Weimar Republic and the Kaiserreich are objects of derision, not idealization.
The true democracy that is envisioned by the editors is thus not rooted in
German political history, but in the dynamic of the present, the potentialities
of the future, and the never-realized dreams of Novalis and his heirs. To some
observers, this might seem exhilarating, to others profoundly unsettling.
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Ulrich Schacht’s essay, “Stigma and Concern: German Identity after
Auschwitz,” pursues an agenda that is not re¶ected it its title. It is primarily
a condemnation of almost every political development since the French
Revolution and a scathing critique of political correctness. In contrast to the
calm, often contemplative manner of Schacht’s poetry and the nostalgic sentimentality of his prose writings about “Heimat,” this essay practically leaps
off the page with polemic energy. The ¤rst sentence contains a key term:
“media democracy” (“Mediendemokratie”). This is a system in which those
who determine the interpretation of political concepts hold power (57). The
fact that this is a view also held by many on the left does not seem to interest
Schacht. For him, the domination of the media is simply the most recent
chapter in the history of the “fallacious systems of virtue and salvation” that
have attempted to achieve power by means of terror (58). Among these are
“National Socialism, Communism, Ignorantism, and Costume Humanism” (58–59). The only one that is not taken seriously is “Costume Fascism”
(a term borrowed from the writer Martin Walser), i.e., the manifestations of
neo-Nazism in reuni¤ed Germany. It is dif¤cult to imagine how anyone
who would like to be seen as a serious critic of the ¤rst four phenomena
could dismiss the latter out of hand. It is even more dif¤cult to imagine a milieu that could bring forth the notion that the political class of the Federal
Republic is the modern equivalent of the “Committees for Public Safety”
from the dark days of the French Revolution (59). What but a raging persecution complex could lead Schacht to speak of “the block-warden system of
West German PC society and its PC commissars” that is leading inexorably
to “discourse apartheid” (60)? Political correctness has been criticized by
many Germans as an unwanted American import,64 but usually not with
such vehemence. The use of the Nazi term “block warden” (Blockwart) also
raises the stakes considerably: “PC” is depicted as nothing less than the media democracy’s version of fascism.
It is problematic that while this type of “fascism” is placed in the spotlight, the historical manifestation is being “contextualized.” As a German,
Schacht apparently—unlike some of his compatriots—is apprehensive
about undertaking such contextualization without outside help, so he uses
a reference to Zygmunt Baumann (sic) as a crutch. The Bauman thesis is
that Auschwitz, Kolyma (i.e., the Gulag), and Hiroshima are the triad of
horror emanating from the spirit of modernism (58). Such a constellation
not only questions the singularity of the Holocaust,65 but also harks back to
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Heidegger’s warnings about the American and Soviet models. The problem
is that before Germany can resume its mission as the “other” between these
models, it has to be cleansed of fascism. To accomplish this feat, Schacht
launches an attack on what he calls “post-German, national-suicidal historiography” under the tutelage of said “West German PC commissars” (62).
Here, as opposed to other parts of the essay, he names names, castigating the
“historical laboratories of Hans-Ulrich Wehler [and] Hagen Schulze” (61)
for situating German identity in a community of culture and language
rather than in a national state. (The positing of culture as the de¤ning moment is also found in the myriad post-1989 statements by Günter Grass.66)
The image of national suicide in the form of a verbal perpetuation of Holocaust memories leading to a permanent German self-reproach, if not selfhatred, is taken to its extreme in the assertion that this suicide is “identical
with the total will of Nazi Germany to destroy the Jewish people” (63).67
The use of the term “blindwütig” (in a blind rage) implies that both the Holocaust and its instrumentalization are pathological. Where, then, does
Schacht ¤nd the seeds of a healthy German self-image? Quoting Hannah
Arendt’s dictum that it was not a German tradition that led to National Socialism, but rather “the violation of all traditions” (64), Schacht memorializes the representatives of the good Germany “who knew honor and dignity
and connected them with Germany” (63). His memorial is a ¶awed one,
however, because he forgoes any differentiation. One ¤nds not only the idealistic Scholl siblings, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, and Georg Elser, the loner who
almost assassinated Hitler, but also the members of the July 20, 1944, conspiracy. The latter group had, at least in part, extremely reactionary plans for
post-Nazi Germany.68 This could possibly be overlooked if Schacht’s selection criterion had been simply resistance to Hitler, but this is not true, because his list intentionally excludes any resistance by German communists. It
also will not do to misuse Thomas Mann as a witness (66), since Mann hardly
shared Schacht’s vili¤cation of the Communist resistance. Schacht’s ¤nal sentence (“Hitler is not a symbol of the German character, and Auschwitz is not
the logical end point of German history” [68]) is thus less convincing than it
could have been. It is one thing to assert—once again, with Camus—that
each person has the “absurd freedom” to determine his own identity (57), but
he who makes such an assertion should not assume that all observers, especially non-German ones, will look favorably upon an identity that rests upon
a questionable reading of the cultural and historical heritage.
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Heimo Schwilk’s contribution to Die selbstbewußte Nation is quite different. Even though he follows his usual practice of drawing from diverse
sources (in this case from liberal novelist Siegfried Lenz, sociologist Max
Horkheimer, Arnold Gehlen, Carl Schmitt, and Peter Sloderdijk), the core
of his essay is the attempt to analyze contemporary Germany through the
lens of Ernst Jünger’s On Pain (1934).69 Jünger had written that of the measures of human greatness, pain is “the most dif¤cult test in that series of tests
that one calls life.”70 He had also spoken—one year after Hitler’s seizure of
power—of his time as a ¤nal “phase of nihilism,” one in which most people
considered the present order to be merely transitional.71 Schwilk’s “Pain and
Morality: On the Ethos of Resistance” moves through similar terrain, with
one signi¤cant difference: whereas the majority of Jünger’s contemporaries
may well have felt that change was necessary—although there was certainly
no consensus on the nature of that change—Schwilk’s contemporaries appear to fear the future, not welcome it. His mission is thus not to offer sustenance, but to shake his fellow Germans out of their stupor. This is
anything but a simple task, for, as Schwilk readily admits, the avoidance of
pain became “the tacit inner prerequisite for the reconstruction of the [German] state and society after 1945” (394). Here, as in the rest of the essay, he
is referring exclusively to West Germany. Pain and sacri¤ce were the order of
the day in the East at least until the 1960s, and that was one of the basic
weaknesses of that system, whose people literally had no respite after war’s
end. In the West, Schwilk discerns an ongoing process of “paci¤cation” that
was meant to radically cleanse Germany of “traditional patterns of authority
and ‘evil’ mentality vestiges” (394). The result, according to Schwilk, was to
systematically strip the West Germans of their identity, resurrecting them as
“constitutional patriots.” This term, associated with Jürgen Habermas and
Günter Grass, is an object of derision for the New Right. Its replacement of
venerable traditions led, according to Schwilk, to “the most extensive neuroticization of generational and authority relationships” in German history.
This in turn yielded a society based on self-hatred and material prosperity.
The true national apocalypse was not, it is claimed, really upon the Germans until the 1960s, when the generation of 1968 hoisted banners proclaiming the “total discrediting of all ascetic ideals” (395). Expert testimony
is offered by Arnold Gehlen, who warns that societies cannot be built upon
the pleasure principle. It is not immediately apparent that this is to be dismissed out of hand (a suitable passage from Freud could have been cited, for
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example), but when one knows that Gehlen published such theses as a sociology professor during the Third Reich, it is dif¤cult not to have second
thoughts. An intellectual discussion of asceticism would not be without
merit, but it is instructive to remind oneself how sel¶essness and renunciation were manipulated by the Nazis for inhuman purposes. In this context,
Schwilk’s critique of German “self-diminishment” as an eternal reparation
for past overbearingness (396) makes one wonder just how much German
grandeur might be restored. It is not reassuring when Schwilk tells us,
through the words of Carl Schmitt, that “only a political esthetics of the sublime that allows the citizen to transcend his physical existence and risk
death” can lead to the discovery of the ability to resist (401). The type of resistance being glori¤ed here is of course not individual resistance, something
anathema in the Third Reich (whose laws were formulated in part by
Schmitt), but national resistance. But what should reuni¤ed Germany resist
as a nation? For one thing, it should resist an untrammeled eudaemonism
(not just a German failing, we are told, since the “pursuit of happiness” is
written into the U.S. constitution!). When Schwilk cites Bertrand Russell
on the connection between prosperity and morality, one hears echoes of the
pre-1933 German image of British materialism (395). Another bugaboo,
possibly the ultimate enemy for Schwilk, is feminism, that is, “the culturalrevolutionary subversion by feminism” (396). The word that is chosen for
subversion, “Umtriebe,” sounds especially sinister in German. Once again,
it is Arnold Gehlen who teaches us that it is the familial “instincts” of women
that lead in the end to “a limitless expansion of humanitarianism and eudaemonism” (396). Gehlen’s aside that such instincts do, to be sure, have their
legitimate place in the family only makes matters worse. His, and Schwilk’s,
concern is the strengthening of the “counterweights” to such instincts in the
realm of the state. If this were to succeed, then many of the problematic aspects of modern Germany would disappear. Among these are road rage (“the
venting of aggression by the arti¤cially paci¤ed West German”), “Angst”
and a “crisis of orientation,” the need for psychiatry, alcohol and drug addiction, crime, vandalism, and, last but not least, abortion (398). Without
denying the existence of such phenomena in practically all modern societies,
it is clear that a system in which they have been abolished or at least greatly
reduced will have to ¤nd a higher purpose. Some form of “venting” will no
doubt take place, and in the past, authoritarian states have sought to ¤nd
ways out of economic or political conundrums by engaging in armed
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con¶ict.72 Can Schwilk truly believe that the reduction of consumption
and an ethos of service to the community will suf¤ce as bases for social cohesion (402)? The Greens have a similar vision (except for their attitude toward eudaemonism and feminism, and those are not trivial matters), but
they are not burdened by a catastrophic realization of the vision in an earlier
time.
The essays by Schacht and Schwilk have been highlighted because of
their editorial/organizational role and also because they have gone on to amplify their views (in the 1997 book Für eine Berliner Republik, which will be
discussed below). The contributions to Die selbstbewußte Nation are divided
into ¤ve categories, i.e., “Identity,” “Con¶ict,” “Interest,” “Resistance,” and
“Unity.” Rather than giving each author equal weight, the individual essays
will be viewed with regard to the “German legacy” described in the ¤rst
chapter and at the beginning of the second chapter of this study. The section
“Identity,” where Schacht placed himself, is, like much of the volume, a
mixed bag. Brigitte Seebacher-Brandt’s essay “Norm and Normalcy: On the
Love of One’s Own Land” is an attack on those who would preserve the
“Bonn Republic” and its mentality in reuni¤ed Germany. The reason for the
attack is that Seebacher-Brandt regards the West German Federal Republic
that existed from 1949 until 1990 as an abnormality characterized by “antifascist gibberish,” “feigned guilt complexes,” and endless “rituals of Enlightenment” (47–48). To counter all-encompassing German self-hatred,73 she
offers countermodels, namely the pre-1933 Social Democrats, the only opponents of Hitler who believed in political freedom (51), and the 20th of
July resistance group, whose members were ¤lled with love for their country
(53). She constructs a kind of utopian anti-Volksgemeinschaft ranging from
aristocrats to workers who dreamed of a Germany free of occupying forces,
be they enemies or friends. Her belief that Germany wants to be a “normal”
democracy (56) is overshadowed by her concern that her country has become too “comfortable,” both materially and spiritually (49). In other
words, she sees, with no little justi¤cation, that most (but by no means all)
Germans are less concerned with regaining a sense of national honor than
with maintaining their standard of living. Most Europeans are quite content
with such a state of affairs.
Seebacher-Brandt’s piece is rather pedestrian and was probably included
as an attempt at coalition building (i.e., wooing the right wing of the SPD).
The rest of the essays in the “Identity” section speak to the question of German
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cultural identity. Reinhart Maurer’s “Guilt and Prosperity: On the Western/
German General Line,” is an attempt to revive “fundamental social criticism” (70) of the kind engaged in by Ernst Jünger and Martin Heidegger in
the early 1950s.74 Maurer laments the fact that talking about nihilism is
“out,” because the Western general line will have us believe that technology
and democracy are “the solution to all problems,” rejecting any other lines as
“either obsolete or evil or both” (70). The Greens have often been targets of
such rejection, and Maurer himself points out with tongue in cheek that all
would be well if the per capita energy consumption of the “progressive countries, especially the USA” would be equaled throughout the world (70). He
considers the Third Reich to be “at least in part a deviation from the [Western] general line,” and de¤nes postwar reeducation as a means to correct this
deviation (71). If the Germans are ever to ¤nd a way back to this deviation
(or at least to a new manifestation of it), they will have to leave behind their
“enduring bad conscience” and ¤nd a way to a “normal national self-image”
(74), the best antidote to an “irrational nationalism” (78). What is fascinating about this view is that Maurer calls for a reevaluation of twentiethcentury history that transcends the “perspective of the victors” [of 1945] and
takes both fascism and socialism seriously as attempts to deal with “fundamental problems in the force ¤eld containing the individual, community,
and society, including those that liberalism tries to solve by repressing them”
(83). This is quite different from Ernst Nolte’s goal of explaining away Nazi
excesses by seeing them as a reaction to Stalinism. Paraphrasing Francis
Fukuyama,75 Maurer states that the combination of liberalism and capitalism (he uses the phrase “pursuit of happiness” in English) will indeed lead to
the end of history—the absolute end (84). Although Maurer calls—like
Seebacher-Brandt—for a normalization of the German self-image, he actually strives to blaze a new “special path,” one in which the Germans will have
the role of saving the human race from ecological disaster. It is thus not surprising that he disputes any connection between Heidegger and Auschwitz
(76), because it is the metaphysical bent of the Germans that supposedly
makes them the strongest advocates of environmental protection.
Klaus Rainer Röhl’s76 “Morgenthau and Antifa[scism]: On German
Self-Hatred” is a barely coherent tirade against everything from the Morgenthau Plan (which is linked to the visions of today’s “fundamentalist
Greens” [92]), the taboo placed on any discussion of Allied war crimes (94),
the “thought police” enforcing political correctness in Germany (97), and
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“multicultural buttering-up” (“Anbiederung”[100]). The last point, the alleged (cynical) xenophilia of postwar Germany’s ruling class, is a particular
concern of the New Right. Although one can easily dismiss Röhl’s potpourri, Gerd Berg¶eth’s “Earth and Homeland: On the End of the Era of
Disaster” leads directly to the con¶uence of Old Right and New Right
thinking. Berg¶eth (b. 1936), a literary scholar and translator, openly embraces the “antimodern tradition of German thought” (122). He thus
chooses to open with a motto taken from Carl Schmitt’s Der Nomos der Erde
about the need for a reorientation of human thought to “the elemental order
of [our] terrestrial existence” (101). Berg¶eth begins with a horror vision of
a world in which the idea of homeland (“Heimat”) has been proscribed
along with “Volk, fatherland, and nation” (102). Since these have been replaced by “humanitarian dreams and a multicultural-criminal [!] society,”
the uprootedness analyzed by Heidegger in the postwar period has become
much worse. Although this is a universal phenomenon, it is the Germans,
robbed of their traditions, who are “broken” and suffer the most (103).
Once again, we are told that it is the “leftist intelligentsia” that has sewn the
seeds of hatred for everything German, brought about the “¤asco of emancipatory education,” cultivated cosmopolitanism instead of love for the
homeland, and thus taught a “disdain for the earth” (104). Utilizing the
same phrases coined by vitalism and the Conservative Revolution and applied by the Nazis to the Jews, Berg¶eth characterizes “the entire culture” of
late modernity as “alienated from the homeland, devoid of origins and roots,
enlightened, intellectualistic, and cynical” (106). The only way out of this
dilemma is through the “antimodern origin” of the homeland, and
Berg¶eth locates this principally in German Romanticism (106).77 Romantic “longing for home” (Heimweh) is de¤ned as a striving to return home in
contrast to modern rootlessness. As a literary scholar, Berg¶eth unfortunately stoops to misusing etymology in the cause of national renewal: even
though the word “home” is common to many Germanic languages, “homeland” (Heimat) is found exclusively in German. It is consequently suggested
to the reader that only Germans can feel what it really means to have—and
lose—one’s homeland.78 (In the Re¶ections, Thomas Mann conceded that
Russians might have similar sentiments, and Berg¶eth agrees.) This is yet
another version of the “special path.” In Berg¶eth’s apocalyptic scenario, a
“major collapse” is coming, the result of a nihilism that threads its way
through the entire history of the West since Plato, a history that brings with
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it a “devaluation of man” (113). The only solution is to transcend history,
especially the modern nihilistic era with its “ideologies of destruction,” i.e.,
“capitalism, communism, National Socialism, and liberalism” (121). Our
sole hope is to renounce the “super¤ciality of the Enlightenment” and return to the “fundamental knowledge of myth” (121). Only then will we ¤nd
the “future realm of freedom”—one that is beyond history and society in the
“state of nature” (110). As one might expect, it is the Germans, or the “Nordic man,” who can understand the “tragic elemental power” of nature (117).
One wonders how Seebacher-Brandt’s desire for German “normalcy” could
possible mesh with such truly frightening doomsday prophecies, how August Bebel or Willy Brandt could ¤nd a modus vivendi with the Nibelungen.
If Berg¶eth’s mutterings were at all representative, he and any followers that
he might have would rate round-the-clock surveillance. Engaging in such
mind games in light of twentieth-century history is either a conscious provocation or an expression of a truly eerie perception of reality.
A welcome contrast to Berg¶eth’s conjuring is found in Hans Jürgen
Syberberg’s essay, “The Self and the Other: On the Loss of the Tragic.” Syberberg emphasizes in his ¤rst paragraph that he is speaking not as a theoretician,
but as an active artist. His goal is to support new activities in ¤lm, the theater,
and literature. The “new” that he is striving for is the rebirth of a truly German culture after decades in which the “ward” Germany was subject to the
in¶uence of the culture of the occupying powers. According to Syberberg, the
end of socialism has brought with it a transitional phase in the old Federal Republic as well, one in which the hegemony of an imported Western morality
is beginning to slip (126). On one hand, the ¤lmmaker portrays himself as an
artist who was criticized at home and supported from abroad, since the
French and American intellectuals saw in his works—for example in the
monumental Hitler ¤lm—the “German soul” that fascinated them (129).
On the other hand, he sees the end of an era for those “of¤cial” artists who
neither caused nor anticipated the events of 1989.79 For him, art is not a mere
provocation, since “esthetics is politics” (132). In other words, he still has a
strong sense of identity as a German because it is derived from the esthetic
sphere, not quotidian reality. This is why culture is paramount for him, and
his vision of Europe’s future is far removed from that of his co-contributors:
If Europe, this stinking ¤sh and maltreated, sore continent, still has—thanks to
us—a center, then it is not its military might, not its science, not its economic or
consumption-oriented mass, but rather its culture. Even now? It is up to us. (133)
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In this vision, the singularity of Germany’s tragic fate is the source from
which an understanding of and salvation from tragic guilt can be obtained.
The other Europeans (with the possible exception of the Italians, who are
not mentioned), who feel superior as associates of the victorious Allies, have
lost the ability to comprehend tragedy and existential guilt. One may take
issue with this claim, but it is clearly on a different plane from the endless
mantra of lament and self-hatred found elsewhere in the anthology. As an
artist, Syberberg has the opportunity to exorcise his demons by providing
them with a form outside himself, rather than watching helplessly while
they devour him from within.
In the ¤nal contribution to the “Identity” section, Tilman Krause (“Inwardness and Distance from the World: On the German Longing for the
Metaphysical”) takes up some of Syberberg’s themes, including the commonalities between East and West German literature. The sophistication of his
approach is re¶ected in his depiction of Thomas Mann. After praising Mann
for his courage in making an “Appeal to Reason” against the Nazis in 1930,
Krause relates how the antifascist Mann characterized the Germans in his
1945 speech “Germany and the Germans” (delivered at the Library of Congress) as basically nonpolitical (134). The purpose of this reference to Mann
is to demonstrate that one can oppose National Socialism without renouncing that which is “incomparable” in German culture, i.e., “German metaphysics [and] German music” (135; Krause is quoting Mann). Revisiting
Syberberg’s image of non-Germans who are entranced by the German soul,
Krause provides an example from France: Brigitte Sauzay, once François Mitterand’s chief interpreter, writes (in 1985) that Germany, once so fascinating
and “magical,” has become “banal” (135). The reason? It is the “normalization” of Germany after World War II (136). Instead of striking out at those
who perpetrated this normalization, Krause admits that a distancing from
“German obscurity” was absolutely necessary in 1945. Now, however, after
the success of the Westernization process, it is time to overcome the fear of
that which has been repressed so long, namely “that complex of melancholypensive introversion and turning-away from the world, which can only with
dif¤culty be reconciled with the belief in progress of the rational social culture
of the West” (136–137). The justi¤cation for such an undertaking lies for
Krause in the danger that anything repressed will eventually return “in a destructive form” (136). To illustrate his thesis that the repression of German
introspection never was completely successful, Krause praises three of its
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contemporary literary representatives, namely Botho Strauß, Christa Wolf,
and Heiner Müller. The latter two are products of the East German culture
and society, one that is seen by Western intellectuals as “premodern” (137).
Wolf is defended80 as a cultural ¤gure who possesses traditionally German
characteristics thought to have been overcome:
[T]oo much serious pensiveness and complicated self-interrogation—very
much in the tradition of Pietistic outpouring of the heart and of “Protestant
uneasiness.” Too much conjuring up of distancing and ¶ight from the world,
something unthinkable without the Romanticism that is today felt to be ambivalent. Too much cultural criticism in the garb of the ancients, something
that is already problematic in Hölderlin. Too much reveling in the ideals of a
fraternal [!] community (rather than society). (138)

When they are formulated in this manner, it is dif¤cult to imagine that these
characteristics could ever be cause for yet another crusade against the Germans. Krause is fully aware of this, and he takes great pains to emphasize
that the presence of non-Western elements in German culture is of no
signi¤cance for German politics (139–141). Let us not forget, however, that
Syberberg equated esthetics with politics. With his attempt to separate the
two, Krause is an outsider in Die selbstbewußte Nation. There is no reason to
doubt his sincerity, but his presence in dubious company makes one think
of Lenin’s concept of “useful idiots.” Most of the other contributors to the
anthology are not interested in enriching German culture for the sake of culture alone. It is hardly fortuitous that the collected essays were not entitled
Treasures of the German Spirit or The Unique German Contribution to Global
Culture.
Much of the rest of the volume is repetitious, and many of the essays are
not concerned directly with culture and identity, so a critical selection and
summary will be provided instead of an exhaustive presentation. In the section “Con¶ict,” there is an outsider somewhat like Krause, namely, Rüdiger
Safranski. This literary scholar, once a highly visible representative of the academic left in 1970s Berlin (it is likely that, at least to a certain extent, his
politics prevented him from becoming a professor) has written well-received
biographies of Arthur Schopenhauer and Martin Heidegger. His essay here
(“Destruction and Desire: On the Return of Evil”) was a preliminary study
for his most recent book.81 The title refers to the repression of evil in the
postwar welfare state, a danger already present in the nineteenth-century
America observed by Tocqueville (237). According to Safranski, the events
of 1989 and their aftermath have destroyed a world in which the Germans82
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and other Europeans were protected against “intellectual and material
risks.” The loss of such protection leads people, he claims, to take out their
fears on foreigners and “here and there once again on Jews” (238). There is
not an emphasis on a speci¤cally German self-hatred, but rather a general
diagnosis of “barbarization” manifested as “sel¤shness, destruction of community spirit, hospitalism, [and] consumerism.” This is not new, but an additional ingredient—one which Tocqueville could not foresee—has been
added to the mix, i.e., the “brutalization and emptiness” brought about by
the media (239). Safranski may sound like a German Neil Postman, but he
actually turns to the philosopher Kant for guidance. Civilization is not seen
as an end in itself; rather, it is the ongoing attempt to “domesticate” evil
(241). Kant believed that the possibility of evil was the price of freedom, but
his successors—Safranski names Hegel, Marx, and Habermas and speaks indirectly of Fukuyama—viewed evil as something that could be overcome. In
the context of Die selbstbewußte Nation, Safranski constructs a unique
model, a possibility of a conservatism that does not wholly reject the Enlightenment. Although human beings are made of “crooked timber,”83 they
may still pursue the project of civilization, although there is no guarantee of
success. Safranski, who once was no stranger to utopian thinking, now calls
upon us to persevere without a gleaming telos, and his ¤nal sentence demonstrates the distance between his brand of conservatism and that purveyed
by many of his coauthors: “We have no choice but to act as if God and our
own nature wanted the best for us” (248).
Safranski’s assessment of our present condition is the rueful reevaluation
of an erstwhile ’68er, and its contemplative tone is unusual in this volume.
(One wonders why he chose to allow the editors to publish his thoughts,
which predate the anthology.) Roland Bubik’s84 essay consists mainly of
whining—about the way right-wingers are stigmatized by the media, about
the alleged domination of the media by the left, about the secret satisfaction
felt by leftists when foreigners are attacked, etc. His improbable vision of
Germany’s future involves combining a “Dionysian feeling for life” with a
“society based on norms” (194). This would involve nothing less than fusing
the two Nietzsches into one. Peter Meier-Bergfeld’s plea for a Germany
more like Austria is chilling. Some of the advantages of the system in place
in the Alpine republic that supposedly deserve emulation are: prisons oriented toward retribution, use of the army to keep the peace on the domestic
front, a legal system that transcends the “American rhetorical cliché ‘rule of
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law’” (206), reverence for the beautiful (as opposed to the German “conscious cultivation of the ugly” [206]), a paternalistic, premodern, somewhat
underdeveloped capitalism with relative autarky, the lack of pornography on
television, the homogeneous (i.e., Catholic) religious life, the absence of a
revolt of “spoiled children against castrated fathers” (216), a “healthy box on
the ears” for misbehaving children (223), and so forth. Perhaps most disturbing is the talk of “Austria’s mission” (226). Michael Wolffsohn believes
that a traditional German nationalism would be “immoral,” whereas an “inwardly directed one” is indispensable (271).85 He is less worried about the
skinheads (who are not particularly German and have no real ideology, he
asserts [268]) than about the “global migration” affecting Europe and much
of the rest of the world. In listing the growth of the foreign population in
Germany since 1958—he calls it a “social revolution”—he does express relief that neither slavery nor the fate of the Jews86 are conceivable today, although he thinks that it was “mindless” to have brought in millions of
“Gastarbeiter” (269). In the course of his often incoherent essay, it never becomes clear just why this might be so. Ansgar Graw, then a journalist at Radio Free Berlin (Sender Freies Berlin), now at Die Welt, trots out the usual
catalogue of leftist sins (the elimination of taboos, attacks on family and
church, paci¤sm, permissiveness, etc.), only to make an astonishing proposal: “Those who mourn the loss of the organic society from the epoch before the Enlightenment will have to ¤nd a historic compromise with those
who dream of the omnipotence of emancipatory rationality” (289). The
original compromise of this type was of course attempted by the Italian
Euro-Communists in the 1970s. What is astonishing about Graw’s proposal
is that he could make it after laying the responsibility for practically every social problem in today’s Germany at the left’s door. For Felix Stern, there
clearly can be no compromise with his chosen antagonists, i.e., feminists.
His title (“Feminism and Apartheid”) and ¤rst paragraph leave no doubt
about that, since he begins with phrases like “sexist virus” and “feminist dead
end” (291). Stern fears a “totalitarian language-cleansing” led by feminist linguists, the utilization of sexual abuse charges as “divorce weapons” (he longs
for simpler times, when “a little ¶irt” in the of¤ce was taken care of unbureaucratically with a box on the ears [297]), and most of all, “the total separation of men and women”—the “feminist apartheid” (306). Anyone
familiar with contemporary Germany knows the feminist movement has
made rather modest strides there in comparison to conditions in some other
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European countries, not to speak of the U.S. (this is especially true in the areas of work and child care).
Another author who analyzes feminism is the historian Ernst Nolte, who
triggered the “Historians’ Debate.” Much of Nolte’s essay is taken up with a
reprise of his hypothesis about Italian fascism and National Socialism as (necessary and understandable) reactions to Soviet communism, but there are
other aspects as well. Nolte, who portrays himself as a “moderate conservative” (160), does not fear a rebirth of fascism in Europe (if it were to reappear,
he predicts, it would be in the U.S. or Russia [161]), but he believes that
“liberism,” a degenerate form of liberalism, could well destroy nation-states,
cause a “gigantic shift in population,” and even wipe out the human race
(160–161). One effective countermeasure to “consumerism” and “hedonism” would be the conscious choice of well-educated people to dedicate a
decade of their lives raising children (and sharing “the burdens and the joys”
as equally as possible). This would, he says, not only be bene¤cial to the environment, it would also realize “the rational and timely core of feminism”
(161). If this sounds uncharacteristic of Nolte, widely considered to be one
of the most conservative German historians, one should not ignore certain
signals embedded in the essay. Nolte discovers “strong leftist features” in the
NSDAP (153), and associates both Ludwig Klages and the Nazis with
“Green” thinking (159). He intimates that the best ideas of the left will only
be realized if put into practice by the responsible right. This is far removed
from the compromise proposed by Graw. As a footnote to the Nolte essay,
it is not surprising that similar ideas about the relationship of left and right
are found in the piece by Rainer Zitelmann,87 a journalist and historian who
is often associated with Nolte. Zitelmann makes the case for a “democratic
right” distinct from the “conformist niche conservatives” and the “antidemocratic ghetto[ized] right” (172). This implies that the German government
led by Christian Democrat Helmut Kohl88 from 1982 to 1998 was not a
government of the right. Zitelmann in fact uses the word “liberal conservative”89 to describe this government. For American readers, it is interesting to
hear that it takes some “gumption” to say openly that one sympathizes with
the right in Germany, whereas one supposedly seldom hears people deny
that they are on the left (164). In the world of American culture, it is none
other than the “L word” that is rarely heard in public. Postwar reeducation
has apparently been, at least when viewed from Zitelmann’s perspective, all
too successful.
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The section “[National] Interest” is not of great relevance here, although there are some notable statements to be found there. Controversial
historian Karlheinz Weissmann tells us that “civil society” demands at once
too much and too little from human beings, who are not completely rational
and are tied to historical tradition (313). If the latter were still quite true,
there would have been no reason to publish Die selbstbewußte Nation.
Former air force of¤cer and former Green Alfred Mechtersheimer characterizes the same Rainer Zitelmann who wishes to construct a “democratic
right” as a “leftist” with an enlightened view of nationalism (346). Mechtersheimer also predicts that in the German future, there will be a collision between the “antinationalism of the elites and the nationalism of the masses”
(363).90 The section “Resistance” contains the only essay that offers any criticism of Botho Strauß. Hartmut Lange, a well-known dramatist who left the
GDR in 1965, praises the “courageous and very unusual food for thought”
found in Impending Tragedy, but he warns that Strauß is “playing with ¤re”
(433). He reminds him that dictatorships are more opposed to art (Strauß’s
raison d’être) than mass democracies with their “anything goes” attitude.91
Lange’s essay is also notable for its separation of Jünger and Heidegger. Citing “Over the Line,” Lange claims that Jünger was wrong to think that nihilism could be overcome by positing a new meaning for life (“Sinnstiftung”),
whereas Heidegger recognized correctly that nihilism is “immanent” to human beings (442). Lange proceeds to assert that the terms “left” and “right”
are irrelevant to culture, pointing to Heidegger’s in¶uence on Sartre and Camus (443). This is a line of thinking (one foreign to many of the contributors) that is taken up in the section “Epilogue,” which was added after the
¤rst edition of the anthology.
Bavarian politician Peter Gauweiler, generally considered to be a representative of the right wing of the CSU, criticizes not the Enlightenment, but
its “bending out of shape” and “falsi¤cation” at the hands of the left (476–
477). He ends his essay not with references to Heidegger, but to Karl Jaspers,
Cicero (whose speeches against Catilina are quoted in Latin), and Orwell’s
1984. This attempt at bridge building is also the thrust of Heimo Schwilk’s
section of the epilogue, although his chosen title, “Mindless Pyromaniacs,”
suggests something quite different. He does begin with a tirade against the
“denunciation” launched against Die selbstbewußte Nation by the leftist media,
mocking leftists who hold up the banner of Habermasian “nonhegemonic discourse” while condemning those who do not share their views (465–466). He
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attests that there is not even a trace of “salon fascism” in his anthology (467).
On the contrary: The book is an illustration of the “freedom of thought”
long opposed by the left (468). He even provides a reading list for those who
would dare to follow him:
a knowledge of critical theory [i.e., the Frankfurt school], Bloch’s utopianism,
Benjamin’s spiritual materialism, Hannah Arendt’s analysis of totalitarianism,
Heidegger’s existential ontology, Carl Schmitt’s theory of the state, and Ernst
Jünger’s esthetics of the miraculous. (468)

Even more signi¤cant than this list is his own comment on it: “As necessary
as a polarization is in the political sphere, it is nonsense in the esthetic
sphere. There are no leftist or rightist metaphors, only good ones and bad
ones” (468). Two things must be said about this dictum: First, it will never
be possible to completely separate politics from culture—especially in Europe, where culture is (still) often highly subsidized—although such a separation has often been posited by both conservative social elites and
conservative artists. (Can one in all good conscience initiate legal proceedings against a Hamsun or Pound?) One should not forget that many of the
same critics—and politicians—who readily accepted the moral authority of
the anti-Soviet92 Solzhenitsyn were disinclined to accept the possibility of
such a phenomenon (Böll or Grass, for example) vis-à-vis Western society.
Second, Schwilk’s words are clearly directed to an extremely small elite.
Very few Germans have had the intellectual preparation necessary to tackle
the kind of texts that Schwilk recommends. If the target group consisted exclusively of conservative intellectuals, the number would be even smaller.
One has the impression that the editors of Die selbstbewußte Nation feel isolated from the mainstream, and that they have realized the necessity of
reaching out to sectors of (educated) society normally averse to their
Weltanschauung. Only time will tell if their efforts will be crowned with a
modicum of success.
This is not the place to survey the responses to the publication of Die
selbstbewußte Nation. Most of them concentrate upon the essay by Botho
Strauß, to which we will soon turn. It would be instructive, however to take
a brief look at the review published in Der Spiegel, probably the magazine
most vili¤ed by the intellectual New Right. The title itself is, unfortunately,
an example of the “bending” spoken of by Gauweiler: “Teachers of Hate.”93
The quotation marks in the title, easily overlooked by the casual reader, refer
to words—quoted in the last part of the review—written by the problematic
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Gerd Berg¶eth. They refer not to the authors of Die selbstbewußte Nation,
but rather to leftist intellectuals, who purportedly sow the seeds of (self-) hatred against everything German (104). After this citational sleight of hand,
Spiegel journalist Martin Doerry uses attributives like these to describe the
contributors and contributions to the volume: “scurrilous,” “a ¶ood of brownish [i.e., protofascist] prose,” “growing enthusiasm for war,” and “duds.”94
Any serious analysis of Die selbstbewußte Nation must come to the conclusion that the authors are an extremely diverse group and that the views expounded are often contradictory. The harried reader of a newsweekly may
not be interested in such ¤ne distinctions, and the editors of the weekly itself
are obviously not. Why is this signi¤cant? The reason is that very few people
have seen lengthy reviews of the anthology, but over a million at least cast a
glance at the polemic in Der Spiegel. Such are the vagaries of the free and
open public sphere.
Three years after their attempt at coalition building,95 and two years after their spectacular newspaper advertisements,96 Ulrich Schacht and Heimo
Schwilk struck out on their own, publishing a book in tandem for the ¤rst
time. The work is entitled Für eine Berliner Republik (For a Berlin Republic),
and it contains, as the subtitle informs us, “polemics, speeches, [and] essays
after 1989.”97 Only one of the pieces had not been previously published (at
least in part), and two are reprints from Die selbstbewußte Nation, i.e.,
Schacht’s “Stigma and Tribulation” and Schwilk’s “Pain and Morality.” No
fewer than ten other contributions appeared in the rightist journal Gegengift
(Antidote), which leads one to believe that the authors have come to the conclusion that publication in peripheral journals is not the way to reach one’s
intended audience. The title refers to the plan to move the German central
government from Bonn to Berlin, a move seen by many as a symbolic gesture uniting the old and new member states of the Federal Republic. The essays in Die selbstbewußte Nation written by East Germans (and not
introduced in this study up until now) demonstrate just how dif¤cult this
unifying process might be. Steffen Heitmann, an unsuccessful candidate for
federal president in 1993, laments the fact that the East German “revolution”—a term that many would not use without quali¤cations—has lost its
original impetus, which was a “moral” one (450, 447). Having said this,
Heitmann has no qualms about citing a polemic by Hans-Dietrich Sander
(for Rainer Zitelmann, a representative of the “antidemocratic right” [171])
and then refusing to make a moral judgment about Sander’s views. Among
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the views cited by Heitmann are the depiction of National Socialism as the
“failed attempt to liberate at least the Germans from the rule of modernity,”
the characterization of the Holocaust as “an interlude of unaccustomed brutality for the Germans, for Jews one grisly act of the normalcy of their history,” and the “oriental rationalism” of the “assimilated Jews” as the
“predecessor of modernity” (435). When Heitmann concludes that “evil is
lurking in human beings,” that we must thus avoid political “extremes” and
preserve the “center” (454–455), then it is clear that his idea of the center is
actually somewhere on the right. The essay by former GDR dissident Wolfgang Templin illustrates the tenuous position of oppositional ¤gures from
the East who attempt to speak to the entire nation from a position of moral
superiority. In the former West Germany, Templin sees an unlikely alliance
of ’68er leftists and “increasingly unprincipled conservatives” who failed to
confront the GDR dictatorship, choosing instead a problematic policy of
détente (458).98 He would like to see a second Historians’ Debate, one concentrating this time not on the Third Reich, but on the image of the GDR
(459–460). The fundamental problem with his perspective is that neither
the majority of Germans nor most non-Germans would place the character
and deeds of the “two German dictatorships” on the same plane. Templin
seems to acknowledge this when he calls those who do share his view a “little
band” (462).99 These are treacherous waters. How are they navigated by the
East/West German Schacht and the West German Schwilk in For a Berlin
Republic?
The lengthy preface written by the two authors gives more than a few
hints of what is to come. Before they begin to speak themselves, they attempt
to endow their enterprise with the aura of truth-seeking by providing, yet
again, a motto from Albert Camus. Camus assures us that the terms “left” or
“right” have nothing to do with the verity of a thought and adds that he
would be on the right if it seemed to him that truth could be found there.
These words are in themselves not without contradictions, but what follows
is much worse. After preparing the reader for a nonideological approach,
Schacht and Schwilk immediately launch into a polemic against the left. In
their view, 1968 was “the beginning of the wanton destruction” of the “political-moral standards” found in the West German constitution (8). In the
meantime, they assert, Germany has become “principally and habitually a republic of the ’68ers” (9). This phrase will perhaps have the unintended effect
of offering a measure of solace to the former student activists who have long
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since resigned themselves to failure or cynically made their peace with the system. What the authors are in effect saying is that of¤cial party politics is absolutely irrelevant, or rather, that the then-reigning Christian Democrats are
no less than puppets of the radical left. Although Helmut Kohl is given his
due for facilitating reuni¤cation, he is also accused of “doing the business of
the social liberalism inspired by neo-Marxism and hyper-egotism” (a puzzling juxtaposition, that) and allowing the dissipation of a state sovereignty
that had just been recovered (11). In their eyes, Germany is a country where
a whole catalogue of horrors makes everyday life practically unbearable.
These include crime, limitless self-absorption, political correctness boosted
by the mass media, abortion, homosexual marriages, the suicidal abolition of
the deutsche mark, paci¤stic ideologies, multiethnic clichés, and a politicized
legal system. (To express the nature of the latter, a new word is imported from
the U.S.: “Simpsonization” [Simpsonisierung] [10].) Even the ancient foe
west of the Rhine is resurrected: The French hope to tame the Germans by
stripping them of their economic might in the dark corridors of European
bureaucracy (12). These present problems are magni¤ed by the past, since
German self-hatred is fueled by “campaign-like, ritualized [pre-]occupation
with the Third Reich’s murder of European Jews” (12). The impersonal formulation (“Third Reich”) is immediately dropped in favor of a reference to
individual murderers, who are “numerous Germans, but also foreign secret
and special policemen, lawyers, and military men acting for German National Socialist politicians” (12–13). In the third paragraph following this
formulation, the authors criticize Germany’s “destructive immigration policies” and warn: “Whoever is not ready to preserve cultural hegemony in his
own country and to undertake the assimilation of immigrants on this basis
will also in the future forfeit his own identity” (13). There are ethnic enclaves—some of them quite large—in German cities (at least in the former
West Germany), but these are not the places where most Germans live and
work. To deny the still-overwhelming Germanness of the reuni¤ed country
is to have a distorted perception of social reality or to engage in demagoguery.
(It goes without saying that Germans of this bent have not a few counterparts
in the United States.) One might also ask just what it means to maintain “cultural hegemony” at a time when the habits and lifestyles of the Germans
themselves—see the Excursus below—are rapidly changing.
In Die selbstbewußte Nation, literature did not play a pivotal role, but
it had an overarching presence in the form of Botho Strauß’s essay “Impend-
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ing Tragedy.” Strauß’s canonization of Heidegger and Jünger as “poetphilosophers” (28) was meant to provide legitimization for his own prophecies, and other contributors, including the editors, clearly accepted the
signi¤cance of prophetic dicta from the mouths of poets. In For a Berlin Republic, the emphasis has changed from the past to the future. Now that the
historical lineage of the New Right has been traced, it is no longer necessary
to dwell upon it. Not only Heidegger and Jünger, but also Gehlen, Schmitt,
and Spengler are now peripheral ¤gures. There is one intriguing reference to
the literary background, however. In his essay against the project of European integration, Schwilk leaves no doubt that, although he is opposed to a
political/bureaucratic Europe, he is very much in favor of a metaphysical
Europe representing venerable traditions. To illustrate this viewpoint, he
cites both Novalis’s Christendom or Europe and Jünger’s 1944 manifesto
Peace. His understanding of this tradition in the present context is that Europe must be grounded on values and must also insure that its market economy take “humane and social standards” into account (74). Schacht and
Schwilk do not, however, look to contemporary authors100 for an elucidation of such values and standards. Rather, they expend considerable energy
attacking these authors for their shortcomings and problematic role in German reuni¤cation.
In a total of four essays, three by Schwilk and one by Schacht, a kind of
literary kangaroo court is set up in order to reprise and extend the “Literature Debate” of the early 1990s. In “Clueless in Berlin: German Authors and
the Revolution” (1990), Schwilk attempts to relegate authors with a political streak to the dustbin of history, accusing them of “dilettantism” (139), a
word strangely absent from his various paeans to Ernst Jünger. Writers are
also dismissed as parasites whose opposition to society is “good for publicity” but without consequences for them, since they “pro¤t” from the economic system (139–140). One must take this to mean that only writers who
never publish hold serious views worth considering. This is of course the
end of literature as we know it. In the swirl of events after 1989, it was somewhat risky to make global pronouncements of any kind, and this essay is a
case in point. Schwilk has great praise for novelist Monika Maron and her
“irreproachable biography,” and he quotes her as saying that she is more
afraid of “Grass and Piwitt” than of “Höpcke and Kant,”101 meaning that
the Western [leftist] intellectuals are worse than the Stalinist Eastern variety
(141). A few years later, it came out that Maron had been an informant for
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the secret police while in the GDR.102 In another 1990 essay, “The Dry
Bread of Utopia: The ‘Wende’ and the Intellectuals,” Schwilk seems to despair of ¤nding any writers worthy of serving the cause of conservative culture in reuni¤ed Germany:
Perhaps it is just a waste of time to generally expect from writers and artists that
exceptional ethos that distinguishes personalities like Havel, Dinescu, Solzhenitsyn, or Sakharov. The morality of these creative artists is usually found in
their works, whose most productive inspirations are vanity and self-portrayal.
There are plenty of examples of great writers who are at times opportunists
[“Gesinnungslumpen”] and political dilettantes. (163)

The unparalleled models praised here are a Czech, a Romanian, and two
Russians. Schwilk seems truly disturbed by the fact that he cannot provide
any comparable ¤gures from East Germany, and he tries—rather unconvincingly—to explain their absence by pointing to the special status of the
GDR as part of a divided country and to the unusually effective socialist “reeducation” in the GDR. The tortured logic could be symptomatic of the
fact that Schwilk himself is not unaffected by a form of German self-hatred,
a phenomenon that he and Schacht would like to eliminate.103
In his 1995 essay “Too Far A¤eld: Günter Grass and the Myth of the Nation,” Schwilk turns to the favorite literary whipping boy of the New Right.
This piece was originally published in November 1995, several months after
the controversies surrounding the commemoration of the end of World War
II. Schwilk cannot accept the fact that Grass, of all people, presented the
country with “the novel about German unity,” since he views the author as a
pathological national pedagogue consumed with his own obsessions (153).
Among these are the author’s interest in Poland, and Schwilk is outraged that
Grass could openly support the emancipation of the Polish104 nation while
rejecting the German drive for reuni¤cation from a “racist-determinist”
standpoint (i.e., the Germans will never change). Grass’s novel Ein weites
Feld (Too far a¤eld) was esthetically and politically controversial,105 but it is
less the book itself than, yet again, the “German self-hatred” displayed by
Grass—and Jürgen Habermas—that raises Schwilk’s hackles. He contrasts it
with the rebirth of the “myth of the nation . . . a spiritual reality of captivating power” (157), a rebirth that took place in the East German demonstrations of 1989. It does not surprise Schwilk that this “miracle of German
national rebirth” (156) took place in the East, for that part of the country
had, he intimates, remained more German than the rest. Once again, it is
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unsettling that he refers to the residents of that part of the country as “Central Germans” (157). These particular Germans exhibit, according to
Schwilk, “German virtues like community spirit, solidarity, inwardness, and
knowledge of tradition” (158). In the second half of the essay, Schwilk becomes so involved with his project of a “self-aware nation” displaying
“puri¤ed patriotism” (158–159) that he forgets completely about Grass and
his novel. Ironically, this novel, which has been criticized by so many, has
probably received more public attention than all of the writings of the New
Right put together. Since intellectuals are rarely free of envy, one can imagine
that Schwilk’s aggressiveness did not stem solely from philosophical disagreements.
Ulrich Schacht’s essay “The Strange Freedom: German Poets and German Unity” is intended to show that patriotism was never foreign to German
poets. He reviews verses from the Baroque period (Gryphius), the eighteenth
century (Wieland, Schiller), the Napoleonic era—when writers took up arms
against Napoleon—and the revolution of 1848, when authors contributed to
the formulation of the democratic constitution. The survey ends here, and
there is a good reason for that—although Schacht does not seem to see it:
Once national unity was achieved—not by the democrats of 1848, but by
Bismarck—only lowbrow authors continued to sing its praises. Instead of
discussing this, Schacht devotes his attention to poems by contemporary authors who are apparently less than enthusiastic about recent German reuni¤cation. Schacht discovers the persistence of a longing for a third path
between capitalism and Soviet socialism, even in poets that he truly respects,
like Volker Braun. To Schacht, the lack of patriotism shown by such ¤gures
is the result of an “incomparable process of spiritual desolation” (150). Since
Schacht concentrates almost exclusively on East German poets,106 an unexpected dichotomy is constructed: The former GDR intellectuals must be as
alienated from the populace as their West German counterparts, since they
clearly do not represent the “German virtues” extolled by Schwilk. Those few
East—and West—German writers who do (based upon Schacht’s assessment) are purportedly evidence enough that the “humane positive myth of
the German” (151) has not been extinguished completely. To an outside observer, this “evidence” does not carry much weight. The intellectuals dedicated to myth-making are and will probably remain a minority.
The question of the role of literati in nation-building may be of peripheral interest to the reader not ¤xated on the literary sphere, but the ¤rst essay
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in For a Berlin Republic is one that could and should hold the attention of
anyone concerned with the future of Germany. It is an analysis of the Goldhagen debate in Germany, and its title is a variation on the young American
scholar’s own: “Hitler’s Willing Executors: On the Logic of Power in the
German Goldhagen Debate.” Although a summary of the German debate
about Goldhagen’s book cannot be given here,107 it should be pointed out
that most observers noted a gap between the reaction of professional historians and that of the general reading public. The historians tended to emphasize errors and omissions, whereas the public displayed a mixture of
enthusiasm for the relatively young author and a deep sense of remorse for
the Holocaust.108 As one might well imagine, Ulrich Schacht is anything but
enthusiastic. His 1997 essay, the only one in For a Berlin Republic not published elsewhere, is less a review of Goldhagen’s book than a polemic against
Goldhagen’s German supporters (whom he calls “propagandists and admirers” [16]). Before entering the fray, Schacht musters “politically correct”
support in the form of two quotations. The section of the book containing
the essay is preceded by a positive assessment of the “truly talented, extraordinary” German people by then U.S. ambassador to Germany Vernon
Walters,109 and the essay itself has as its motto a statement by German-Jewish Holocaust survivor Inge Deutschkron, who compares Goldhagen’s generalizations about the Germans to Nazi practices (16). It is thus suggested to
the reader that it is not just right-wing conservative Germans who reject
Goldhagen, but even Americans and Jews. Schacht’s tactic suggests that he
might be worried about a backlash that could harm his conservative project
in reuni¤ed Germany.
Schacht’s actual target is not Goldhagen, but rather Jürgen Habermas,
the “militant spiritus rector with rational-shamanist denunciation rhetoric,”110
for whom Hitler’s Willing Executioners is a gift, or, to use Schacht’s military
imagery, an “impressive delivery of ammunition” (17), an “anachronistic argumentation bomb” (21). If “eliminatory anti-Semitism” did in fact, as
Goldhagen claims, permeate every fact of German society before 1933, then
the constant resurrection of that phenomenon could have a deleterious effect
on the (re-?)construction of a self-con¤dent nation. Instead of engaging in
damage control, however, Schacht literally loses control. Habermas is accused
of organizing an “institute for applied repressive tolerance” and transforming
the social sciences into “police sciences” used to spy on the populace (18).
Habermas’s “destructive delusions” (i.e., the possibility of a rerun of fascism,
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the necessity of replacing the old nationalism with constitutional patriotism)
are compared with “vampire research” (18). Jan Philipp Reemtsma of the
Hamburg Institute for Social Research, who praises Goldhagen, is portrayed
as a “quasi-racist” whose “methodological Stalinism” and “orgy of suspicion”
are “virulent” (20). What is odd about this is that it was not right-wing historians who criticized Goldhagen, but left-liberals. Were Schacht’s compatriots asleep? That is not likely. Instead, one could imagine that the taboo
against attacking Jews was still quite effective. Axel Springer, the late publisher of the tabloid Bildzeitung and the blandly conservative Die Welt, always
took a pro-Israeli stance, and Schacht himself has called for German military
support for Israel, as we have seen. This position, long a ¤g leaf hiding other
unsavory sentiments like xenophobia and racism, may well lose its effectiveness as a result of Schacht’s tirades. It is true that Schacht does stray from his
polemical mission by launching into a rather ho-hum review of leftist fascism
theories, but before putting down his pen, he takes the offensive again. He
revels in the discomfort of the (leftist) German audience (caught up in “antiGerman destructive hate”) forced to listen to Goldhagen praise postwar West
Germany as a great democratic success (29), and he believes that he has witnessed the Waterloo of leftist pseudomorality, one that he describes as “ermächtigungsgesetzlich” (i.e., similar to the Nazi seizure of power in 1933)
(30). The real neofascists, he hopes to teach us, are not the right-wingers, but
the hypocritical leftists. Before this lesson can sink in, however, Schacht
makes yet another tactical error. He describes the Holocaust as “undeniable,”
only to add that it was perpetrated by
politicians, policemen, lawyers, secret agents, German soldiers, and SS formations of National Socialist Germany, and [my emphasis] their foreign collaborators in the uniforms of the French gendarmerie, Dutch police, Latvian and
Lithuanian SS men, or Polish and Ukrainian thugs in this or that garb. (30)

The structure of this sentence leads the reader to the conclusion that the Germans and their collaborators played roughly equal parts in the Holocaust. If
Schacht truly does believe this, his criticism of Goldhagen’s book (“It is primarily speculative. One just has to believe it.” [28]) rings hollow.111 To lend
credence to his argument, he cites Eric Hobsbawm, Ruth Bettina Birn, and
Christopher Browning (33). Cite them he may, but he in no shape or form
shares the same intellectual and moral universe. He accuses the German intellectual left, his real adversary, of “shameless fornication with the dead of
Auschwitz” and an “eliminatory hate” of all that is German, accompanied by
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“self-righteousness and ice-cold arrogance” (34–35). The essay ends with a
rejection of the singularity of the Holocaust. Schacht asserts that the German
media are under “almost totalitarian [leftist] control” (17). He should in fact
consider himself fortunate that this control—be it “totalitarian” or not—
keeps his views from the general public, and, more importantly, from international attention. If the paranoia, projections, and polemics of Schacht and
other New Rightists were widely disseminated, the global community would
in all likelihood wonder if the granting of full sovereignty to the Federal Republic was somewhat precipitous.112 One enterprise that could quickly endanger that sovereignty would be the attempt to use Schacht’s description of
the reuni¤ed country as “Rump Germany” (“Restdeutschland” [181]) as the
basis of a political program.113
Schacht’s speech “The Measure of Shock: On the Fiftieth Anniversary of
May 8, 1945” is problematic in similar ways. In order to shake up his audience,114 Schacht once again chooses to use the language of Auschwitz. He
compares the leftist intellectuals who mourn the Nazi victims deeply, but the
Soviet victims only in passing, to those who decided who should live and who
should die in the concentration camps. For him, these people are “the suffering selectors on the ideological ramp of the year 1995” (48). Their supposed
hegemony in German society is described as “Gleichschaltung,” i.e., a new
version of the Nazi homogenization program that no longer (thanks in part
to the mass media) needs a one-party dictatorship to succeed. He will have us
believe that, ¤fty years after World War II, Germany is very close to the totalitarian regime depicted in Orwell’s 1984 (49). The “cultural of¤cers of the
West German special consciousness who profess paci¤sm” are in actuality the
ones bent on destroying German identity (51–52). We are not told just who
these people might be,115 but we do learn that they consider Mickey Mouse
cartoons to be a higher form of culture than German Romanticism, simply
because the latter was “supposedly prefascist” (52). For those who do not
fathom this logic, one could add that Mickey Mouse is a product of Western
civilization, and the postwar Germans are accused of fetishizing absolutely
anything that emanates from the West. It is arduous to have to wade through
such verbiage, and the task is not made easier by Schacht’s self-recycling. Instead of editing the material destined for this volume, the individual texts are
simply put together between two book covers. The May 8 speech thus parallels Schacht’s “Stigma and Tribulation,” a reprinted chapter from Die selbstbewußte Nation that is placed here cheek-to-jowl with the speech. Both texts

Chap_two.fm Page 71 Friday, August 25, 2000 1:20 PM

Reuni¤cation and the Right’s Quest for Respectability

/// 71

have the same quotations from Elias Canetti (44 and 54) and Hannah Arendt
(44 and 55), and both discuss “concern” (Sorge) for Israel (45 and 58). The
misuse of Canetti is, incidentally, quite distasteful. The 1945 passage in question, from Canetti’s Sketches, 1942–1972 reads as follows:
When spring comes, the sadness of the Germans will be an inexhaustible well,
and not much will still distinguish them from the Jews. Hitler has turned the
Germans into Jews in just a few years, and “German” has now become a word
as painful as “Jewish.” (54)

Schacht laments the fact that this text is not discussed in German schools,
but he sees only the second part of it, namely the victimization and stigmatization of the Germans. He has nothing to say about how Canetti’s prophecy did not come true: in 1945, not endless sadness and mourning were the
order of the day in Germany, but rather the beginning of a long-term repression of the immediate past. Given that Schacht is familiar with the work of
Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich (see above), this lacuna is the result
either of purely tactical considerations or of ideological blinders. Is Schacht
capable of providing a more insightful and straightforward analysis of the
former GDR and its legacy?
In the May 8 speech, the one contemporary German who is singled out
as a model and named directly is East German Joachim Gauck, the director
of the of¤ce charged with dealing with the activities and ¤les of the GDR Secret Police. Gauck is viewed by most, though not all, Germans as someone
sel¶essly dedicated to preserving the memory of the GDR past as a warning
for future generations. In For a Berlin Republic, Schacht contributes several
essays to this project. One of these, “We Brandenburgers: Memories of the
First Secretary of the Bureaucratic Murderers” [Schreibtischmörder], sheds
light on Schacht’s innermost motivation as a writer. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Schacht strolls through East Berlin and buys a copy of the propagandistic biography Erich Honecker—A Life for the People. Sitting in a café
in Friedrichstraße, he leafs through it and comes across a photo of the prison
in Brandenburg-Görden where Honecker was held as a political prisoner by
the Nazis from 1937 to 1945. He managed to escape from a work detail outside the prison about two months before the end of the war, but in his
of¤cial biography, he is said to have been liberated by the Soviets.116 Schacht
is incensed that Honecker could insult the victims (of fascism?) with his
“liberation performance” (105). To him, Honecker is yet another embodiment of the “banality of evil”117 (Hannah Arendt), and he refuses to grant
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him the status of a resistance ¤ghter who “fought for humanity although
threatened with death” (105). To do this is to deny that German communists suffered and died under Nazi terror, and, more signi¤cantly, to deny
that the personal experiences of these victims played any role in their political and personal behavior after 1945. Schacht effectively engages in dehumanization, despite his partisanship for humanity. This puzzle is solved by
Schacht himself, albeit obliquely. When he looks at pictures of the Brandenburg prison, he looks for his own face: “Behind one of the barred windows:
1974, 1975, 1976” (104). He not only provides us with his prisoner identi¤cation number, but also recounts the story of his own resistance against
the East German communists. The harsh realities of his life as a prisoner are
undeniable and inexcusable, but Schacht’s prose creates the portrait of a heroic resistance ¤ghter who overcame every obstacle and retained absolute
personal integrity to the bitter end. This is indeed a story worth telling, but
when it is told by Schacht himself, it smacks of self-elevation. A sense of
moral superiority was probably a means of survival in an East German
prison, but the same sense can easily be transformed into arrogance in the
post-1989 political scene. In addition, when the superiority is not accepted
or is even questioned, the result is often aggression, insult, and vitriol. Sadly,
Schacht engages in the same “selection of the dead” that he has accused West
German leftists of: there are “victims of the purest kind” (108) who deserve
our veneration, and pseudo-victims like Honecker. As for Schacht himself,
he was “never a victim,” he declares, because he never accepted Honecker’s
system. Ironically, Schacht ends this essay by saying that he is “sorry for” the
benighted Honecker (110), who did his duty (like many other Germans of
his generation, one might add). It is the West Germans who negotiated with
Honecker rather than ostracizing him for whom Schacht’s deepest contempt
is reserved.
Schacht’s essay “The Sacrosanct Dictator: Erich Honecker and His Societal Defenders” continues in the same vein. It need not be discussed here,
with the exception of one point that is relevant in another area of the volume.
Schacht attacks Rudolf Bahro, one-time prominent GDR dissident and political prisoner, for thinking aloud about a possible historical legitimacy of the
GDR. Although Bahro’s political activities in the West—he worked with the
Greens and was active in the New Age alternative scene—are not the topic at
hand, Schacht cannot help but castigate him for his “ecologically oriented totalitarianism” (112). This epithet is developed into a full-blown argument by
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Heimo Schwilk in another part of the collection. The title of the essay, “SelfBetrayal as a Virtue: The SED State and Its West German Collaborators,”
speaks for itself. It is a condemnation of détente as “inhumane and reactionary” (88) and a vili¤cation of its proponents as collaborators. The analogy
with the fascist era does not quite ¤t, however, especially since Schacht
chooses to end the piece with another quote from Camus about “leftist collaborators.” One of the characteristics of these people, according to Camus,
is a toleration or even acceptance of anti-Semitism (92). The deténte policymakers have been accused of many things, but this is patently absurd.118 No
less absurd is the misstep involved in quoting Gottfried Benn at the beginning of the section that contains the essay on collaborators. Writing in 1946,
the (former Nazi collaborator) Benn expresses surprise that the “so-called intellectuals” fall prey to political ideologies (77). Finally, the brief polemic
“Dangerous Legacy: The PDS and Its Clandestine Admirers” warns West
Germans not to fraternize with the East German neocommunist Party of
Democratic Socialism, since many of its members belonged to the “hard
core” of the toppled regime (183). In a strange twist, Schacht criticizes the intellectual supporters of the PDS as “anti-Western . . . anticapitalist, and antiAmerican” (184). These are positions not unknown among the contributors
to Die selbstbewußte Nation.
As has been mentioned above, Heimo Schwilk comes from a very different background, and his writings bear the stamp of a corresponding animus. Although he is no stranger to polemics, from time to time he provides
the reader with a glimpse of a pessimistic streak. In 1996, for example, he
complained that the chance to “turn” the reunited country to a domestic
and foreign policy in the national interest, one prepared by a “spiritual, order-oriented, moral-ethical and economic shift,” had been “pathetically
squandered” (211).119 A year later, he predicted that even “contemplating”
right-wing alternatives could in the future become a punishable offense, and
he went on to advise conservative thinkers to become accustomed to “an existence in the catacombs” (180). At the end of that passage, he used the
phrase “holding out even though the situation is hopeless.” This is a description of the dilemma of the later Jünger,120 who had given up all hope of seeing a transformation of society in his lifetime. It is far removed from the
Camus-inspired stance of absolute freedom and pugnacity favored by
Schacht. Schwilk has not given up yet, however. He continues on as a conservative mole, inspired by the Goethe quotation placed before one of his
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political essays: “One cannot change one’s century, but one can stand up
against it and lay the groundwork for salutary developments” (175).
What is, however, the nature of this “century” when seen through
Schwilk’s eyes? It is surely not the one seen by most Germans. First of all, the
Social Democrats, who were out of power from 1982 to 1998, and who have
only held the chancellorship for a total of fourteen years (out of almost ¤fty),
are the true victors. Schwilk speaks of the “Kohl system,” which is none other
than the “universal social-democratization” of Germany (175). Whereas some
of the other European countries with comparable systems have seen the light
of “Thatcherism” (praised as a practical American way of doing things [177]),
Germany is in an era of “national decline” (176). This is hardly an original
viewpoint, but what distinguishes it from its formulation by less right-wing
observers is the insistence that Germany is ¤rmly in the grip of the “’68ers and
their pro¤t-seeking fellow travelers,” who are responsible for the “nihilism” of
public life and the battle against all traditions (177).121 For Schwilk (and
Schacht), a typical representative of this group is Dr. Rita Süssmuth, then the
president of the Federal Parliament. Süssmuth, who does believe in equal opportunity for women, was born in 1937, ¤nished her Ph.D. in 1964, and was
a young professor long before the students took to the streets. She is considered to be a liberal member of the CDU, but her ideas are not close to those
of the Greens’ Joschka Fischer (an archetypal ’68er, but one without real political power until his appointment as foreign minister in 1998). What “’68er”
really means is anyone who does not believe that the only hope for Germany
lies in a return to the reigning values of the pre-1933 period. Schwilk cannot
reconcile himself to the fact that, since Hitler took advantage of these values
(Schwilk’s list: “a readiness to take risks, the will to renewal, daring, a readiness
to sacri¤ce, achievement, punctuality, order, loyalty” [178]), they have become discredited. What has in fact changed is something else: in the process
of postwar democratization, more ordinary citizens have a voice in determining what to take risks and make sacri¤ces for, what to achieve, and who deserves their loyalty. This is often a messy business in a democracy, and today’s
Germans are no less acquisitive or self-centered than anyone else, but the alternative proposed by the New Right—an alternative that is never really ¶eshed
out to any great extent—does not exert any great attraction. At least not so
far.122 One must concur when Schwilk postulates that German immobilism
can be primarily attributed to the consequences of National Socialism (179),
and these are not likely to disappear in the near future.
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Schwilk contributes essays on, or rather, against political correctness and
United Europe that recapitulate what he and Schacht have said before. His attack on the Greens—“Eco-Pharisees or The German Desire for Destruction”
—deserves a closer look, however, since environmental consciousness and the
Green Party are factors to be reckoned with in Germany. Schwilk is so anxious to dismantle the ecology movement as a viable political alternative in
Germany that he engages in an activity that he (and Schacht) have often condemned, namely, the construction of a catastrophic tradition in German history. The concrete manifestations of German politics have been determined
(he does not say partially determined ) for centuries by ambivalence—a “genuinely German phenomenon”—an ambivalence that burdens the German
mentality. Oscillating between “moralism and dreams of destruction, belief
and applied rationality, fear and a desire for renewal,” the Germans have gravitated toward an “apocalyptic messianism” (195). The explanation for this,
according to Schwilk, must be sought in Germany’s central geographic location in Europe, religious con¶icts, imperial dreams, and in the ambitions of
its neighbors. Once again, we have arrived at the “special path.” It is, however,
dif¤cult to take the construction of this path seriously when one reads that
not only the Nazis, but also Kant and German idealism are part of it (196).123
The most recent manifestation is supposedly the Green movement, which
pairs apocalyptic warnings with hypocrisy (i.e., wailing while consuming
high-end goods). Reading Schwilk, one gets the impression that all of the
Greens are from the upper middle class, “eco-pharisees” who praise asceticism
without practicing it themselves. This does not jibe with his claim that, in coalition with the SPD, they use tax money to support the following groups:
“gays, lesbians, drug addicts, criminals, autonomous (i.e., left-wing extremist) activists, anarchists [“Chaoten”], communists, and squatters who reject,
disregard, or ¤ght against the values and norms of our free society” (198).
This confused piece of prose tells us little about the ecology movement, but
much about Schwilk’s enemies list. At the end, Schwilk reports with obvious
satisfaction that the German economic crisis has led to a drop in interest in
ecological questions (200). In place of the purportedly inconceivable combination of “emancipation ideology” and “asceticism,” he proposes a “controlled modernism” that would give both nature and man their due (201). In
his fervor, Schwilk has overlooked something relevant to his own project.
Many observers who attempt to come to grips with the Green Party and the
ecological movement in Germany discuss the conservative roots of the protest

Chap_two.fm Page 76 Friday, August 25, 2000 1:20 PM

76

///

Literary Skinheads?

against industrialization and the consumer society, beginning with the educated middle class (Bildungsbürgertum) in the nineteenth century.124 One has
even asserted that the Greens are the “true conservatives,” those who strive to
“conserve what is worth conserving and preserve what is worth preserving.”125 It is clear that the title “true conservative” cannot be shared, so
Schwilk’s vehemence is understandable. His dilemma is unlikely to be resolved in the near future, since the “modernity” of which he speaks has shown
few signs of responding to the feeble attempts to “control” it. Given that he
has called for some sort of German Thatcherism himself (see above), the
phrase “controlled modernity” is a sham.
At the end of For a Berlin Republic, Schacht and Schwilk mount the podium once more in order to speak of the future. In “The Answer of History:
Will Our System Be Able to Transform Itself?” Schacht labels Habermas a
Trotskyite in disguise (240) and produces Jacob Burkhardt as an early witness
to the “demagogic core of all Enlightenment philosophy” (241). Despite
this, he unexpectedly calls for a dialogue with “the authentic representatives
of the ’68ers,” whom he distinguishes from the “petit-bourgeois imitators”
[Epigonen] of that generation (243). Why might he wish to exchange ideas
with those whom he has vili¤ed so thoroughly? The answer lies in his fear of
a German apocalypse (this is apparently different from the apocalypse envisioned by some Greens and belittled by Schwilk). Schacht warns us that if the
“radical transformation within the system” is no longer possible, the “radical
change [i.e., replacement] of the system is inevitable” (243). In other words,
if the New Right is not given its chance, another model will take over, and
this could well be another attempt to save Germany from modernity by
means of fascism.126 Such rhetoric is a variant of the slogans used by left-wing
extremists in the 1970s (“First brown, then red!”) with the difference that
Schacht hopes to prevent the apocalypse by nipping the “brown” phase in the
bud. Despite the oil crisis and recessionary retrenchments, the leftist version
held little appeal. The new reformulation has not achieved much resonance
so far either. In contrast to such forbodings, Schwilk—usually the more pessimistic of the two—chooses to strike an upbeat note by using as a motto a
prophecy by U.S. diplomat Richard Holbrooke: “In ¤ve years, the entire
world will regard Berlin as the capital and center of Europe” (244). In “From
the Bonn to the Berlin Republic: Plea for a National Shift [“Wende”] in Germany,” Schwilk predicts that the new republic will no longer be able to prolong “national-masochistic pathologies” or the “boundless hedonistic
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repression of the West German welfare state” (245). One explanation for this
is his belief that, whereas “national” projects remain suspect in the West, the
revival of national pride could come from the newly incorporated East. (One
recalls that Schwilk’s focus at Die Welt is on the former GDR.) First, however,
the alleged hegemony of the ideas of 1968—“the continuation of 1933 with
other means and an especially momentous date of shame in our history”
(246)—must be broken.127 Schwilk is so ¤xated with this endeavor (despite
Schacht’s tentative attempts at dialogue just a few pages back!) that he does
not hesitate to enlist the aid of liberal academic and journalist Richard Herzinger,128 who condemns the ’68ers as “political enemies of liberal democracy
per se” (247). Searching for the roots of German identity, Schwilk quotes
Hegel about the “special role” of the Germans in the intellectual sphere and
praises the representatives of idealism rejected by Schacht (248). He characterizes the “mass murder of the Jews” as the “nadir of a perverted striving for
‘purity’ and ‘cleansing’” and worries about the “inclination of the Germans
toward the ideal, universal, or totalitarian solution” (248). Has Saul suddenly
become Paul? Only to a certain extent. Although Schwilk admits that it is
dif¤cult to be proud of being a German, he also rejects “ritualized abhorrence
or self-hatred” (248–249). If one combines this stance with his praise of German cultural profundity (247), the gulf between him and Günter Grass is no
longer unbridgeable. In fact, he almost (at least at the end of the volume)
seems closer to Grass than to Schacht.
What is one to make of this? Perhaps sloppy editing and haste have obscured the New Right creed as proclaimed in For a Berlin Republic. If this
were the case, then more clarity might be expected in the future. A comparison of this volume with Die selbstbewußte Nation makes such a prospect unlikely, however. Creative thinking—including a stimulating rethinking of
earlier concepts and critiques—can only be encountered rarely, and contradictions can be discovered both within individual contributions and between various contributors. The overriding propensity is toward resentment,
resulting in a striking out in all directions. These angry young men—many
of whom are graying at the temples—have so far not succeeded in channeling their rage (reminiscent of “white male backlash” in the U.S.) into a coherent program for political action and social change. It is dif¤cult to
imagine how such a program might look, given the dif¤culty of juxtaposing
a concern for the entire “Volk” with Thatcherism, a rejection of the mass
media with attempts to in¤ltrate such media, and the advocacy of religiously
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anchored values with an increasingly secularized populace. In addition, the
myriad attempts at critique have yet to lead to creative production in the culture sphere. A younger generation of conservative authors has not yet made
its appearance,129 and the tastes of the reading public presently run more to
Anglo-American middle-brow novels than to Teutonic profundities (whether
articulated from left or right). German feature ¤lms with themes even marginally relevant to conservative cultural renewal are few and far between.130
Practically the only conservative art, i.e., art devoted to variations of traditional models, is produced by former GDR painters like Werner Tübke. Can
one thus conclude that the New Right has had negligible impact on the cultural sphere in post-Wall Germany? That conclusion would be justi¤ed if
one examined only the younger generation(s). In actuality, the lion’s share of
media attention and publicity has not been directed toward the would-be
theoreticians of the New Right, but rather to two established writers of the
1968 generation, namely Botho Strauß (b. 1944) and Peter Handke (b.
1942). Might the “right turn” discerned in the writing of these prominent
¤gures be the harbinger of the cultural, political and societal paradigm shift
anticipated by Schacht, Schwilk, and others?
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Doctor Pusch had once again gotten ready to take off, and he had
gone over to America. Yet he found freedom there freer than he
liked, and very soon after he had tried living in New York, then in
Chicago, he returned to Europe.1

%

he American hemisphere, in the form of metaphor, myth, and utopia,
has been a presence in Germany for hundreds of years. Germans, like
other Europeans, long projected their dreams and fears onto the terra
incognita on the other side of the world. After the founding of the United States,
myths gradually gave way to new cultural, political, and social realities, to
which numerous German immigrants contributed. Re¶ecting a characteristic
ambivalence, German observers have felt both an af¤nity with and an aversion
to the American project more pronounced than any other found on the European continent. The positive feelings about democracy, ef¤ciency, and technology that arose in the nineteenth century have been at times overshadowed by
resentments regarding the American role in the military defeat of Germany in
the two world wars. In addition, the American popular culture that began to
sweep the world in the 1920s and has in the meantime penetrated into almost
every corner of the globe has elicited enthusiasm from the masses and skepticism, if not outright scorn, from the educated elite. Postwar attempts at reeducation and the presence of American troops since 1945 have of course also had
a tremendous impact. In short, the U.S. has been the most signi¤cant “other”
in German life for over a half-century. (The Russian presence in the former
///
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GDR, though signi¤cant, was not—if one considers the long term—a comparable phenomenon.)
American in¶uence is often discussed on a purely theoretical plane. To
illustrate its quotidian ubiquitousness, I have selected a number of passages
from Der Tagesspiegel, the Berlin daily, from August 1997 to January 1998.
They represent only a fraction of the information about, interpretation of,
and comparison with America available day in and day out in the print and
visual media. An alien reader who knew nothing about the earth’s geography
might well have the impression that Germany and the U.S. were not separated by an ocean, but rather close neighbors.
• On a tour of the U.S., Dieter Schulte, head of the German Labor Federation
(DGB), asserts that wages are too high in Germany, and that the Germans
talk things to death rather than acting creatively like the Americans. (“In
Amerika wird einfach mal etwas ausprobiert,” August 2, 1997.)
• After Brandenburg’s prime minister, Manfred Stolpe, publicly worries that
Germany will fall apart trying to copy the American system, American historian David Schoenbaum feels the need to lecture him about “American conditions” (excessive energy use, the gap between private wealth and state
funding, the love affair with guns, the number of people without health
insurance), claiming that “relatively few Americans” are affected by them.
(“Amerikanische Zustände,” August 9–10, 1997.)
• After wearing a Stetson on a European tour and talking tough, the American
secretary of state is dubbed “Sheriff Albright.” (Stefan Kornelius, “Der Erste
unter Ungleichen,” August 9–10, 1997.)
• Reporter Rainer Stadler is not impressed with arguments against af¤rmative
action. His article begins: “Berkeley, of all places.” (“Korrekt und ungleich,”
August 30–31, 1997.)
• Andrew Young speaks in the legendary Nikolai Church in Leipzig, one of the
centers of the GDR opposition before 1989. Some listeners leave early, shaking their heads because Young talks not about the civil rights movement they
so revere, but rather about business. He characterizes the opening of a Mercedes plant in Alabama as “one of the greatest victories of the civil rights
movement.” (Paul Stoop, “Big Business: Verbündeter im Kampf für die
Menschenrechte,” September 5, 1997.)
• Reporter Rüdiger Scheidges is skeptical about trying out the “get tough” policies of U.S. police departments in Germany. He points out that the U.S., “the
most industrialized, most capitalist, most technically advanced country in the
world,” still has a murder rate twenty times higher than Britain and ten times
higher than Germany. (“Mit aller Gewalt gegen Gewalt,” September 11, 1997.)
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• A German expert on labor law wants his colleagues to consider the American
method of job creation, “even though . . . it increases the economic inequality in the populace more and more and creates a growing class of marginalized workers.” (Martin Gehlen, “Das amerikanische Jobwunder—eine
zwiespältige Verheißung,” September 21, 1997.)
• The ¤rst McDonald’s restaurant is opened in Potsdam. Prime Minister Manfred Stolpe (see above!) is photographed taking a big bite out of a hamburger.
Preservationists had been against the opening, but youth members of the
Christian Democrats applaud it, saying that now the Potsdamers have an alternative to “conservative gastronomy [!].” (“Ein kräftiger Biß in den ‘BrandenBurger,’” October 9, 1997.)
• In an article about the Crazy Horse Memorial in South Dakota, an American journalist is quoted as saying that the people behind the memorial are
“news Nazis.” Tagesspiegel reporter Robert von Rimscha explains to his readers: “In contemporary American usage, the suf¤x ‘-Nazi’ refers to a stubborn
ideologue who only accepts his own truths.” (“Das größte Denkmal der
Welt,” October 13, 1997.)
• In a review of the movie Air Force One, critic Jan Schulz-Ojala expresses his
disgust at the role of German directors in Hollywood: “American directors
shy away from making such cineastic stories for ¤rst graders. . . . In Roland
Emmerich [Independence Day] . . . and now Wolfgang Petersen, Hollywood
has found two Germans who are willing to deliver crude patriotism —and
they’re even proud of it.” (“Fritzchen spielt Krieg,” October 23, 1997.) In
an interview with Petersen in the same edition, the director admits that, “as a
German,” he was not able to try his hand at patriotic ¤lms.
• In an interview with American expatriate author Donna Leon, German
readers are provided with the following tidbit: “Today, I feel like a foreigner
in my own country. . . . Everything there is plastic, everything is garbage
. . . I no longer desire to live in the midst of all this cultural trash—and to
be constantly subjected to the terror of pseudo-psychological gabbing.”
(“Kritische Italien-Liebhaberin,” November 2, 1997.)
• Gary Smith, the newly appointed founding director of the American Academy in Berlin, tells his interviewer: “This shouldn’t sound arrogant, but a
half-century after the Berlin Airlift (Luftbrücke), we are initiating a kind of
intellectual airlift.” (“Eine intellektuelle Luftbrücke,” November 12, 1997.)
• Robert von Rimscha describes American anxiety about globalization (the
“fast-track” bill had just been voted down) and concludes: “The U.S.A. . . . ,
which likes to make fun of social-welfare-oriented Frenchmen and Germans
because of their timidity and deliberateness, have now demonstrated that
fear of the new has a majority at home, too.” (“Angst made in U.S.A.,”
November 12, 1997.)
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• In a review of Zbigniew Brzezinski’s new book The Grand Chessboard,
Jacques Schuster states: “After all, the United States is one of the few powerful nations that will ¤nish this century for the most part morally undamaged. Beyond that, its principles are values that are worth living by.” (“Kein
Interesse an globaler Konkurrenz,” December 6, 1997.)
• “America is religious and multiethnic. That won’t change, even if the immigration laws become more restrictive and bizarre groups claim the status of
religions.” (Robert von Rimscha, “Religiös und multiethnisch,” December 27,
1997.)
• “Drastic change arouses mistrust in Germany—for understandable historical
reasons. However, a dramatic shift is exactly what the world increasingly
demands.” (Fred Kempe [editor of Wall Street Journal Europe], “Der ‘German Dream’ von Ruhe und Frieden,” December 28, 1997.)
• “The puritan esthetic is not permitted to be an end in itself; it must have a
message, the most edifying message possible. A Christ ¤gure submerged in
urine does not look very edifying. . . . One side calls for political correctness,
the other for patriotic correctness. Both are (in the European view) esthetic
nonsense. As if nonconformist, disturbing, undemocratic, and message-free
content . . . had not always been the privilege of the arts.” (Andreas Zielcke,
“Frohe Botschaft,” December 31, 1997 / January 1, 1998.)
• “No graf¤ti on the walls of the single-family homes with porches and back
yards. The venerable walls of the university are decorated with neither posters nor political slogans. In Princeton, demonstrations don’t have to be broken
up, for there are none. Whoever lives here is content. Princeton is beautiful,
and Princeton is not America.” (Hans W. Korfmann, “Hier gibt es keine
Demonstrationen,” January 2, 1998.)
• “Critics of the gigantic highway expansion are most upset about the shopping malls out in the country. . . . With their dozens of shops and free parking, they cause the traf¤c problems, they say. But the objections are coming
too late. When Berlin and Brandenburg agreed in 1993 not to allow another
‘Wild East,’ most of the shopping malls were already up and running or
under construction.” (Claus-Dieter Steyer, “Im Kriechgang zum Einkaufstempel,” January 4, 1998.)

The wealth of information about the U.S. might be one reason why the Germans have such strong opinions about the former occupying power. It is certainly indisputable that they know much more about us than we do about
them. This has of course always been the lot of small(er) states.
Many of the key ¤gures in the German tradition of conservative cultural
criticism, including Nietzsche, George, Hofmannsthal, and Thomas Mann,
felt ambivalence, even antipathy toward the United States.2 Many of the
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contributors to Die selbstbewußte Nation picked up this thread. To bring
these sentiments into focus, one might consider the following two statements made in 1925, during the most stable period of the Weimar Republic.
The ¤rst expresses sympathy, even enthusiasm for the U.S.:
Concrete and sentimental, thus in a positive sense naïve—such is the method
of Americanism, in the life of the soul and the spirit as in practical affairs. No
burden of culture weighs this method down. It is young, barbaric, uncultivated, willful. It has that free and strong breath we sense in the poems of Walt
Whitman and which already enchanted Baudelaire. It follows no abstract or
historical ideal, but instead follows life. Americanism is fanaticism for life, for
its worldliness and its present-day forms.
Americanism thus appears as the strongest opponent of romanticism,
which sought to ¶ee worldliness. It is the natural enemy of all distraction from
the present, whether through a backward-looking conception of history,
through the mystical, or through intellectualism.3

In this text, America has become an illustration of German vitalist philosophy.
The reference to the “burden of culture” also harks back to Goethe’s 1827
poem “To the United States,” in which the poet envies the people who need
not engage in “useless remembering.”4 Those who believe in the inherent superiority of a culture that has evolved over time—despite their veneration of
the Goethean icon—are of course horri¤ed by this and fear what is to come:
An equivalence of souls unconsciously arises, a mass soul created by the growing drive toward uniformity, an atrophy of nerves in favor of muscles, the extinction of the individual in favor of the type. Conversation, the art of
speaking, is danced and sported away, theater brutalized into cinema; literature
becomes the practice of momentary fashions. . . . And since everything is
geared to the shortest units of time, consumption increases; thus does genuine
education—the patient accumulation of meaning over the course of a lifetime—become a quite rare phenomenon in our time, just like everything else
that can be achieved only by individual exertion. . . . What is the source of this
terrible wave threatening to wash all the color, everything particular out of life?
Everyone who has been there knows: America. The historians of the future will
one day mark the page following the great European war as the beginning of
the conquest of Europe by America.5

Although he perhaps was not aware of it, the author of these lines was not
speaking about Europe at all, but rather about the European cultural elite
and its conception of what the “Old World” should be. From the perspective
of the masses, life had become actually more colorful than before thanks to
the availability of cheap entertainment in the form of movies, gramophones,
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radio, competitive sports, dance halls, etc.6 High culture had not been consumed by the masses in earlier epochs (Shakespeare’s Globe Theatre being a
notable exception), and that did not change. What did change was the status
granted to those who produced works of high culture. Over a period of time,
the creators of such culture had to yield their pedestals to technological wizards like Edison, daring adventurers like Lindbergh, and athletes like Joe
Louis (or, in the German case, Max Schmeling).
Although the decline of the Bildungsbürgertum began in the nineteenth
century, it has yet to reach its conclusion. Some conservatives even dream of
reversing the process of decline.7 The lamentations of the last hundred years
continue to be repeated with little variation:
Someone has said that the people (“Volk”) is the highest and the lowest. That
may be accurate in a historical sense, even more so in a mythical one. Today,
however, the German people no longer creates a secret treasure in the soul of
the individual, a treasure from which he could derive strength. He [the people]
is nothing but a moody, lazy majority potentate. A destroyer of absolutely all
intellectual power. He speaks German only out of laziness. Most of his emotions and interests could be better expressed in American [English].8

Botho Strauß wrote these words in the 1990s, shortly before the publication
of “Impending Tragedy.” His vision of the German people in its unspoiled
state is a Romantic idealization of a people’s community (Volksgemeinschaft)
that may or may not have existed in a distant past. The idea of a “treasure” produced by a homogenous culture is similar to the “secret Germany” (geheimes
Deutschland) yearned for in the George Circle. Peter Handke has expressed
similar feelings, but there is one important difference. Whereas Strauß, despite his interest in American literature and theater, never felt especially close
to the U.S., Handke did. As a critic has recently pointed out, the protagonist
of his 1972 novel The Short Letter about a Long Good-bye (Der kurze Brief zum
langen Abschied) did not fear that his European identity and artistic sensitivity would be damaged by “eating fast food at some gas station in the U.S.A.”
Until 1989, when he wrote his Essay on the Jukebox (Versuch über die Jukebox), his love of pop culture and “commodity esthetics” remained strong,
and anti-American resentments did not appear. It was only the disappearance of the old Yugoslavia that brought forth anti-Western feelings.9
German elitist writers and other New Right intellectuals would be less
concerned about the in¤ltration of American mass culture if they were to
read—and believe—the analyses of it provided by certain scholars writing in
English. Richard Pells, for example, argues that “the ‘Americanization’ of Eu-
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rope is a myth. A powerful and enduring myth, often cherished by the Europeans themselves because they can use it to explain how their societies
have changed in ways they don’t like, but a myth nonetheless.” Despite Allied efforts at postwar reeducation, Germany provides, according to Pells, in
its “mixture of acquiescence and de¤ance,” an illustration of the European
ability to resist outside pressure. The motivation behind Pells’s book is a desire to advocate democratic “free choice” as opposed to the “paternalistic
prescription” favored by European elites.10 Similarly, Rob Kroes describes
how American cultural products are adapted to European sensibilities, and
he celebrates the “resilience [of] . . . the old European cultures that refuses to
be washed away easily.”11 Kroes speaks of “cultural appropriation,” of “an
experiment in creative identi¤cation,”12 but neither he nor Pells has much
empathy for those who might chafe at the role of mere adapter.
The same is true for Roger Rollin, who states categorically: “The world
has been McDonaldized.” From Rollin’s perspective, anyone who asks
whether this is “progress” is a “cynic.”13 He seems surprised that “those on
the receiving end of American exports” seem more interested in the process
than the exporters.14 Stephen Haseler, who rather simple-mindedly equates
anti-Americanism with opposition to democracy, discusses “traditional German criticisms of the United States” in the context of the “contemporary
search for a separate German identity” and worries that “these deepseated . . . ‘cultural’ criticisms could enter mainstream thinking.”15 Haseler
wrote this in 1985, and he located the troublesome elements not in the New
Right, but rather among the “Greens” and the “peace movement.” Perhaps
the most thoughtful contribution to this discussion is that of Paul Hollander, who began his study of anti-Americanism with conceptions not unlike those of Pells. Even though Hollander retains his partisanship for the
American system, he concludes that “hostility toward the United States, and
especially certain aspects of American culture, is not always or entirely irrational, and even some of its irrational manifestations may originate in conditions that warrant concern.”16 Like Haseler, he examines such hostility on
the left, not the right (as evidenced by his multiple references to Günter
Grass). Despite his capacity for objective analysis, Hollander has a blind
spot that distorts his perception:
[T]he restlessness of estranged intellectuals and the hostility of the adversary
culture are in all probability generalized responses to the discontents of life in
a thoroughly modernized, wealthy, secular, and individualistic society where
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making life meaningful requires great ongoing effort and remains a nagging
problem—at any rate for those whose attention does not have to be riveted on the
necessities of survival.17

German critics of American in¶uence doubtless exhibit the responses described here, but these responses are not completely unrelated to the social
conditions referred to at the end of this passage. This is to be expected, since
practically the entire German populace has been engaged in a struggle for survival twice in this century. This experience has not disappeared from the German collective consciousness, and there is no reason to believe that it will in
the near future. Those who have been pushed to the edge of the abyss in wartime would surely be traumatized if that were to become a real possibility in
peacetime.18
In his 1993 study of German anti-Americanism,19 Dan Diner takes a
stance similar to Hollander’s. Diner, a history professor who teaches in both
Tel Aviv and Essen, writes that his study was “triggered by the reactions of
the German public to American involvement in the Gulf War of 1991” (ix).
As someone who has gained a reputation as a critical intellectual,20 Diner
displays a strange form of self-censorship when writing about German attitudes toward the U.S. On the one hand, he obviously has no sympathy with
the “Romantics’ clear disapproval of America [that] went hand in hand with
general opposition to liberal views” (38). In convincing fashion, he demonstrates why one should reject the modern versions of such disapproval as
manifested in such books as Adolf Halfeld’s Amerika und der Amerikanismus
(1927), Leo L. Matthias’s Die Entdeckung Amerikas oder das geordnete Chaos
(The discovery of America or the orderly chaos, 1953) and Die Kehrseite der
USA (The other side of the USA, 1964), and Caspar Schrenck-Notzing’s21
Charakterwäsche. Die amerikanische Besatzung in Deutschland und ihre Folgen (Characterwashing: The American occupation of Germany and its consequences, 1965). On the other hand, he devalues any and all criticism of
the U.S. by linking anti-Americanism with anti-Semitism:
Like a cultural code, it [anti-Americanism] is expressed even by people having
neither practical nor theoretical knowledge of America.
In this way, though not only in this way, anti-Americanism resembles antiSemitism structurally (as well as in the selection of metaphors). In some respects,
anti-Americanism can even be understood as a further stage in the secularized
hostility towards Jews. Even though the two phenomena, on account of their different developmental histories, could never be considered identical, they both
represent ideologically shaped reactions to modernity. (20)22
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Although Diner is cautious in his formulations (“in some respects,” “even
though”), this linking is comparable to the “fascism club” oft wielded by
German leftists against their critics. What is strange is that one ¤nds another
turn of phrase that sounds much like Hollander: “[N]ot all perceptions are
products of irrational spouting of blind ¤gments of the imagination” (12).
Diner has no desire to discuss such perceptions, however. When critiquing
Rolf Winter’s23 book about the violent nature of U.S. society, for example,
he speaks meekly of “facts which are not being contested here individually”
(146). When dealing with Hans Magnus Enzensberger, a sometime critic of
the U.S. with a formidable intellect, Diner’s analysis is more than questionable. He cites a 1968 statement by Enzensberger (“Fascism is not hideous
because the Germans practiced it, but because it is possible everywhere.”24)
and interprets it as follows: “The horror of Nazism referred to as fascism
thus does not lie in its past reality, but in its future possibility” (129). What
Enzensberger meant to say was that it is not the particular perpetrator that
makes fascism hideous (a characterization that he would not reject), but
rather the realization that this was—and continues to be—a human possibility. As we have seen above, Enzensberger does not view his countrymen
through rose-colored glasses, but his 1968 statement does dispute the singularity of the Holocaust, something that Diner cannot accept. In the end,
Diner is not sure that Germany has irreversibly become part of the West. His
reservations are not his alone, and he cannot be denied the right to be “anxious” (108) about the future. However, he opens himself up to criticism
when he asserts that “the stance toward America is an indicator for the Westernization of Germany” (108). This is tantamount to proclaiming that there
is only one viable model for modern society, and those who do not embrace
it are untrustworthy. Such proclamations are of course welcomed by the
New Right, since they support the view that Germany is a mere satellite
without its own identity. If Diner refers to American “political culture” as
the measure of all things, the authors of another study also include U.S.
popular culture, making the mix even more potent.
In the past few years, Germanist Richard Herzinger has become a tribune
of liberalism in Germany. His cultural commentary, which has appeared in
Die Zeit, Der Spiegel, Der Tagesspiegel, and elsewhere, concentrates on themes
like human rights, cultural pessimism, the Holocaust, neonationalism, fundamentalism, and utopia.25 In 1995, he published, together with Hannes Stein
(whose ¤eld is English literature), a volume entitled Endzeit-Propheten oder
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Die Offensive der Antiwestler (Apocalyptic prophets or the offensive of the antiWesterners).26 The authors’ views are close to those of Dan Diner, but they go
much farther. In contrast to most of the writers who have been presented in
this study, they clearly enjoy utilizing humor and irony to make their points.
This can be quite refreshing; unfortunately, there are also instances of unintended humor. These arise mainly when the virtues of mass culture are being
praised. The dedication and epigraph of Apocalyptic Prophets were carefully
chosen to emphasize the direction of the authors’ thinking. The book is dedicated to the memory of Karl Popper, whose rejection of nationalism and primitivism are cited in the text (89, 225). The epigraph is a quotation from Robert
Kennedy’s To Seek a Newer World:
To be an American also means having been ostracized and foreign, it means
having gone down the path of exile and knowing that whoever turns away the
ostracized, the foreign, and the exiled is also turning away America.27

The insertion of this quotation should indicate to the reader that the book
in question has less to do with America than with an idealized view of what
America should be.
Herzinger and Stein reject paci¤sm, so it is only logical that they would
resort to a scorched-earth policy in their book. After they have attacked representatives and resurrectors of the Conservative Revolution, anti-Semites,
regionalists, communitarians, cultural nationalists, tribalists, advocates of
political correctness, environmentalists, paci¤sts, fundamentalists, and others,28 there are few ¤gures left standing. These include Voltaire, Karl Popper,
Albert Camus, Robert Hughes, liberal Israelis (“A miniature version of the
U.S.A. has emerged on the Mediterranean.”—[43]29), and Woody Allen.30
Many of those subjected to scathing criticism (or sarcastically humorous dismissal) are also “red ¶ags” for the New Right. This is because both liberals
and rightists reject the world view of the generation of 1968. Herzinger and
Stein of course see no common ground, as evidenced by the following statement about the legacy of Romanticism: “The leftists repeated the litany that
bourgeois democracy is only a formal one; their rightist opposite numbers
[the English term is used in the original] decry the absence of values
(“Wertevakuum”) in mass society” (12). They reject both “progressive” and
“reactionary” (195) antiliberals while defending the empty space (“Leerstelle”) at the center of liberalism (12). This is not the place to discuss the
supposedly nonideological character of liberal thought. Of interest here is
the authors’ attitude toward American culture, especially popular culture.
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That their assessment would be a positive one is a foregone conclusion,
given their characterization of the U.S. as “a kind of new founding of the human race . . . a continuing, un¤nished experiment with a society that is open
to all people of every ethnic and cultural origin” (33). Europe has no right to
a separate identity, since it has almost destroyed its own “so highly praised culture” in two wars. (This is a rather strange formulation, given the otherwise
sharp criticism directed toward the path of German history in the volume.31
The two world wars were not initiated by “Europe.”) At this historical juncture, “‘Americanization’ is not an unpleasant secondary effect, but rather the
conditio sine qua non of European freedom” (34). Herzinger and Stein have
no sympathy with European intellectuals who—like theater director Ariane
Mnouchkine—see Euro-Disney as a “Chernobyl of culture” (34). More to
their liking is the attitude of German-Romanian writer Richard Wagner, who
has said that the progress of democratic reforms in Eastern Europe can be
measured by “the degree of proliferation of McDonald’s restaurants” (35). (In
1995, Romania still did not have one.) They claim that in every antiAmerican, there is a small voice persistently whispering: “Do it right, go to
McDonald’s” (24).32 An explanation of why this is the “right” thing to do is
also provided: “McDonald’s symbolizes the American experiment of combining equality for all with the pro¤t motive and entrepreneurial initiative” (25).
This institution is hated by both right and left, it is claimed, because it has
surpassed the fascist notion of “Eintopfsonntag” (people from all walks of
National Socialist life came together to eat a simple bowl of soup on Sundays)
and also realized the old goal of the labor movement to have the proletarians
partake of the culinary bounty of the bourgeoisie. It is dif¤cult to take such
(admittedly humorous) statements seriously, but there is no question that the
authors are not joking when they contrast the purportedly antimodern, tribalistic comic Asterix (in which the last remaining Gallic village de¤es the
modernizers from Rome) with the world of “Entenhausen,” the German
name for the town where Donald Duck lives.33 Here we ¤nd a “voluntary association of autonomous individuals” that has replaced “tribal ties” (179). Allowance is made for a great variety of lifestyles, and the private sphere is
respected. (This was before the advent of Kenneth Starr.) There is no discrimination, since dogs, pigs, and owls can compete with ducks for leading positions in the community. The political system is stable, prosperity has reached
(almost) everyone, and Donald is the kind of worker that European entrepreneurs fantasize about: “mobile and willing to retool and unwilling to put up
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with the lack of opportunities in his profession” (183). Entenhausen even offers niches for the “social-romantic” pigs and the “hypermoralistic collectivist” Bad Boy Club. These outsiders demonstrate that there is no alternative to
“modern metropolitan civilization” (184).
Do Herzinger and Stein look up from their comic book and think that
they are still in fantasy land? No, they know the difference between fairy tales
and reality.34 They readily admit that the West is not “the best of all worlds.”
Their commitment to it is, they point out, “nothing more than the cheerful
admission that we have no utopia” (11). At the same time, they fear that the
West may be once again betraying its universalist roots, as it did when it
stood by and let the Holocaust take its course (228–229). This was—and
is—a serious matter, but the authors do not convince us that such a betrayal
is contrary to the logic of the liberal system. Although they believe that the
uniqueness of Western civilization lies in its capacity for self-criticism (230),
there is one area of that civilization that is never subjected to scrutiny, namely
the economic system. We learn that the residents of Entenhausen are so absorbed in “the joys of the consumer and leisure society” that they have no time
to think about something as “boring” as an “identity” (188). Such thoughts
might be boring for the authors, who indirectly hint at their own identity as
“rootless cosmopolitans who feel absolutely no desire to belong to a community” (80), but for the majority of the human race, self-de¤nition via consumer goods is not an option. If it were, ecological catastrophe would be a
probability rather than a possibility. Capitalism can thrive in a society that
upholds the universalist rights of the Enlightenment, but these rights are not
a precondition of success. Other things are necessary, however, i.e., constant
economic growth, increases in productivity, a quick return on investments,
and rising pro¤ts. These are the “values” (and the cultural, environmental,
political, and social rami¤cations that follow from them) that warrant no attention from Herzinger and Stein, and this omission—be it intentional or
not—greatly diminishes the impact of their polemics against the “anti-Westerners.” In the ¤nal analysis, their offensive back¤res and even provides succor to those who strive to discredit the Enlightenment as a sham purveyed by
cynics. Unfortunately, their attempt to neutralize anti-Semitism fails as well.
The New Europe, they assert, must embrace the “Jewish component of European history,” what is described as “the liberating, opening, cultivating effect of capitalism” (92). The “moneyed Jew” (Geldjude—93), personi¤ed by
the cosmopolitan Rothschild family, is offered as a much better model for the
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continent than culture, something basically “irrational” that can be used as a
springboard for tyranny (94–95). The accompanying portrayal of Switzerland as a model country where money—rather than “mythical origins”—determines identity (91–92) has been rendered especially embarrassing by
events of the past few years. This faux pas, together with the implication that
“Jewish rootlessness” is an ideal worthy of emulation, will not be quickly forgotten.
Any critique of Apocalyptic Prophets undertaken from abroad would be incomplete without an attempt to demonstrate just what Herzinger and Stein
are reacting to. Their missionary zeal is at least somewhat more understandable when it is compared to the spoutings of the prophets referred to in their
title.35 Many harrowing accounts of American arrogance, bullying, ignorance,
soullessness, etc. have come out of Germany in this century. In this context,
one example will have to suf¤ce. It is a 1996 volume entitled Deutschland—
eine amerikanische Provinz. Der große Seelenmord (Germany—an American
province: the great killing of souls).36 The author, Gustav Sichelschmidt,37 has
done students of anti-Americanism and the German right a great service.
They need not scour libraries and archives in search of characteristic themes
and formulations. Everything that one needs to know is found in this volume.
One can speak of four major questions: 1) Who are the Germans? 2) Who are
the Americans? 3) What is the West? 4) What is the shape of the future, and
how will it be affected by Europeans (especially Germans), Americans, and
Jews?
Germany is, for Sichelschmidt, ¤rst and foremost the land of idealism—
as opposed to materialism. Goethe is the embodiment of this idealism, and
its purpose, already formulated in the Romantic era, is to counter the “disenchantment” (88, 141) of the world typical of our age. This can only be accomplished in the inner realm (“humane[s] Weltinnenreich”) that is the true
home of the Germans (95, 163). Germany has been prepared for this task by
its many trials over the course of history. The project of dismantling the special German identity during and after the Thirty Years’ War is compared to
the plan for reeducation after 1945. One important vehicle for this was and
is the contamination of the German language (“our old honest German”
[49]) with foreign words and concepts, leading to a German-American
“Mischidiom” (8). The foreseeable end result is cultural genocide: “One
does not think in a German manner anymore, and soon one will not feel in
a German manner. One speaks the language of our country less and less”
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(61). Citing Lamennais, Sichelschmidt wonders if his people is not destined
for the role of martyr (“Märtyrervolk”) put on earth to preserve true humanity (93). (Germany already saved the West by battling the Red Army, it is emphasized—[18, 98].) Although one stereotype of the “Hun” is the fanatical
soldier, his militarism is supposedly a mere invention (angedichtet [46]).
Echoing the words of Thomas Mann, Sichelschmidt also asserts that the Germans are basically “nonpolitical” (91). Their main failing, he claims, is that
they are too malleable, too ready to become “loyal subjects” (65, 107), “opportunists,” and “fellow travelers” (57). This is not a revelation, but another
assertion is: the Germans are more “friendly toward foreigners” than anyone
else (63). This is the portrait of a nation of victims subjected to innumerable
injustices. (The term “castrated” appears four times in the text.) To bolster his
case, Sichelschmidt cites positive assessments of German culture ranging
from Madame de Staël and Emerson to Knut Hamsun and former Boston
University president John Silber. He leaves no doubt that the disappearance
of this culture would be “the true German catastrophe,” whereas the destruction in 1945 was terrible, but not a threat to German identity (82–83).
An integral segment of victimology is the search for a conspiracy, and
Sichelschmidt’s description of the United States leads exactly down that
path. In his Manichean scheme, America is diametrically opposed to Germany in every possible respect. Symbolized by Hollywood and the “Wall
Street mentality” (7), this is a country without culture that represents “the
greatest danger for all civilized nations” (39). Educated Germans cannot accept the moralizing tone used by the descendants of both the murderers of
the Native Americans and slave owners, according to the author: “How
would it be if good old Uncle Sam, instead of putting up Holocaust museums all over, would build memorials to the Indians who were sacri¤ced on
the altar of history or to the (too) many millions of black slaves that died?”
(139). (This is the only instance where the world “Holocaust” is used in the
book.) Beyond the issue of guilt—Dresden and Hiroshima are mentioned
(130) and the conduct of the Vietnam War is termed “bestial” (112)—
Sichelschmidt’s America is an ametaphysical, conformist, hypermaterialistic, nonreligious, soulless, super¤cial society that exports catastrophe to the
Germans and the rest of the world. The “goods” include
AIDS, alcoholism, antiauthoritarian education, drug addiction, youth sects, violent crime, the Ma¤a, cultural decline, pornography, record divorce rates, sexism, terrorism, racism, neuroses, and all kinds of damage to civilization. (45)

Excur.fm Page 151 Friday, August 25, 2000 1:35 PM

Attacks on Americanization and Westernization

/// 151

This is far from the world of Herzinger/Stein, and it is only logical that the
author warns of the “horrible legacy of liberalism” (171) and rejects the
“Laissez-faire” attitude of modern intellectuals (71). One “export” not on
the above list, simply because it permeates the entire book, is American popular culture, especially popular music. German youth, alienated from “serious German music” (56), welcomes the “invasion of the Afro-American
jungle” (9). Sichelschmidt chooses his words carefully here. The word “nigger” only appears twice in his book, and on both occasions, it is contained
in a citation or reference. Jazz, we are reminded, was considered to be “nigger
music” by the Nazis (56), and an unnamed American is quoted as saying
that the rhythms of rock-and-roll are being used to bring the whites down
to “the level of a nigger” (60). Such rhetorical strategies lead to the question
of whether Sichelschmidt is really against America per se. When he refers to
John Kenneth Galbraith’s thesis about the “capitulation of the white elite”
(118), one can imagine that he sees a conspiracy at work in the U.S. as well.
This is indeed the case, although it is dif¤cult to follow the argument.
On the one hand, Sichelschmidt clearly rejects the whole idea of an arti¤cial
society that has not evolved organically. On the other hand, one suspects
that the “white elite” might have done better if it had not been subject to
corrupting in¶uences. Who was, then, actually behind the cosmopolitanism, hedonism, and mammonism that he deplores? This only becomes obvious in the second half of the book, where references to Jews abound. The
author readily embraces the highly controversial view that it was primarily
Jews who pro¤ted from the African slave trade (140, 144), so Jewish in¤ltration can be posited as appearing very early on. The American variety of capitalism is called “Raffkapitalismus” (33), the term, mentioned above, that
was favored by the Nazis. The Americans’ notion of being a chosen people
may have come from the Jews, who joined them in an “unholy cooperation”
(37). Despite the use of the word “cooperation,” the general impression is
that the Jews have worked behind the scenes. They dominate the media
(85), and Hollywood was and is “¤rmly in the hands of the Jews” (121). It
is surely no accident that the only ¤lm title that appears in the book is
Schindler’s List (“unspeakable”), and Sichelschmidt blames the “Jewish
bosses” in the ¤lm industry for cementing the negative image of Germans
on the screen (130–131). It is impossible to dispute that such stereotyping
exists, but Sichelschmidt does not ask himself if it might at least partially be
connected to the course of modern German history. On the contrary: He
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understands very well, he says, why the German people chose to end the disaster of the Weimar Republic by “opting” (98) for the Nazis, and he theorizes that the Third Reich might have been “a secret revolt against
Americanism” (99).
Although the tone of Germany—An American Province is generally pessimistic, the author does hope that another “revolt” might still take place. He
often compares today’s U.S. to the Roman Empire in its decline. The German “historical mission” is to preserve the West in the face of the “great
American apocalypse” (141). In contradistinction to Herzinger/Stein, Sichelschmidt speaks of a “speci¤c occidental self-image” that must oppose Americanism (45). In other words, the center of the West is not America, but
Europe. Although Sichelschmidt singles out the French for high praise in
light of their resistance to American cultural in¶uence (49–51, 119–123), he
envisions Germany as the “spiritual leader of Europe” (the phrase comes from
writer and Nobel Prize winner Paul Ernst [156]). If one compares this train
of thought to Thomas Mann’s Re¶ections, it is clear that the West has moved
in an eastwardly direction. (The position between East and West no longer
exists.) Like Mann, Sichelschmidt has found a soul mate in Russia, where, he
claims, opposition to American in¶uence in the post-Soviet era goes hand in
hand with homegrown anti-Semitism. He is upset that Germans are still
afraid to publicly link the two phenomena (126–127). Given his Russophile
stance, it comes as no surprise that his favorite critic of the U.S. is Alexander
Solzhenitsyn, who became intimately familiar with U.S. “cultural de¤cits”
(127) while an exile in Vermont. When he praises the “brave and disciplined”
Red Army (129) and casts aspersions on the U.S. military (13, 111), the
reader might well wonder if yet another world war might be in store. This is
a mistaken impression, however. Sichelschmidt does intimate that the Germans have secret strengths (Berserkerkräfte [88]), but he leaves no doubt that
Germany will not survive as a recognizable entity unless there is “a decisive
collapse” of the United States (157). If this were to come to pass, would it be
the end of history? Not in Sichelschmidt’s view. Even after the American disappearance from the world stage, the “racially homogeneous Jews” would not
stop trying to dominate the world (157–158). In the meantime, the German’s duty is to “hate” the Americans (174).
Although Sichelschmidt’s book was published in 1996, it re¶ects the
temperament and thinking of the Old Right more than that of the New
Right. It is a swan song, not a program for political action. Many younger
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rightists have realized that it is (politically) suicidal to appear to be loose cannons, and they have decided to transmit their messages in a more subtle
manner. In the framework of this excursus, a brief look at Heimo Schwilk’s
thin volume about the Gulf War can illustrate the shift. In his preface to Was
man uns verschwieg. Der Golfkrieg in der Zensur (What we were not told: the
Gulf War and censorship),38 the author sounds not unlike other German
anti-Americans.39 His thesis is that both Saddam Hussein and George Bush
had planned from the beginning to manipulate the press. One might expect
from this that the two leaders would be put on the same plane, but that is
not the case. Although Schwilk rejects the characterization of Hussein as the
“Hitler of Baghdad” (23), he does not hesitate to call him a “notorious brute
and inveterate militarist,” a dictator who is too impatient to develop the
kind of military-industrial complex needed to carry out his threats (25). The
Germans are criticized for building chemical plants and bunkers and helping to extend the range of the Scud missiles (26), and the possibility that Israelis could be killed by poison gas provided by the Germans is described as
“horrible” (31). At least some of these statements could have been made by
German leftists.
Schwilk’s real concern is connected to the role of the U.S. in the “New
World Order” and the lack of respect given the Germans for their contributions to that order. Although he appears to be against press censorship (and
upset about the lack of access granted to German journalists like himself), he
actually seems to admire American policy during the war. For him, Bush’s
plan to co-opt the media is a strategy that may be “questionable with regard
to democracy” but “understandable with regard to power politics” (29). The
German observer appears to be envious of a country that can successfully
pursue such strategies. The patriotism of American reporters (75) is also duly
noted (see the statement by Wolfgang Petersen above). In contrast to this, the
Germans were subject to attacks in the media for not sending ground troops
to the Gulf. Schwilk believes that the U.S. wanted it this way, because German reticence made it easy to portray the European “giant” as a fair-weather
ally incapable of being counted on in international affairs (78). He boasts
that without German logistical support, the preparation for battle would
have been impossible (78). A German chancellor from the New Right, one
surmises, would not have hesitated to offer the services of the Bundeswehr.
Schwilk’s experiences in Saudi Arabia allow him to demonstrate that his
countrymen are not undervalued everywhere. He learns that Germans are
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treated well there because they are considered to be “honest, capable, and
friendly toward the Arabs” (77). When crossing the border into Saudi Arabia, Schwilk has a long conversation with a Saudi of¤cer, and this conversation is the real center of the book. Lt. Abdul Al-Issa ¤rst asks for advice about
the top Mercedes model, and this is signi¤cant, because, we are told, the fabulous wealth of the oil-rich country allows its residents to always choose
“only the best” (48). Wealth has of course brought with it an incredible
in¶ux of Western goods, as well as “fast-food chains and garishly colorful
amusement parks à la Disneyworld” (49–50). Are the Saudis in danger of
losing their souls like the Germans portrayed by Sichelschmidt? According
to Schwilk, they are not, because they are careful to distinguish between “the
material achievements of the West and cultural modernity” (50). The author apparently also believes that it is possible to separate the two, a feat considered impossible by the Old Right. Schwilk leaves no doubt that he
sympathizes with the “Saudi experiment of a symbiosis of modernity and
tradition” (51). In Germany, there is a group of people who stand in the way
of such an experiment. They are only mentioned in a roundabout way in
this book about the Gulf War. Schwilk describes how dif¤cult it was for him
to obtain a visa for Saudi Arabia, reporting that German journalists were
“mistrusted,” since they had the reputation of being “hypercritical, moralistic, and undependable” (33). The term “journalist” is actually a code word
for “leftists” or “left-liberals,” i.e., the generation of 1968. These are also the
people who oppose German military operations abroad.40 With them cast
aside (or, more realistically, sent off to retirement homes), the German presence in the Arab world and elsewhere might take on a different dimension.
Perhaps this is the subtext of Schwilk’s equation of the Arabs’ hyperbolic
“rhetoric of destruction” with the reuni¤ed Germans’ “dream of eternal
peace” (46): both are mere facades that crumble when tested. Whereas
Sichelschmidt’s animosity toward America is unequivocal, Schwilk would
apparently like to see his country pursue a dual-pronged strategy: While
waiting for the collapse of the U.S., Germany can play along with the
“Moloch”41 and regain stature on the international stage.
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When one thinks of democracy, Germany is generally not the
¤rst country that comes to mind.1
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he words cited above were written by a historian in the late 1990s.
They surely resonate differently in a German context than in a nonGerman one. More than ¤fty years after World War II, the reliability
of the Germans as democratic partners is still in doubt—at least for some observers. It is this doubt, a sword suspended over the head of the German people, that causes establishment politicians to despair (or grovel), rightists to lash
out, and elitist writers to retreat into visions of the past. The left, especially the
intellectual left, has typically sought to wield this sword itself, perhaps as a
compensation for a lack of political in¶uence in postwar German society. The
spectre of National Socialism in general and Auschwitz in particular continues to darken the scene in the now reunited country, and there are no signs
that it will fade from view in the foreseeable future. (As I write this, the wire
services are carrying a story about violence at the 1998 World Cup entitled
“In France, Hooligans Are Awakening Memories of a Dark Past.”2 ) One can
discern two possible reactions to this state of affairs. First of all, Germans can
strive to be model democrats and responsible members of the international
community (although there is no little disagreement about what that might
entail).3 Second, the very basis for the suspicion directed toward the German
people can be reexamined and put in a new light. Aside from fringe groups,
there would be little support for the portrayal of the Third Reich as a benign
system that went wrong, but a reassessment of the Conservative Revolution
and its representatives is much less controversial, simply because this phe///
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nomenon is relatively unknown, both at home and abroad. It is just such a reassessment that has been launched in the post-Wall period.
In 1993, the respected Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft published a detailed analysis of the Conservative Revolution.4 The author, Stefan Breuer,
emphasized that his book was a purely scholarly exercise: “It is not intended as
‘an aid to the rightist intelligentsia in Germany’ (Mohler 1989, 2:7) . . . or
meant to provide the opposite camp with cheap targets [wohlfeile Feindbilder]” (6). The mention of Armin Mohler in the introduction demonstrates
that Breuer feared that he might be dismissed as another partisan like his predecessor. Anyone who has read his study has no trouble distinguishing between the two. Breuer would like to get rid of the term “Conservative
Revolution” altogether, because it is “an untenable concept” that leads to confusion (181). He sees elements like a fascination with the apocalypse, the willingness to use violence, and male bonding as common features (47), but the
only common position that he can discover is opposition to political liberalism
as “a Western phenomenon unsuitable to the German character” (181). Beyond this opposition, he takes pains to make it absolutely clear that the Conservative Revolution was not an attempt to return to the premodern world,
but rather one of many “diverse designs for modernity” that were being discussed in the Weimar Republic (180). Concomitant with this interpretation is
a complete rejection of the “special path” thesis—premodern elites did not
dominate Wilhelminian Germany, he argues against Arno Mayer and others
—and the claim that Weimar Germany was a “bourgeois” society like any
other (15). Its unusual aspects were limited to the heterogeneity of the middle
class (thanks to the presence of the Bildungsbürgertum) and the “¤xation” with
the state as the “sole guarantor of unity and universality” (18–19). This is indeed rather “academic (6),” especially since Breuer states that the Conservative
Revolution (which he prefers to term the New Nationalism) did not survive the
Third Reich, “despite attempts to revive it” (201). Although he plays with the
idea of a Conservative Revolution that did manage to outmaneuver the Nazis
(it would probably have been a dictatorial and irredentist regime minus the Holocaust and World War II, he thinks [194]), the present relevance of the New
(Charismatic) Nationalism is to be found beyond Western Europe. The “heirs”
to the tradition can be found in Teheran, Baghdad, Black Africa, Southeast
Asia, and the Slavic countries, Breuer tells us (201). This is supposedly an
“echo” of what was “played through” in Germany after 1918 (201). Such a scenario places German nationalism ¤rmly in the past and ignores present resus-

Concl&pr.fm Page 157 Friday, August 25, 2000 1:38 PM

Conclusions and Prospects

/// 157

citation efforts. Given the “threat” to the West emanating from the venues just
listed, Breuer hopes that the once-virulent German nationalism will in the
coming years function not only as an example of the dangers involved in deviating from the Western path, but also as an occasion for re¶ection about the
nature of that path. We might ask ourselves, he suggests, if a “technological civilization” that is “indifferent” to individual traditions that have evolved over
time is immune to criticism (202). Writing in the years before 1989, he did
not foresee that many representatives of the German New Right would repeatedly ask this question after reuni¤cation.
Two studies that appeared in 1995 proceed from assumptions similar, although not identical, to Breuer’s. Rolf Peter Sieferle’s biographical sketches of
¤ve major representatives of the Conservative Revolution (including Ernst
Jünger)5 all portray Germans, but the author emphasizes that the movement
was practically “pan-European” (19, 44). Like Breuer, Sieferle views the Conservative Revolution as a thing of the past, a “purely historical phenomenon”
that can now be comprehended without ¤ghting it (21). Its protagonists were
working on “projects of an alternative modernity” (43), but it was not they,
but rather the Nazis who succeeded with their “real Conservative Revolution”
(24). According to Sieferle, National Socialism was only one of the “¤ve elements” that coexisted in the 1920s, which he categorizes as the “volkish,” the
“national Socialist,” the “revolutionary nationalist,” the “activist-vitalist,” and
the “biological naturalist.” Although Sieferle is not a proponent of these “elements,” he is also not an advocate of a one-dimensional model of modernization or a history of the West in which the ¤nal result seems inevitable
(201). It is perhaps not coincidental that he illustrates this by referring to the
United States:
It can easily be demonstrated that contemporary U.S. society, for example,
does not in some ways ful¤ll the criteria of modernity that were developed in
current theories. The ideal of “secularization” is confronted with a widespread
religious fundamentalism. “Democratic participation” is realized in an oligarchical party system with low voter turnout. An unpredictable justice system
contradicts the rule of law. . . . Instead of growing equality, we ¤nd a widening
social gap, instead of “rationality,” the dominance of the myths of mass culture.
The “state monopoly of force” is retreating in the face of growing violent
crime. Finally, one can hardly still speak of a “cultural integration” in light of
the increasing segmentation of society into races and ethnic groups. (202)

Although such issues also appear in Sichelschmidt’s polemic, they are brought
up here because Sieferle is unhappy about the direction that U.S. society is
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taking, not because he is eager to gloat about it. While reconstructing the ideologies of Nazism and the Conservative Revolution, the author acknowledges
that the results of such scholarly spadework might be misused by “confused
contemporaries” (220). He states unequivocally that both movements were
“designs of an alternative modernity” that “fortunately failed” (221). It will
not escape a careful reader that this is not tantamount to saying that any and
all alternatives should or must fail.
Michael Rupprecht’s look back at the “literary civil war” in twentiethcentury Germany bears the subtitle “On the Politics of the Nonpolitical in
Germany.”6 Thomas Mann’s self-description is thus applied to an entire
group of intellectuals. Like Breuer, Rupprecht believes that the time has
come for an objective reappraisal of the Conservative Revolution. His own
purported objectivity is contrasted with “old and new ideologists” (10) who
have a distorted view of the past. Even though he clearly rejects such New
Rightists as France’s Alain de Benoist or Russia’s Vladimir Shirinovsky, he
claims that ¤gures like Jünger, Spengler, and Schmitt stood “between all
ideologies” during the Weimar Republic, although it is admitted that these
¤gures (for no apparent reason, Thomas Mann is included in this group)
did contribute to the catastrophic course of German history (9–10). Taking
as his point of departure the highly charged German debates regarding the
nature of the Gulf War, Rupprecht calls upon his fellow intellectuals to
make political discourse more disinterested (“versachlichen”) than it has
been in the past (29). On the surface, this is laudable enough, given the
German proclivity for polemics. Unfortunately, Rupprecht is not an impartial observer himself. Anyone who can compare Ernst Jünger’s relationship
with democracy to that of Thomas Mann (199), claim that Jünger cleansed
the cultural criticism of Spengler and others of “unpleasant antidemocratic
overtones” (207) or argue that it is “inappropriate” to compare Botho Strauß
with the Conservative Revolution (25) clearly cultivates more than exclusively scholarly interests. His concluding remarks, in which he emphasizes
the necessity of reexamining the actions of all intellectuals, both left and
right, in our “century of civil wars” (211), suggest that Ernst Nolte’s revisionist history is one of his guideposts. In words reminiscent of Sieferle, he
describes the Conservative Revolution as one of the projects of “an alternative modernity” (43). He obviously believes that current projects can learn
from those predecessors who had dif¤culty comprehending the dangers of
Nazism.
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It is noteworthy that those scholars who dedicate their energies to prevent just such “learning” refrain, unlike the three ¤gures just discussed, from
declaring their disinterestedness. In their 1997 volume Vordenker der Neuen
Rechten (Intellectual mentors of the new right),7 Kurt Lenk and his coauthors introduce the thought of Georges Sorel, Oswald Spengler, Hans
Freyer, Carl Schmitt, Martin Heidegger, and Ernst Jünger to a general readership. This is not done as part of the current “philosophical café” fad, but rather
to the end of making the German public aware of trends that the authors consider disturbing. It is not disputed that the works of the six intellectuals have
been—and continue to be—read and re¶ected upon by a diverse group of
people, but the focus in this case is on the “young-conservative intellectuals
who have been trying for some years to make positions to the right of the established politics of the large broadly based parties socially acceptable
again.” What is found disturbing is the attempt to revive the tradition of an
“anti-Western, antiliberal, and antiparliamentary right” that had long remained peripheral in West Germany (11). The representatives of the Conservative Revolution are now, in the authors’ view, portrayed either as
martyrs or as misunderstood loners whose ideas were misused. It is apparently Lenk, a professor emeritus, who is amazed that the younger generation
seeks to emancipate itself from a “politically correct” culture by turning to
the “weapons of [their] grandfathers” (12). Among these weapons, as
described here, are a belief in the power of fate, apocalyptic presentiments,
service and discipline, nationalism, heroism, antibourgeois feelings, xenophobia, and many others. (Jürgen Habermas’s rather hyperbolic term for
all this is “intellectual junk.”8) The authors see in this arsenal “a declaration
of war against civil and bourgeois values” (16), and the international community as a whole will certainly be relieved to know that these values ¤nd
defenders in today’s Germany. In the long term, however, one of the positions taken by these particular defenders is not unproblematic. It is the subliminal tendency to take the alienation characteristic of our modern age less
than seriously.
Another 1997 publication9 is cut from the same cloth, although it is
more openly political and less scholarly. (This is not to say that the two areas
cannot coexist. It is an author’s denial that the former in¶uences the latter
that is problematic.) The author, Iris Weber, begins by referring to the 1995
report of the German Constitutional Police, in which the intellectual New
Right is given attention for the ¤rst time. She wishes to inform her fellow
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citizens about the “potential danger” to democracy posed by this grouping
(7). Her emphasis is somewhat different from that of Lenk et al. A number
of pages are devoted to Carl Schmitt and his theory of the state, but Freyer,
Jünger, and Spengler are marginal ¤gures. (Heidegger is not mentioned at
all.) Instead of concentrating on earlier manifestations of rightist thought,
the author discusses more contemporary ¤gures, like Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt,
Arthur Jensen, Hans Jürgen Eysenck, and Alain de Benoist. Her differentiation between the various camps within the New Right helps to explain
some of the contradictions found in Die selbstbewußte Nation. In the context
of this study, one aspect that does not interest Weber should be pointed out.
Although she provides a detailed presentation of the New Right’s plan to
gradually achieve “cultural hegemony” (87–90), the role of literature is not
considered at all. This was also true of the Lenk volume—with the exception of the chapter on Jünger—and it appears to be characteristic of most
observers who are drawn to the topic.10 Was Botho Strauß’s brief encounter
with right-wing politics both the beginning and end of the literary right?
At least one critic—like Herzinger, a disciple of Karl Popper—says this
and much more. In a breathtaking survey of “two hundred years of the German religion of art,” Dirk von Petersdorff equates the end of Soviet socialism
with the disappearance of “the last of those counter-modern worlds . . . that
had been entwined with bourgeois society since the late eighteenth century.”11
He distances himself from Stefan Breuer, who has analyzed anti-Westernization and a critique of democracy as a phenomenon of the literary right.12 For
Petersdorff, both rightist and leftist German artists (he uses this term to refer
mainly to writers and estheticians) have opposed the “open society” and come
under the spell of “totalitarian politics” (68). Such statements make his essay
appear to be a belated postscript to the Literature Debate, especially since
Christa Wolf is criticized for speaking of a “truly democratic society” different
from the West German model (71). When Petersdorff portrays Novalis—including the novel Heinrich von Ofterdingen—as the beginning of German antimodernism, his comments are somewhat one-sided, but generally not off the
mark. With respect to the twentieth century, however, his case is much less
convincing. He hesitates to criticize Gottfried Benn, and he seems to forget
that Thomas Mann—albeit not without inner con¶icts—became an outspoken defender of the Weimar Republic. Worst of all, he sees no great difference
between the role of important writers in the GDR (who “had the telephone
number of the chairman of the state council”) and West German novelists
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who campaigned for Willy Brandt and the SPD (76). Instead of using the
term “novelists,” Petersdorff might have speci¤cally mentioned Heinrich Böll
and Günter Grass, but this would have undermined his entire argument,
since neither Böll nor Grass, despite their often caustic criticism of West German democracy, could be accused of harboring a secret af¤nity with totalitarian systems. The ongoing interventions of Günter Grass13 demonstrate that it
is possible to envision an incrementally better society without opposing modernity. Petersdorff ’s plea for an “esthetics that does justice to the freedoms
of modernity” (86) is praiseworthy, but his support of Karl-Heinz Bohrer’s
desire to “free” esthetic modernism from “social criticism, the temptations
of totality, [and] the slag of the philosophy of history” (83) is not only a dead
end but also a dangerous path for today’s Germany.
Why is this so? Imaginative writers (and to a certain extent all true intellectuals) possess a sensitivity that enables them to perceive the normally imperceptible. They are certainly not the only human beings who are capable
of this, but they are (almost) the only ones whose main activity consists of observing human actions in the microcosm of everyday life and contextualizing
them in the macrocosm of long-term developments. Some would say that
this is merely one aspect of literary pursuits, and that is indisputable. There
is no dearth of writers who are greatly interested in or even exclusively concerned with the microcosm of their inner selves. In times when cultural and
political upheaval is the order of the day (e.g., during the Weimar Republic
or the 1960s), the “inner self” is of necessity set upon by external reality and
forced to come to terms with that reality. Writers living in such times often
produce works that juxtapose the inner and outer worlds, and the reception
of such works by contemporary readers can, over time, affect the perception
of social reality. In relatively stable or stagnant times (Hegel’s description of
happiness as the “empty pages of history” comes to mind), few people can
discern the currents beneath the calm surface. To accomplish this, one must
have an educational background that equips one with the facility to see parallels between the present and past epochs. In Wilhelminian Germany, and
even until the 1960s, this background was provided to the extremely small
elite that attended the humanistic Gymnasium. The postwar democratization
and modernization of the German school system has had as one result the
virtual disappearance of this background, even among the elite. There can be
no doubt that Humboldt’s ideal of the well-rounded person is doomed when
an intellectual like Stefan Breuer characterizes the traditional Gymnasium as
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“not preparation for the world,” but instead “against the world.”14 Although
this preparation is by no means suf¤cient, it is crucial for the development
of an educated citizenry and the survival of civil society. If public support for
the humanities (taken to mean critical thinking, esthetic sensitivity, and historical consciousness) continues to wane, there will be only one small cohort
of people in a position to perceive the difference between illusion and reality,
namely writers and artists. Since the German example has shown that the
occupation of such an exclusive position can lead to an unhealthy selfexaltation, the struggles to maintain a critical literature and a critical public
are ultimately inseparable.
This is my own subjective judgment, but it is hardly unique. To my own
amazement, I have found similar views—albeit from a very different perspective—in the ¤rst monograph on the Conservative Revolution, which
appeared in 1941. Former Nazi functionary Hermann Rauschning, who,
previous and subsequent to his involvement with National Socialism, was a
Christian monarchist, had hoped to preserve “human substance” in the face
of the destruction caused by the “great secular emancipation movement”
that began in the Enlightenment.15 He lamented the turning away from
German idealism (“Weimar and humanism,” 180) rejected the stance of
both Nietzsche and George, and described Jünger as an “extremist intellect”
who played into the hands of the Nazis (72). (The reference to Hofmannsthal at the beginning of the preface set the stage for an alternative vision of
culture.) Rauschning saw German literature in the hands of the left, but
rather than attacking this camp for monopolizing it, he examined the attitudes of the German elite. His analysis ran as follows: Already before the
First World War, the elite had failed in its duty to preserve the “continuity”
of “intellectual and political tradition.” Even worse, this group had “no real
relationship with culture,” and this failing had a negative in¶uence on the
German people, especially on the middle class, for whom life revolved exclusively around economic success. An untenable situation obtained long
before the rise of the NSDAP: “In our political elite, any occupation with
intellectual matters was considered to be more or less suspect” (194). The
solution, as proposed by Rauschning, is a new kind of elite:
[W]ithout a stratum that carries the historical, intellectual, and political creativity of the people, even the greatest people falls back onto the level of semiconscious vegetating. Such a stratum should not be confused with any societal
upper class based on the nobility of birth or property. (209)
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This is tantamount to an elevation of culture, manifested as both a knowledge of tradition and a cultivation of creativity in the present, to equal status
with the political and economic system. Equal status does not imply the superiority ¶aunted by the prophets and seers discussed above, but it does
mean that we cannot allow the shape of the future to be determined by
forces either unknown to or beyond the reach of the majority of the human
race. To do so would be to abdicate all responsibility to coming generations.
The realization that such a position might lead to a dialogue between nonfundamentalist elements of the right and the left—not to be confused with
the ongoing battle for a middle void of de¤nable characteristics—should
not be a hindrance.16
Rauschning unwittingly (?) provided the model for such dialogue, even
though he was unrelentingly critical of the left as a force for secularization.
The model is to be found in his portrayal of the Jews and their role in German society. According to Rauschning, the essence of Jewishness is the combination of critical, dialectical thinking and a conservatism that respects the
law, the family, tradition, and a rootedness in the “divine calling” of human
beings. As long as the Jew can maintain the creative tension inherent in this
constellation, he is “the greatest enrichment within any people (Volk)”
(239). (In the case of his own country, Rauschning does not hesitate to characterize the last one hundred and ¤fty years of German intellectual history
as German-Jewish intellectual history17 [240]!) The antiassimilatory implication of the word “within” is problematic, but one might consider what the
future relevance of the model might be if the word “Jew” were replaced by
“intellectual.” In the twentieth century, most intellectuals on the left have
seen tradition as an enemy, whereas most of their counterparts on the right
have attempted to defend it or even reinstitute parts of it that had been cast
off over time. Leftist critical thinkers have all too frequently been remiss
with regard to criticism of their own projects, and their rightist opponents
have as a rule viewed tradition as beyond questioning. Certain representatives of the Conservative Revolution attempted to fuse “traditional” concepts such as authority, military virtues, and service with mass society and
the use of technology both in industry and as an organizational model for
society (i.e., function rather than identity). This alternative failed between
the world wars, and there is little reason to believe that it would be more successful now, despite the efforts of such latter-day advocates as Botho Strauß
and Heimo Schwilk.
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In 1933, some of the ideas of Heidegger, Jünger, Schmitt, et al. were
plundered by the Nazis and forced into the Procrustean bed of National Socialist ideology. The contemporary New Right has yet to reach a mass audience,18 but the relatively sophisticated language in Die selbstbewußte Nation
has a trivialized counterpart in youth culture (e.g., neo-Nazi racist rock
bands, nationalist/xenophobic websites on the Internet,19 etc.). Until recently, the ¶urry of intellectual activity and waves of rightist popular culture
had not translated into success at the ballot box comparable to that of JeanMarie Le Pen in France, Jörg Haider in Austria, Gianfranco Fini in Italy, or
even Pia Kjærsgaard in Denmark.20 The right-wing Republikaner have been
on the wane, and they have often been involved in turf battles with the German Peoples Union (DVU). In April 1998, the latter unexpectedly won a
victory that sent tremors through the entire German political establishment.
The DVU captured 13 percent of the vote in the Sachsen-Anhalt state elections. Despite the fact that this impressive ¤gure (about 154,000 votes) was
garnered by a “phantom party” with almost no members in the area and
made possible by the millions of its founder, Gerhard Frey, there was no ignoring the calculation that a full one-third of male voters between eighteen
and twenty-¤ve chose Frey’s party.21 The party program of the DVU, disseminated via the Internet (<www.dvu.net/programm.htm>), demonstrates
how the ruminations of intellectuals and the mail-order distribution of CDs
with extremist content can be transformed into practical politics. An analysis of the DVU’s Twelve Points shows not only how a rightist party attempts
to sound like the voice of reason; it also highlights the distance between the
German Right and American ultraconservatives.
The preface to the program contains a commitment (“without any reservation”) to the German constitution. The individual points begin with a
moderate tone, often slipping into right-wing rhetoric at the end. Under
“Preservation of the German Identity,” for example, there is talk of serving
the cause of world peace, but the speci¤c contribution to this noble project
is a policy aimed at limiting the number of foreigners in Germany, stopping
the abuse of the right to political asylum, and deporting “foreign criminals.”
The language of Alain de Benoist’s ethnopluralism22 is borrowed here, and
France is also set up as a model for stopping the “distortion” of German: the
state is called upon to stop the in¶ux of foreign words by means of an institution like the “Académie française.”23 “Self-determination” and the German mark are defended against the bureaucracy of the European Union—a
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position not unknown even in liberal European Union members like Denmark—but this point is linked to the loss of German territories after World
War II. This loss, it is asserted, contradicts the principles of international
law. This situation, we are assured, can only be changed by peaceful cooperation, not violence. (One can imagine that the Poles will not be soothed by
this addendum.) Collective guilt as a discriminatory measure supposedly
used against the German people is rejected, although the crimes of the Nazis
are not disputed. It does not inspire con¤dence, however, when these crimes
are depicted as no different than the actions of the Communists,24 and it is
also maintained that “serious war crimes” were also perpetrated by the Allies.
German suffering must not be forgotten, and the German soldier (both in
his incarnation as a member of the Wehrmacht and today) is to be given due
respect. The historical dimension in the ¤rst three points yields to questions
of social and economic policy in the rest of the document. Subsidies for
“German families and mothers,” expansion of day care, equality for women,
and better health care for all citizens are grouped together with an attack on
abortion as both immoral and detrimental to the “preservation of the German people and the securing of the future.” Revenues saved by contributing
less to international organizations25 are to be used to guarantee pensions and
social programs. Housing and transportation policies are to take the needs
of children and youth into account, especially in urban areas. The educational system should offer equal chances to all without promoting pseudoequality (“Gleichmacherei”). The goals of education are “respect for human
dignity and religious conviction, courage, a sense of responsibility, democratic spirit and international understanding, and love for the homeland and
the German people.” Stricter laws against polluters are called for, and the
state is to make the protection of the environment one of its “primary tasks.”
Experiments using animals are to be kept to a minimum, and those who
abuse animals are to be punished more severely. Foreign in¶uences on German
culture are to held to a “reasonable level,” whereas German artists are to be
supported (according to their “achievements”). The mass media are to re¶ect
the “values of the constitution” and the morality of the “majority of the people” and refrain from exerting a negative in¶uence on German rights and
concerns. The authors of the program are not unaware of the effects of globalization. They appear to support a limited policy of autarky, one that includes preferential treatment for German ¤rms and farmers (in light of
“excessive foreign competition”), a program to renew key domestic industries
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like shipbuilding and steel, and the use of the “native” energy source, namely
coal. All of this is to be accomplished by increased political awareness and
participation on the part of the citizenry, channeled through political parties
(including new small ones, like the DVU) and referendums.
This vision of a self-aware/self-con¤dent nation contains passages that
could have been lifted from speeches by Patrick Buchanan, Jesse Helms,
Ross Perot, and many others.26 It is not surprising to ¤nd German versions
of isolationism, the V-chip, and “English First,” but in the American context, such ideas would hardly be merged with the goal of a strong state that
intervenes in the economy, provides myriad forms of social welfare, and
lends ¤nancial support to artists and writers. The campaign to limit immigration is of course not a unique exercise in the industrialized West. The one
aspect of the program that is rooted in the German experience is the effort
to restore national pride and patriotism, an effort that must of necessity include a revisionist look at the Third Reich and a plea for the return of lost
territories. As was mentioned above, many of the voters who opted for the
DVU in Sachsen-Anhalt were young males. They live in one of the “new
states” of the Federal Republic, where unemployment is rampant and job security practically nonexistent. Such people could hardly be expected to
view globalization as an opportunity or “¶exibility” as a virtue.27 Groups
like the DVU may have nothing to offer beyond the tired old recipes of the
past, but they are reacting to real social phenomena as well as the perceptions
of individuals, as skewed as they may be. If political parties from other segments of the political spectrum in Germany continue to act as if globalization and the gradual disappearance of national identity are not only
inevitable but also bene¤cial, disaffected youth and others may choose to
once again follow the “special path.” This could have catastrophic consequences for both the Germans themselves and the other residents of the global village.
There are signs that a new type of thinking is emerging in Germany, although it is too early to tell where it might lead. At a meeting of German Catholics, the audience hears criticism of the “uninhibited and shameless egotism”
in German society. Delegates also attend a forum about the ecological responsibility of business that includes then Christian Democrat Environmental Minister Angela Merkel and Joschka Fischer, the prominent Green
politician.28 Jürgen Habermas engages in a dialogue with then SPD chancellor candidate Gerhard Schröder and uses the occasion as an opportunity

Concl&pr.fm Page 167 Friday, August 25, 2000 1:38 PM

Conclusions and Prospects

/// 167

to call for the development of transnational democracy as a reaction to globalization and the “strained frivolity of . . . neoliberal politics.”29 Sociologist
and legal scholar Sibylle Tönnies (granddaughter of Ferdinand Tönnies,
who described the transition from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft) strives to
separate Romanticism from the anti-Enlightenment stance of neo-Romanticism and advocates a return to “metaphysically motivated Enlightenment”
with an emotional component.30 She also attempts to come to terms with
American communitarianism as a possible method for revitalizing the notion of community (“Gemeinschaft”) long shunned in postwar Germany.31
Political scientist Antonia Grunenberg supports a concept of freedom that
is not equated with material prosperity or social welfare programs. Using the
political philosophy of Hannah Arendt as her point of departure, she envisions a society in which individuals see themselves in the ¤rst instance not
as receivers of services provided by the state, but rather as citizens concerned
with using and preserving freedom. Knowing that the Germans panic when
security and stability are threatened, Grunenberg adds that the stemming of
increasing poverty is the conditio sine qua non of this model.32 She has of
course read Benjamin Barber, who has issued a trenchant indictment of both
“Jihad” (represented in Germany by the xenophobic skinhead, and, on another plane, by the elitist intellectual) and “McWorld:”
Each eschews civil society and belittles democratic citizenship, neither seeks alternative democratic institutions. . . . Jihad pursues a bloody politics of identity, McWorld a bloodless economics of pro¤t. Belonging by default to
McWorld, everyone is a consumer; seeking a repository for identity, everyone
belongs to some tribe. But no one is a citizen. Without citizens, how can there
be a democracy?33

This kind of American export to Germany will one day, one hopes, be as
widely accepted as the franchises of McDonald’s restaurants, Toys “R” Us or
Blockbuster Video found in many cities between the Rhine and the OderNeiße.
What of the role of literature in this contemporary constellation? Sibylle
Tönnies offers Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (whose drama of tolerance,
Nathan der Weise [Nathan the wise], was the ¤rst play performed in postfascist Germany) as a model worthy of emulation.34 Lessing was indeed an
exemplary embodiment of intellectual rigor, bourgeois virtues, and human
empathy. He was also the product of an era of great upheaval, one far removed from our own barely surveyable terrain. Writers like Günter Grass
and Christa Wolf are nearing the end of their long—and not uncontroversial
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—careers, and the following generation, represented by the now-tainted
¤gures of Botho Strauß and Peter Handke, offers no promising candidates
for succession.35 Few authors desire, or dare, to transcend their own personal
concerns, offering a portrait of modern life that might have some impact on
more than private life or group identity. Endless debates about whether this
is the result of a conscious decision or simply a sign of the (postutopian)
times are not likely to be fruitful. Beyond global formulas, the small-scale alternative offered by writer Matthias Altenburg (b. 1958) should perhaps be
considered. Unwilling to accept the retreat into elitism and cultural pessimism undertaken by some members of the generation of 1968, Altenburg
asks us to at least attempt to resist the “daily evil”:
[A]t least it is possible that this attempt is both the least that must be done and
the most that can be done. That would be: an Enlightenment that would not
again succumb to the illusion that everything can be illuminated, one that
would be aware of the non-enlightenability of most of what exists and would,
despite this, doggedly do what it can, knowing that otherwise, only tyranny
and resistance would remain.36

One cultural ¤gure who apparently thinks along these lines is Hans Jürgen
Syberberg (b. 1935). His provocative public statements37 have made him a
favorite target of the cultural left, and his presence in the table of contents of
Die selbstbewußte Nation has only reinforced his image as a rightist. This is an
oversimpli¤cation, as a reader of Syberberg’s 1981 book Die freudlose Gesellschaft (The joyless society)38 can attest. Many passages of this work appear to
be source material for Botho Strauß’s essay “Impending Tragedy.” The author laments the lack of respect and interest given to culture in democratic
society (39), despises television (“Gradual stulti¤cation: Television as a
drug” [176]), bemoans a youth that has no time to listen and will thus never
become wise in old age (190), and values myth as a repository of the “secrets,
wishes and the subconscious” of the people (317). At the same time, he does
not hesitate to give expression to the contradictions within himself. Although he attacks the “leftist establishment of the intellectuals” (220), he
does not conceal his own sometime association with it (231). He is saddened
by a loss of German traditions and values (240), but he does not portray
these as a racially pure phenomenon:
Germany without Jews: Loss of intellectual curiosity and the clumsiness of
fashions as an inadequate replacement (“Ersatz”). The Jews were our most intellectually vital partners in the modern symbiosis of our culture. This loss is
now making its impact felt. We are alone (“unter uns”). (55)
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He can laud Ernst Jünger as a writer who dared to be different (221) but go
on to compose a list of German cultural icons that includes not only Strauß
and Handke, but also leftists and left-liberals like Wolf Biermann, Alexander Kluge, Günter Grass, Heinrich Böll, Bertolt Brecht, Hans Mayer, and
Alexander Mitscherlich (381–383). It is not coincidental that Syberberg often emphasizes the human qualities of the people on his list. His main concern, which is re¶ected in the title of his book, is that the limitless
production of material goods in the “consumer society” (he uses the English
term) and the removal of obstacles have not yielded a better quality of life:
“Are we happier today? Are there more celebrations? Is there more art? Are
marriages, social life, living and dying better (190)? These are questions that
the left should also be asking, both when analyzing contemporary conditions and proposing alternatives.39 Once Syberberg’s generation of Germans, the last to have consciously experienced both everyday happiness and
profound horror, have left the scene, there may be few people disposed to
ask such questions, whether in literature or in life. That is a disconcerting
prospect.
When Ernst Jünger died on February 17, 1998, at the age of 102, the
German print and visual media reacted with an outpouring of appraisals of
his life and works.40 On the evening news (ARD’s “Tagesschau”), the one
formulation used by many commentators made its debut: “With his voluminous literary œuvre, Jünger evoked great admiration, but also clear rejection.” Federal President Herzog was quoted as saying that literature had lost
“a unique witness to our time,” and Chancellor Kohl added that Jünger had
been “an independent and indomitable intellect.” (The fact that the two
highest representatives of the state would make statements about the passing
of a literary ¤gure illustrates the—at least residual—status of high culture in
Germany.41) The still-controversial discussion of the author’s relationship to
war and National Socialism was also touched upon during the news broadcast. This was a relatively even-handed portrait provided in a short time slot,
and it was probably the one that reached the greatest number of Germans.
The many assessments offered by literary scholars, critics, and politicians
were actually much more problematic. One would expect a conservative
CSU leader like Theo Waigel to call Jünger a “great German” and transform
him into an anti-Nazi resistance ¤ghter, but then SPD chairman Oskar
Lafontaine’s praise of the “stimuli” found in Jünger’s works was an example
of cynical pandering to the conservative electorate, given the author’s dis-
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taste for everything that Social Democracy stands (stood?) for.42 Philosopher
Hans Georg Gadamer characterized Jünger’s life as “an irrefutable witnessing,” granting the author instant status as a monument.43 (Does “irrefutable” mean “beyond assessment”?) The French—with the exception of
Sartre— always more appreciative of Jünger than the Germans, compared
the deceased with Hugo and Valéry (Libération), asserted that he represented
“intellectual freedom” vis-à-vis “subjugation and barbarism” (Le Figaro),
saw him as a latter-day Roman—“proud, unpretentious, unshakable”
(François Mitterand—not from the grave, but in an earlier statement),
someone capable of “deciphering” the secrets of modern man (Jack Lang), a
writer who sought not military, but rather “literary” salvation (Michel
Tournier).44 Even Jean-Marie Le Pen praised Jünger’s patriotism and “chivalrous conduct.”45 It is one thing for outside observers (including former
Spanish premier Felipe González, who memorialized Jünger’s “human sensitivity”46) to make such pronouncements, but quite another for today’s
Germans to accept an antidemocratic (or at least democratically disinterested) intellectual as a ¤gure worthy of emulation. The Süddeutsche Zeitung
published articles that contributed to such acceptance, but at least that
newspaper also offered a selection of Jünger’s own thoughts—from 1982—
about subjects like democracy: “I do not advocate any one constitutional
form. . . . In Venice, in Greece, in Rome, in various German principalities,
there were various forms of human existence. Some succeeded, some did
not”; or anti-Semitism: “Who didn’t say something against the Jews from
time to time back then? Especially the Jews themselves. Take Heine, take
Marx.” 47 Such details are reduced to insigni¤cance by the eulogizers who
wish to exalt Jünger. Writer and essayist Curt Hohoff, who sees Jünger misinterpreted by “politically fanatical ideologists,” claims that the author’s cultural criticism was on the level of Hegel, Nietzsche, Jacob Burkhardt, and
Karl Jaspers.48 Germanist Harro Segeberg begins his portrait of Jünger with
a list of the various manifestations of the centenarian, a list so long that no
one phrase stands out. (Strangely enough, the ¤rst item on the list is not “enthusiastic soldier,” but rather “author of military analyses of the First World
War.”) Segeberg ¤nds Jünger’s purported resistance to “ideological-political” seduction—at least until his ¤nal years—admirable, but he is more fascinated with than concerned about the “dangers” inherent in his world
view.49 Critic Wolfram Schütte does not attempt to transform Jünger into a
democrat or a humanist, calling him “the only contemporary reactionary
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with true literary merits,” but he in the end describes him as a “fearlessly curious intellectual.”50 Thomas Assheuer ¤nds Jünger’s “tirades” against the
Weimar Republic “incomprehensible,” but he calls him a “genius of perception” who undertook a moral—if not democratic—“turn” (Kehre) during
World War II. If Jünger was in fact the “biographer and chronicler of the
century,”51 how would one categorize those ¤gures like Anna Seghers or
Heinrich Mann, who experienced a very different saeculum? The best advice
comes from East German writer Rolf Schneider, who suggests that we use
Jünger’s diaries as one—not the—documentary source on the history of our
times.52 In general, the reactions to Jünger’s death are not the expression of
a vibrant democratic culture53 in Germany (at least in my view). They are
also not merely a heeding of the old custom of not speaking disparagingly
about the dead (De mortuis nil nisi bene). The willingness on the part of intellectuals (quite surprising, in some cases) to divorce esthetic sensitivity and
sophisticated—if skewed—perception from life in society and the lot of the
majority could once again be manipulated in times of crisis. No one should
wish that such a test will come.
For the past few years, the Munich publishing house C. H. Beck has offered a series of small paperbacks under the title “The Most Important
Knowledge.” Three of the recent additions to this series, The Era of Enlightenment, Romanticism, and Good and Evil, delineate the general context of
the present study. Gerhard Schulz, the author of the Romanticism survey
(which, ¶outing chronology, came out ¤rst), tells the intended general readership that the Romantic is “not a German characteristic and especially not
a German fate.”54 Although he does not mention Goldhagen (whose book
was yet to come), he sharply criticizes historian Gordon Craig for emphasizing an alleged German af¤nity with Romanticism’s more pathological facets
and denies that the discussion of national character has any scienti¤c basis
(134). Werner Schneiders, who is responsible for presenting the Enlightenment, has a much easier time of it, since he is not confronted with a primarily German phenomenon (logically enough, the chapter on Germany
follows those on England and France). To the probable dismay of the New
Right, Schneiders does not refrain from emphasizing that the German version of the Enlightenment had a strong religious dimension.55 Lessing’s juxtaposition of religious conviction with an optimistic philosophy of history
is also given its due. On the negative side, the author does not omit a reference
to the “long alliance between [German] Enlightenment and absolutism”56
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and the reluctance of the Aufklärer to push for political reforms (114).
Schneiders discusses many critiques of the Enlightenment, but asks in the
end: “What is the alternative?” (133). (Die selbstbewußte Nation is not included in the selections for further reading.) Annemarie Pieper, who traces
the scienti¤c and philosophical attempts to explain the existence of good
and evil, cannot ¤nd any one explanation that could claim universal validity.57 As might be expected in a book written for a German audience, Hitler,
Eichmann, and Goldhagen appear on the ¤rst pages of the introduction.
Pieper is convinced that evil is often more attractive than good, but she
tends to side with Hannah Arendt rather than Goldhagen with regard to the
crimes of the Holocaust (9). Good and evil remain a “puzzle” to her (119),
but she does not hesitate to advocate a “freedom-based constitution” (120)
as an absolute necessity. In a passage analyzing utopian dreams, she presents
her own personal view of humanity. Her words are a ¤tting expression of the
motivation behind my own investigations:
[I]n the end, the humanity project always seems to be endangered when one of
the basic human capacities—sensuality, common sense, reason, rationality—is
deemed absolute and elevated to the sole measure of good and evil. The consequence is an inner disruption of humaneness that leads to brutalization. (113)
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No country (or political regime) has a corner on complexity or inner contradictions, but some countries (and regimes) are psychologically more
stressful to study than others. Germany is a stressful country to study.1



fter this study was completed, several events occurred in Germany
which had an impact on the sociocultural landscape of the country.
This is neither the time nor the place for an in-depth analysis of
these events, but a brief survey can shed light on the prospects of the intellectual New Right. In the political sphere, it was the defeat of Helmut Kohl
in the September 1998 national elections that was—at least initially—viewed
by both political observers and large segments of the populace as a watershed
in postwar German affairs. In the cultural sphere, it was the October 1998
speech made by Martin Walser (cf. chapter 3) and the response to it by German-Jewish spokesman Ignatz Bubis and many others that held the attention of the public for several months. The “Walser-Bubis debate” was
accompanied by the continuing controversy surrounding design and erection of a Holocaust memorial in Berlin. In the spring of 1999, the “ethnic
cleansing” of Kosovo and the participation of the Bundeswehr in military
action against Yugoslavia stirred up memories of the 1940s. Finally, there
were occurrences in Germany itself whose “normalcy,” rather than exceptionality, provided a disturbing backdrop to all of the above, i.e., violent attacks against foreigners.
When Social Democrat Gerhard Schröder was elected chancellor in
1998, it was—incredibly—the ¤rst time in the history of the Federal Republic
///
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that a government has been voted out of power. Such ultra-stability has been
attributed by some to the economic success of the (West) German model, by
others to a fear of change stemming mainly from the experience of pre-1945
upheavals. (As the Italians have demonstrated, such fear is not the only possible response to the fascist era.) When Kohl’s sixteen-year tenure was brought
to an end, commentators were unsure of what to make of the unseating of the
Christian Democrats (and their coalition partners, the increasingly neoliberal
Free Democrats). One recalls that the editors of Die selbstbewußte Nation saw
the “generation of 1968” as the root of all evil in postwar German society. For
them, Helmut Kohl was a “stealth” Social Democrat who maintained a conservative facade while allowing the left to in¤ltrate all areas of society. Kohl’s
talk of an “intellectual-moral shift” was, in their view, a mere sham. Now the
reins of power have been taken over by a ’68er who was once a member of the
Young Socialists (the youth wing of the SPD).2 The (traditionally) conservative newspaper Die Welt, employer of Ulrich Schacht, Heimo Schwilk, and
Rainer Zitelmann, did not, however, react to the election results with the publication of a jeremiad:
The 27th of September is a day of triumph for the ’68 generation. With Schröder, the ¤ghters from the extra-parliamentary opposition will occupy the highest of¤ces of the state for the ¤rst time.
The “march through the institutions” was successful. . . . However, Schröder’s election victory is a structural one, not one of the ideology of ’68. That was
quietly disposed of. In the place of change, though, there appeared in many
cases a kind of philosophical [“weltanschauliches”] vacuum. . . . That makes the
victory of the [’68] generation into something hollow. A victory without substance? 3

This question became the order of the day after the new chancellor presented
his government’s agenda (Regierungserklärung) to parliament on November 10,
1998. A brief summary of this agenda would be instructive here.
Those who expected a blueprint for sweeping changes were doubtless
disappointed by the words of the new chancellor. He told his audience that
unemployment was Germany’s “most pressing and painful problem,” emphasizing that “economic productivity is the beginning of everything.”4 Such
assertions surely reminded the listeners more of Christian Democrat Ludwig
Erhard (the architect of the “Wirtschaftswunder”) than of Schröder’s charismatic Social Democrat predecessor, Willy Brandt. This was not a critique of
the system, but rather of stagnation within the system. Lamenting that the

Epilgoue.fm Page 175 Friday, August 25, 2000 1:46 PM

The Ongoing German Quest for Normalcy ///

175

Germans were no longer “innovative” enough, Schröder called upon his fellow countrymen to make themselves “¤t for the European info-society”
(“Wissensgesellschaft”)” by, among other things, accepting the necessary role
of elites and reforming the university system. He called for a tax reform that
would combine “modern pragmatism” with “a strong sense of social fairness”
and at the same time spoke out against the “abuse of state services.” He also
promised to ¤ght crime and pay more attention to the rights of victims. The
term coined for the agenda so described was “politics of the New Center.” In
reality, this meant that the SPD was attempting to occupy the middle, pushing the CDU onto the political fringes. Given this core project, references to
cultural matters in Schröder’s speech seemed to be mere window dressing.5
Kohl would surely not have cited Habermas’s vision of civil and cosmopolitan
society, but this was not more than a passing reference. Although Schröder
spoke of the election outcome as a “generational shift in the life of [the] nation” and praised his own generation (in both East and West Germany) as
torchbearers of “civic virtue,” “civil courage,” and opposition to “authoritarian structures,” he emphasized that there would be no attempt to escape Germany’s “historical responsibility,” i.e., the commitment to building and
broadening democracy. It is telling that the one statement in the address that
had an old-fashioned social-democratic ring to it, namely the proclamation
that everyone has a “moral right” to employment and training, was modi¤ed
by an addendum stating that the unemployed have a “duty” to accept any opportunity for training offered them. While denying that his government
wanted to perpetuate a “paternalistic” state (Bevormundungsstaat), he made
it clear that personal choices would have to be subordinated to the goal of a
“leaner, more ef¤cient,” less bureaucratized government.
No one was moved to describe the bearer of these sober tidings as a charismatic ¤gure (“A visionary he’s not.”6; “This chancellor will not become a philosopher for red-green visions.”7). The would-be visionaries, namely those of
the extreme right, were the real losers of the election—or were they? In his programmatic speech, Schröder made a point of emphasizing that the German
people had “clearly rejected extreme-right and xenophobic tendencies” at the
ballot box. They should be proud of this, he said. A brief glance at the election
results does provide a basis for this pride: Taken together, the three main rightwing parties (Republikaner, DVU, NPD) received only 3.3 percent of the
vote. The Republikaner garnered 0.1 percent less than in 1994. The collective
¤gure was still far below the 5 percent required for representation in parlia-
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ment, but it was higher than in the previous election. More signi¤cant were
the regional results of the far right, especially in Berlin and the former East
Germany (in percentages)8:
Berlin
Saxony
Saxony-Anhalt
Brandenburg
Thüringen

1994

1998

1.9
1.4
1.0
1.1
1.4

4.9
5.7
4.1
5.2
4.5

These results suggest that the attraction of nationalistic rhetoric and (informal) “ethnic cleansing” in the eastern states should not be dismissed out of
hand. This impression was strengthened in March 1999 when the Of¤ce for
the Protection of the Constitution issued its report for 1998. Although the
number of violent incidents involving right-wing extremists dropped by 5.7
percent vis-à-vis 1997, the number of persons considered part of the “scene”
grew from 48,400 to 53,600. The number of those considered violent also
rose from 7,600 to 8,200.9 One can quibble about the ¤gures or question—
as many have—the criteria utilized by the Of¤ce, but the trend is a clear one.
Probably the most disturbing aspect of this trend—at least to this
observer—is the growing readiness to use violence against foreigners. More
than half of the violent incidents involved attacks on foreigners, and half of
these occurred in the former GDR, where youth employment was a major factor, according to Interior Minister Otto Schily.10 One can by now speak of an
endless series:11 Just weeks before this epilogue was written, Ghanian writer
Amma Darko was taunted by about ten youths, who then used beer bottles to
emphasize their racial epithets. This occurred on the Baltic-coast island of Rügen.12 In the same week, three foreign students were insulted and attacked in
nearby Greifswald (the word “nigger” was used, although the injured student
was from Syria), and two African students were injured in Köthen (where
Bach composed his Brandenburg Concertos).13 Such atrocities led Schily and
Justice Minister Herta Däubler-Gmelin to call for an “Alliance Against Xenophobia” (“Bündnis gegen Fremdenhaß”).14 Although it is impossible to determine which of the many incidents of the past few years were the most
despicable, the death in February 1999 of Algerian asylum seeker Farid Guendoul in Guben, a city on the Polish border, was perhaps the most shocking to
broad segments of the German populace. Guendoul bled to death while ¶ee-
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ing from over a dozen violent youths associated with the extreme right. Even
the tabloid Bildzeitung spoke of an “incomprehensible battue” (Treibjagd).15
There was bitter irony in the fact that the societal elites in both Guben and the
Polish city of Gubin, across the Neiße river, have long been planning a merging of the two towns in the framework of European uni¤cation. (One asks
oneself whether the elites or the youthful extremists are isolated from society.)
Guben also has more social workers than the typical East German municipality.16 Shocked citizens took part in memorial services, but politicians attempted to make political capital out of the affair. The party chairman of the
Brandenburg CDU, Jörg Schönbohm, accused the reigning SPD of hoping
for right-wing electoral successes as a way to weaken the CDU. (He said this
on the day of a march organized by concerned citizens in Guben.)17 Two days
later, the Brandenburg minister for economic affairs, Burkhard Dreher (SPD),
warned of the economic rami¤cations of xenophobia: “Although investors
have not spoken to me directly about this topic up until now, I know that xenophobia and right-wing radicalism are a hindrance of the highest order for
investments.” He added that all citizens of Brandenburg should know that by
advocating xenophobia, they were “sawing off the branch that they are sitting
on.”18 There is doubtless no little truth in this statement, but one must question the ethical principles of a politician who chooses to speak of such things
during a period of trauma and mourning. Any public of¤cial primarily concerned with his country’s image abroad rather than with the serious social
problems that affect that image is sending out all the wrong signals. On another level, one must ask to what extent the attitudes exhibited by Schönbohm
and Dreher in this particular case are representative of the German political
class as a whole. Renowned psychotherapist Hans-Joachim Maaz, upset about
the stigmatizing of his fellow East Germans, has recently put forward the hypothesis that, although special circumstances in the former GDR tend to exacerbate antisocial behavior, what is happening in Guben and elsewhere is not
unrelated to German society in the West as well:
[T]he data [concerning] growing violence in the new federal states give us some
indications about conditions in all of Germany, and they could warn us about
the danger that threatens when the prosperity that has become a given for most
of the citizens of the old Federal Republic becomes less and less certain.19

One need not accept Maaz’s generalizations about the East Germans’ “readiness
to conform and subjugate [themselves]” and the West German “domination
and doer [“Macher”] mentality” to consider the import of the above statement.
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In the weeks before the 1998 election, the venerable German discourse
about the relationship between thinking and acting, intellectuals and politicians, surfaced yet again. In late August, Berlin witnessed a meeting of
minds, the tenth in a series of brainstorming sessions about almost anything
under the sun (this one was entitled “10. Ideentreff—Eurovisionen”). Among
the organizers of the event were the political artist Klaus Staeck and sociologist Oskar Negt. The point of the exercise was to formulate a manifesto
that would provide “a political perspective for a cultural and social Europe.”20 This turn of phrase sounds as strange in English as it does in German: What Europe would not be “cultural” and “social”? The actual intent
was to defend the (postwar) European project of social justice and a unique
(i.e., non-American) culture. One could not help but reminisce about the—
in the meantime highly mythologized—alliance between critical intellectuals and Willy Brandt in the 1960s. In comparison to those days, when the
views of writers like Günter Grass were taken seriously (or at least given a
requisite hearing), the Kohl era had seemed to be a sort of black hole that
swallowed up any incipient dialogue between the pensive and the pragmatic.21 Ironically, Grass did not come to Berlin this time. If he had been a
one-man grassroots movement in 1965, now he chose to appear on a mere
four occasions for the SPD, all of them in the East. He was still upset about
Social Democrat support for restrictions on the in¶ux of asylum seekers and
for broadened surveillance powers for the police.
The chautauqua about “European visions” brought together celebrities
like actor Ben Kingsley, ¤lm director Constantin Costa-Gavras, writer Elie
Wiesel, philosopher Bernard-Henri Lévy, Michael Naumann (later to become Schröder’s cultural minister; listed here as “publisher from Berlin”),
and former French cultural minister Jack Lang, who, in an subsequent interview, said something that no German intellectual would have dared to say
at the time:
Society has changed. Germany cannot let itself be eternally enslaved by the
memory of the Hitler dictatorship. The new Berlin no longer has anything to
do with the Berlin of the “Third Reich.” I have also already heard that people
reject [the idea of] a federal cultural minister, because it reminds them of Goebbels. One is still giving power to Goebbels and Hitler ¤fty years after their iniquitous deeds.22

A German version of this lament was to appear not long after the election. Before turning to it, however, it should be pointed out that Gerhard Schröder, although not a dominating ¤gure at the Berlin conference, did make a
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statement of some relevance for the present study. After characterizing the
Kohl era as “one and a half decades of silence between politics and culture,”
he proclaimed: “Now we want European high culture.”23 Although it remains unclear just what this might mean (perhaps Pavarotti singing the role
of Siegfried at Covent Garden?), one possible subtext could be the hope that
Europe could maintain its identity by shoring up the cultural elite as a bulwark against the increasingly ubiquitous mass culture emanating from
America.
On October 11, 1998, Martin Walser, a card-carrying member of that
elite (albeit one who enjoys extended sojourns in America24), delivered an address that spoke to the long-suppressed sentiments of a substantial segment of
the German populace. The occasion was the awarding of the 1998 Peace Prize
of the German Book Trade. This prestigious honor, presented to persons who
have made an outstanding contribution to promoting the idea of peace, had
previously been given to such well-known ¤gures as Albert Schweitzer, Ernst
Bloch, Max Frisch, Astrid Lindgren, Yehudi Menuhin, and Václav Havel. In
1997, the winner was Turkish novelist and civil rights activist Yasar Kemal.
Kemal was introduced by Günter Grass, who provoked many by using the occasion to criticize the German government’s policies toward asylum seekers.
The laudatio for Walser was delivered by none other than Frank Schirrmacher,25 who had done his best to discredit the leftist literary intelligentsia in the
“Literature Debate” of the early 1990s (see chapter 3). In contrast to the immediate postreuni¤cation controversy, the purpose was not to destroy the reputation of writers—like Christa Wolf—with a certain political bent, but
rather to elevate one author to the status of a model worthy of emulation.
Schirrmacher constructs the image of an eccentric who does not ¤t into everyday reality, but who nonetheless “sees clearer than others things left over,
things left undone, legacies (Hinterlassenschaften).”26 This special vision is
made possible by contemplation untainted by any ideology, since Walser—
“this great utopia skeptic”—believes in only one utopia, namely narration.
The point of all this is to mold the author’s entire career into a logical progression culminating in a project of remembering the German past in a highly
personal manner. This is not meant to be ahistorical or antihistorical, however. According to Schirrmacher, it is “easy to detest and morally condemn
National Socialism” but much more dif¤cult to grasp how “misfortune and
crime can rise up all around a person without him noticing it.” Ironically, the
¤rst part of this statement is wishful thinking (i.e., quite utopian). The second
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part refers to Walser’s 1998 novel Ein springender Brunnen (A gushing fountain),27 in which an attempt is made to rescue a German childhood from the
supposedly all-encompassing context of the Nazi period (Walser was six years
old when Hitler took power). When Schirrmacher tells us that Walser’s politics “stand on poetic feet,” we have returned to the perspective of the Romantic Novalis. The problem with this portrait, which is meant to be laudatory, is
that it has less to do with Walser’s life and career than with the way in which
the honoree, who was seventy-one at the time of the ceremony, might now
want to (re-)interpret what has come before. As a young(er) man, he challenged the legitimacy of the Christian Democratic government of Konrad
Adenauer, followed the Frankfurt Auschwitz trials very closely, and protested
against the Vietnam War. As mentioned in chapter 3, he even ¶irted with orthodox communism for a time. It is clear that Schirrmacher would like to use
Walser’s reputation and stylized biography as a tool to recast the role of literature in reuni¤ed Germany. Although his notion that the gift of seeing can only
be realized through a literary mind devoid of ideological and political concerns is highly problematic in the German context, he does direct us toward
the core of Walser’s acceptance speech. Speaking of A Gushing Fountain,
Schirrmacher points out the “great paradox” of the author’s generation: “to
have been objectively innocent, possibly even happy, and simultaneously,
thanks to the birth certi¤cate, part of a whole that has become guilty.”
When Walser went to the podium in the Frankfurt Paulskirche—where
Germany’s ¤rst democratic constitution was drafted—he began by telling his
audience that it was not easy to decide what kind of speech to deliver. Those
who congratulated him when the prize was announced seemed to expect a
“critical” speech, something that Walser had already done,28 a “critical sermon” based on the “bad news” (“unguten Meldungen”) of the given day. Such
sermons usually give the media something to chew on for “two, or even two
and a half days.” This time, he wanted to “say only nice things, i.e., things
that feel good, stimulating things, things appropriate for a peace prize.” But
how would he be able to justify such a speech? One way would be to confess
his weaknesses, especially one of relatively recent vintage:
I seal myself off from evils in whose elimination I cannot participate. I have several refuges (“Fluchtwinkel”) into which my glance immediately ¶ees when the
[TV] screen29 shows me the world as an unbearable place. I consider my reaction to be appropriate. I should not have to be able to bear something unbearable. I am also experienced in thinking the other way (“Wegdenken”). Without
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looking the other way and thinking the other way, I would not get through the
day, let alone the night. I am also not of the opinion that everything has to be
atoned for. I could not live in a world where everything had to be atoned for.

These words were interpreted by many as a license for repression, as a kind
of absolution for the Germans, who have had to look at horrible images—
speci¤cally those from Auschwitz—over and over since 1945. Such positions
have been taken on numerous occasions by the right-wing intellectuals discussed above. Had Walser suddenly decided to join them? Was his long-time
advocacy of reuni¤cation, a position that had caused him to be ostracized
from some segments of the intellectual community, a Trojan horse concealing reactionary sentiments? This statement, along with others in the speech,
was clearly provocative, and it had the—surely unintended—effect of rendering some listeners incapable of keeping an open mind until the end (a
phenomenon all too prevalent in critical discourse in postwar Germany).
Most of Walser’s speech revolves around the tension between the conscience of the individual and the societal rituals that speak—with varying
degrees of success—to that conscience. Every German of Walser’s generation has experienced decades of public penance for the crimes of the Nazis,
but not all Germans have internalized the message or even paid attention.
Some, mainly on the fringes of the right wing, have vigorously denied the
necessity of such public mea culpa declarations. (The of¤cial antifascism of
the East German state was quite another matter.) Walser himself has not
only been conscious of the dilemma of postfascist Germans seeking a “normal” identity, he has pondered the question at great length and written
about it.30 If he now admits that he is compelled to “look the other way,” this
comes after a long period of self-examination in search of his “share” (cf.
Schirrmacher’s title) in the horror that was Auschwitz.31 Many Germans (especially, in Walser’s view, representatives of the media and the intellectual
left), simply cannot accept the fact that an individual could be absolutely
overwhelmed by the shadows of the Holocaust. Some of these people, he intimates, attempt to join the ranks of the victims by taking on the mantle of
the indefatigable antifascist.32 Walser himself makes his stance perfectly
clear: “I have never considered it possible to leave the side of the accused (Beschuldigten).” This is not the position of someone acting as an advocate for
repression or forgetting. The message is not problematic, but the choice of
venue was perhaps inappropriate: The author was mapping out a very personal journey in a very public space.
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Walser was doubtless aware of this dilemma, but he was also upset that
he, as a German, had to weigh every word carefully. (Already in 1994, he had
delivered a public address in which he railed against “new German taboos”
and the evils of “political correctness.”33) Something in him rebelled against
a half-century of self-censorship, and his soul was “thirsty for freedom,” as
he put it. The result was a rhetorical tightrope act. One sentence in particular demonstrates the perils involved in such an exercise:
No one who can be taken seriously denies Auschwitz; no one still in full possession of his faculties splits hairs regarding the horror of Auschwitz; when in
the media, however, this past is held up to me every day, I notice that something inside me resists this continuous presentation of our shame.

This resistance is then connected to the belief that this shame is being “instrumentalized” for some current ends. (Walser added that these ends are “always
good ones, honorable ones,” but this was generally ignored.) The general impression is that the postwar Germans have been assigned a special status on
the periphery of the inner circle of civilized nations. Walser spoke of the “suspicion” that arises whenever anyone asserts that his countrymen now comprise “a completely normal people, a completely ordinary society.” In the
period after the Frankfurt speech, he was to reiterate his conviction that the
Germans have done enough to demonstrate their transformation into a normal democratic nation. On the political plane, Chancellor Schröder was
echoing these sentiments, creating an unusual harmony between culture and
power.34
Although one of Walser’s main aims in Frankfurt was to celebrate the
emancipatory power of literature and literary language, this was practically
ignored in the ensuing debate. The critics focused mainly on two aspects. In
defending the sanctity of personal conscience, Walser criticized the planned
Holocaust memorial35 as a “paving over of the center of the capital with a
nightmare as big as a soccer ¤eld,” a “monumentalization of [our] shame.”
This would send the message that the interaction between Germans and Jews
had to end in Auschwitz (in other words, that Goldhagen was right).36 In addition, he utilized an entire series of epithets to characterize the abuse of Auschwitz for purely political purposes: “routine of threats,” “means of intimidation,” “moral cudgel,” “ritual exercise.” Such phrases were not unknown in
the Federal Republic, but they had hitherto been used solely by the extreme
right outside the public sphere in which most Germans were involved. Walser
apparently believed that his impeccable credentials as a progressive intellec-
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tual who had dissected not only the fascist mentality, but also the problems
of West German society, would shield him from accusations of retrogression
and facilitate an open discussion of future prospects. This was a fatal misestimation of the temper of the times.
The major response to Walser’s speech was mounted by Ignatz Bubis
(1927–1999), a Holocaust survivor and chairman of the Central Council of
Jews in Germany. Judging from videotapes of the Frankfurt event, he and his
wife were the only members of the audience to refrain from applauding at the
end of the speech. If Walser had hoped for an intellectual discussion about the
nature of German identity in the new millennium, his hopes were dashed
when Bubis became his main respondent. This very public ¤gure was not an
intellectual, but rather a businessman, politician (as a member of the FDP),
Jewish activist, and voice of the survivors. One would expect a “gut reaction”
to Walser’s ponderings and provocations, and that is exactly what happened.
To lend his critique the weight of history and symbolism, Bubis chose to express it on November 9 at a memorial service for the sixtieth anniversary of the
“Kristallnacht.” This was actually Bubis’s second intervention into cultural affairs: He was the driving force behind the protest that stopped the performance of Rainer Werner Fassbinder’s play Der Müll, die Stadt und der Tod
(Garbage, the city, and death) in 1985. In his autobiography, he stated that the
“fundamental question” at the time was “whether one can, in the mid-1980s
in Germany, allow an anti-Jewish play to be performed, one that hurts the feelings of the survivors in an extreme manner.”37 In 1998, Bubis did not prevent
Walser from speaking (he of course had not seen the text beforehand), but he
attempted to discredit the speaker after the fact.
Already on the day after Walser’s speech, Bubis had accused the author of
“mental arson” (geistige Brandstiftung) and compared him with right-wing
politicians like Gerhard Frey of the DVU and Franz Schönhuber, the former
leader of the Republikaner.38 On November 9, he revisited this accusation
and ampli¤ed it. Martin Walser was not mentioned until the thirteenth paragraph. In the ¤rst twelve, one ¤nds a catalogue of horrors: a description of the
1938 pogrom and thoughts on the nature of anti-Semitism in Germany and
elsewhere, the Nazi racial laws, the Wannsee Conference, contemporary German racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia, revisionist historians, the 1995
newspaper advertisements about Germany’s 1945 capitulation (see chapter
2) and even the Fassbinder play referred to above. The next link in this gruesome chain, as it were, is Walser:
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The most recent attempt to repress history or to extinguish memory was undertaken by Martin Walser in his gratulatory speech [“Dankesrede”] on the occasion of the awarding of the Peace Prize of the German Book Trade to him on
October 11 of this year.39

This is guilt by association of the most primitive kind. If Walser was upset
when former friends and colleagues shunned him for advocating reuni¤cation and “expelled” him from the community of leftists, how must he have
felt when Bubis portrayed him as an enemy of democracy, even humanity?
It was little consolation that the accuser blatantly misinterpreted some statements, including a passage from Walser’s 1978 text “Our Auschwitz.” This
is not to say that all parts of the Frankfurt speech were perfectly clear (the
passage about his attitude toward xenophobic violence is especially vague, as
is the nature of the “instrumentalization” of the Holocaust), and Bubis recognized that Walser’s highly personal meditation could be taken as a model
for others, something that ran contrary to the speaker’s intention but was
not explicitly excluded, either. In this regard, Walser displayed the kind of
naiveté characteristic of Strauß and Handke: One can certainly stand on
“poetic feet,” as Schirrmacher put it, but one cannot expect to be answered
in a poetic manner when speaking about politics. This “blind spot” is one
of the few commonalities held by the three authors.
Bubis proved to be naive himself, or at least it seemed to be so. Toward
the end of his speech, he emphasized that “he alone” was responsible for what
was being said, not “all Jews,” just as “only Walser” was responsible for his
speech, not “all Germans.” Even over ¤fty years after the collapse of the Third
Reich, it is simply not possible for a German Jew—a prominent one, at
that—to speak as an individual. This was especially true for Bubis, although
he had been the prototype of the assimilated Jew for most of the postwar period.40 His desire to be a German citizen of the Jewish faith, as he called himself, was much like that of Victor Klemperer, whom Walser admires as a
model of the cultured German Jew. When Bubis stated that “we [i.e., the Germans, both Jewish and non-Jewish] have to confront history,” he pointed to
Goethe, Schiller, Beethoven, and Bismarck as examples of the positive side of
that (German) history. This is not the world of contemporary reuni¤ed Germany, but rather the sphere of the pre-1933 Bildungsbürgertum, which now
almost disappeared. Walser also feels at home in this sphere, so his confrontation with Bubis was sadly ironic.41 Bubis was, and Walser is also patriotic in
an old-fashioned manner, something that many Germans are not. The differ-

Epilgoue.fm Page 185 Friday, August 25, 2000 1:46 PM

The Ongoing German Quest for Normalcy

/// 185

ence lay in personal agendas: Walser hopes for a future Germany whose citizens will not feel stigmatized because of their origin, whereas Bubis strove to
preserve the memory of past horrors in a time when none of the survivors are
alive. Unfortunately, two aspects of the Kristallnacht speech made dialogue
almost impossible. Firstly, Walser was accused of being part of a growing
trend of “intellectual nationalism” tainted by “subliminal anti-Semitism.”
(Bubis had made similar accusations with respect to Strauß and Enzensberger
a few years earlier.42) This would place Walser in the midst of the contributors
to Die selbstbewußte Nation, where he does not belong. Secondly, the ¤nal
paragraph of Bubis’s speech was delivered in the tone of an Old Testament
prophet: “We owe it to the victims of the Shoah not to forget them! Whoever
forgets these victims kills them once again!” How could anyone respond to
such an admonition? And how could Walser pursue a rapprochement with
someone who had presented him to the German people—and the world—
as an arsonist and potential murderer?
In the weeks after Bubis’s speech, hundreds of articles were published
about the affair in German newspapers, and television interviews were also
conducted. The controversy dominated the cultural scene for the last quarter
of 1998, which was of course also the ¤rst quarter-year of the Schröder government. A detailed analysis of the positions taken by Jewish and non-Jewish
Germans, by intellectuals, politicians, and ordinary citizens will be undertaken in a future publication.43 In this context, it must suf¤ce to describe the
role of Klaus von Dohnanyi, a prominent Social Democrat and son of an antifascist executed by the Nazis, the attempted mediation by former federal
president Richard von Weizsäcker, and the face-to-face discussion between
Walser and Bubis in late 1998.
Dohnanyi published an essay in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung ¤ve
days after Bubis had castigated Walser on November 9. He chose the title
“Eine Friedensrede” (A peace speech), emphasizing his view that Walser
had indeed earned his prize and made a speech worthy of it. Although he
reproduced, almost ritualistically, the idea of German crimes and German
guilt, he also did something unheard of in postwar Germany: He openly
criticized the main spokesperson for the Jewish community while defending Walser. In addition, he left no doubt that Germany was still anything
but a “normal” country. After asserting that Bubis did not understand
Walser, he added that perhaps such understanding was an impossibility,
since “Walser’s speech was the lament of a German—a non-Jewish German,
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though—about the much too frequent attempts by others to gain advantages from our conscience. To abuse it, yes, to manipulate it.”44 This sounds
as vague as Walser, but speci¤cs are supplied, above all in the person of U.S.
Senator D’Amato, who is portrayed as trying to better his reelection
chances by pandering to those who demand compensation from the German government and German ¤rms. Other examples are given, e.g., German schoolchildren being insulted as Nazis in Holland, caricatures of Helmut
Kohl as a new Hitler in British tabloids, and knee-jerk negative reactions
when German politicians make proposals regarding the Balkan crisis. What
is intriguing is that Dohnanyi does not believe that such things can be
changed: “Germany is stigmatized, and we Germans carry this mark of
Cain. Thus nothing molds German consciousness more profoundly than
knowing this and experiencing it.” He is convinced that nothing determines Germany identity more than “our common descent from this shameful time” (i.e., the Third Reich). This is actually quite different from the
position of a Walser, who, while denying no responsibility or shame, strives
to help future generations extract themselves from this conundrum. As writer
Peter Schneider has put it:
We shouldn’t let our children grow up with only images of mass murderers in
their minds. . . . We have no “normal history,” no argument there. But where
would we end up if the ¤rst thing that we teach our children is this: You are not
normal, you do not belong to a normal people. We would surely breed monsters.45

Dohnanyi hopes for no more than an increased sensitivity on the part of Jews
when they deal with Germans, an acknowledgment of the latter’s emotional
wounds. Unfortunately, his own emotions got the better of him, and he
made a statement that will probably be remembered long after the controversy has faded from memory:
[T]he Jewish citizens in Germany of course should also ask themselves if they
would have behaved much more courageously than most of the other Germans
if, after 1933, “only” the disabled, the homosexuals, or the Romanies had been
dragged away to death camps. Everyone should attempt to answer this question
honestly for himself.46

In reality, most Germans did not resist fascism, and most Jews did not become antifascist partisans. Such utterances thus serve no purpose other than
to open up old wounds and in¶ict new ones.
Dohnanyi and Bubis exchanged open letters in subsequent issues of the
Frankfurter Allgemeine. Despite mutual accusations and insinuations—
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Bubis, for example, termed the hypothetical situation cited above “malicious” (bösartig)47—they did meet and resolve their differences. Walser and
Bubis did not sit down for an open-ended debate until December 13. Walser
had felt rather beleaguered in the weeks after his speech: His public appearances were disturbed by demonstrators, Elie Wiesel had asked him to tell his
readers that the preservation of memory was part of a digni¤ed life (something that Walser would never dispute),48 and even the Israeli ambassador to
Germany, Avi Primor, had called upon him to supply the clari¤cation that
would free his speech from the accusation of anti-Semitism.”49 (In a “normal” country, a foreign diplomat would not have become involved in a domestic cultural row.) Richard von Weizsäcker had defended the integrity of
all three “highly respected personalities” (i.e., Walser, Bubis, and Dohnanyi)
and expressed the fear that, among other things, “concerned questions” were
being asked abroad.50 Through all this, Walser had remained obstinate, demanding that Bubis retract the characterization “mental arson” before a
meeting could be arranged. When the encounter did occur in Frankfurt, the
two septuagenarian adversaries were joined by Frank Schirrmacher and
Salomon Korn, an architect and member of the Central Council of Jews in
Germany. The Frankfurter Allgemeine published the entire transcript of the
long (almost four hours) discussion on the next day.51
The headline that the newspaper chose to place above the transcript—
“We need a new language of remembrance”—was an allusion to a speech
made by federal president Roman Herzog on November 9, in which he attempted to reconcile the positions of Walser and Bubis without mentioning
them by name. Herzog called for a “vital form of remembrance” that would
express not only sadness regarding past sufferings but also the necessity of
maintaining “democracy, freedom, and human dignity” for future generations.52 He agreed with Bubis when he emphasized the necessity of remembering the victims of the Holocaust, but he was closer to Walser when he
warned that constant reiteration of the message could be counterproductive.
He also rejected—again, without providing the source—Goldhagen’s term
“eliminatory [German] anti-Semitism,” as Walser had done in Frankfurt. Did
this rhetorical effort facilitate détente between the writer and his critic?
The answer to this question is “yes and no,” or as the Germans would
say, “jein.” The photographs printed along with the transcript lend graphic
expression to the course of the discussion. More than once, Bubis is shown
pointing his index ¤nger at Walser, who reacts by “defending” himself with
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an open hand. This constellation can be attributed to the fact that Bubis utilized not only political arguments, but also the weight of his biography,
something that Walser could not do. In his long opening statement, Bubis
not only criticized “mental arson” and talk of “instrumentalization,” but
also offered personal narration about the Holocaust, including his father’s
death in Treblinka and the discovery of information about the murder of
other family members in the archives at Yad Vashem. Given this mixing of
the personal and the political, Walser was left with three choices: He could
simply refuse to listen, but this was not a viable option, since he is not a
right-wing Holocaust denier. Alternatively, he could apologize for any grief
that he might have caused; this would probably also have ended the discussion. Finally, he could mount a defense based on the premise that Bubis had
misinterpreted what he said in Frankfurt. This is the path that he chose.
To accomplish this, Walser had to amplify what he had said before. With
regard to “instrumentalization” of the Holocaust, he now provided three concrete examples: 1) “The division [of Germany seen as] rational because of
Auschwitz.” 2) “The practice of reuni¤cation will lead to a new Auschwitz.”
3) Literary critics condemning a novel “because Auschwitz does not appear in
it.” The last point refers to criticism of the 1998 novel A Gushing Fountain,
which led the German best-seller lists for a long period after its publication.
What he did not speak of was the question of compensation for Holocaust
victims and forced laborers—in contrast to Dohnanyi. He was thus able to
portray his concerns as that of a patriot who believed that his countrymen
had a right to be reunited,53 and an author whose pride had been wounded
when political criteria were applied to a work of ¤ction. Bubis had nothing to
do with these issues, so here Walser was speaking to the nation, not to his individual adversary. On the question of “looking away” from the horrible images of the Holocaust, the one that disturbed Bubis the most, Walser
reformulated his earlier statement:
I have looked away at least twenty times when scenes from the concentration
camps are shown on television. Why? Because I cannot endure them. In this case,
it is physically and psychologically impossible for me to look. I concluded from
this that these scenes perhaps—as far as I am concerned—appear too often. However, I did not recommend to anyone that they have to feel as I do about it.

As anyone familiar with the German media knows, if Walser looked away
only twenty times, he was in all likelihood exposed to these images hundreds
of times. In fact, he said that he was “incensed” to hear himself portrayed as
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someone calling for a termination (“Schlußstrich”) of dialogue about the
Holocaust, since he had engaged in this dialogue for a long time—much
longer than the survivor Bubis, he added. The latter reacted to this insult by
asserting that he could not have “continued to live” if he had studied the
Holocaust in the postwar years. Later on, Walser cited an insult launched
earlier by Bubis (“If his [i.e., Walser’s] forebears had kept the Jews from being killed, he would have his [peace of mind].”), but in general a civil tone
prevailed.54
Even after several hours of give and take, one major point of contention
remained, and it was one of some signi¤cance with respect to the future activities of German right-wing intellectuals. Bubis maintained doggedly that
Walser’s public remarks had “opened a gate for others,” whereas the author
countered that it was “high time . . . that this gate was opened.” What was
behind this metaphor? The Jewish leader was shocked that a respected ¤gure
from the democratic cultural community would express doubts about the necessity for routine, ritual ceremonies commemorating the victims of the Holocaust. For decades, everyone—with the exception of the extreme right—
had upheld this taboo. Walser has believed for some time that the radical
fringes actually prosper when the representatives of democracy shy away from
dealing with delicate matters like patriotism, national identity, and the
weight of the past. He also has taken the position—as he did once again in his
discussion with Bubis—that National Socialism is by now no more than an
“apparition” (Spuk).55 To him, the social problems in Germany are the same
as those in France, Italy, the U.S. and other countries. Only in the German
case, however, do the media connect them to Nazism. Such a “connection”
can lead to self-hatred (as described in Die selbstbewußte Nation), denial of national identity in favor of an abstract cosmopolitanism, or aggressive nationalism. Any and all of these could, in Walser’s view, prevent Germany from
becoming a nation like any other, forcing the country to remain “a convict let
out on parole.” To him, the chance of one’s remarks being misused by the
forces of reaction is less of a danger than the stagnation of public discurse in
the face of myriad prohibitions.
German reactions to the Kosovo crisis demonstrate that the public
sphere is now much more multidimensional than it once was, and that it is
no longer easy to determine an individual’s position based on his or her association with a certain camp. Before 1989, the intellectual left and the peace
movement were generally opposed to any armed con¶ict56 and any use of the
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German military. The intellectual right tended to praise the Bundeswehr
without calling for its use in a real con¶ict. This began to change in the Gulf
War, when long-time leftists like Wolf Biermann and Hans Magnus Enzensberger came out in favor of Operation Desert Storm. In the present con¶ict
with Milosevic, strange alliances have been formed. In 1999, it was the Social
Democrats and Greens who were committed to the NATO bombing, and
the once reigning Christian Democrats who were skeptical. (The rightist
DVU saw the Germans as puppets of the Americans.) The Greens came to
close to a split at their special party congress in May 1999, but in the end,
Green foreign minister Joschka Fischer gained the support he needed to continue in of¤ce.57 No consensus has emerged from the intellectual community.
Biermann wrote a poem in support of the bombing,58 and Enzensberger criticized the peace movement: “I was never a paci¤st, because I owe my existence to the victors of the Second World War.”59 Grass sided with NATO but
also criticized Western support for the breakup of Yugoslavia. 60 Der Spiegel,
which published statements by a number of writers, summed up the situation
as follows:
The Cold Warrior Alfred Dregger [a veteran CDU politician] united with exRAF [Red Army Faction] guerrillero Horst Mahler, Pastor Schorlemmer [of the
former GDR human rights movement], and Gregor Gysi [chair of the postcommunist PDS] for an immediate stop to the bombing; Erhard Eppler [from
the SPD left wing] and Bärbel Bohley, once representatives of the West and
East German peace movement, [are] for the bombing. . . . Ex-chancellor Helmut Schmidt, advocate of NATO rearming, rejects the military action, as does
the leftist investigative author Günter Wallraff.61

The Viennese daily Der Standard drew up a kind of scorecard of proponents
(including Grass, Enzensberger, and Bubis), doubters (including Walser,
Christa Wolf, Christoph Hein, and Elfriede Jelinek) and opponents (including Alexander Solzhenitsyn and Peter Handke).62
The Spiegel article cited above contains a rather apodictic proclamation
announcing the death of the critical intellectual who appeared on the scene
during the so-called Dreyfus affair in France a century ago. If this were true,
high culture would be a hermetic exercise accessible to only a few. Martin
Walser may concur that intellectuals have no monopoly on conscience, but
he continues to offer comments—some would say sermons63—on the state
of the world, albeit in literary language. Peter Handke also seems determined
to cling to the once-acknowledged role of the writer as truthsayer and
prophet.64 Unlike Botho Strauß, who has stayed away from public scrutiny in
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the past few years, Handke has sought out opportunities for confrontation,
bringing the (or rather, one) voice of high culture to the marketplace of ideas.
This demonstrates that temperament is no insigni¤cant factor in the activities of intellectuals (literary or otherwise): Whereas Strauß has—at least for
the moment—reacted to sharp public criticism by returning to the role of the
“pure” author, Handke still feels the need to take on the Western media and
Western cultural hegemony.
It was mentioned in chapter 3 that Handke planned to publish a book
about Kosovo as the third volume in his series about the Balkans. For now, he
has written an essay describing his experiences in Serbia in early and late
April.65 In February 1999, Handke had said, in an interview with Serbian
television conducted in Rambouillet, that “no people in Europe have suffered
as much in this century as the Serbs have been suffering for [the past] eight
years.”66 In March, he wrote to the magazine Focus and explained that he had
misspoken: He had meant to say that “[t]he people who . . . have suffered (at
the hands of the Germans, the Austrians, the Catholic Ustasha-Croats) the
most in Europe in this century (after the Jews), for me, is the Serbs.”67 When
the NATO bombing campaign began, Handke wrote an open letter to the
world that was published in the Belgrade daily Politika on March 26. The
most quoted passage from that letter is as follows: “Mars is attacking, and
since the 24th of March Serbia, Montenegro, (the Bosnian) Republic Srpska,
and Yugoslavia are the fatherland for all those who have not become Martians
and green butchers.”68 At the beginning of April, the writer traveled to Belgrade, where he was inducted into the order of “Serbian Knights” for his
courage in the face of the “bestial and brutal NATO aggression.”69 After his
return home, he announced that he would leave the Catholic Church and return the money awarded as part of his 1973 Büchner Prize.
At this writing, the picture of what happened in the province of Kosovo
is still incomplete. Of interest here is Handke’s ongoing campaign against
the Western media and the scorn that he has been heaping on the principles
of the Enlightenment,70 since this smacks of the “special path” discussed
above. Evidence of this can be found in two interviews that he granted in
May 1999. In the ¤rst, he characterized the “anti-Serbians” as “just as evil
and unbearable as the anti-Semites in their worst time.”71 Since he went on
to say that “since Hitler, nothing so catastrophically dirty has happened [as
has happened here],” one must state that Handke has been engaging in exactly the kind of “instrumentalization” that Walser criticized in Frankfurt.
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For him, it is not today’s “right-wing radicals” who are the living offspring
of Nazism (“to me, they’re stillborn, dangerous only like ptomaine”), but
rather the generation of 1968 and the leaders it has produced: “The American ¤lthy swine, the English gymnast, all these criminal types.” Their German counterparts, i.e., Schröder and Fischer, represent for Handke “eternally
horrifying Germany.” (By means of a sleight of hand, Austria is exonerated,
since it does not allow NATO bombers to ¶y over its territory.) In the second interview, Handke went much farther. He asserted that NATO has
achieved “a new Auschwitz. . . . Back then it was gas valves; today it’s computer killers from a height of 5,000 meters.”72 This statement was outrageous enough, but more was to come. The interviewer mentioned that
Daniel Goldhagen would like to “reeducate” the Serbs,73 a proposal that has
been criticized by many observers. Handke went beyond mere criticism
when he called the Jew Goldhagen, son of a Holocaust survivor, a “Pimpf ”—
i.e., a member of the Hitler Youth.74 Walser’s (and Dohnanyi’s) manner of
dealing with Ignatz Bubis might be described as abrasive and at times insensitive, but Handke’s epithet was so unconscionable that it may severely damage the prospects of any intellectual “special path” or volkish revival for the
foreseeable future. Psychohistorians will no doubt want to analyze Handke’s
mélange of a nostalgic yearning for the premodern past and the use of modern demagogic rhetoric.75
Lest Handke’s in¶uence on coming intellectual and literary trends be
overemphasized, it should be pointed out that two other factors will be extremely signi¤cant. One is the fate of the Berlin Holocaust memorial. After
endless discussions and multiple proposals for design and redesign, including
those put forth by cultural minister Michael Naumann, a decision was ¤nally
made on June 25, 1999. The Bundestag voted 314 to 209 in favor of a
modi¤ed version by U.S. architect Peter Eisenman, consisting of 2,700 gravestone-like slabs and a documentation center.76 Now that this “monumental”
version has been chosen, only time will tell if such an edi¤ce is destined to become a rendezvous for xenophobic skinheads and their “autonomous” opponents. Were that to happen, it could be a major irritant in the body politic of
the Berlin Republic. Secondly, the reaction of the populace to the new citizenship law—a limited version of the ius soli ¤nally passed by the Bundestag and
Bundesrat in May 1999 after months of heated debate77—will be monitored
carefully by the extreme right. The CDU/CSU had collected ¤ve million signatures against the original plan of the Schröder government, and the SPD-led
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state government of Hesse was defeated in the state elections of February 1999
when the Christian Democrats made opposition to dual citizenship the main
issue in the campaign. Bavaria is considering an appeal to the Federal Constitutional Court. If the watered-down legislation (which only permits lifelong
dual citizenship in special cases) were declared unconstitutional, or if the new
legal status did not lead to real integration and assimilation in the long term,
there would be no lack of fertile ground for those who would strive to (re-)
plant the ideas of the Conservative Revolution and of ethnic homogeneity.
Could such ideas really take root? Recent trends make this unlikely, but for all
the wrong reasons: In the course of the Walser-Bubis debate, almost no one
from the younger generation chose to enter the fray. Female voices were also
noticeably silent (one notable exception was novelist Monika Maron). The
media often portrayed the entire affair as one last standoff between two elderly
men attempting to prolong the postwar period, but few opined as to what
might follow. On another front, there seems to be mounting evidence that
right-wing youth are oblivious to any ideas at all (cf. Enzensberger!). According to the Thuringian Of¤ce for the Protection of the Constitution, most reactionary young people are under twenty, and they seem to think that being a
rightist is “cool.” These people apparently are also attracted to the new strategy
of groups like the NPD, which no longer deny the Holocaust but glorify it.
This has given the movement a “totally new character.”78 After presenting
these ¤ndings, the President of the Thuringian Of¤ce made a recommendation that deserves to be heeded: “[German] society will have to grapple with
this [phenomenon] much more vigorously than before.” It is only through
such grappling that Walser’s “parolee” will ever be truly free.
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1. Steven Erlanger, “Germany Sits in with a New Team,” New York Times, April 12,
1998. In the same issue of the Times, it is reported that total German spending on
tourism is a close second to that of the United States, making the Germans by far the
biggest spenders per capita in travel abroad. This means that while some Germans—
the ones discussed in this study—are turning inward, many others are seeking solace
and stimulation outside the borders of the country. See Barbara Crossette, “Surprises
in the Global Tourism Boom,” New York Times, April 12, 1998.
2. G. P. Gooch et al., The German Mind and Outlook (London: Chapman and
Hall, 1945). The other contributors were E. M. Butler, Alexander Farquharson,
Morris Ginsberg, Roy Pascal, S. D. Stirk, and L. A. Willoughby.
3. Gooch, vii. Compare this image of the Germans with the recent one from
Thomas Sowell: “In the long view of history, few peoples have made such cultural
and economic contributions to so many lands in so many parts of the planet as the
Germans.” Thomas Sowell, Migrations and Cultures: A World View (New York: Basic
Books, 1996), 104.
4. Gooch, viii. Compare the following statement: “Despite the bluster of recent
advocates of ‘structural’ analysis, the evidence returns us to the view that political
ideas and cultural traditions are not of lesser signi¤cance than structures of classes or
states.” See Jeffrey Herf, Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in
Weimar and the Third Reich (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), x.
5. See Ist der Nationalsozialismus Geschichte? Zu Historisierung und Historikerstreit,
ed. Dan Diner (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1987); Charles S. Maier, The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust and German National Identity (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1988); Special Issue on the Historikerstreit, ed. Anson
Rabinbach, New German Critique, no. 44 (Spring/Summer 1988); The Unresolved
Past: A Debate in German History, ed. Gina Thomas (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
///

195

Notes_ne.fm Page 196 Friday, August 25, 2000 1:52 PM

196 /// Notes to Preface
1990), and Reworking the Past: Hitler, the Holocaust, and the Historians’ Debate, ed.
Peter Baldwin (Boston: Beacon Press, 1990).
6. This debate is documented in “Es geht nicht um Christa Wolf ” Der Literaturstreit
im vereinten Deutschland, ed. Thomas Anz (München: Edition Spangenberg, 1991)
and Der deutsch-deutsche Literaturstreit oder “Freunde, es spricht sich schlecht mit gebundener Zunge.” Analysen und Materialien, ed. Karl Deiritz and Hannes Krauss (Hamburg and Zürich: Luchterhand Literaturverlag, 1991). For an interpretation of the
debate(s) as a generational phenomenon, see the following two articles by Stephen
Brockmann: “A Literary Civil War,” The Germanic Review 68.2 (Spring 1993): 69–
78 and “German Literary Debates after the Collapse,” German Life and Letters 47.2
(April 1994): 201–210.
7. A not unrelated phenomenon is the emigration of Germans to other countries.
In 1995, the number of those willing to begin a new life abroad had reached
130,000, and it has stayed at that level since then. See Burkhard Riedel, “Woanders
sein Glück versuchen,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, June 13, 1998.
8. Pascal in Gooch, 183. As Steven E. Aschheim puts it: “Whether one approves
of the fact, a variety of movements and ideologies did annex (or actively resist) Nietzsche.” See Aschheim’s The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany 1890–1990 (Berkeley and
Los Angeles, Oxford: University of California Press, 1992), 309.
9. Cf. Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners (1996; New York:
Vintage, 1997). Here are three characteristic formulations from the book:
What conditions of cognition and value made genocidal motivations plausible in this
period of German history? . . . The structure of cognition and value was located in
and integral to German culture. (24)
This book is ultimately not only about the perpetrators of the Holocaust. Because the
perpetrators of the Holocaust were Germany’s representative citizens, this book is
about Germany during the Nazi period and before, its people and its culture. (456)
The reception that this book has received tells us a great deal about what is positive
in Germany today. For Germans to confront this horri¤c part of their past is unpleasant in the extreme. That so many are willing to do so is yet another indication of how
radically transformed democratic Germany has become in the second half of the twentieth
century. (466; my emphasis)

10. Rudy Koshar, Germany’s Transient Pasts (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 330. The author speaks of “the indeterminacy, the quality of not leading to a de¤nitive end or result, of German national
identity” (330).
11. Sigrid Schultz, Germany Will Do It Again (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock,
1944). This book was published in the U.S. during World War II. Like the British volume mentioned above, it was “produced in full compliance with the government’s regulations for conserving paper and other essential materials.” The journalistic account
contains the following conclusion: “We will have to remember that Nazism will retain
a great appeal for the Germans, even in defeat. . . . Their decent, humanitarian in-
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stincts have been buried in decades of wrong teaching, wrong thinking” (238). Echoes
and permutations of this teaching and thinking are the subject of this book.
12. The Eastern border, once dubbed the “peace border” (Friedensgrenze) by the
East German communists, is being—quietly—put into question again. This will be
discussed below. For a description of postwar debates about the nature of that border,
see Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name: Germany and the Divided Continent
(New York: Random House, 1993), 224–227.
13. For a summary of these attempts, see Barbara Junge et al., RechtsSchreiber. Wie
ein Netzwerk in Medien und Politik an der Restauration des Nationalen arbeitet (Berlin:
Elefanten Press, 1997), 46–55. See also “Rexrodt warnt vor rechts und greift von
Stahl an,” Die Welt, January 9, 1996, and Evelyn Roll, “Weich wie Stahl,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, January 12, 1996.
14. After writing this, I discovered a very similar description of the New Right in
the U.S. and Britain: “The New Right represents that section of the right wing distinct from both traditional conservatism and from more extreme Far Right groupings.” Amy Elizabeth Ansell, New Right, New Racism: Race and Reaction in the United
States and Britain (New York: New York University Press, 1997), 30. The ideology
that Ansell analyzes is, however, somewhat different from the German version.
15. Jürgen Habermas, “Die Kulturkritik der Neokonservativen in den U.S.A. und
in der Bundesrepublik,” Die Moderne— ein unvollendetes Projekt (Leipzig: Reclam,
1994), 75–104.
16. The dif¤culties involved in ¤nding an accurate term to describe the conservative intellectuals discussed in this book are re¶ected in Anthony Giddens’s Beyond
Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1994). The German neoconservatives that he refers to (31) are close to what I have
called the German New Right; Giddens, however, uses this term to describe Thatcherite neoliberalism, which is quite different.
Elliot Neaman has divided the “generation of 1989” into four groups: 1) the “ethnopluralist New Right”; 2) the “theorists of a strong state” in¶uenced by Carl
Schmitt; 3) the “spiritual reactionaries” (a term taken from Diederich Diederichsen);
and 4) promoters of “neonationalist historiography” such as Ernst Nolte. See Elliot
Neaman, “A New Conservative Revolution? Neo-Nationalism, Collective Memory,
and the New Right since Uni¤cation,” Antisemitism and Xenophobia in Germany after
Uni¤cation, ed. Hermann Kürthen et al. (New York and Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1997), 192–197. Botho Strauß is found in the third group—the focus of the
present study—along with ¤lmmaker Hans Jürgen Syberberg. These two ¤gures are
actually quite different, and the term “spiritual reactionary” is, in my view, too narrow as a characterization of the cultural tradition described in chapter 1 below. Neaman’s categories are useful nonetheless.
In 1999, Neaman published an important book on Ernst Jünger, A Dubious Past:
Ernst Jünger and the Politics of Literature after Nazism (Berkeley, Los Angeles and
London: University of California Press). I was not able to read it until after ¤nishing
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the present study, but I recommend it highly as a thought-provoking complement to
my own work. Whereas I am a literary scholar examining the interplay of cultural
history and politics, Neaman is a historian who takes seriously the impact of the cultural sphere on political developments. He goes into more depth regarding ¤gures
such as Gehlen, Heidegger, and Schmitt (see chapter 2 below), but does not discuss
contemporary literary ¤gures like Handke or Walser. As his title indicates, he provides much more detail with respect to Jünger than I do here. Our intentions are similar, but our conclusions are not always the same.
17. John Carey, The Intellectuals and the Masses: Pride and Prejudice among the Literary Intelligentsia, 1980–1939 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993). Carey’s book
has been translated into German as Haß auf die Massen. Intellektuelle 1880–1939
(Göttingen: Steidl, 1996). Given the topic, Carey may well have more readers in Germany than in Britain or the U.S.

Chapter 1
1. Ricarda Huch, Die Romantik (1899–1902), Gesammelte Werke, ed. Wilhelm
Emmerich (Köln, Berlin: Kiepenheuer and Witsch, 1969), 6:619. Huch of course
views this as an injustice, since in her eyes, it was the ideal of German Romanticism
“to encompass everything, the North Pole and the South Pole, within and without,
the historical and the radical” (619). Hans Joachim Mähl, speaking of the recent
overcoming of this one-sided reception, has said that he is skeptical of contemporary
attempts to transform Novalis into a predecessor of postmodern theories and poststructural methods. Cf. Mähl, Die Idee des goldenen Zeitalters im Werk des Novalis.
Studien zur Wesensbestimmung der frühromantischen Utopie und zu ihren ideegeschichtlichen Voraussetzungen (1965; Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1994), vii–viii.
2. Maren Jochimsen, Die Poetisierung der Ökonomie. Novalis’ Thesen im Heinrich
von Ofterdingen als Anregungen zu einer ökologieorientierten Ökonomie (Stuttgart:
Verlag Hans-Dieter Heinz, 1994), 91.
3. Unless otherwise noted, all of these works will be cited from the following edition: Novalis, Werke, Tagebücher und Brief Friedrich von Hardenbergs, ed. HansJoachim Mähl and Richard Samuel (München, Wien: Hanser, 1978–1987), vol. 2:
Das philosophisch-theoretische Werk (1978). References in the text will use these abbreviations: VB=Vermischte Bemerkungen; Bst=Blüthenstaub; GuL=Glauben und
Liebe; PA=Politische Aphorismen; and CoE=Die Christenheit oder Europa.
For a selection of Novalis’s works in English translation, see Pollen and Fragments:
Selected Poetry and Prose of Novalis, trans. with an introduction by Arthur Versluis
(Grand Rapids, Mich.: Phanes Press, 1989).
4. This is possibly a pre¤guration of Hofmannsthal’s notion of “preexistence”
(Präexistenz), and the inability—or unwillingness—of poets to “grow up” is a topos
of Western modernism.
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5. No. 61 contains a disturbing prophecy about the Germans: “The German has
long been the little guy. Soon, however, he is likely to become the king of the hill. His
fate is that of many dumb kids: he will be alive and clever and head of the household
long after his precocious siblings have decayed.” (“Der Deutsche ist lange das Hänschen gewesen. Er dürfte aber wohl bald der Hans aller Hänse werden. Es geht ihm,
wie es vielen dummen Kindern gehn soll: er wird leben und klug seyn, wenn seine
frühklugen Geschwister längst vermodert sind, und er nun allein Herr im Hause ist”
[251].) This is very close to a prophetic poem by Heinrich Heine, although Heine is
not enthusiastic, but rather concerned by his prophetic vision. Cf. H. Heine,
“Deutschland” (1840), Heines Werke in fünf Bänden, ed. Helmut Holtzhauer (Berlin
und Weimar: Aufbau Verlag, 1974), 1:154f. Heine’s third stanza reads as follows:
“He is a clumsy little giant, / [who] tears the oak out of the ground, / and beats your
backs until you’re sore / and your heads till they’re soft.” (“Es ist ein täppisches Rieselein, / Reißt aus dem Boden die Eiche, / Und schlägt euch damit den Rücken wund
/ Und die Köpfe windelweiche.”) Both poetic texts refer to the “belated nation” (verspätete Nation) described much later by Helmuth Plessner.
6. The idea that “commendable housewives” (verdienstvolle Hausfrauen) should
be given a medal (Glaube und Liebe, no. 26, 297) became the “Mutterkreuz” in the
1930s. The description of the role of women in no. 27 is also very close to “Kinder,
Kirche, Küche.” Similarities to the Soviet system should not be ignored either.
Interestingly, Novalis is also not “soft on crime,” as evidenced by the comments in
Blüthenstaub, no. 100: “A criminal cannot complain about injustice when he is treated
harshly and inhumanely. His crime was an entry into the realm of violence and tyranny. There is no measure or proportion in this world, thus the disproportionateness
of the countermeasure should not surprise him.” (“Ein Verbrecher kann sich über Unrecht nicht beklagen, wenn man ihn hart und unmenschlich behandelt. Sein Verbrechen war ein Eintritt ins Reich der Gewalt, der Tyranney. Maß und Proporzion giebt
es nicht in dieser Welt, daher darf ihn die Unverhältnißmäßigkeit der Gegenwirkung
nicht befremden” [273].) The less than harsh treatment of Hitler by the justice system
of the Weimar Republic unfortunately did not ¤t into this model.
7. The role of the child has been described as “a seed that has become visible between nature and the mind.” Mähl, Die Idee des goldenen Zeitalters, 366.
8. A similar passage is found at the end of the Politische Aphorismen (no. 68, 309).
At the end of this section, Novalis calls for political and religious tolerance, and in doing so, he sounds more like a representative of the Enlightenment than the quintessential Romantic.
9. Hermann Kurzke, Romantik und Konservatismus. Das “politische” Werk Friedrich
von Hardenbergs (Novalis) im Horizont seiner Wirkungsgeschichte (München: Fink,
1983), 260 and 171. Kurzke has been criticized for going beyond Novalis’s own intentions in his interpretation. Such criticism is extremely problematic, because it assumes that it is only such intentions that determine the way in which a work may be
used—or abused. Cf. Herbert Uerlings, Friedrich von Hardenberg, genannt Novalis.
Werk und Forschung (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1991), 591–593. It is telling that Uerlings
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puts the term “political” between quotation marks when referring to Novalis. His
¤nal chapter is thus called “‘Politisches’ Werk und Geschichtsphilosophie.” One has
the impression that Uerlings wishes to eliminate any considerations that would stand
in the way of a canonization of the author. Kurzke of course uses quotation marks in
his own title, but for a different reason: He views Novalis as a political dilettante
whose writings did, however, have real political impact. This impact is more
signi¤cant than the fact that he might have been misread.
George Mosse begins the ¤rst chapter of his book on German ideology with a
broadside (“The intellectual and ideological character of Volkish thought was a direct
product [my emphasis] of the romantic movement of nineteenth-century Europe.
Like romanticism, Volkish ideas showed a distinct tendency toward the irrational and
the emotional . . .”), but he does not refer to any Romantic writers by name. George
Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich (New
York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1964), 13.
10. Hans Kohn, The Mind of Germany: The Education of a Nation (1960; New
York: Harper Torchbooks, 1965), 52–55.
At the other extreme, the “poetic” Novalis has been portrayed as a revolutionary
opposed not to the ideas of 1789 but rather to the political methods used to realize
them. Cf. Wilfried Malsch, “Europa.” Poetische Rede des Novalis. Deutung der Französischen Revolution und Re¶exion auf die Poesie in der Geschichte (Stuttgart: Metzler,
1965). The author undertook his study to counter the “common misjudgment” of
Novalis and his epoch as reactionary (vi–vii).
11. Georg Lukács, The Destruction of Reason (1962; Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1981).
12. Die politische Romantik in Deutschland. Eine Textsammlung, ed. Klaus Peter
(Stuttgart: Reclam, 1985), 31–35, 42–47. In the ¤rst English-language collection
of this kind, Novalis is a relatively minor ¤gure. The editor provides only the essay
“Christendom or Europe.” Most of the volume is taken up with excerpts from
Fichte. Cf. H. S. Reiss, The Political Thought of the German Romantics 1793–1815
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1955). In his introduction, however, the editor does state
the following: “The work of Novalis constitutes a quarry from which others, such
as Adam Müller and Friedrich Schlegel, have hewn stones with which to build their
systems” (27).
13. One notable exception is the Thomas Mann of Re¶ections of a Non-Political
Man. To enlist Stifter in his version of the conservative cause, Mann had to ignore
Stifter’s complete lack of irony—a major feature of Mann’s own work.
14. A review of new books on Nietzsche is appropriately titled: James Joll, “Nietzsche vs. Nietzsche,” New York Review of Books, February 11, 1993, 20–23. Joll writes:
“There will be no end to the differing interpretations of Nietzsche because the core
of each of them can be found in Nietzsche himself” (23). For a critique of the view
that Nietzsche was “unequivocally the philosopher of the German right,” see Seth
Taylor, Left-Wing Nietzscheans: The Politics of German Expressionism 1910–1920
(Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, 1990), 230.
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15. Erich Heller is one who makes such a claim. He is, however, quite selective
when it comes to determining what is true literature. In his The Importance of Nietzsche (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1988), he makes the following statement: “Name almost any poet, man of letters, philosopher, who wrote in
German during the twentieth century and attained to stature and in¶uence—Rilke,
George, Kafka, Thomas Mann, Ernst Jünger, Musil, Benn, Heidegger or Jaspers—
and you name at the same time Friedrich Nietzsche” (2). Peter Pütz has said basically
the same thing: “Nietzsche has left the clearest traces in literature and existential philosophy,” in Friedrich Nietzsche (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1967), 58.
16. Even the extraordinarily erudite historian Eric Hobsbawm refers to The Will
to Power as Nietzsche’s “most ambitious work.” Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire,
1875–1914 (New York: Pantheon, 1987), 252. That may be, but Nietzsche never
completed it.
17. Lukács, 313.
18. Friedrich Nietzsche, Philosophical Writings, The German Library 48, ed. Reinhold Grimm and Caroline Molina y Vedia (New York: Continuum, 1995), 171.
19. Nietzsche, Philosophical Writings, 210, 170.
20. The Portable Nietzsche, ed. Walter Kaufmann (1954; New York: Viking Press,
1968), 442.
21. Nietzsche, Philosophical Writings, 204.
22. Nietzsche, “Beyond Good and Evil,” section 242, The Philosophy of Nietzsche
(New York: The Modern Library, 1954), 551–552.
23. R. H. Hollingdale, Nietzsche, Routledge Author Guides (London and Boston:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973), 195.
24. Nietzsche, Philosophical Writings, 235. This is not the kind of productive suffering that Nietzsche went through himself: “Only great pain is the ultimate liberator
of the spirit . . .” The Portable Nietzsche, 680.
25. Nietzsche, Philosophical Writings, 30.
26. Nietzsche, Philosophical Writings, 204.
27. Nietzsche, Philosophical Writings, 228.
28. Julius Wiegand, Deutsche Geistesgeschichte (Frankfurt am Main: Diesterweg,
1932), 231.
29. Stefan George, “Nietzsche,” Werke, vol. 1 (München and Düsseldorf: Helmut Küpper, 1958), 231–232. See also Frank Weber, Die Bedeutung Nietzsches für Stefan George und
seinen Kreis (Frankfurt am Main, Bern, New York, and Paris: Peter Lang, 1989).
30. Die Zerstörung der deutschen Politik. Dokumente 1871–1933, ed. Harry Pross
(1959; Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1983), 154. Pross speaks of the “esthetic assessment of social conditions” as a characteristic of the Youth Movement. For a profound
study of the limits of “esthetic rationality,” see Cornelia Klinger, Flucht Trost Revolte.
Die Moderne und ihre ästhetischen Gegenwelten (München and Wien: Hanser, 1995).
31. Hermann Glaser, Spießer-Ideologie. Von der Zerstörung des deutschen Geistes im
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19. und 20. Jahrhundert und dem Aufstieg des Nationalsozialismus (1964; Frankfurt
am Main: Fischer, 1985), 100. The German phrase is “Herrschafts-, Dienst-, Bundund Reichsideologie.”
32. Stefan George, Werke, 1:410–411.
33. George, Werke, 1:411.
34. One of George’s early poems could be read as an elaboration of the Novalis
aphorism on hunger and freedom (see page 5 above): “You learn: only the house of
privation knows melancholy- / Now see in the splendor of the columns the more bitter melancholy . . .” [My emphasis.] (“Ihr lernt: das haus des mangels nur kenne die
schwermut- / Nun seht im prunke der säulen die herbere schwermut . . .”) George,
Werke, 1:139. It is always dangerous to generalize from individual passages, but it is
also problematic to ignore such passages. Unfortunately, George’s defenders tend to
view a “reverence” for the entire work as a necessary prerequisite for the interpretation of any one idea or image. See for example Dominik Jost, Stefan George und seine
Elite. Eine Studie zur Geschichte der Eliten (Zürich: Speer-Verlag, 1949), 9.
35. With good cause, George’s contemporary Soergel begins his chapter on
George and his circle with reference to the oft-quoted Horatian dictum: “Odi profanum vulgus et arceo.” (“I hate and avoid the base people.’) Albert Soergel, Dichtung
und Dichter der Zeit. Eine Schilderung der deutschen Literatur der letzten Jahrzehnte
(1911; Leipzig: R. Voigtländer, 1921), 557.
36. In the introduction to the third Jahrbuch für die geistige Bewegung, one ¤nds a
passage in which the “Amerikawelt” is equated with both the world of Satan and the
world of ants. This passage, which has drawn the attention of many critics, can be
found in Christian Graf von Krockow, Die Deutschen in ihrem Jahrhundert 1980–
1990 (1990; Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1992), 56–57.
Krockow also provides the reader with a quote from Rilke decrying the “illusions”
(“Schein-Dinge”) emanating from super¤cial America (389).
37. For a fascinating presentation of George’s fate in the Third Reich, see Michael
Petrow, Der Dichter als Führer? Zur Wirkung Stefan Georges im “Dritten Reich” (Marburg: Tectum, 1995). In one of the ¤rst exercises in German cultural studies in English, the name Stefan George is not found in the index, although the “George-Kreis”
is included as “perhaps the most notable, but most exclusive, manifestation of culturalconservative opposition” in the Wilhelmine period. This truncation misleads the
reader into believing that the group was insigni¤cant after 1918. German Cultural Studies. An Introduction, ed. Rob Burns (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 20.
In a widely-read survey of German history, the “Kreis” is omitted, but George is
listed as a famous poet. Cf. Mary Fulbrook, A Concise History of Germany (1990;
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 169.
38. Karl Dietrich Bracher, Die deutsche Diktatur. Entstehung, Struktur, Folgen des
Nationalsozialismus (1969; Köln: Kiepenheuer and Witsch, 1972), 155. Bracher refers to this world view as “romantic-irrationalist reveries” (155).
39. The term Sonderweg has been called into question by a number of historians. There
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is no doubt that similar ideas can be found beyond the borders of Germany, but nowhere
else were they put into practice with such rigor. (It is not surprising that the present-day
media image of Italians is not intimately linked to the fascist era, current neofascist political successes notwithstanding. There is a difference in degree that cannot be overlooked.)
Thomas Mann’s biographer Klaus Harpprecht entitles his chapter on Mann’s Re¶ections
of a Non-Political Man “On the German Special Path” (“Auf dem deutschen Sonderweg”). Klaus Harpprecht, Thomas Mann (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1995), 400.
The main points of the Sonderweg model have been summarized as follows: “. . . the
belief in direct continuities between Bismarck and Hitler; the idea of a fundamental
contradiction between economic modernity and political backwardness leading to the
empire’s structural instability; the view that Germany lacked the emancipatory experience of a successful bourgeois revolution, falling prey instead to the continued dominance of old-style ‘preindustrial elites’ in the political system; the notion that these elites
exercised their power by repressive forms of social control and manipulative techniques
of rule; and the belief that German history was the site of an exceptional ‘misdevelopment’ by comparison to the healthier trajectories of the societies of ‘the West.’” All this
amounts to a “teleology of German exceptionalism.” See Geoff Eley, “Introduction 1,”
Society, Culture, and the State in Germany, 1870–1930, ed. Geoff Eley (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 3. This summary does not address itself directly to
cultural concerns, which are the focus of the present study.
40. Heinrich Mann, “Zola,” Geist und Tat (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp,
1981), 164, 184, 216, 166, 167. A new American edition of the correspondence of
the two brothers has just appeared: Letters of Heinrich and Thomas Mann, 1900–
1949, ed. Hans Wysling, trans. Don Reneau (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1998). See the following review: John Simon, “Mann and Super Mann,” New
York Times Book Review, April 12, 1998, 12–13. Simon’s statement that the brothers
were “farthest apart politically” is only partially accurate.
41. From April 1885 to March 1886, Heinrich Mann was editor of the reactionary monthly Das Zwanzigste Jahrhundert. Blätter für deutsche Art und Wohlfahrt. One
of the contributors was Thomas Mann. For an assessment of this phase in Heinrich
Mann’s development, see Bernd M. Kraske, “Heinrich Mann als Herausgeber der
Zeitschrift Das Zwanzigste Jahrhundert,” Heinrich Mann. Das essayistische Werk, ed.
Rudolf Wolff (Bonn: Bouvier, 1986), 7–24. See also Alfred Kantorowicz, “ZolaEssay—Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen. Die paradigmatische Auseinandersetzung zwischen Heinrich und Thomas Mann,” Heinrich Mann. Werk und Wirkung,
ed. Rudolf Wolff (Bonn: Bouvier, 1984), 54–76.
42. Thomas Mann, Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen (1918; Frankfurt am Main:
Fischer, 1983). All citations will be made from this edition. The Betrachtungen are
also in volume 12 of the Gesammelte Werke (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1960).
43. Mann claims that he “almost slept through” the transformation of the German
Bürger into a bourgeois. Betrachtungen, 130.
44. This does not stop him from criticizing the imperialist British for using the
term “nigger”! Betrachtungen, 441.

Notes_ne.fm Page 204 Friday, August 25, 2000 1:52 PM

204 ///

Notes to Chapter 1

45. On de Lagarde, see Mosse, 31–39. For literary manifestations of the fantasies
of de Lagarde and his ilk, see Jost Hermand, Old Dreams of a New Reich: Volkish Utopias and National Socialism (1988; Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992).
46. Despite his protestations to the contrary, Mann does, incredibly, indulge in
the glori¤cation of war as a path to ennoblement (453), claim that suffering brings
forth true grandeur (451), and comment sarcastically that it can be as horrible to die
in bed as on the ¤eld of battle (450). We are all condemned to “bitter death” anyway,
he philosophizes (450).
47. Thomas Mann, “Von deutscher Republik,” Gesammelte Werke in 12 Bänden
(Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1960), 12:809–852. Page references from this edition
in the text. Not all scholars believe that a real “transformation” took place, at least in
the realm of ideas—as opposed to practical politics. See Martin Flinker, Thomas
Mann’s politische Betrachtungen im Lichte der heutigen Zeit (’s-Gravenhage: Mouton,
1959), and Ernst Keller, Der unpolitische Deutsche. Eine Studie zu den “Betrachtungen
eines Unpolitischen” von Thomas Mann (Bern and München: Francke, 1965).
48. It has been pointed out that Mann already used the term “Third Reich” in
1912. At that early stage, it was de¤ned as “the reconciliation of the mind [“Geist”]
and art, of knowledge and creativity, of intellectualism and simplicity, of rationality
and the demonic, of asceticism and beauty.” Thomas Mann, Gesammelte Werke,
11:564. The passage is discussed in Hermann Kurzke, Auf der Suche nach der verlorenen Irrationalität. Thomas Mann und der Konservatismus (Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 1980), 141.
49. Michael Rupprecht, Der literarische Bürgerkrieg. Zur Unpolitik der Unpolitischen in Deutschland (Frankfurt am Main: Josef Knecht, 1995), 48. The subtitle of
this study applies Mann’s term to a large group of twentieth-century German writers.
50. Bernhard Weyergraf, “Konservative Wandlungen,” Literatur der Weimarer Republik 1918–1933, ed. Bernhard Weyergraf, Hansers Sozialgeschichte der deutschen
Literatur vom 16. Jahrundert bis zur Gegenwart, ed. Rolf Grimminger (München and
Wien: Hanser, 1995), 8:281.
51. Harpprecht, 429. Georg Lukács criticizes the “romantic anti-capitalism” of the
Re¶ections, but praises Mann for his continuing “skepticism with regard to Western
bourgeois democracy.” Lukács, Destruction, 71. He ignores Hofmannsthal completely.
52. Characteristically, a new introduction to today’s Germany contains multiple
references to Thomas Mann, but not a single one to Hofmannsthal. Cf. Stuart
Parkes, Understanding Contemporary Germany (London and New York: Routledge,
1997). The ¤rst reference to Mann is at the very beginning of a chapter on the political system—not in one on literary history. And what work is mentioned there? None
other than the Re¶ections (33).
In a weighty anthology about the Weimar Republic, readers are provided with a
four-page excerpt from Thomas Mann’s On German Democracy, whereas the passage
from Hofmannsthal’s speech is less than one page long. The Weimar Republik Source-
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book, ed. Anton Kaes, Martin Jay, and Edward Dimendberg (Berkeley and Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1994), 105–109 and 341.
A standard history of ideas in English provides an article about conservatism that
links Hofmannsthal to the term “conservative revolution” and mentions de Lagarde,
but omits reference to Thomas Mann. Rudolf Vierhaus, “Conservatism,” Dictionary
of the History of Ideas, ed. Philip P. Wiener (1968; New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons,
1973), 1:480a and 483a.
53. Johann Hinrich Claussen, “Politik der Unpolitischen. Konservative Revolution: Hofmannsthal und Thomas Mann,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 4,
1997. For an article on Hofmannsthal that begins with a report on the 1995 discussion about the Conservative Revolution in the German parliament, see Ute and Helmut Nicolaus, “Hofmannsthal, der Staat und die ‘konservative Revolution.’ Aktuelle
Bemerkungen anläßlich einer parlamentarischen Anfrage,” Politisches Denken. Jahrbuch 1997 (Stuttgart and Weimar: Metzler, 1997), 141–174.
54. These pieces have been described as “embarrassing.” Cf. Mathias Mayer, Hugo
von Hofmannsthal (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1993), 161. For a detailed analysis, see Heinz
Lunzer, Hofmannsthals politische Tätigkeit in den Jahren 1914–1917 (Frankfurt am
Main, Bern, and Cirencester: Peter Lang, 1981), esp. 179–181.
55. “Vorrede des Herausgebers,” Deutsches Lesebuch. Eine Auswahl deutscher Prosastücke aus dem Jahrhundert 1750–1850, ed. Hugo von Hofmannsthal (1923;
Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1952), vii.
56. Although Hofmannsthal promoted the idea of Austria, he did not believe that
there was such a thing as an Austrian literature. The Reader includes authors from all
of the German-speaking countries, and Austrians are a distinct minority.
57. Hugo von Hofmannsthal, “Das Schrifttum als geistiger Raum der Nation,”
Gesammelte Werke in Einzelausgaben, ed. Herbert Steiner (Frankfurt am Main:
Fischer, 1955), 6:392. Further references to this edition in the text.
58. French literature is described as “full of life,” but also “devoid of dreams”
[“traumlos”]. Hofmannsthal, “Das Schrifttum,” 395.
59. Despite such rhetoric, there is no trace of anti-Semitism in the speech (in contrast to the Re¶ections). The German Reader includes selections from the German
Jews Heinrich Heine and Ferdinand Lassalle. Hofmannsthal was himself part Jewish,
but that is of course no barrier to anti-Semitism. One of the most conservative “German”
writers in the ¤rst half of the twentieth century, Rudolf Borchardt (who corresponded with Hofmannsthal), was also Jewish.
60. As Hans Kohn has put it: “In the Europe after 1918 he [Hofmannsthal] no
longer felt at home. The democratization of the world which set in after the First
World War was beyond Hofmannsthal’s perceptive powers.” If one were to replace
1918 with 1945 or even 1989, a similar statement could be made about the contemporary heirs of the Conservative Revolution. Cf. Kohn, The Mind of Germany, 250.
61. The Weimar Republic Sourcebook, 330.
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62. Hermann Rudolph, Kulturkritik und konservative Revolution. Zum kulturellpolitischen Denken Hofmannsthals und seinem problemgeschichtlichen Kontext (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1971), 21.
63. Kurzke, Auf der Suche, 26.
64. In 1900, Thomas Mann served a total of two and one-half months in the infantry (Leib-Infanterieregiment). He was released from the military for medical reasons, thanks to the intervention of a friend of his mother. Hofmannsthal served a full
year as a cadet (Einjährig-Freiwilliger) in 1894–95. He was called up in 1914 and sent
to Istria, but after a few weeks, he was sent back to Vienna to work in the War Ministry.
65. Ernst Jünger, Storm of Steel, trans. Basil Creighton (Garden City: Doubleday,
Doran & Company, 1929), xi. The original German edition was published in 1920.
See also Ernst Jünger, Sämtliche Werke (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1978–1983), vol. 1.
Further page references from the English edition in the text.
My own copy of In Stahlgewittern was a 1943 Christmas present from the commander of the “4.Pion.Lehr.Batl.4” to his men. The title page has the inscription
“Kriegs-Weihnacht 1943,” the signature of the company commander, and the Wehrmacht symbol.
66. Jünger, Storm, 21, footnote (added to later editions).
67. When away from the front, Jünger can fantasize about “women’s hands and a
good thousand super¶uous things . . . that make our lives colorful”! Der Kampf als inneres Erlebnis, Sämtliche Werke, 7:24. Further citations in the body of the text.
68. Jünger, Der Kampf, 13. To ward off criticism, Jünger asserts that only those
who have directly experienced combat have the right to speak about it (22).
69. Like Nietzsche and George, Jünger was neither anti-Semitic nor racist. He was
also too much of a connoisseur of French culture and savoir vivre to be a true German
nationalist. Richard Herzinger speaks of an “intellectual” anti-Semitism in Jünger:
“Jünger’s anti-Semitism was not based on race, but rather on ideas. He considered the
Jews to be representatives, not creators, of liberalism. For him, the ‘Jewish question’
was thus not the central problem of the ‘national revolution.’ Just the same, he believed that Jewishness and ‘Germanness’ were irreconcilable.” See Richard Herzinger,
“‘Der Sieg der Deutschheit über die Erde.’ ‘Die Nation’ zwischen Mythos und
Utopie im Denken der politischen Romantik, der Konservativen Revolution und der
Neuen Rechten,” Neonationalismus. Neokonservatismus. Sondierungen und Analysen,
ed. Michael Kessler et al. (Tübingen: Stauffenburg, 1997), 31, n. 27.
70. Here are three recent works in English: Marcus Paul Bullock, The Violent Eye.
Ernst Jünger’s Visions and Revisions on the European Right (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1992), Thomas Nevin, Ernst Jünger and Germany: Into the Abyss, 1914–
1945 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996), and Elliot Y. Neaman, A Dubious
Past: Ernst Jünger and the Politics of Literature after Nazism (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1999).
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Although this is not the place for a research report, it is dif¤cult not to respond to
one of the most recent essays on Jünger. The author is concerned that the reader
might not perceive the true complexity of the material, but he ends by justifying both
Jünger’s pessimism and his positive attitude toward the near-apocalyptic effects of
World War II by pointing out that many others held similar views. One of these was
supposedly Bertolt Brecht, who wrote in 1944 that he was ready to support Hitler in
his liquidation of the aristocratic of¤cers who attempted to assassinate him. This is
indeed “complex,” but not in the way intended by the author of the essay. One small
footnote to this is that Jünger spent his twilight years in a house owned by the
Stauffenberg family, one of whose members was in fact executed as one of the aristocratic plotters. Cf. Helmuth Kiesel, “Zwischen Kritik und Af¤rmation. Ernst Jüngers
Auseinandersetzung mit dem Nationalsozialismus,” Literatur in der Diktatur.
Schreiben im Nationalsozialismus und DDR-Sozialismus, ed. Günther Rüther (Paderborn, München, Wien, and Zürich: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1997), 163–172, esp.
170–172. Since Kiesel’s title does not follow the alphabet (“criticism” is placed before
“af¤rmation”), one must assume that Jünger was mainly critical toward the Third
Reich. His wartime service in the Wehrmacht was apparently not related to the
“ideals” that he spoke of in his early writings.
71. Jünger’s own self-image—at least the one for public consumption—was that of
a passive observer rather than an activist. See the famous passage in the preface to his
wartime diaries: “After the earthquake, one strikes out at the seismograph. However,
one cannot make the barometer atone for the typhoons, unless one wishes to be considered a primitive.” Ernst Jünger, “Vorwort,” Strahlungen. Erster Teil. Werke (Stuttgart:
Klett, 1960), 2:13. The “primitive” was hardly a negative term in the earlier Jünger.
72. After a riding accident, Nietzsche was not able to ¤nish his one year of military
service (1867–1868). In the Franco-Prussian War, he brie¶y volunteered as a medic
until turning ill himself. Hemingway volunteered as a Red Cross ambulance driver
in Italy in World War I. During a brief stint as an of¤cer in 1918, he sustained shrapnel wounds.
73. Karl Heinz Bohrer has described how the post-1945 German middle class
could bring Jünger into the cultural fold by concentrating on the later works and ignoring the early ones that contained attacks on the morality and politics of their parents. See Karl Heinz Bohrer, Die Ästhetik des Schreckens. Die pessimistische Romantik
und Ernst Jüngers Frühwerk (München and Wien: Hanser, 1978), 13.
74. Jünger was also saluted by Helmut Kohl, but this was clearly a misunderstanding on Kohl’s part! Jünger accepted the respectful greetings from the head of state just
the same, as they could only enhance his aura as a kind of conservative Voltaire.
75. For example, see the following: Peter de Mendelssohn, “Das Verharren vor
dem Unvereinbaren. Versuch über Gottfried Benn,” Der Geist in der Despotie. Versuche über die Möglichkeiten des Intellektuellen in der totalitären Gesellschaft (1953;
Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1987), 236–282; Jürgen Schröder, “Benn in den
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dreißiger Jahren,” Intellektuelle im Bann des Nationalsozialismus, ed. Karl Corino
(Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1980), 48–60; Jürgen Schröder, “‘Wer über
Deutschland reden und richten will, muß hier geblieben sein.’ Gottfried Benn als
Emigrant nach innen,” Literatur in der Diktatur, 131–144.
76. Dieter Wellershoff, the editor of Benn’s collected works, criticizes the irrationalism that led Benn to sympathize with the Nazis, but he also asserts that Benn is
“an exemplary ¤gure of recent German intellectual history” whose œuvre is “a concentrated expression of the nature of the era.” Cf. Wellershoff, Gottfried Benn. Phänotyp dieser Stunde (1958; Frankfurt am Main and Berlin: Ullstein, 1964), 8.
77. Gottfried Benn, “Rede auf Stefan George,” Gesammelte Werke in vier Bänden,
ed. Dieter Wellershoff (1959; Wiesbaden: Limes Verlag, 1962), 1:464–477. Harry
Pross refers to this speech at the very beginning of his book on the destruction of German politics. Cf. Pross, 11. In this speech, Benn speaks of his time as the “age of
storms of steel and imperial horizons.” It is dif¤cult to imagine a relationship between George and Jünger.
78. Benn, “Rede auf Heinrich Mann,” Gesammelte Werke, 1:410–418. The epigraph of this speech is “Nihilism is a feeling of happiness” (!).
79. Benn, Gesammelte Werke, 1:440. Further citations in the body of the text. The
“higher form” of collectivity can be characterized as National Socialism or the system
described in Ernst Jünger’s Der Arbeiter (1932), according to Benn. This passage
must not have pleased Jünger, who believed that his system was “higher” than that of
the Nazis.
80. Klaus Mann’s letter is included in Benn’s autobiography Doppelleben. Cf. Benn,
Gesammelte Werke, 4:74–78. Page references to this letter in the body of the text.
In 1937, Klaus Mann published an article about Benn (“The History of an Aberration”) in the émigré journal Das Wort. Even in this text, Mann confesses that he still
has a weakness for certain verses by Benn. He goes on to say: “His ‘case’ is still interesting, only because he was the only [my emphasis] German writer of any stature who
seriously and with no little intellectual resolution went astray into the camp of National Socialism.” KM, “Gottfried Benn. Die Geschichte einer Verirrung,” Die Expressionismusdebatte. Materialien zu einer marxistischen Realismuskonzeption, ed.
Hans-Jürgen Schmitt (1973; Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1976), 39–40.
81. De Mendelssohn, 237.
82. Benn, “Antwort an die literarischen Emigranten,” Gesammelte Werke, 4:239–
248. Page references in the body of the text.
83. Despite such attacks, Benn was actually defended by none other than Heinrich Himmler. In a 1937 letter, Himmler stated: “From a national point of view,
Benn’s behavior has been absolutely beyond reproach since 1933 and even earlier. I
consider it to be unnecessary and nonsensical to now run amok against this man who
has—especially in the international arena—represented Germany impeccably. I have
prohibited all of my subordinates from getting involved in the Benn case.” Heinrich
Himmler, “Letter to Wolfgang Willrich, Sept. 18, 1937,” Literatur und Dichtung im
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Dritten Reich, ed. Joseph Wulf, Kultur im Dritten Reich, ed. Joseph Wulf (1982;
Frankfurt am Main and Berlin: Ullstein, 1989), 2:144.
84. Benn, Doppelleben, 74. Further page references in the body of the text.
85. His lack of insight was, characteristically, no hindrance when it came to “placing his name at the disposal” of the anticommunist crusade during the Cold War.
86. See the volume Und das wurde nicht ihr Staat. Erfahrungen emigrierter Schriftsteller mit Westdeutschland, ed. Peter Mertz (München: C. H. Beck, 1985).
87. Those interested in this other tradition could begin by perusing the works of
G. E. Lessing, G. C. Lichtenberg, Georg Forster, Georg Büchner, Bettine von Arnim,
Ludwig Börne, Heinrich Heine, Georg Herwegh, Ferdinand Freiligrath, Gottfried
Keller, Heinrich Mann, Karl Kraus, Kurt Tucholsky, Ernst Toller, and Bertolt Brecht.
This particular stream of German literature is not devoid of contradictions, but it
clearly represents a view of the human condition and a concept of history which I, for
one, ¤nd much more appealing. For a critical assessment of the initial phase of this
tradition, see W. Daniel Wilson and Robert C. Holub, eds., Impure Reason: Dialectic
of Enlightenment in Germany (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1993).

Chapter 2
1. Cf. Egbert Krispyn, Anti-Nazi Writers in Exile (Athens: University of Georgia
Press, 1978), 151–158.
2. See the following books on the situation of Jews in the former GDR: Lothar
Mertens, Davidstern unter Hammer und Zirkel. Die jüdischen Gemeinden in der SBZ/
DDR und ihre Behandlung durch Partei und Staat 1945–1990 (Hildesheim: Olms,
1998); Angelika Timm, Hammer, Zirkel, Davidstern. Das gestörte Verhältnis in der
DDR zu Zionismus und Staat Israel (Bonn: Bouvier, 1998). See also the following review: Peter Dittmar, “‘Diese Waffen sind in der Lage, israelische Panzer zu durchschlagen,’” Die Welt, May 2, 1998.
3. The form that Jünger declined to ¤ll out was the basis for a postwar novel (Der
Fragebogen [1951]) by the former militant right-wing author Ernst von Salomon.
4. Franz Lennartz, “Günter Grass,” Deutsche Schriftsteller des 20. Jahrhunderts im
Spiegel der Kritik (Stuttgart: Kröner, 1984), 1:596. The con¶ict between Grass and
Ziesel—including legal action—is documented in Kunst oder Pornographie? Der
Prozess Grass gegen Ziesel (München: Lehmann, 1969). See also Günter Grass. Die
Blechtrommel. Erläuterungen und Dokumente, ed. Volker Neuhaus (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1997), 177–180. Ziesel’s mission has recently been taken up in the U.S., where
the video of Volker Schlöndorff ’s ¤lm version of The Tin Drum has been denounced
as pornography.
5. Keith Bullivant, “Literatur und Politik,” Gegenwartsliteratur seit 1968, ed. Klaus
Briegleb and Sigrid Weigel, Hansers Sozialgeschichte der deutschen Literatur vom 16.
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Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart, ed. Rolf Grimminger (München and Wien: Hanser,
1992), 12:285.
6. Jay Rosellini, “A Revival of Conservative Literature? The ‘Spiegel-Symposium
1993’ and Beyond,” Beyond 1989: Re-reading German Literature since 1945, ed.
Keith Bullivant (Providence and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1997), 109–110.
Keith Bullivant has asserted that conservative writing, i.e., “the German idealist
tradition,” exhibited great staying power even after 1945. He is one of the few observers to postulate that “the apparent gulf between an older, apparently conservative
generation of writers and critics and the younger, post-war one was far less than it
seemed then and has since been perceived.” (The Future of German Literature [Oxford and Providence: Berg, 1994], 23 and 28).
7. Those who wished to enlist postwar youth in the anticommunist crusade were
not pleased with such skepticism. Cf. Helmut Schelsky, Die skeptische Generation.
Eine Soziologie der deutschen Jugend (Düsseldorf and Köln: Diederichs, 1957). For a
(surprisingly) sympathetic portrayal of such youthful skepticism, see the character
Manfred Herrfurth in Christa Wolf ’s ¤rst novel, Divided Heaven.
8. Some examples: Victor Farías, Heidegger and Nazism, trans. Gabriel R. Ricci (1987;
Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989); Hugo Ott, Martin Heidegger: Unterwegs zu
seiner Biographie (Frankfurt am Main and New York: Campus, 1988); Philippe LacoueLabarthe, Heidegger, Art and Politics, trans. Chris Turner (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990); Peter
Kemper, ed., Martin Heidegger—Faszination und Schrecken. Die politische Dimension
einer Philosophie (Frankfurt am Main and New York: Campus, 1990); Günther Neske
and Emil Kettering, eds., Martin Heidegger and National Socialism: Questions and Answers
(New York: Paragon House, 1990); Tom Rockmore and Joseph Margolis, eds., The
Heidegger Case: On Philosophy and Politics (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992);
Alan Milchman and Alan Rosenberg, eds., Martin Heidegger and the Holocaust (Atlantic
Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press International, 1996).
The volume by Neske and Kettering contains, in English translation, the 1933
Freiburg speech “The Self-Assertion of the German University” as well as the legendary 1966 interview with Der Spiegel.
9. Jürgen Habermas, Philosophisch-politische Pro¤le, 3rd rev. ed. (1981; Frankfurt
am Main: Suhrkamp, 1984), 107.
10. Christian Graf von Krockow, Die Entscheidung. Eine Untersuchung über Ernst
Jünger, Carl Schmitt, Martin Heidegger (1958; Frankfurt am Main and New York:
Campus, 1990). Page references in the body of the text.
11. Historian Heinrich August Winkler has said the following about this path:
“The anti-Western ‘special path’ of Germany de¤nitively ended with the 1945 collapse of the German Reich. . . . The process of ‘Westernization’ that has taken place
in the ‘Bonn Republic’ will continue in the ‘Berlin Republic,’ because historically
speaking, there is only one political culture of democracy, and that is the Western
one”: “Zwei Zusammenbrüche,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, October 15, 1997. The writ-
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ings of the New Right intellectuals discussed in this study demonstrate that, at least
in the cultural sphere, the “special path” is by no means a thing of the past.
12. Krockow, Entscheidung, 47. The quote is taken from the 1922 edition of
Jünger’s book (p. 76).
13. Krockow, Entscheidung, 54. The quote is taken from the 1932 edition of Der
Arbeiter that appeared in Hamburg (p. 201). The emphases are mine.
14. One of the readers at the Universität Basel (where Nietzsche had taught in the
1870s) was Karl Jaspers, a leading critic of the intellectual right.
15. Armin Mohler, Die Konservative Revolution in Deutschland 1918–1932.
Grundriß ihrer Weltanschauungen (Stuttgart: Friedrich Vorwerk, 1950). Unless otherwise noted, the citations in this section will be taken from the second edition: Die
Konservative Revolution in Deutschland 1918–1932. Ein Handbuch (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1972). The publication of this second edition by the
prestigious Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft lent an aura of academic respectability to Mohler’s work.
16. Mohler discovers similarities to the German movement in Russia, France, Spain,
Italy, England (like John Carey, he discusses D. H. Lawrence), and the U.S. Even in the
African liberation movements, he maintains, one ¤nds “the mixture of national liberation struggle, social revolution, and rediscovery of identity characteristic of the Conservative Revolution.” Mohler, Die Konservative Revolution (1972), 13.
17. This quotation and all those which follow come—unless otherwise noted—
from the 1972 edition.
18. Krockow also devotes a large section of Die Entscheidung to an analysis of Romanticism.
19. A review of Irving Kristol’s Neoconservatism: The Autobiography of an Idea by
Theodore Draper is entitled “An Anti-Intellectual Intellectual.” The review was
printed in the New York Review of Books, November 2, 1995.
20. Iris Weber, Nation, Staat und Elite. Die Ideologie der Neuen Rechten (Köln:
PapyRossa, 1997), 20 n. 40.
21. In his 1989 third edition, Mohler provides some interesting autobiographical
background: “First of all, I wanted to correct a personal error: When I got to know
the Third Reich in 1942 [under what circumstances one wonders!], I still naively
identi¤ed National Socialism with the Conservative Revolution. Soon, however, that
turned out to be wrong, and I wanted to discern the difference between the two mentalities. Secondly, my book was meant to be of help to the right-wing [“rechte”] intellectuals in Germany. I had become acquainted with a number of them personally
or by reading their works. The way in which they were discriminated against across
the board disgusted me—especially since these men had no opportunity to defend
themselves. I was always on the side of the people who had the ‘compact majority’
against them.” Vol. 2, 7. There were of course other underdogs to defend, but that is
another story.
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It was reported in Die Zeit that Mohler, a Swiss citizen, volunteered for the
Waffen-SS. (He was not accepted.) See Marko Martin, “Stramm zur Sache,” Die
Zeit, no. 33, 1993. The article is about the right-wing newspaper Junge Freiheit and
the emergence of a new generation of right-wing intellectuals whose models are not
“Hitler or Himmler, but rather Carl Schmitt and Oswald Spengler.” For a biographical pro¤le of Mohler, who has been a sort of mentor for Alain de Benoist and the
French New Right, see Antifa Reader, ed. Jens Mecklenburg (Berlin: Elefanten Press,
1996), 104.
22. Hans-Peter Schwarz, Der konservative Anarchist. Politik und Zeitkritik Ernst
Jüngers (Freiburg: Rombach, 1962). Citations from this work in the body of the text.
23. Schwarz criticizes Krockow (Die Entscheidung) for describing Jünger as a passive ¤gure (e.g., one unwilling to actively support the attempts of the resistance to assassinate Hitler on July 20, 1944). According to Schwarz, Jünger used his pen as a
weapon, acting as an “extremely uncomfortable critic” of three successive political
systems (300 n. 12). One can only accept such a statement if it is made clear that
Jünger’s critiques had an incomparably more devastating effect on the Weimar Republic than on the Nazi state or West Germany. If Jünger had been such a thorn in
the side of the Nazis, his books would not have appeared until the early 1940s. (Even
the “resistance parable” Auf den Marmorklippen was actually printed in an edition for
the Wehrmacht in 1942!) If he had shaken things up so much in the Federal Republic, he hardly would have been presented with the prestigious Goethe Prize in 1982
or the Bundesverdienstkreuz in 1985.
24. A fascinating sketch of Jünger’s postwar “character” is provided by the poet
Stephen Spender, himself an admirer of Jünger’s works. When Spender, then on duty
in Germany purging the libraries of Nazi literature, met with him in 1945 in his
study (“a comfortable room with leathern armchairs and lined with beautiful
books”), Jünger not only held forth about the childishness of the French but also
spoke of war as “a necessary stage of my experiences.” Cf. Stephen Spender, European
Witness (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1946), 215 and 219. Contrast this with
the sickeningly sweet portrait of Jünger presented by historical dramatist (!) Rolf
Hochhuth in his Und Brecht sah das Tragische nicht. Plädoyers, Polemiken, Pro¤le
(München: Knesebeck, 1996), 83–101. Hochhuth pays homage to Gottfried Benn
in the same volume.
25. In the de¤nitive biography of Jünger, which appeared after the fall of the Berlin Wall, a similar perspective can be found. The author quotes an infamous phrase
from Copse 125 (“We cannot be national, yes, nationalistic enough.”), pointing out
that Jünger was reformulating the ideas of Spengler, Niekisch, and Moeller van den
Bruck for a reading public “for whom democracy had long since become obsolete.”
He goes on to say: “For the work in its literary physiognomy, such speculations, no
matter how alarming they might be in their politicization effect, remain inconsequential [nicht entscheidend].” Cf. Martin Meyer, Ernst Jünger (München and Wien:
Hanser, 1990), 83.
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In one of the standard works on twentieth-century German literature, the chapter
on Jünger concentrates almost exclusively on essayistic style, disregarding content
(and history) to the greatest extent possible. Cf. Hans Schumacher, “Exkurs über
Ernst Jünger,” Deutsche Literatur im 20. Jahrhundert. Strukturen und Gestalten, ed.
Otto Mann and Wolfgang Rothe (Bern and München: Francke, 1967), 1:285–296.
26. In the Weimar Republic, the judiciary dealt much more harshly with politically motivated crime from the left than that from the right. The classic example is
the nine-month imprisonment of Hitler in relatively comfortable quarters and the
¤ve-year prison ordeal of poet-dramatist Ernst Toller.
In West Germany, the state often played down the activities of the extraparliamentary right, while investing considerable resources to counter such activities
emanating from the left. The scales have tipped in the other direction since the early
1990s, simply because the number of incidents of xenophobic violence perpetrated
by the right has skyrocketed, whereas leftist terrorists like the Baader-Meinhof group
have all but disappeared from view. The “Soviet threat” is also no longer relevant
(whether most West German leftists were ever attracted to the Soviet model is another question).
27. One explosive factor in this equation lies in the fact that a great number of leftist writers—Heine, Kraus, Tucholsky, Benjamin, and many others—were Jewish. Cf.
Bernt Engelmann, Deutschland ohne Juden. Eine Bilanz (Köln: Pahl-Rugenstein,
1988). One historian has portrayed the German Jews as the “outsiders” who unexpectedly became the “insiders” of Weimar culture. These “new insiders”—“foreign
and irrepressibly modernist”—became the prime target of the reactionary forces. Cf.
Avraham Barkai and Paul Mendes-Flohr [said historian], Aufbruch und Zerstörung
1918–1945, Deutsch-jüdische Geschichte in der Neuzeit, vol. 4, ed. Michael A. Meyer
(München: C. H. Beck, 1997), 167.
The archetypal German leftist writer Bertolt Brecht was not Jewish (although his
wife and collaborator, Helene Weigel, was), but the attempts to devalue his literary
production by delving into his private—especially sex—life would be inconceivable
vis-à-vis a conservative writer. (One example: Jünger’s experimentation with mindaltering drugs does not seem to bother his German disciples, although they would
certainly castigate President Clinton for his “no-inhaling” rhetoric.)
28. “8. Mai 1945—Gegen das Vergessen,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, April 7,
1995, 3. The FAZ published a front-page editorial with the telling title “Überwunden,
nicht befreit” (“Overcome, not Liberated”) on April 11. In that editorial, Ignatz Bubis,
the then leader of the German Jewish community, was criticized for implying that conservatives are “Nazis minus genocide.”
Bubis answered with his own letter to the editor on April 19. (In a radio interview,
he had stated that the signatories “were consciously or unconsciously laying the intellectual groundwork for the rise of a dangerous German nationalism.” Cf. the Reuters news dispatch by Michael Shields from April 8, 1995.) Additional letters about
the affair were published on April 20. On May 6, the FAZ published a statement by
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Helmut Kohl about the ¤ftieth anniversary of the capitulation (“Jedem einzelnen
Schicksal schulden wir Achtung”). Although Kohl expressed his respect for the human dignity of every person, he lumped together those sent to concentration camps,
soldiers, and those driven from their homelands after the German defeat. This was
reminiscent of Ronald Reagan’s comments in Bitburg in 1985. Rudolf Scharping,
then the SPD Chairman, said that it was “intolerable” that cabinet ministers had
signed the advertisement published on April 7. Cf. “Scharping: Der 8. Mai 1945 war
die Geburtsstunde der Freiheit,” FAZ, May 5, 1995. Scharping did not mention that
Hans Apel (SPD) had been one of the original signatories.
29. This omission was attacked in the counter-advertisement “WIDER DAS
VERGESSEN, denn wie sollte man vergessen,” placed by the prominent GermanJewish Brauner family in the May 5 edition of the Frankfurter Allgemeine. In this text,
three ¤gures are singled out for sharp criticism, namely the historian Ernst Nolte, the
journalist and historian Rainer Zitelmann, and the Christian Democrat politician
Alfred Dregger.
30. The one Social Democrat on the list, former defense minister Hans Apel, removed his name after its presence had caused him—and his party—considerable embarrassment.
31. For more information about this and other advertisements, including the
1994 Berliner Appell, see Weber, Nation, Staat und Elite, 96–97.
32. This does not imply that the two faces of totalitarianism are identical in the view
of the New Right. Brown is still better than red, an argument forcefully presented by
historian Ernst Nolte. In his controversial opus on National Socialism and Bolshevism,
Nolte describes the Nazi seizure of power (“Machtergreifung,” the standard term) as an
“anti-Marxist takeover of power” (antimarxistische Machtübernahme), a much more
positive formulation. Cf. Ernst Nolte, Der europäische Bürgerkrieg 1917–1945. Nationalsozialismus und Bolschewismus (Frankfurt am Main and Berlin: Propyläen/Ullstein,
1987), 28. For a contemporary German review of totalitarianism theories, see Wolfgang Wippermann, Totalitarismustheorien. Die Entwicklung der Diskussion von den Anfängen bis heute (Darmstadt: Primus Verlag, 1997).
33. Ulrich Schacht, ed., Hohenecker Protokolle. Aussagen zur Geschichte der politischen Verfolgung von Frauen in der DDR (Zürich: Ammann Verlag, 1984).
34. Ulrich Schacht, Gewissen ist Macht. Notwendige Reden, Essays, Kritiken zur Literatur und Politik in Deutschland (München and Zürich: Piper, 1992), 30. Further
page references in the body of the text.
35. Although it is problematic to judge literature using the criteria of the secret police, one Stasi informant did opine that Schacht’s poems were “very abstract” and
would probably not have any “mass appeal.” This assessment is found in Stasi documents provided by Schacht himself. Cf. Ulrich Schacht, “Versteinerte ‘Quellen.’
Fragmente zu einer politischen Fossilienkunde im Fundhorizont des Elbe-Oder-Gebietes,” Aktenkundig, ed. Hans Joachim Schädlich (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1993), 212.
At least in this publication, Schacht’s tone is humorous and ironic rather than bitter.
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36. The young Schacht did nonetheless write quite a bit in the East. The circulation of these writings was limited to showing them to a few trusted friends, however.
Some of these “friends” later turned out to be Stasi informants. A detailed list of the
preprison writings can be found in court documents relating to the justi¤cation of
sentencing him to prison. Cf. “Dissidenten? Texte und Dokumente zur DDR—
‘Exil’—Literatur,” Deutschunterricht 43.10 (Sonderheft 1990):522–526. According
to the documents, Schacht was viewed as a “democratic socialist” in the tradition of
the Prague Spring. One ironic twist: one of the con¤scated writings, “The country in
which I live,” was not held against him, because it was only meant for his diary!
37. These included poets Sarah Kirsch, Günter Kunert, and Reiner Kunze and
novelists Jurek Becker, Erich Loest, Hans-Joachim Schädlich, and Rolf Schneider. Jurek Becker may be the only former East German writer who was completely accepted
in the West and achieved broad popularity.
38. “Among Western leftists, criticism of the GDR had been seen since the 1950s
as an activity engaged in by Christian Democrats, as a theme of the Cold War that
did not mesh with détente, as an anti-Communist argument.” Jürgen Große, “Politische Verantwortung und moralische Schuld: Aspekte des intellektuellen Diskurses,” German Studies Review, special issue on “Totalitäre Herrschaft—totalitäres
Erbe” (Fall 1994), 176.
39. The only serious attempt to introduce the poet Schacht to the reading public
is found in Birgit Lermen and Matthias Loewen, Lyrik aus der DDR. Exemplarische
Analysen (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1987), 404–424. Schacht himself is probably not,
however, enthusiastic about being categorized as a GDR poet, since most of his
poems have been written in the West. In a 1989 letter, Schacht said himself that he
could not live well if the money from his book publications in the West were his only
source of income. An excerpt from the letter is printed in Sie kommen aus Deutschland. DDR-Schriftsteller in der Bundesrepublik (Worms: Stadtbibliothek, 1989), 112.
It is of course true that before and after 1989, very few East or West German writers
could devote themselves exclusively to their writing careers.
40. Deutsche Literatur 19¤. Jahresüberblick, ed. Franz Josef Görtz, Volker Hage et
al. (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1981–.) The volume printed in any given year covers the literature of the previous year.
41. Ulrich Schacht, “Ein 784–Seiten-Roman gegen die Wiedervereinigung,”
Deutsche Literatur 1995, 289–293.
42. Roland Müller, “Dichter im braunen Netz,” Deutsche Literatur 1994, 315–
319.
43. No fewer than twenty of the pieces were published in Die Welt, the newspaper
that has employed Schacht since 1987.
44. See John Torpey, Intellectuals, Socialism, and Dissent: The East German Opposition and Its Legacy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995).
45. Or rather, the “GDR.” The Axel Springer newspapers routinely placed the abbreviation for the “other” German state in quotes.
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46. In a speech given less than a month before the fall of the Berlin Wall, Schacht
described a reuni¤ed Germany made up of the FRG and GDR as “the smallest
possible Germany” (Kleinst-Deutschland). Gewissen ist Macht, 96. In the same
speech, he said that Germany should be reuni¤ed even if “a majority of Europeans”
were against it. (97)
47. Schacht does not hesitate to use the word “liberation” to describe how he was
released from prison in the GDR and allowed to settle in West Germany (Conscience
Is Power, 26), but he and his group now refuse to use it vis-à-vis 1945.
48. Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich, Die Unfähigkeit zu trauern. Grundlagen kollektiven Verhaltens (1967; München: Piper, 1970).
49. Schacht does not always make a clear distinction between the two: “Homeland is, to be sure, always less than the nation, but it is not worth less to the individual. Often it is more essential and valuable to him. . . . Homeland is the foundation
of the individual. The nation is the foundation of all the people: in that regard,
homeland awareness is foundational, and national awareness is liberating.” Gewissen
ist Macht, 164.
50. Ironically, the SED often put up propaganda posters with the phrase “The human being is at the center [of our endeavors]” (Im Mittelpunkt steht der Mensch).
51. The major decision—at least for most males—was whether to move to West
Berlin to avoid induction into the Bundeswehr.
52. See Heimo Schwilk, Ernst Jünger. Leben und Werk in Bildern und Texten (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1988); Heimo Schwilk, ed., Das Echo der Bilder. Ernst Jünger zu
Ehren (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1990); Günter Figal and Heimo Schwilk, eds., Magie
der Heiterkeit. Ernst Jünger zum Hundertsten (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1995).
53. Heimo Schwilk, Wendezeit—Zeitenwende. Beiträge zur Literatur der achtziger
Jahre (Bonn, Berlin: Bouvier, 1991). Page references in the body of the text. The title
is a play on words: “Wende” is the term denoting the collapse of the GDR and the
beginning of reuni¤cation, whereas “Zeitenwende” is any turning point in history.
54. The word reminds one of the leftist term “late capitalism.”
55. In place of cruise missiles and the like, Schwilk recommends national defense
centered around popular resistance, a model based on Ernst Jünger’s “Der Waldgang.”
56. An essay in which the growing in¶uence of Germany and its link to the socalled “post-Auschwitz paradigm” are discussed was written from a perspective far to
the left of Schacht and Schwilk. See Andrei S. Markovits and Simon Reich, “Should
Europe Fear the Germans?” German Politics and Society 23 (Summer 1994). Reprinted in Germany, Volume II, ed. Klaus H. Goetz. The International Library of Politics and Comparative Government, ed. David Arter (Aldershot: Dartmouth and
Brook¤eld, Vt.: Ashgate, 1997), 1–20. The authors state: “We agree with the optimists that the Federal Republic’s greatest achievement is its eradication of most factors
that could lead to yet another Auschwitz. Where we part ways with the optimists is
in their view of a democratic Germany with virtually no exercise of power in Europe
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and the world.” (1–2; my emphasis.) This is similar to Goldhagen’s view of today’s
Germany.
57. All page references will be taken from the 1995 edition: Heimo Schwilk and
Ulrich Schacht, eds., Die selbstbewußte Nation. “Anschwellender Bocksgesang” und
weitere Beiträge zu einer deutschen Debatte (Frankfurt am Main and Berlin: Ullstein,
1995). The ¤rst edition was published in September 1994, the second revised and expanded edition in December 1994, and the third expanded edition in February
1995.
58. In his lengthy bibliography, Armin Mohler lists only one group of seven
women associated with the Conservative Revolution. He calls them “weibliche
Völkische,” i.e., women who believed in the movement to return the German people
to their true “pure” origins. See Mohler, Die Konservative Revolution, 3rd ed. 1989,
1:361–362. Mohler makes a point of mentioning that one of the women, Gertrud
Prellwitz (1869–1942), was a “true philosemite” (361). The other women on his list
are Edith Grä¤n Salburg (1868–1942), Leonore Kühn (1878–?), Sophie RoggeBörner (1878–?), Maria Grunewald (1875–?), Marie Eckert (no dates), and Ursula
Zabel (1908–?).
59. Fritz Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1969), 6. Ringer excludes scientists and engineers from his study.
60. The word used is actually “Selbstverfehlung,” which contains the word for
transgression (“Verfehlung”). Together with “selbst” (self), it means something akin
to “alienation from one’s true self.”
61. Did the editors consciously choose the term “degenerate” (entarten) in this
context? It was an often-used word in the Third Reich, for example in the title of the
infamous exhibition of “degenerate art” (entartete Kunst) staged by the Nazis.
62. This word (“Selbstbefriedigung”) also means masturbation.
63. See Antonia Grunenberg, Antifaschismus—ein deutscher Mythos (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1993).
64. See for example Jörg von Uthmann, “Körper und Lehrkörper. Amerikas Universitäten streiten über ‘political correctness’,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, February
19, 1992; Henning Ritter, “Erziehungssucht. Was ist politisch korrekt?” Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung, April 22, 1992; Jörg von Uthmann, “PC vs. PC. Die Scheindebatte
über das multikulturelle Amerika,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, January 7, 1993;
Matthias Matussek, “Kunst als Schauprozeß,” Der Spiegel, no. 15, 1993, 228–232;
Ingo von Münch, “Die preußische Großmutter darf nicht ¤epen . . . Anmerkungen
zur Political correctness in Deutschland,” Die Welt, July 3, 1997; Diederich Diederichsen, Politische Korrekturen (Köln: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1996); Stephan Wackwitz,
“Stoff für die Lichterketten. Diederich Diederichsen und die politische Korrektheit,”
Süddeutsche Zeitung, October 28, 1996; Thomas Groß, “Tugendterrors Geistermarsch.
PC im Zeitalter ihrer medialen Vermonsterung. Das neue Buch des Polit-DJs Diederich Diederichsen . . .” Tageszeitung, November 2, 1996.
65. In Schacht’s words, Auschwitz was “not unique, but a human possibility” (66).
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66. See his Ein Schnäppchen namens DDR. Letzte Reden vorm Glockengeläut
(München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1993). The ¤rst piece (from February
1990) in this collection, entitled “Brief Speech by a Man without a Fatherland,” begins with a description of how Grass was accosted by a young man at the Hamburg
train station. The man not only called him a “traitor to the fatherland” but also
warned that it was time to get rid of people like him (7). Grass goes on to say: “That’s
the way it is: I not only fear the Germany that has been simpli¤ed out of two states
into one, I also reject the uni¤ed state” (7).
67. In calling for German defense of Israel as a true atonement for the Holocaust,
Schacht is echoing the line of the late conservative publisher Axel Springer.
68. Stauffenberg, whom Schacht mentions, was also associated with the “GeorgeKreis.” For a study of the illiberal and antidemocratic political philosophy of some resistance circles as a continuation of Germany’s “special path,” see Nicolai Hammersen, Politisches Denken im Widerstand. Ein Beitrag zur Wirkungsgeschichte
neokonservativer Ideologien 1914–1944. Beiträge zur Politischen Wissenschaft, vol.
67 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1993). See also Gordon A. Craig’s review essay
“Good Germans,” New York Review of Books, December 17, 1992, 38–44.
69. Ernst Jünger, “Über den Schmerz,” Sämtliche Werke, 7:143–191.
70. Jünger, “Über den Schmerz,” 145.
71. Jünger, “Über den Schmerz,” 190.
72. Without comment, Schwilk offers a quotation from Carl Schmitt about the
horrors of a world without metaphysics and “existential enmity” (401).
73. Many of the authors speak of this, but no one offers any empirical evidence for
it. My suspicion is that it is more prevalent among intellectuals than among the
masses of the people. This would not bother the authors of Die selbstbewußte Nation,
however, since they are speaking to an elite, at least a potential one.
74. See Jünger, “Über die Linie,” Sämtliche Werke, 7:237–279. Jünger dedicated
this text to Heidegger on his sixtieth birthday. The ¤nal section contains a brash rewriting of Jünger’s biography: “He who has not experienced the overwhelming
power of nothingness (“das Nichts”) in himself and resisted the temptation knows
the least about his time” (279). Heidegger answered with a 1955 essay also entitled
“Über die Linie.” A slightly expanded version of this essay can be found in the Complete Works: Martin Heidegger, “Zur Seinsfrage,” Gesamtausgabe, Abt. 1, Bd. 9
(Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1976), 385–426. At one point, Heidegger relates
the following: “In the Winter of 1939–40, I discussed the Worker [i.e., Jünger’s Der
Arbeiter] in a small group of professors. They were amazed that such a perceptive
book had been around for years” (390).
75. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and The Last Man (New York: The Free
Press, 1992). Fukuyama does not envision any “special paths” for the Germans: “After the great events of the fall of 1989 in Eastern Europe, a signi¤cant number of Germans had doubts about the wisdom of reuni¤cation because it would cost too much.
These are not the hallmarks of a civilization wound tight like a spring, ready to im-

Notes_ne.fm Page 219 Friday, August 25, 2000 1:52 PM

Notes to Pages 52–56

/// 219

molate itself on the pyre of new and unforeseen fanaticisms, but rather of one quite
satis¤ed with what is and will be” (337). Maurer—and he is not alone in this belief—
clearly believes that “what will be” will not be a cause for celebration.
76. Röhl was once publisher of the leftist journal konkret, and he was married to
Ulrike Meinhof of the Baader-Meinhof terrorist group. His rantings are clearly related to his autobiography or rather his attempts to come to terms with it.
77. Berg¶eth praises Tieck, Kerner, and Eichendorff as well as their supposed heirs
Gustav Fechner, Johann Bachofen, and Ludwig Klages.
78. As a non-Jewish reader of Berg¶eth’s essay, I can only imagine what a Jew
might feel when reading these words.
The British would surely by astonished to learn that liberalism is of “maritime
origin” and is tied to a “disdain for the earth,” which in turn leads to a disdain for
“homeland, Volk and fatherland” (105–106). It is certainly a mystery that the seafaring British insisted on defending their own patch of earth against the Germans.
79. This might sound like a rehashing of the Literature Debate, but Syberberg is
actually not at all judgmental regarding the writers from the former GDR. He has no
desire to take Christa Wolf (referred to in the essay as Christa W.) to task for her role
as a leading GDR author. Perhaps this is because he senses more vestiges of an acknowledgment of the tragic in the East than in the West.
80. With reference to the “Literature Debate” (the term itself is not mentioned directly), Krause calls Wolf ’s critics “conservative and left-liberal opinion leaders” (137).
What might Krause’s own stance be? Perhaps that of a cultural conservative and political liberal? This is a rare breed. Although Krause and Syberberg feel no need to condemn Wolf, Heimo Schwilk does so with relish, devaluing her entire œuvre as the work
of a totalitarian collaborator. See Schwilk, Wendezeit—Zeitenwende, 177–182.
81. Rüdiger Safranski, Das Böse oder Das Drama der Freiheit (München and Wien:
Hanser, 1997). The biographies are Schopenhauer and the Wild Years of Philosophy
(1987; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990) and Ein Meister aus Deutschland. Heidegger und seine Zeit (München and Wien: Hanser, 1994). The latter has
now been translated as Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1998).
82. Safranski sees similar mechanisms at work in East and West Germany. He refrains from using the totalitarianism theory to analyze the former GDR, since he is
concerned more with ethical questions and psychological states.
83. Kant used this phrase in his Idea for a General History with Cosmopolitan Intention (1784), and it is also in the title of a fascinating book on liberalism. See Isaiah
Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity (New York: Vintage, 1992).
84. Bubik writes for the most provocative and unorthodox right-wing newspaper,
Junge Freiheit, that has been under observation by constitutional police. See
Burkhard Schröder, “Falsches Kaliber. NRW—Verfassungsschutz observiert ‘Junge
Freiheit,’” tageszeitung, May 29, 1996. Schröder makes a connection between the
newspaper and Armin Mohler, whom he dubs “the Nestor of the ‘new’ fascists.” See
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also Bubik’s “generational manifesto” Wir ’89er. Wer wir sind und was wir wollen
(Berlin and Frankfurt am Main: Ullstein, 1995).
85. See also his attempt to de¤ne the differences between right and left: Michael
Wolffsohn, “Rebellion der konservativen Querköpfe der Nation,” Hamburger
Abendblatt, June 16–17, 1994. In this article, Wolffsohn asserts that the “New Right”
is antitotalitarian and includes people like Armin Mohler and Botho Strauß, who are
not associated with the Old Right. It is unlikely that Strauß was pleased to be
grouped together with Mohler.
86. Wolffsohn, the only Jewish contributor to the anthology, does not believe in the
singularity of the Holocaust. He compares it to similar state-controlled genocides in the
Soviet Union, China, and Cambodia (273). (In 1998, the French parliament passed a
resolution of¤cially recognizing the 1915 massacre of the Armenians at the hand of the
Turks as “genocide.”) In doing so, he functions as a token Jew in more than one sense.
See his book Meine Juden—Eure Juden (München and Zürich: Piper, 1997).
87. Zitelmann is one of the conservatives who have tried to push the FDP to the
right (see the preface to this study). In his biography of Hitler, Zitelmann states: “An
image of Hitler freed from . . . legends and prejudices can possibly contribute to making it more understandable why not only millions of people, but also intelligent persons from the areas of politics, the military, and even the cultural sphere succumbed
to him.” See R. Z., Adolf Hitler. Eine politische Biographie (Göttingen and Zürich:
Muster-Schmidt, 1989), 9.
Zitelmann was also one of the editors of a volume that might be viewed as a “trial
run” for Die selbstbewußte Nation. See Rainer Zitelmann, Karlheinz Weißmann and
Michael Großheim, eds., Westbindung. Chancen und Risiken für Deutschland (Frankfurt am Main and Berlin: Ullstein/Propyläen, 1993). The cultural considerations
that are emphasized in Die selbstbewußte Nation are peripheral in Westbindung.
88. Recent biographies of Helmut Kohl, written before his defeat in the 1998 national elections, suggest that he is very close to the mind-set of most contemporary
Germans (at least those who vote), and a reviewer cites Margaret Thatcher’s pronouncement after a visit with Kohl in his home at Oggersheim: “Oh, this man is sooo
German!” See Richard Meng, “Der Kanzler und die Macht, die Macht und der Kanzler. Vier Journalisten widmen sich in vier Büchern der Geschichte und den Geschichten des Dauerregenten Helmut Kohl,” Frankfurter Rundschau, April 2, 1998.
89. “Rockefeller Republican” might be an equivalent term in the context of U.S.
politics.
90. Also in Die selbstbewußte Nation, Jochen Thies makes the case for the formation of new national elites in Germany. These would not be antinationalistic. Compare this to Christopher Lasch’s The Revolt of the Elites (New York: Norton, 1995).
Michiko Kakutani’s review of the book in the New York Times (January 13, 1995)
denigrates Lasch by placing him on a level with Dan Quayle. Many of the problems
that bother Lasch are the ones that bother the German New Right. This does not
mean, however, that Lasch is an archconservative. The ideological blinders worn by
critics like Kakutani will be discussed at the end this study.
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91. Given the recent controversies involving the National Endowment for the Arts,
it is clear that Lange’s comments do not apply to the American form of mass democracy.
92. Solzhenitsyn’s dim view of Western decadence and moral decline was only accepted by the far right.
93. Martin Doerry, “‘Lehrmeister des Hasses,’” Der Spiegel, October 17, 1994, no.
42, 239–243. The German word “Lehrmeister” includes the meaning of “mentor,”
making the title even more provocative than it is in English.
94. The German word is “Blindgänger,” the term for an unexploded shell. It is
ironic that a word taken from military parlance would be used against people accused
of an infatuation with militarism and war.
Doerry also offers a critique of the antifeminism in the anthology. The irony here
is that even though Der Spiegel is generally sympathetic toward feminism and
women’s rights, it regularly uses female nudity to boost sales among its—mainly
male—readers.
95. When I attended a lecture by one of the contributors to Die selbstbewußte Nation in the fall of 1997 in Berlin, an acquaintance from the local cultural scene opined
that the speaker “probably was sorry that he ever had allowed his essay to be published in that collection.”
96. Already in 1994, a “Berlin Appeal” was published as a complement to the appearance of Die selbstbewußte Nation. It ¤rst was printed in the Süddeutsche Zeitung
of September 28, 1994, and then reprinted in other newspapers. The text of the appeal is found on page 220 of Für eine Berliner Republik. In it, attention is called to a
new generation, the conservative “’89ers,” who strive to take over cultural hegemony
from the ’68ers. As has been mentioned above, a number of the ’89ers belong to the
same generation as the ’68ers.
97. Ulrich Schacht and Heimo Schwilk, Für eine Berliner Republik. Streitschriften,
Reden, Essays nach 1989 (München: Langen Müller, 1997).
98. For a Western discussion of this question, see Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe’s
Name: Germany and the Divided Continent (New York: Random House, 1993).
99. The German word is “Häu¶ein.” In English, this would be akin to “Robin
Hood’s merry men,” and Templin is thinking of a group of outsiders upholding the
ideals of freedom and justice.
100. Schwilk does however, praise Enzensberger as “one of the few writers critical
of Europe” (74).
Schacht criticizes Enzensberger for misinterpreting the “Prague Spring” as an attempt to democratize socialism instead of seeing it for what it—allegedly—really
was, namely an attempt to introduce Western European democracy (82).
101. This refers to famed novelist Günter Grass, minor West German writer Hermann Peter Piwitt, who was associated with the orthodox Marxist journal konkret,
former East German literature czar Klaus Höpcke, and GDR author Hermann Kant,
long a cultural functionary (and still unrepentant). Placing Grass in this company is
no less than scandalous.
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102. I do not agree with those who would like to see the works of Maron and others like her pulped, but I do believe that those works must be read in a different light
given the revelations about collaboration with the Stasi. For Maron’s (prerevelation)
critique of the East German mentality, see Monika Maron, “Das neue Elend der Intellektuellen,” tageszeitung, 6 February 1990 and “‘Peinlich, blamabel, lächerlich,’”
Der Spiegel, no. 35, 1992. Maron’s later explanation of her own activities—“Man hat
manches Bekloppte gemacht in dieser DDR”—was printed in Der Spiegel, no. 32,
1995. GDR dissident Wolf Biermann reacted to this article with his own: “Verlogene
Treue,” Der Spiegel, no. 43, 1995. For an assessment of the options open to GDR intellectuals, see Wolfgang Engler, “Jenseits des Machtprinzips,” Die Zeit, no. 15,
1993.
103. The successful (left-liberal) theater director Peter Stein, who has staged many
of Botho Strauß’s plays, recently made a statement guaranteed to raise the hackles of
the New Right: “I have always had problems with being German. Like all Germans.
I don’t like the Germans.” (My emphasis.) See Wolfgang Kralicek, “Ich mag die
Deutschen auch nicht,” Der Tagesspiegel, June 6, 1998.
104. In this passage, Schwilk mentions that “it is considered to be historically
proven” that the Poles were partially to be blamed for German aggression against
them in 1939 (154).
105. The discussion is documented in Deutsche Literatur 1995. Jahresrückblick,
288–359. The ¤rst review printed there is the one by Ulrich Schacht, who sees the
book as a novel against reuni¤cation. Tilman Krause and Hartmut Lange (cf. Die
selbstbewußte Nation) are also among the reviewers. For an example of the kind of
prose by Grass that irritates Schacht and Schwilk the most, see Günter Grass,
“Schreiben nach Auschwitz,” Die Zeit, no. 9, 1990.
106. He does manage to include a stab at Grass as one of the “poets of West German special consciousness” (150). In another essay in the same volume, Schacht
characterizes Grass as “this spiritus rector of the intellectual version of the classic German movement for self-hatred” (80). It is noteworthy that in this passage, Schacht
admits that Grass has been esthetically innovative as a novelist. This separation of
content and form was not typical of the “Literature Debate.”
107. A thought-provoking analysis and summary (one which is scholarly and subjective at the same time) is provided by Wolfgang Wippermann in his book Wessen
Schuld? Vom Historikerstreit zur Goldhagen-Kontroverse (Berlin: Elefanten Press,
1997). One of the ¤rst collections of Germans reactions to Goldhagen was edited by
Julius H. Schoeps: Ein Volk von Mördern? Die Dokumentation zur Goldhagen-Kontroverse um die Rolle der Deutschen im Holocaust (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe,
1996). The liberal weekly Die Zeit and Der Spiegel loomed large in the debate. See
the following articles from Die Zeit: Volker Ullrich, “Hitlers willige Mordgesellen,”
no. 16, 1996 (prepublication excerpts from the German edition of Goldhagen’s book
are found in the same issue); Christopher Browning, “Dämonisierung erklärt
nichts,” no. 17, 1996; Julius H. Schoeps, “Vom Rufmord zum Massenmord,” no. 18,

Notes_ne.fm Page 223 Friday, August 25, 2000 1:52 PM

Notes to Page 68 ///

223

1996; Gordon A. Craig, “Ein Volk von Antisemiten,” no. 20, 1996; Hans-Ulrich
Wehler, “Wie ein Stachel im Fleisch,” no. 22, 1996; Hans Mommsen, “Die dünne
Patina der Zivilisation,” no. 36, 1996; Robert Leicht, “Ein Urteil, kein Gutachten,”
and Marion Grä¤n Dönhoff, “Mit fragwürdiger Methode,” both in no. 37, 1996;
Volker Ullrich, “Goldhagen und die Deutschen,” no. 38, 1996. Der Spiegel printed
the lengthy article “Ein Volk von Dämonen?” as well as a portrait of Goldhagen and
his father by German/Israeli journalist Henryk M. Broder in no. 21, 1996. In no. 33,
1996, Spiegel publisher Rudolf Augstein published an article entitled “Todbringende
Humanisten” and an interview with Goldhagen (“Was dachten die Mörder?).
The Berlin daily Der Tagesspiegel published an interview with Goldhagen (“Können Sie wie ein Nazi fühlen?”) on September 6, 1996. Die Welt, the employer of
Schacht and Schwilk, published a review by Manfred Rowold entitled “Das ganze
deutsche Volk als Hitlers willige Scharfrichter?” on April 17, 1996. See also the following contributions from the Süddeutsche Zeitung, the leading liberal daily: Norbert
Frei, “Ein Volk von ‘Endlösern’? Daniel Goldhagen bringt eine alte These in neuem
Gewand,” April 13, 1996; Josef Joffe, “Hitlers willfährige Henker. Oder: Die
‘gewöhnlichen Deutschen’ und der Holocaust,” April 13, 1996; Jan Philipp
Reemtsma, “Die Mörder waren unter uns. Überlegungen zu Daniel Goldhagens
Buch ‘Hitlers willige Vollstrecker,’” August 24, 1996. Here is a sampling of American
reactions to Goldhagen: Jerry Adler, “Just Following Orders? A New Book Blames
‘Ordinary Germans,’” Newsweek, April 15, 1996; Gordon A. Craig, “How Hell
Worked,” New York Review of Books, April 18, 1996; Clive James, “Blaming the Germans,” The New Yorker, April 22, 1996; Thomas M. Disch, “A Nation and People
Accursed,” The Nation, May 6, 1996; Alan Cowell, “Holocaust Writer Debates Irate
Historians in Berlin,” New York Times, September 8, 1996; Christopher R. Browning, “Human Nature, Culture, and the Holocaust,” Chronicle of Higher Education,
October 18, 1996, and Russell Berman, “Goldhagen’s Germany,” Telos, no. 109 (Fall
1996), 131–140. A psychoanalytic perspective is found in Alice Miller, “Schrebers
mörderische Kinder. Wie Haß entsteht: Die schwarze Pädagogik der Deutschen oder
die Erziehung der Menschen zu willigen Helfern Hitlers,” Süddeutsche Zeitung,
March 14, 1998.
In 1997, Der Spiegel continued the debate with the following publications: “‘Ein
Anschein von Unsauberkeit.’ Interview mit Christopher Browning,” no. 31, 164–
165; “Goldhagen—ein Quellentrickser?” no. 33, 156–158; “‘Alles und nichts erklärt,’” [excerpts from an article by Norman Finkelstein criticizing Goldhagen], no.
34, 56–62; various letters to the editor about Finkelstein’s theses in no. 35, 12, and
“‘Holocaust als Andachtsbild.’ Interview mit NS-Expertin Ruth Bettina Birn über
Goldhagens Attacken auf Kritiker,” no. 46, 266–267.
On September 4, 1997, the Berlin Tagesspiegel published a long essay—“Angerührt und aufgerührt”— written by Goldhagen himself to his German readers.
108. It is of course extremely dif¤cult to gauge the reaction of the public as a
whole. When I attended a lecture by historian Wolfgang Wippermann in Berlin in
October 1997 (the title was “People or Structures? The ‘Goldhagen Effect’ and the
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Crisis of German Historiography”), I was amazed to hear that literally everyone in
the room agreed with Wippermann that Goldhagen’s thesis was correct. (Wippermann also spoke of some of the problems with Hitler’s Willing Executioners, but this
did not change his overall assessment.) Most of the members of the audience were
under ¤fty. In a discussion with young Germans published by the weekly Der Stern,
on the other hand, many of the young people felt that Goldhagen’s portrayal of the
Germans was too one-sided and even racist. See “Ich fühle mich durch dieses Buch
angegriffen. Fünf junge Deutsche über Goldhagen, Antisemitismus und die Zukunft,” Der Stern, no. 40, 1996.
A collection of contributions to the Goldhagen debate has now appeared in English. See Robert R. Shandley, ed., Unwilling Germans? The Goldhagen Debate (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1998).
109. Walters says that one should not overlook the rest of German history when
concentrating on the “twelve years of the National Socialist reign of terror” (15).
110. This phrase provides a taste of Schacht’s often impenetrable style, which is almost more of a hindrance than the supposed leftist media monopoly.
111. Actually, Schacht sees some good in the Goldhagen debate, namely that it
demonstrated the self-hatred and anti-German sentiment of the leftist intellectuals
(36).
112. CSU politician Peter Gauweiler, who, as a public ¤gure, has access to the media, does not shy away from drastic formulations. In the CSU newspaper Bayernkurier, Gauweiler called Goldhagen a “judge of the [German] people” and accused him
of “reverse racism.” Incredibly, he mentioned that the book had provided Goldhagen
with “over a million Deutschmarks in pro¤t.” In a country where the image of Shylock has not disappeared, such statements keep alive the Nazi portrayal of the Jews.
The Bayernkurier article is summarized in “Für Gauweiler ist Goldhagen ein ‘Volksrichter.’ Der CSU-Politiker beschimpft den Historiker auch als antideutschen ‘Rassisten,’” tageszeitung, October 10, 1996.
113. Compare this to Federal President Herzog’s 1996 statement at a meeting of
the Germans driven from their homes in the East: The territories now part of Poland
and Russia belong “to our historical and cultural legacy, but no longer to our state.”
Cited in “Herzog: Kein Anspruch auf frühere Ostgebiete,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, September 9, 1996.
114. The speech had originally been planned as part of the May 7, 1995, program
in the Munich Philharmonic Hall that was linked to the newspaper campaign
“Against Forgetting” (see above). That program was canceled, and Schacht then delivered the speech in more friendly territory, namely at the conservative think tank in
Weikersheim near Stuttgart.
115. For example, Schacht criticizes the legendary 1985 speech by Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker—a Christian Democrat—without naming the speaker
(49–50). The speech is contained in Richard von Weizsäcker, Von Deutschland aus
(Berlin: Siedler, 1985), 13–35. In his speech, Weizsäcker spoke of the 8th of May as
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“a day of liberation” for the Germans (15), one that freed them from the National Socialist system of terror. This implies that not all Germans were Nazis, something with
which Schacht agrees. The problem is that Weizsäcker commemorated not only the
victims of Nazism but also the German resistance, and he dared to include the Communist resistance. This was and is not acceptable to the former East German
Schacht.
116. See Heinz Lippmann, Honecker and the New Politics of Europe, trans. Helen
Sebba (New York: Macmillan, 1972), 31–35. The scientist and later dissident-to-be
Robert Havemann was held in the same prison.
117. Schacht calls Honecker one of the most “horrifying petit bourgeois ¤gures”
(113) ever to exercise power in German history. One wonders if he could produce a
list of other representatives of the German petite bourgeoisie who have been given
major political responsibility. By referring to the proletarian Honecker as a petit
bourgeois, Schacht unwittingly concurs with Lenin, whose skepticism about the possibility of revolution in Germany stemmed from his view that the German workers
were too tame, i.e., petit-bourgeoisi¤ed.
118. In another essay, Schacht refers the reader to journalist Henryk M. Broder’s
book The Eternal Anti-Semite (193). Schacht asserts that anyone who does not embrace Zionism “loves dead Jews, in order to be able to hate the living ones” (192).
119. This phrase is also found on p. 73.
120. One other example of the traces of Jünger in Schwilk’s essays: Helmut Kohl
is referred to as the “Head Forester” (“Oberförster” [175]), the title of the brutal
leader in Jünger’s On the Marble Cliffs.
121. In contrast to this, leading left-liberal critic Ulrich Greiner, a key ¤gure in the
“Literature Debate,” declared in 1992 that the left no longer exists. See Ulrich
Greiner, “Flucht in die Trauer,” Die Zeit, no. 39, 1992.
122. National pride, for example, does not mesmerize the upper two-thirds of
Germany society. It does, however, hold an attraction for the “losers” of the present
system. Whoever asks about the attraction of the New Right must simultaneously ask
how many more “losers” there might be in the future.
123. It might be recalled that “Goethe Communities” were a solution proposed by
historian Friedrich Meinecke to set the Germans back on the path to civilization after
1945. Meinecke’s thoughts on the subject are excerpted in: Hermann Glaser, Die Kulturgeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1990),
3:100–102. The excerpts are taken from Meinecke’s 1946 book Die deutsche Katastrophe.
See the English translation The German Catastrophe. Re¶ections and Recollections, trans.
Sidney B. Fay (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950), 119–121.
124. Contrast this with Peter Gauweiler’s skewed assessment: “Like the ’68ers, the
Greens are the party of generational con¶ict and of disagreement with everything
that was learned and lived before them.” See Gauweiler’s “‘Ich will kein Held sein!’
oder Machtgestöber,” Die wilden 40er. Porträt einer pubertären Generation, ed. Peter
Roos (Düsseldorf: Econ, 1992), 304.
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125. P. C. Mayer-Tasch, Aus dem Wörterbuch der Politischen Ökologie (München:
Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1985), 79. See also Ulrich Linse, Ökopaxe und Anarchie. Eine Geschichte der ökologischen Bewegungen in Deutschland (München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1986). Linse disputes the claim that the Greens are the
heirs of a German tradition of Romantic anticapitalism and prefascist irrationalism
(154). Neofascists who tried to gain a foothold in the Greens were unsuccessful. See
Richard Stöss, Politics against Democracy. Right-Wing Extremism in West Germany
(New York and Oxford: Berg, 1991) 162–163. For a now somewhat dated assessment of the Greens as an expression of New Age activism, see Fritjof Capra and Charlene Spretnak, Green Politics. The Global Promise (New York: Dutton, 1984). In a
review of this book, Kirkpatrick Sale stated: “The Green movement is an amalgam
of many groups from all parts of the political spectrum (even conservatives).” See
“Greener Pastures,” The Nation, June 23, 1984, 776. For a detailed analysis of Green
politics, see Joachim Raschke, Die Grünen. Wie sie wurden, was sie sind (Köln: Bund
Verlag, 1993).
126. This is of course not the only interpretation of the relationship between National Socialism and modernity. Jeffrey Herf speaks of a “reactionary modernism”
that “incorporated modern technology into the cultural system of modern German
nationalism, without diminishing the latter’s romantic and antirational aspects.” See
Jeffrey Herf, Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and
the Third Reich (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 2. One of the representatives of this movement as described by Herf is Ernst Jünger. In general, Herf ’s
analysis of Jünger’s works rings true, but it is dif¤cult to accept his admiration for the
latter’s “unmatched literary ¶air” (70).
127. In a recent 1968 commemorative edition of the leftist tageszeitung (April 11,
1998), the ’68ers’ lack of political success was discussed. On April 9, the paper had
published an article by Peter Gauweiler (“Kleiner großer Bruder”) in which the conservative CSU politician claimed that the ’68ers were no longer radical, or only verbally so. Instead of transforming the establishment, they have become part of it, said
Gauweiler. In the same article, Gauweiler called the members of the ’68 generation
who were conservative back then “contras.”
128. Herzinger’s ideas will be scrutinized in the Excursus below.
129. Even Tilman Krause, a critic associated with the New Right, admits that the
outlook is bleak: “No one has come forward. Many left, but no one came. Rightist
authors have been rare since 1945. The irrational Brehms and Grimms, the Beumelburgs and Kolbenheyers—they simply died off. The German intellectual landscape
has been redistributed [¶urbereinigt].” Tilman Krause, “Der Sehnsüchtige im
Fahndungsraster,” Deutsche Literatur 1994, 299. Krause’s article originally appeared
in Der Tagesspiegel on September 25, 1994.
130. Some that come to mind are Syberberg’s Hitler, Wolfgang Petersen’s Das Boot,
or Joseph Vilsmaier’s Stalingrad. They all lend themselves more to ambivalence than
one-dimensional interpretations, however.
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Chapter 3
1. Christa Wolf, Was bleibt (Berlin, Weimar: Aufbau, 1990).
2. For a detailed exposition of this hypothesis, see Jay Rosellini, “Kahlschlag im
Land der Dichter und (Polit-)Denker? Zum Hintergrund des Intellektuellenstreits in
Deutschland,” Monatshefte 86.4 (Winter 1994):480–499.
3. Karl Deiritz and Johannes Krauss, “Ein deutsches Familiendrama,” Der deutschdeutsche Literaturstreit, 8.
4. Frank Schirrmacher, “‘Dem Druck des härteren, strengeren Lebens standhalten.’ Auch eine Studie über den autoritären Charakter: Christa Wolfs Aufsätze,
Reden und ihre jüngste Erzählung ‘Was bleibt’.” Cited in Anz, “Es geht nicht um
Christa Wolf,” 89. Schirrmacher’s article was originally published in the Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung of June 2, 1990.
5. Robert Leicht, “Vom Bockshorn und vom Bocksgesang,” Die Zeit, no. 41,
1994. The subtitle of this editorial is “The ’89ers against the ’68ers—a new generational con¶ict or the old battle between myth and enlightenment?”
6. “Hausmitteilung: Betr.: Intellektuelle,” Der Spiegel, no. 26, 1993, 3. The Strauß
essay is found in no. 6 (202–207), Enzensberger’s is in no. 25 (170–175), and
Walser’s concluding piece is in no. 26 (40–47). “Anschwellender Bocksgesang” is a
“Polemik” listed under the rubric “Kultur,” “Ausblicke auf den Bürgerkrieg” is categorized as “Zeitkritik,” also under “Kultur,” whereas “Deutsche Sorgen” is in the section “Deutschland” under the subheading “Intellektuelle.” Page numbers of speci¤c
citations are provided in the text.
7. Analogous to this constellation, right-wing Republicans of the Gingrich stripe
in the U.S. House of Representatives portray themselves as revolutionaries, whereas
the liberal establishment is branded as an obstacle to change.
8. Hans Magnus Enzensberger, “Gemeinplätze, die Neueste Literatur betreffend,”
Kursbuch 15 (1968): 197.
9. Cf. Rolf Warneke, “Kurswechselparade eines Intellektuellen. Konsequent
inkonsequent: Hans Magnus Enzensberger,” text und kritik 113, Vom gegenwärtigen
Zustand der deutschen Literatur (January 1992): 97–105. See also Matthias Uecker,
“Katastrophe und Normalität. Hans Magnus Enzensberger seit den siebziger
Jahren,” Deutschsprachige Literatur der 70er und 80er Jahre, ed. Walter Delabar and
Erhard Schütz (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1997), 321–343.
10. Hermann Korte, “Hans Magnus Enzensberger” Kritisches Lexikon zur deutschsprachigen Gegenwartsliteratur (1978ff.), 39. Nachlieferung 1992, 20.
11. Holger-Heinrich Preuße, Der politische Literat Hans Magnus Enzensberger.
Politische und gesellschaftliche Aspekte seiner Literatur und Publizistik (Frankfurt am
Main, Bern, New York and Paris: Peter Lang, 1989), 191.
12. H. M. Enzensberger, Aussichten auf den Bürgerkrieg (Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp, 1993). For a wide-ranging discussion of Enzensberger’s comments on the
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state of the post-1989 world, see Gerhard Fischer, ed., Debating Enzensberger. Great
Migration and Civil War (Tübingen: Stauffenburg, 1996).
13. H. M. Enzensberger, “Hitlers Wiedergänger,” Der Spiegel, no. 6, 1991, 26–28.
André Glucksmann, one of the so-called “new philosophers” in France, praised the
essay on Saddam but castigated Enzensberger for his piece on the global civil war as
an excuse for passivity in the face of barbarity. “Ein neuer Vogel Strauß,” Der Spiegel,
no. 37, 1993, 247–249.
14. In actuality, Enzensberger meant to say that the Germans should refrain from
demonizing Saddam and his followers as some kind of foreign, premodern barbarians, since they themselves had engaged in the same behavior not long ago. This line
of reasoning can be traced to traditional leftist internationalism and anti-imperialism, although the conclusion does not seem to ¤t into such a mode of thinking.
15. Hans Magnus Enzensberger, Diderots Schatten (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1994). In the afterword to this collection, he writes of Diderot: “He was responsible for everything and got involved in everything. . . . Diderot plunged into the
adventure of helping not out of an ideological sense of duty or because of party discipline, but rather out of naive curiosity” (382–383).
16. “‘Ich will nicht der Lappen sein, mit dem man die Welt putzt.’ André Müller
spricht mit Hans Magnus Enzensberger,” Die Zeit, no. 4, 1995.
In his essay “Im Fremden das Eigene hassen?”, Enzensberger refers to the Aryan as
“an absurd construction” and speaks of Germany’s “especially fragile national identity.” Der Spiegel, no. 34, 1992, 176.
17. Martin Walser, “Treten Sie zurück, Erich Honecker!” Der Spiegel, no. 20,
1974, 136. In this letter, Walser is reacting to the Guillaume affair and Willy Brandt’s
resignation. He is upset that the rapprochement between the two German states has
suffered a setback. In a way, he is calling for a kind of socialist nationalism, so this is
clearly a foreshadowing of later developments in his thinking.
18. Martin Walser, Dorle und Wolf (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1987), 54. In
his review of this book, Martin Lüdke wrote: “Walser confronts a problem that we,
almost without exception, have repressed. . . . No one is still having sleepless nights
over the division of Germany.” “Nichts Halbes, nichts Ganzes. Martin Walsers
deutsch-deutsche Novelle,” Die Zeit, no. 13, 1987. In Peter Schneider’s The Wall
Jumper (Der Mauerspringer, 1982), the division of Berlin and Germany is really little
more than a curiosity.
19. Martin Walser, “Über Deutschland reden. Ein Bericht,” Über Deutschland reden (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1988), 88–89. It is interesting that Walser
praises Enzensberger for pondering the German question in his “Katechismus zur
deutschen Frage,” which appeared in Kursbuch 4.
Enzenberger’s fellow intellectuals are criticized sharply: “Leftist intellectuals and
rightist ones are at the moment in agreement about nothing more than in the belief
that the division [of Germany] is acceptable” (92). The inclusion of intellectuals on
the right is worthy of note in the face of the New Right program of the 1990s.
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20. “Viel Gefühl, wenig Bewußtsein. Der Schriftsteller Günter Graß über eine
mögliche Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands,” Der Spiegel, no. 47, 1989, 80: “I am no
stranger to these feelings either, but that does not seduce me into breaking out in
mawkishness.” In the same interview, Grass describes several surprising ¶ip-¶ops in
Walser’s world view: “When I met him, he was an enlightened conservative from
Lake Constance with a certain careful leaning toward the SPD that became an
af¤nity with the DKP [the orthodox West German Communist Party] via the student movement. He moved away from that later, and now he is chatting with Waigel
[CSU member and cabinet minister]—there are one too many unexplained turns
there that I don’t like.” (80) It is of course Grass himself who has remained steadfast
in his support of the “Kulturnation” Germany as opposed to the geographically and
politically uni¤ed version. Walser also used the term “feeling for history” in his article
“Zum Stand der deutschen Dinge,” which was published in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on December 12, 1989.
21. Walser defended himself in the tageszeitung of January 16, 1989. Excerpts from
his text were reprinted in Die Zeit, no. 4, 1989. He claimed there that he had maintained his independence: “I don’t see any chance of being co-opted by someone as an
author or intellectual.” In the meantime, even ex-Communist poet and singer Wolf
Biermann has participated in political discussions at the CSU retreat, and he seemed
to feel more comfortable there than when mixing with the leftists who heap “totalitarian scolding” upon him like “pseudo-leftist Tartuffes.” See Wolf Biermann, “Freundschaft mit dem Klassenfeind,” Der Spiegel, no. 3, 1998, 32. The Berlin Tagesspiegel
editorialized: “One would like to be there when the former anti-communist devourer
Biermann and the former communist devourer Stoiber [the Bavarian premier] and his
devotees encounter each other in January in Kreuth.” See “Kreuther Kaminwunder,”
Der Tagesspiegel, December 12, 1997.
22. Some years ago, poet Erich Fried—hardly a conservative nationalist!—was
vili¤ed by Henryk M. Broder for daring to speak with skinheads.
23. Cf. Walser’s letter “Lieber Herr Kinkel,” tageszeitung, July 16, 1994. In this endeavor, Walser found himself in the company of Salman Rushdie and Elfriede Jelinek,
among others. He inveighed against religious terror and “orders to kill given by fanatical
monotheists,” adding that “Europe has put its religious calamities behind her.” Walser’s
support for Nasreen is exactly the kind of activity that A. Glucksmann had in mind
when he criticized Enzensberger for his inactivity and cynicism (see note 13).
24. It should be emphasized that Enzensberger has a very different attitude toward
Strauß than Walser does. The following quote from the 1995 interview (see note 16)
illustrates this: “God, he [i.e., Strauß] is a very talented man, but his preoccupations
are not mine. I ¤nd it indecent to portray oneself as a tragic ¤gure. It is dif¤cult to
speak correctly of the tragic, since that can lead all too easily to self-stylization, selfheroization, and kitsch. I don’t like any of these poses. . . . [A]ll this stuff from the ’20s
that he is constantly referring to, Ludwig Klages, Rudolf Borchardt, all of these leftover, faded motifs . . . I don’t know why he keeps hanging on to these things. A gifted
person has to recognize that those are no longer relevant themes.”
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25. Martin Walser, “Vormittag eines Schriftstellers. Über Deutschland reden—
und die Folgen: Warum einer keine Lust mehr hat, am Streit der Meinungen teilzunehmen,” Die Zeit, no. 51, 1990. Reprinted in Martin Walser, Vormittag eines
Schriftstellers (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1994), 9–26. Walser is quoting from
Botho Strauß, Diese Erinnerung an einen, der nur einen Tag zu Gast war (München
and Wien: Hanser, 1985), 48. Here is the original German: “Kein Deutschland gekannt zeit meines Lebens. / Zwei fremde Staaten nur, die mir verboten, / je im Namen des Volkes der Deutsche zu sein. / Soviel Geschichte, um so zu enden?”
26. I have discovered numerous parallels in the following editions: Rumor
(München: Hanser, 1980); Paare, Passanten (München and Wien: Hanser, 5th edition, 1982); Der junge Mann (München: Hanser, 1984); Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit (München: Hanser, 1989); Beginnlosigkeit. Re¶exionen über Fleck und Linie
(München: Hanser, 1992);Wohnen Dämmern Lügen (München and Wien: Hanser,
1994); Schlußchor in Theaterstücke II (München and Wien: Hanser, 1991), and Das
Gleichgewicht (München and Wien: Hanser, 1993). These works demonstrate that
the development of Strauß’s ideas has been a gradual one, not a sudden eruption.
27. One might also include Alice Schwarzer’s afterword to the legendary volume
Frauen gegen den ¶ 218 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1971), although Schwarzer
is a journalist rather than an imaginative writer.
28. Botho Strauß, Versuch, ästhetische und politische Ereignisse zusammenzudenken.
Texte über Theater 1967–1986, 2nd ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Verlag der Autoren,
1996).
29. In another essay, he uses the word “totalitarian” to describe both the left and
right avantgarde of art. Versuch 37.
30. “Internal Memo (“Hausmitteilung”) Concerning Intellectuals,” Der Spiegel,
no. 26, 1993, 3. The “entire critical intelligentsia,” the memo goes on to say, “is on
the lookout for new values and orientations.” If that were true, then the texts by Enzensberger, Strauß, and Walser would hardly have been criticized so sharply. (Some
observers of course consider the opponents of the three to be “uncritical,” i.e., dogmatic intellectuals.)
31. Der Pfahl. Jahrbuch aus dem Niemandsland zwischen Kunst und Wissenschaft 7
(1993): 9–25.
32. In Schiller’s poem “Dividing Up the Earth” (“Die Teilung der Erde,” 1795–
96), the artist was still depicted as a dreamer who had no possessions on earth and was
thus allowed to live with Zeus in the heavens. Such modesty has been ebbing away
for the past two centuries.
33. Those with a historical memory or at least consciousness would also think of
Nazis or Communists. Their heirs are less given to “orderly” marching.
34. In “Hitler Reincarnated,” Enzensberger theorized early in 1991 that the Iraqis
would willingly die for Saddam Hussein. The reality turned out to be quite different.
See “Hitlers Wiedergänger,” Der Spiegel, no. 6, 1991, 27.
In the U.S., it is interesting to observe that not a restriction, but rather a limitless
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expansion of material needs is undergirded by religious beliefs (“God’s own country”). There is no other country in the world where a widespread belief in God (demonstrated by regular attendance at church services) coexists so peacefully with the
consumer society. A few conservative churches or sects have recognized the contradiction, but their criticism of it remains peripheral.
35. This has a problematic ring to it in German, since the verb “sich wehren,” to
defend oneself, contains the root of both “Wehrmacht” and “Wehrertüchtigung”
(readying soldiers for battle). The present German army is the “Bundeswehr,” perhaps named in such a way as to remove the term “Wehr” from initial position.
36. Historian Robert Darnton offers a refreshing and stimulating assessment of
the “little” Enlightenment: The Enlightenment “has been blown up to such a size
that it would not be recognized by the men who ¤rst created it.” See “George Washington’s False Teeth,” New York Review of Books, March 27, 1997, 34. Defending the
Enlightenment in this manner is more fruitful than attacking anyone who criticizes
the West. It is possible to oppose the perversion and cooptation of the Enlightenment
at the hands of the ruling classes without distorting the origins of the movement.
This theme will be taken up in the Excursus.
37. For stylistic reasons, I have not translated this passage literally. Instead of
“mocking, ridicule, and derision,” Strauß uses the word “Verhöhnung” three times in
one phrase. His version sounds more fanatical than mine.
38. Thirty years after 1968, the rise in youth crime has made antiauthoritarian
pedagogy once again a target of criticism. See Rudolf Wassermann, “Wenn die moralischen Hemmschwellen fehlen. Das Versagen der Erziehung als entscheidender
Grund für die wachsende Kinderkriminalität,” Die Welt, April 23, 1998. Wassermann ¤nds an “ethical vacuum” in society, with “little egotists” ignorant of the difference between “good and evil, right and wrong, yours and mine.” According to
Wassermann, much of the crime is committed by the children of immigrants, and
those who speak openly about this are accused of antiforeigner sentiments. Der Spiegel has also weighed in with a lengthy report advertised in comic-book style on the
cover of the magazine. See “Der Krieg der Kinder,” Der Spiegel, no. 15, 1998, 126–
137. A second article, discussing the psychological problems of today’s youth (“Das
Drama beginnt früh,” 138–141), appeared in the same issue. The Spiegel journalists
seem absolutely shocked that the kind of brutal acts that occurred in Jonesboro, Arkansas are also possible in Germany.
39. It seems inevitable that Joschka Fischer of the Greens will be immortalized in
a novel or polemic entitled something like From Sneakers to Double-Breasted Suits:
The Transformation of a ’68 Icon.
40. I have translated “das Unsere” as “existing conditions.” The German term, not
really a political one, means “that which is ours,” i.e., our civilization. The possessive
is misleading, for it implies that there is consensus about what the civilization should
be. There is no place for multiculturalism in Strauß’s choice of words.
41. It is inexplicable that a sensitive person like Strauß could use a word like this
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one. Anyone who has not forgotten the history of this century must be horri¤ed by
the author’s callousness.
42. In this passage, Strauß speaks of scapegoats as objects of reverence rather than
hate. When Green politician Antje Vollmer attempted to mediate in the debate about
“Impending Tragedy,” she discovered new, modern scapegoats: “Anyone who is clever
can come out in Germany these days as anything—but not as a writer, ¤lmmaker, and
intellectual. The creative people are the noble animals, the scapegoats.” “Woher kommt
diese Wut?” Der Spiegel, no. 46, 1993, 255. German politicians, who are increasingly
subjected to an American-style glare of publicity, might well dispute that statement. Resentments against the elite are, however, characteristic of contemporary Germany (although the economic and ¤nancial elite seems to be often disregarded).
43. This statement should not be interpreted to mean that it would be advisable
to return to the old ubiquitous epithets “fascist” or “protofascist,” but Strauß’s characterization of antifascism as “ordered from above” or even “libertarian to the point
of becoming psychopathological” (26) is the kind of frivolous rhetoric that could
lead to Germany’s stigmatization by the international community. That would be in
no one’s interest.
44. The following sentence recalls Nietzsche’s disdain for the “semieducated:”
“The illiterate with good writing skills is the typical paradox in today’s newspapers”
(29). Nietzsche, however, would not have expected anything else from journalists.
45. This particular sentence was—understandably—omitted from the Spiegel version of the essay.
46. At least one must hope that they were not his goal. If the opposite were true,
one would have to write off Strauß completely as a political thinker (or a writer with
an interest in politics). On the day after I wrote this footnote, the following sentence
appeared in a German newspaper: “It is said of the Germans that in politics, they are
receptive to everything that is nebulous, incomprehensible, and bombastic” (“verschwiemelt”). Michael Winter, “Triebkraft Angst. Über deutsche Nationaldenkmäler,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, June 25, 1997.
47. Assuming that Strauß believed his own depiction of the German media as a leftist bastion, he must have known that “Impending Tragedy” would cause an outcry.
48. Others might turn to alternate pairs like Bettine von Arnim and Rachel Varnhagen, Annette von Droste-Hülshoff and Fanny Lewald, Marieluise Fleißer and Else
Lasker-Schüler, or Ingeborg Bachmann and Christa Wolf.
49. Klaus R. Scherpe und Hans-Ulrich Treichel, “Vom Überdruß leben: Sensibilität
und Intellektualität als Ereignis bei Handke, Born und Strauß,” Monatshefte 73.2
(Summer 1981):189.
50. Lothar Pikulik, “Mythos und ‘New Age’ bei Peter Handke und Botho Strauß,”
Wirkendes Wort, no. 2 (1988), 236.
51. Pia Janke, Der schöne Schein. Peter Handke und Botho Strauß (Wien: Verlag
Holzhausen, 1993), xi. Janke discovers several differences between the two ¤gures,
but in the end, she emphasizes—in her conclusion, for example—the common ele-
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ments: “If in the works of Handke a new age is introduced, then in the works of
Strauß the old one that once again is to reign is preserved. In the case of both authors,
however, it is the sphere of literature that makes possible this (varied) invention of
meaning” (214).
52. Susanne Marschall, Mythen der Metamorphose—Metamorphose des Mythos bei
Peter Handke und Botho Strauß (Mainz: Gardez! Verlag, 1993), 11.
53. With regard to Handke, there are two exceptions to this rule. As a thirty-yearold, he published four so-called “political exercises” (“politische Versuche”) from the
years 1967 to 1969. Topics included socialism and the Springer publishing empire.
See Ich bin ein Bewohner des Elfenbeinturms (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1972).
It is noteworthy, however, that Handke attempted to depoliticize these texts in the
preface that he wrote for this volume: “It would be nice if one could read most of
these texts as stories.” He added that it would not be possible to extract a coherent
world view from the collection. “Vorbemerkung,” 7–8.
In 1986, Handke published a polemic against Kurt Waldheim at the end of the
latter’s (successful) campaign to become president of Austria. This was not a real attempt to in¶uence the outcome of the election, since Handke assumed that the “hideous dwarf” would be victorious. It is interesting that Handke emphasized at the time
that he wanted to speak for the “real people of Austria.” His text was ¤rst published
in the Austrian journal pro¤l. An English translation (from which the two citations
were taken—cf. p. 177) can be found in Bernard Cohen and Luc Rosenzweig, Waldheim, trans. Josephine Bacon (New York: Adama Books, 1987). This volume is an
English translation from the French original: Le Mystère Waldheim (Paris: Editions
Gallimard, 1986). I am grateful to Matthias Konzett for making me aware of this episode in Handke’s career.
54. Bernhard Sorg, “Erinnerung an die Dauer. Zur Poetisierung der Welt bei
Botho Strauß und Peter Handke,” Peter Handke, Text und Kritik, Heft 24 (5th rev.
ed. 1989), 122.
55. In addition, one cannot assume that any insights that the imaginative writer
might have will be formulated in such a way that the average reader, i.e., citizen, will
be able to gain access to them.
56. Süddeutsche Zeitung, January 5–6 and 13–14, 1996. The title of the essay later
became the subtitle.
The essays will be cited in the text using the following editions: Peter Handke, Eine
winterliche Reise zu den Flüssen Donau, Save, Morawa und Drina oder Gerechtigkeit für
Serbien, 2nd ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1996) and Sommerlicher Nachtrag
zu einer winterlichen Reise (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1996). The ¤rst volume
will be abbreviated as “WR,” the second as “SN.”
57. Reinhard Mohr, “Eine böse Harmonie,” Der Spiegel, no. 12, 1996, 216.
58. Karl-Ludwig Baader, “Aufbauscher und Abwiegler,” Hannoversche Allgemeine,
December 29, 1993. Cited in Deutsche Literatur 1993. Jahresrückblick, ed. Franz Josef Görtz et al. (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1994), 308.
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59. “‘Ich bin nicht hingegangen, um mitzuhassen.’ Peter Handke antwortet
seinen Kritikern. Ein ZEIT-Gespräch mit Willi Winkler,” Die Zeit, no. 6, 1996. In
the heading printed above the interview, the Zeit editors placed emphasis on the
signi¤cance of the controversy: “Since ‘Impending Tragedy’ by Botho Strauß, no text
has stirred up the public like Peter Handke’s philippic (‘Kampfschrift’) ‘Justice for
Serbia.’ Is this a political scandal or just a literature debate?”
60. Compare for example Handke’s Der kurze Brief zum langen Abschied (1972)
with his Abschied des Träumers vom Neunten Land [i.e., Slovenia] (1991).
61. The island Krk, formerly Croatian/Yugoslavian, is now Croatian. While on
the island, Handke did not have the impression that the culture of then multiethnic
Yugoslavia was a product of coercion. See his comments in the interview with Die
Zeit (see note 59).
62. “‘Nackter, blinder, blöder Wahnsinn’” (W. Reiter and C. Seiler interview Peter
Handke), pro¤l, no. 12 (1996), 81.
Handke has traveled through Slovenia on many occasions. Before greater Yugoslavia broke apart, he regarded the region as part of a larger country. It was the Slovenian
contribution to the multicultural potpourri that fascinated him.
63. The phrase “need not continue to read” is also used on page 36. One Croatian
reader who did not put the book down and went on to call for justice for all of the
ethnic groups—including the Serbs, but not granting them special status—was journalist Branimir Soucek. See Branimir Soucek, Eine Frühlingsreise zum Gedanken¶uß
eines verirrten Literaten oder Gerechtigkeit für Peter Handke (Thaur, Wien, and
München: Druck- und Verlagshaus Thaur, 1996), 31.
64. Already on the ¤rst page of WR, one ¤nds the word “I” four times, “my” twice,
and “me” once. In the Spiegel version of “Impending Tragedy,” the word “I” appears
only six times.
65. “Handke has always had two faces: the brooder and observer buried in the world
of books and landscapes and the rebel and madman (‘Amokläufer’) . . . Handke was always good for a surprise. Sometimes he was a bit ahead of everyone else, but sometimes
he was simply way off the mark.” Volker Hage, “Dichters Winterreise. Peter Handkes
Serbien-Reportage und die Intellektuellen,” Der Spiegel, no. 6, 1996, 193.
66. Handke traveled with two companions (and, for a time, with his new wife—
although that was not emphasized in the text).
67. A third volume about a journey to the Albanian region Kosovo is in the works.
This would be an opportunity to work through some of the narrative dif¤culties described above. If the second volume is any indication, though, skepticism is in order.
68. Gerhard Stadelmaier, “Zittern und sagen. Szene Deutschland: Woran ist
Botho Strauß schuld? (I),” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, April 11, 1994; Gustav
Seibt, “Echo des Bocksgesangs. Was die Rechten lasen oder Woran ist Botho Strauß
schuld? (II),” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, April 16, 1994.
69. Even the editors of Der Spiegel refer to “Impending Tragedy” as a “seismography” of the “growing tragedy . . . of a present shocked by xenophobia and disorien-
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tation.” See “Ein Unbekannter,” Der Spiegel, no. 6, 1993, 203.
70. Bubis’s Tagesspiegel interview was summarized in the article “Die gewaltige
Schuld” in Der Spiegel, no. 16, 1994, 168–170.
71. Botho Strauß, “Der eigentliche Skandal,” Der Spiegel, no. 16, 1994, 168.
72. As was discussed above, Enzensberger and Strauß are both critical of the status
quo, but they have little else in common.
73. “‘Wegbereiter wie Nolte.’ Ignatz Bubis erläutert seine Intellektuellen-Schelte,”
Der Spiegel, no. 16, 1994, 170.
74. It is surely not coincidental that Strauß was moved to self-re¶ection after viewing a production of Goethe’s play Torquato Tasso in 1969. That play thematizes the
gap between real life in society and the esthetic sphere. Strauß comments on the
plight of the title ¤gure as follows: “Maintaining the consciousness of genius while
producing in reality decorations for the status of the rulers must end in debilitating
confusion.” Botho Strauß, Versuch, 166.
75. Willi Winkler, “Ist Botho Strauß ein Faschist?” tageszeitung, February 13, 1993.
76. Peter Glotz, “Freunde, es wird ernst,” Deutsche Literatur 1993, 273. Originally
published in Wochenpost of February 25, 1993.
77. Andreas Kilb, “Anschwellende Geistes¤nsternis,” Die Zeit, no. 14, 1993. Kilb’s
title is a play on words with an apocalyptic tone like the one for which he criticizes
Strauß.
78. Hilmar Hoffmann, “Sprachverwirrungen eines Unpolitischen,” Deutsche Literatur 1993, 279. (Note the allusion to Th. Mann’s Re¶ections in the title.) Originally
published in Die Welt, March 29, 1993. For (much) more of the same, see Michael
Maar, “Das Angerichtete: Botho Strauß oder die Unfähigkeit zum Stil,” Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung, March 9, 1993. Strauß was later defended by Ulrich Greiner:
“No one can write so badly that he deserves all these insults.” See “Die Neunundachtziger,” Deutsche Literatur 1994, 284.
79. Klaus Kreimeier, “Wiedergänger und Nachbereiter,” Deutsche Literatur 1994,
266–268. Originally in Freitag, May 13, 1994. Looking back to a generation before
Benn, Gustav Seibt spoke of Strauß as something like “a caricature of Stefan George”:
“Leere Truhen,” Deutsche Literatur 1994, 277. Originally published in Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung, August 20, 1994.
80. Cited in the preface to the second edition of Die selbstbewußte Nation (also
contained in the third edition). Strauß’s letter was also published in the Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung on October 27, 1994.
81. Roland Müller, “Dichter im braunen Netz,” Deutsche Literatur 1994, 319.
Originally published in the Stuttgarter Zeitung, December 15, 1994.
82. Peter von Becker, “Abschied von Botho Strauß . . . ,” Deutsche Literatur 1994,
324. Originally published in Theater heute, no. 12, 1994.
83. Michael Wachsmann, “Was darf ein Dichter denken dürfen?” Deutsche Literatur 1994, 300. Originally published in Die Woche, January 13, 1995.
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84. Dietz Bering, who hopes to use “Impending Tragedy” to motivate the left to
think about the destruction of the humanities and the general crisis of education in
Germany, rejects the content of Die selbstbewußte Nation completely. He thus counsels his readers to forget about Strauß as a person (those who reprinted his essay were
“usurpers,” he claims) and to concentrate on his ideals. This stance is the opposite of
the one that led to the “Literature Debate”: “Die linke Lehre des Bocks,” Der Spiegel,
no. 29, 1995, 149. Here Strauß appears to be a naif who was hoodwinked.
85. Tilmann Krause, “Der Sehnsüchtige im Fahndungsraster,” Deutsche Literatur
1994, 301. Originally published in Der Tagesspiegel, September 25, 1994.
86. Bodo Kirchhoff, “Die Mandarine werden nervös,” Deutsche Literatur 1993,
277. Originally published in Die Zeit, February 26, 1993.
87. Eckhard Nordhofen, “Vor der Bundeslade des Bösen,” Deutsche Literatur
1993, 291. Originally published in Die Zeit, April 9, 1993.
88. Sigrid Berka, ed., Das Werk von Botho Strauß und die ‘Bocksgesang’-Debatte, Weimarer Beiträge 40.2 (1994). Berka provides a bibliography of the discussion of “Impending Tragedy” at the end of her introduction (175–177). She sees the essay as an
integral part of Strauß’s production, albeit with a different accent: “What is new in
the ‘Bocksgesang’-Essay is the articulation of that which was always present in
Strauß’s works in hermetic, allegorical, or parabolic form. The only partial translation of the coded message into the journalistic, i.e., polemical context and thus into
the political context was at its conception thus doomed to failure” (167). This is in
my view a problematic de¤nition of the role of journalism in a democratic society.
Page references from the special issue of Weimarer Beiträge are provided in the text.
89. In the May 7, 1993, edition of Le Monde, Jünger is quoted as saying: “il faudra
que les élites deviennent puissantes, petites et puissantes” (203). (The elites will have
to become powerful, small and powerful.)
90. See Volker Hage, “Dichter nach der Schlacht,” Der Spiegel, no. 30, 1993, 140–
146. Page references are taken from the Spiegel version.
91. Tilman Krause, “Ein guter Hasser, der lieben will,” Der Tagesspiegel, July 20, 1997.
92. Strauß believes, according to Krause, that it was only in the early 1960s that
German intellectuals played “a decisive role in changing consciousness.”
93. One example: when the New York Times took up the Handke story, it was described as “a full-scale literary and political uproar.” This is accurate, but the reporter
went on to assert—referring indirectly to the “Historians’ Debate”—that “[n]othing
comparable has been seen here since a decade ago.” In other words, Botho Strauß and
his provocative essay were simply not noticed. See Stephen Kinzer, “German Writer
Sets Off Storm over Balkan War,” New York Times, March 18, 1996. Handke’s works
are de¤nitely part of German literature, but he is an Austrian.
94. “‘Gelassen wär’ ich gern.’” Der Spiegel, no. 49, 1994, 170–176. Page references
in the text. The interview was conducted by Volker Hage and Mathias Schreiber.
95. “‘Ich bin nicht hingegangen, um mitzuhassen. Peter Handke antwortet seinen
Kritikern.” Handke later says that anyone who thinks that his description of Serbia
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is “bucolic” or “idyllic” is simply an “oaf” (“Trottel”). In this regard, the af¤nity with
Strauß is quite apparent.
In a preface written especially for American readers, Handke emphasized that his
new work was no different from anything else that he had written: “I wrote about my
journey through the country of Serbia [!] exactly as I have always written my books,
my literature: a slow, inquiring narration; every paragraph dealing with and narrating
a problem, of representation, of form, of grammar—of aesthetic veracity; that has always been the case with what I have written, from the beginning to the ¤nal period.”
Peter Handke, A Journey to the Rivers: Justice for Serbia (New York: Viking, 1997), vii–
viii. The change in the title may re¶ect the publisher’s belief that Americans are generally not very interested in geography.
96. Noch einmal vom Neunten Land. Peter Handke im Gespräch mit Joze Horvat
(Klagenfurt, Salzburg: Wieser Verlag, 1993), 96, 98. Page references in the text.
97. “‘Nackter, blinder, blöder Wahnsinn’” (W. Reiter and C. Seiler interview Peter
Handke), pro¤l, no. 12 (1996), 81–83. Page references in the text. The same issue
also contains an article by Wolfgang Reiter about the “Handke affair”: “‘Der Journalismus hat versagt,’” 76–79.
98. Peter Schneider, “Ritt über den Balkan,” Der Spiegel, no. 3, 1996, 163.
Schneider also reminds his readers that Handke—“courageously and at the time almost alone” (164)—spoke out against German recognition of an independent
Croatia at the beginning of the Balkan con¶ict. In the letters to the editor published
in no. 5, 1996, Handke is both supported and criticized. One of Handke’s supporters
was the well-known Austrian writer Elfriede Jelinek. Schneider was one of the European writers sent to Sarajevo in 1994 to describe conditions there for European newspaper readers. In his report, Schneider railed against European “hypocrisy” in general
and German denial in particular. See Peter Schneider, “Der Sündenfall Europas,” Der
Spiegel, no. 7, 1994, 140–146.
In 1992, the Viennese daily Der Standard asked Handke to write a reportage about
Bosnia, but the author declined. See Michael Cerha, “Anregung einer gemeinsamen
Erinnerung,” Der Standard, March 20, 1996. Handke did, however, write an article
for the Paris daily Libération (“My Slovenia in Yugoslavia,” August 22, 1991) in
which he denied that Serbia was oppressing the other ethnic groups in Yugoslavia.
This article is mentioned in Mariam Niroumand, “Ils ne regrettent rien. Frankreichs
Intellektuelle über ihr Engagement für Bosnien,” tageszeitung, September 18, 1996.
99. It is perhaps not coincidental that Handke uses this word as a means of
depersonalization, just as Strauß does in “Impending Tragedy” (see above). This is
clearly not what one would expect from a sensitive artist and self-appointed peace
ambassador. See Winter Journey, 47.
100. Andreas Kilb, “Das Neunte Land,” Die Zeit, no. 4, 1996.
101. Michael Thumann, “Das andere Serbien,” Die Zeit, no. 4, 1996.
102. Willi Winkler, “Am Stammtisch zum ewigen Krieg,” Deutsche Literatur
1996, 289–290. Originally published in the tageszeitung, January 19, 1996.
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103. Michael Scharang, “Erfahrung schrecklicher Fremdheit,” Der Standard, January 24, 1996. This text was later reprinted in the German journal konkret, no. 3
(1996), 50–51.
104. Peter Vujica, “Ein Elfenbeinturm im Kreuzfeuer,” Der Standard, February 3–
4, 1996.
105. “‘Lassen wir Peter Handke ein bißchen träumen.’ Gespräch mit dem serbischen Schriftsteller Aleksandar Tisma,” Die Welt, September 27, 1996.
106. Luc Rosenzweig, “Handke avocat pro-serbe,” Le Monde, January 19, 1996.
Quoted from excerpts published in the Süddeutsche Zeitung, January 27, 1996.
107. The discussion took place on March 19, 1996. The comments by Turrini
and Handke were excerpted in “Die vierte Lesung und immer dasselbe,” Der Standard, March 20, 1996. Already in 1995, Turrini had expressed sympathy with the
viewpoints of Strauß and Handke, but not without reservations with regard to the
former: “[T]he political right that he and others are getting close to has in the end just
speculated about violence. The intellectual curiosity of the German rightists was always minimal, but the desire to murder great. It [the right] has never put up a program of thinking, but rather a program of acting—of violence. Sooner or later, any
writer who sympathizes with the rightists will be hit on the head by rightists who are
not at all sympathetic to him.” See “‘Wir sind explosive Wesen’” (Interview with Peter Turrini), Der Spiegel, no. 18, 1995, 196.
108. Reported by Rainer Stephan, “Zwischenzeit. Handke, umnachtet,” Der
Standard, March 26, 1996.
109. Reported by Peter Paul Wiplinger, “‘Ein Affentheater, das die Würde des
Hauses verletzt,’” Der Standard, May 29, 1996. For more on the anal tradition, see
Alan Dundes, Life Is Like a Chicken Coop Ladder: A Portrait of German Culture
through Folklore (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984). The title of the German edition is a bit different: Sie mich auch! Das Hinter-Gründige in der deutschen
Psyche (München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1985).
110. Reported by Bernhard Küppers, “Die Angst des Publikums vor der Beschimpfung,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, June 5, 1996. Küppers’s title recalls the title of the
early Handke play “Publikumsbeschimpfung” (“Insulting the Audience”).
111. Gustav Seibt, “Wahn von Krieg und Blut und Boden,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, January 16, 1996. Quoted from excerpts reprinted in the Süddeutsche
Zeitung, January 27, 1996.
112. Marcus Pucnik, “Die Beleidigung der Opfer,” Der Standard, January 29,
1996. A lawyer friend of Pucnik’s told him that there were only two explanations for
Handke’s “Schreibtischtätertum,” either that he was crazy (“ein Spinner”) or trying
to increase his market value by starting a nonsensical discussion.
113. Wolfgang Müller-Funk, “Perspektivische Blindheit,” Der Standard, February
10–11, 1996. Müller-Funk sees in Handke a mixture of naiveté and in¶exibility.
114. Reinhard Mohr, “Eine böse Harmonie,” Der Spiegel, no. 12, 1996, 217.
Mohr actually calls Handke not a prophet, but a “charlatan.”
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115. Rainer Stephan (see note 108) called Handke a ¤tting “guru” for the “irrationalist gang.”
116. “‘Es gibt kein literarisches Leben’” (Interview with Gustav Seibt), tageszeitung, October 12, 1996.
117. Seibt makes a point of saying that he is not critical of the role that his predecessor Frank Schirrmacher played in the “Literature Debate.”
118. Tilman Zülch, ed., Die Angst des Dichters vor der Wirklichkeit (Göttingen:
Steidl, 1996). Page references in the body of the text.
After this study was completed, a new collection of material on the Handke/Serbia
controversy appeared in Germany: Thomas Deichmann, ed., Noch einmal für Jugoslawien: Peter Handke (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1999).
119. See Peter Schneider, Lenz ([West-]Berlin: Rotbuch, 1973), 79.
120. Grass has always treated historical and political themes in his works, and his
political activity was tied for years to the left wing of the Social Democratic Party. Unlike Handke, he has never been a “politicized poet.” He is a writer engaged with the
society in which he lives. One may criticize his engagement, but not because it is one
undertaken by a writer.
121. Caspary’s own sense of history is a questionable one, since Handke describes
not only homemade bread and home-brewed drinks, but also the necessity of ¤lling
gasoline tanks from plastic canisters—hardly a “medieval” activity.
122. Even Volker Hage, who defended Christa Wolf during the “Literature Debate” and, as we have seen, empathized with Strauß, has become impatient with
Handke’s posturing: “How naive can a writer in the prime of life (“im reifen Mannesalter”) be?” “Dichters Winterreise. Peter Handkes Serbien-Reportage und die Intellektuellen,” Der Spiegel, no. 6, 1996, 190.
123. Compare this to the recent statement by theater director Claus Peymann,
who took over Brecht’s Berliner Ensemble in 1999: “Theater must be a place for political debates. . . . Theater keeps an eye on the powerful and speaks for the powerless.” Cited in “Peymann kündigt politisches Theater für Berliner Ensemble an,”
dpa/eu dispatch distributed by the online service Germany Live on May 1, 1998.
124. Dzevad Karahasan, “Bürger Handke, Serbenvolk,” Die Angst des Dichters,
53. Further page references in the text. Karahasan’s analysis was ¤rst published in Die
Zeit, no. 8, 1996.
125. Karahasan claims that Handke does not know “a single word” of the languages
spoken in the area. He deduces this from the fact that Handke needs a dictionary. Actually, the author read aloud (for forty-¤ve minutes!) parts of the Serbian translation of
Winter Journey in Serbian when he visited Belgrade. This was reported by Andrej Ivanji
in his article “Belgrad feiert Peter Handke,” Der Standard, May 18–19, 1996.
126. This passage was misprinted in the book version—the preposition “of ”
(“von”) was omitted. The problem might be the translation into German. I say “examples of ” because the German phrase “Beiträge von” is incorrect. It would have to
read either “contributions to” (“Beiträge zu”) or examples of (“Beispiele für”).
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For an ethically based view of the Balkan con¶ict, see the book by American Peter
Maass, Love Thy Neighbor: A Story of War (New York: Knopf, 1996). Compare Maass’s
description of Visegrad (8–15) with that of Handke (Summer Supplement, 30–60).
127. Marcel Ophuls, “Die Wut. Eine Antwort auf Peter Handkes Artikel ‘Gerechtigkeit für Serbien,’” Die Angst des Dichters, 38. Originally published in the tageszeitung, January 22, 1996.
128. André Glucksmann, “Du bist ein Terrorist,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, January
27, 1996. Excerpts from an article/interview printed in Corriere della Sera on January
6, 1996.
129. For insight into Grass’s view of the Enlightenment, see his contributions to
the symposium Der Traum der Vernunft. Vom Elend der Aufklärung, Eine Veranstaltungsreihe der Akademie der Künste, Berlin, 2 vols. (Darmstadt und Neuwied:
Luchterhand, 1985–1986). In his speech “Der Traum der Vernunft,” Grass sounds
like an advocate for the “third path” between “a capitalism producing misery” and “a
Communism ruling by force,” 1:7. In his introductory remarks in the second volume, he mentions Gottfried Benn’s “cowardly cynicism” (8).
130. In his rather positive review, Volker Hage takes it as a given that it is no longer
possible to write a cohesive text with a clear structure. See “Vor allem die Liebe,” Der
Spiegel, no. 32, 1994, 158.
131. Botho Strauß, Das Gleichgewicht (München and Wien: Hanser, 1993). Page
references in the body of the text.
132. Reported by Volker Hage in “Dichter nach der Schlacht,” Der Spiegel, no. 30,
1993, 143. In the same article, it is reported that Claus Peymann, the then director of the
Vienna Burgtheater, found the play a bit too nationalistic (“Das Stück riecht ein bißchen
sehr nach Schwarz-Weiß-Rot.”). Hage himself is amazed by Peymann’s remark, as he
views Equilibrium as “almost a summery play . . . devoid of the mystical” (143–146).
133. Equilibrium was not a great success in the former East Germany. Its diction
was apparently too Westernized, too postmaterialistic for those whose lives of necessity continue to revolve around the basics of everyday life. See Ronald Richter, “Zen
oder Die Kunst des hohen Klagetons,” Theater der Zeit, July–August 1995, 66–68.
Not everyone in the West was enthusiastic, either. One well-known critic called
Equilibrium “a mediocre play against mediocrity in society and art.” See C. Bernd
Sucher, “Gemogelt—und gewonnen. ‘Das Gleichgewicht’ von Botho Strauß in
München,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, October 5, 1996.
134. Reported by Sibylle Ahlers, “Die Odyssee, entstaubt und in 21 Happen,” Die
Welt, August 19, 1996. The American television version, which was broadcast in
1997, assumed no previous knowledge and reduced much of Homer’s images to the
level of comic books.
135. Botho Strauß, Ithaka. Schauspiel nach den Heimkehr-Gesängen der Odyssee
(München and Wien: Hanser, 1996). Page references in the text.
136. See Wolfgang Höbel, “Ende einer Dienstfahrt,” Der Spiegel, no. 30 (1996),
150. The title of this article is an allusion to a 1966 novel by Heinrich Böll about the

Notes_ne.fm Page 241 Friday, August 25, 2000 1:52 PM

Notes to Pages 120–125 ///

241

burning of a Bundeswehr jeep. The reference is meant to contrast Böll’s paci¤sm with
Strauß’s alleged glori¤cation of war.
137. It is ironic that the antimaterialist Strauß should echo Marx by using this
phrase. Compare the following passage from Marx about the culture of ancient
Greece: “Why should the historical childhood of humanity, where it had obtained its
most beautiful development, not exert an eternal charm as an age that will never return?” Karl Marx, Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy, excerpted in Marx
and Engels on Literature and Art, ed. Lee Baxandall and Stefan Morawski (St. Louis
and Milwaukee: Telos Press, 1973), 135.
138. One observer reports that Strauß decided to work on an adaptation of the
Odyssey after it was proposed to him by Swedish director Ingmar Bergman. See Peter
Iden, “Wiederholung, Teilhabe, Erinnerung,” Deutsche Literatur 1996, 97. Originally published in Frankfurter Rundschau, July 22, 1996.
139. Playwright Gerhart Hauptmann covered similar ground in his 1914 drama
Der Bogen des Odysseus (Odysseus’s bow). The early Hauptmann had been a naturalist
interested in social problems. His “turn” was somewhat like that of Strauß.
140. Penelope is capable of resisting “the sirens of slime and passion” herself, but
Odysseus must be tied to his ship’s mast when passing by the Sirens and hearing their
seductive song (14).
141. This reaction was quite clear when I attended a performance of the play at
Berlin’s Deutsches Theater in September 1997.
142. C. Bernd Sucher, “Zeige mir, Muse, die Gedanken, nicht Bilder nur!” Süddeutsche Zeitung, July 22, 1996.
143. Wolfgang Höbel (see note 136), 151.
144. Rolf Michaelis, “Der Bogen des Botho,” Die Zeit, no. 31, 1996.
145. See the dpa dispatch “Bruno Ganz gefeierter Star in ‘Ithaka’—Fast ungeteilte
Zustimmung,” July 21, 1996. The dispatch was distributed by Germany Live.
146. Gerhard Stadelmaier, “König Kinderleicht,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,
July 22, 1996. In his review of the later Berlin production, Stadelmaier stated
categorically that Ithaka is “not a drama of kingship . . . not a political play.” See
“König Schinderleicht oder Die Spaßarbeit am Mythos,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, April 7, 1997. In the Berlin theater program, one ¤nds the following quotation
(selected by Strauß) from Nicolás Gómez Dávila: “The reactionary is the guardian of
the heritage. / Even of the heritage of the revolutionary.” Botho Strauß: Ithaka (Berlin:
Deutsches Theater und Kammerspiele, 1997), 25.
147. Richard Herzinger, “Die Rückkehr der romantischen Moderne,” Theater
heute, no. 8 (1996), 7. Further page references in the text.
148. See the following reviews of the premiere in Berlin: C. Bernd Sucher, “Das
Weib als Wasserleiche und Weltanschauung,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, April 23, 1998;
Klaus Dermutz, “Ein Leben ohne Wahl,” Frankfurter Rundschau, April 23, 1998;
Günther Grack, “Von fern bellt der Welthund Hitler,” Der Tagesspiegel, April 23,

Notes_ne.fm Page 242 Friday, August 25, 2000 1:52 PM

242

///

Notes to Chapter 3

1998; Reinhard Wengierek, “Ohnmenschliche Schönheit,” Die Welt, April 23,
1998; Petra Kohse, “Aus dem Zwielicht ins Dunkel,” tageszeitung, April 23, 1998;
“Buhrufe für Botho Strauß’ neues Stück ‘Jeffers—Akt I und II,’” dpa dispatch, April
22, 1998 (distributed by Germany Live).
149. Eric Bentley gives Jeffers only a passing reference in his study A Century of
Hero Worship, 2nd ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), 3. For a sympathetic portrayal
of Jeffers, see Radcliffe Squires, The Loyalties of Robinson Jeffers (1956; Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1963). Squires’s readers are called upon to make a leap
of faith: “Eventually, when people cease to take his [Jeffers’s] impersonal view of the
species homo sapiens as an assault on humanity, he will be seen as one of our master
poets” (vii). Another critic will have us believe that “the question whether Jeffers is
pessimist or misanthropist . . . is really of no importance whatever.” See William H.
Nolte, Rock and Hawk: Robinson Jeffers and the Romantic Agony (Athens: University
of Georgia Press, 1978), 15. For a broad selection of Jeffers’s verse, see The Selected Poetry of Robinson Jeffers (New York: Random House, 1937). In his introduction, Jeffers
compares his hideaway near California’s Monterrey coast mountains to “Homer’s
Ithaca” (xvi). If Strauß adapted the Odyssey, he was following in the footsteps of Jeffers, who produced a verse adaptation of Euripides’ Medea in 1946. See Robinson Jeffers, Cawdor and Medea (New York: New Directions, 1970).
150. Compare Martin Heidegger’s lament: “Perhaps never before was the necessity of the pure work [i.e., œuvre] greater than today and in the future—for never before was the deforming and destructive force of announcing and chatting, of extolling and noise, of the addiction to spiritual dissection and dissolution greater and
more unimpeded and more conscious than [it is] today. How much and [how] surely
one succumbs to the illusion that one has comprehended and taken possession of the
work if one knows the ‘letters’ and utterances of its creator and his psychology,” “Ein
Rückblick auf den Weg” (1937–38), Besinnung, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 66 (Frankfurt
am Main: Klostermann, 1997), 416.
151. Botho Strauß, Die Fehler des Kopisten (München and Wien: Hanser, 1997).
Page references in the text.
152. Willi Winkler, “Ich bin der Haß. Der Dichter Botho Strauß als Photoroman,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, April 16, 1997.
153. “Wenn der Vater mit dem Sohne,” Der Spiegel, no. 16, 1997, 192–193;
Botho Strauß, “Wo der Geist Knecht ist,” 194–200. Here are some reviews of the
book: Ronald Pohl, “Die Firma Botho Strauß und Sohn,” Der Standard, May 5,
1997; Hellmuth Karasek, “Ein Paar ohne Passanten,” Der Tagessspiegel, April 24,
1997; Jörg Magenau, “Wege des Berührten,” tageszeitung, April 26, 1997.
154. In his newest play, Die Ähnlichen (The Similar Ones), which had its premiere
in the summer of 1998, people have become indistinguishable “androids.” See
Ronald Pohl, “Das Menschen-Ballett der Androiden,” Der Standard, May 2–3,
1998. In The Copyist’s Errors, these creatures are described as technical intellectuals who
may eventually eliminate all of the problematic and yet enriching aspects (“consolation,
desperation . . . , re¶ection and blind rage”) from life (55). It may be that Strauß is
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not offering these glimpses into his private life to the masses, but rather to the “second-class intellectuals,” whose number, he claims, has grown tremendously. See The
Copyist’s Errors, 88.
155. Peter Handke, Zurüstungen für die Unsterblichkeit. Ein Königsdrama (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1997). Page references from this edition in the text.
156. The program for the performance at Berlin’s Deutsches Theater has the following words printed on its back cover: “Remain true to the words of your childhood; / every other word would be false.” Peter Handke. Zurüstungen für die Unsterblichkeit. Ein
Königsdrama (Berlin: Deutsches Theater und Kammerspiele, 1997).
The Deutsches Theater marketed the plays by Handke and Strauß as a weekend
package in fall, 1997. Participants in the “Strauß Handke Wochenende: Die Rückkehr der Könige II” had the opportunity to not only attend performances of the two
plays on successive evenings, but also to hear a lecture by a professor, hear readings
of other works by the two authors, and discuss the productions with the ensemble.
157. Peter Handke, Mein Jahr in der Niemandsbucht—Ein Märchen aus den Neuen
Zeiten (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1994).
158. Ulrich Greiner, “Die ganze Welt, das ganze Leben,” Die Zeit, no. 49, 1994.
159. The character Felipe Vega in Preparations refers to himself as a “Taugenichts,”
i.e., a good-for-nothing (79). Handke is of course familiar with Eichendorff ’s famous 1826 novel Aus dem Leben eines Taugenichts.
160. “‘Gelassen wär’ ich gern.’ Der Schriftsteller Peter Handke über sein neues
Werk, über Sprache, Politik und Erotik,” Der Spiegel, no. 49, 1994, 170.
161. It is the women’s father who says this of his “idiotic” (9) daughters, who con¤rm its accuracy later. Why Handke felt the need to include such sarcasm is unclear.
162. In German leftist culture, this sentiment is re¶ected in the popular bumper
sticker “Foreigners! Don’t leave us alone with the Germans!” (Ausländer! Laßt uns
mit den Deutschen nicht allein!) Space permitting, it would be interesting to discuss
how the purchasers of that bumper sticker explain to themselves and others that they
are not “German.” The New Right intellectuals would surely wish to participate in
such a discussion.
163. This is a favorite term of Handke’s (“Zwischenräume”) denoting the spaces
between “normal” perceptions that are the homeland of the writer. See the volume
“Aber ich lebe nur von den Zwischenräumen.” Peter Handke im Gespräch mit Herbert
Gamper (Zürich: Ammann, 1987).
164. See the recent scholarly book on the ideology of childhood: Yvonne-Patricia
Alefeld, Die Kindheitsideologie in der Romantik (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1996). In his
review of this book, Karl Menges states the following: “Childhood utopia . . . coincides with poetic visions of the sovereignty of the poet who, incidentally, does not retreat from the world but embraces it with an advanced consciousness that combines
‘universal’ Romantic sensuality with contemporary (Kantian) transcendentalism.”
The review appeared in Monatshefte 90.1 (Spring 1998): 111–112.
165. Why must this be stated and repeated in both German and Spanish?
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(“Traum und Arbeit. Arbeit und Traum. Sueño y trabajo. Trabajo y sueño.”) This is,
once again, excess ballast. Similarly, why must we be told that the storyteller’s festive
garb is that of a “Landarbeiterin oder labradora” (66)?
166. She does repeatedly say how “ugly” the Space Eliminators are, and she systematically goes about erasing their ugliness (102–103). Antinoos (see above) used
the same word in Ithaka.
167. One critic described Preparations as a mixture of fairy tales, the magic plays
(“Zauberstücke”) of the Austrian Biedermeier, the commedia dell’arte, and Samuel
Beckett. The eclecticism apparently did not disturb him, since he spoke of “the production of the year.” See Lothar Schmidt-Mulisch, “Abenteuer im Zaubergarten der
Phantasie,” Die Welt, February 10, 1997. In the fall of 1997, this observer found the
Berlin production of Preparations absolutely deadening. The mass of verbiage overwhelmed the audience in the Deutsches Theater.
168. Thomas Assheuer, “Die Ornamente der Ordnung,” Die Zeit, no. 10, 1997.
Assheuer actually uses the term “scandalous” to describe the essays.
169. Wolfgang Höbel, “Sag dem König leise Servus,” Der Spiegel, no. 8, 1997,
210–211; “‘Die Banalität bestimmt das Bewußtsein.’ Claus Peymann über Wien,
Berlin, und seine Liebe zu den Dichtern,” Der Spiegel, no. 8, 1997, 211–214.
170. Ronald Pohl, “Zurüstungen für die Verlängerung” [Interview with Claus
Peymann], Der Standard, February 6, 1997.
171. Benjamin Henrichs, “Ein Königreich für ein Kind,” Die Zeit, no. 8, 1997.
See the similar formulation in note 65.
172. Dietmar N. Schmidt, “Bald wird kaum einer noch wissen, wer Schiller war,”
Die Welt, May 12, 1997. Another critic discovered a quite different similarity: both
plays, he said, were “boring” and (especially in the case of Handke) “sickeningly German” (“zum Kotzen deutsch”). See Lorenz Tomerius, “‘Zurüstungen’ als Zumutungen,” Der Standard, June 17, 1997.
173. Gerhard Stadelmaier, “König Schinderleicht . . .” (see note 146).
174. Peter von Becker, “Unser aller Mitternachtsblues?” Der Tagesspiegel, June 17,
1997.
175. Thomas Assheuer, “Die Ornamente der Ordnung” (see note 168). Richard
Herzinger (see note 147) portrays the author of Ithaka as the major heir of Ernst
Jünger. See Strauß’s own paean to Jünger, “Refrain einer tieferen Aufklärung,” Magie
der Heiterkeit. Ernst Jünger zum Hundertsten, ed. Günter Figal and Heimo Schwilk
(Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1995), 323–324. Strauß asserts here that Jünger is becoming
a prototype of the art of the future for the younger generations, an art that will replace
the “subversive radical, the Jacobin-‘Hölderlinian’ hero of the age” (324).
176. C. Bernd Sucher, “Aus dem Königreich der Kunst in die Welt,” Süddeutsche
Zeitung, February 10, 1997.
177. Peter Handke, In einer dunklen Nacht ging ich aus meinem stillen Haus (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1997).
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178. Peter Handke, Am Felsfenster morgens und andere Ortszeiten 1982–1987
(Salzburg and Wien: Residenz, 1998).

Notes to Excursus
1. Theodor Fontane, Der Stechlin (1898; Leipzig: Reclam, 1973), 323. [34. Kapitel.] The title character in this novel is a traditional conservative who does not automatically reject anything that is new.
2. See Klaus Schwabe, “Anti-Americanism within the German Right 1917–
1933,” Amerikastudien 21.1 (1976):89–107.
3. Rudolf Kayser, “Americanism,” The Weimar Republic Sourcebook, 395. The text
originally appeared in the Vossische Zeitung (Theodor Fontane’s sometime employer!)
on September 27, 1925.
4. Johann Wolfgang Goethe, “Den Vereinigten Staaten,” Gedichte—Versepen, ed.
Walter Höllerer, Werke (Frankfurt am Main: Insel, 1965), 1:224.
5. Stefan Zweig, “The Monotonization of the World,” The Weimar Republic Sourcebook, 398–399. Originally published in the Berliner Börsen-Courier, February 1, 1925.
Ironically, Rudolf Kayser had not seen America when he enthused about its merits.
6. The elites invented derogatory terms for such diversions: “Schmutz und Schund,
Hintertreppenroman, Kitsch, Gassenhauer, Traumfabrik; pulp ¤ction, dime novel,
soap opera, trashy literature; camelote, toc, littérature de bas étage, littérature de gare,
etc.” See Kaspar Maase, Grenzenloses Vergnügen. Der Aufstieg der Massenkultur 1850–
1970 (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1997), 27.
7. “The Bildungsbürgertum as a hegemonial social stratum may have died off.
However, the Bildungsbürger, in his ethos and habits dedicated to knowledge and
cultural experience, lives on. And here’s to him!” Tilman Krause, “Ohne Arbeit kein
Genuß,” Der Tagesspiegel, October 25, 1996. Krause credits these people for helping
to transcend the gap between high and low culture, overcoming nationalistic narrowmindedness (by often traveling abroad), and combining a sense of esthetics with the
work ethic and a capacity to broaden one’s horizons. This portrait applies more to the
liberal Bildungsbürger than his conservative counterpart.
8. Botho Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit. Re¶exionen über Fleck und Linie (München and
Wien: Hanser, 1992), 122.
9. Ina Hartwig, “Politik und Landschaft. Über die Veränderung eines Motivs bei
Peter Handke,” Frankfurter Rundschau, April 25, 1998. In fall 1997, Peter Schneider
returned from a nine-month stay in Washington, D.C., as a Woodrow Wilson Fellow. His published comments on the nature of U.S. society are astonishingly naïve.
“Das mutlose Land,” Der Spiegel, no. 46, 1997, 59–67 and “Sie irren, ich bin typisch
deutsch” (interview with Peter Schneider), Der Tagesspiegel, October 7, 1997.
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10. Richard Pells, Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture Since World War II (New York: Basic Books, 1997), xiv, 41,
239. In the fall of 1997, Prof. Pells was a Fulbright American Studies professor at the
Universität Bonn. In an article entitled “Cinéma Vérité in Europe: Rejecting U.S.
Culture” (International Herald Tribune, December 16, 1997), he described how European students reacted to his book and lectures. He was disappointed about “European youth’s continuing apathy to the marketplace mentality of American culture”
and observed that the “hostile attitudes” of students were still linked to “a Marxist
analysis of capitalism.” Although he hoped that his audiences would still “grow up to
be dedicated capitalists,” he stated that “policymakers in London, Paris, and Bonn
have failed to convince large numbers of people crucial to the future economic health
of Europe that the American model is worth following.” (He should have known that
it is dangerous to make generalizations about all of Europe on the basis of encounters
with students interested in the humanities, who are hardly a representative group in
Europe or the U.S.) The IHT printed highly critical letters responding to Pells’s laments on December 19 and 24–25.
For other material on postwar reeducation, see the following: James F. Tent, Mission on the Rhine: Reeducation and Denazi¤cation in American-Occupied Germany
(Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), and Nicholas Pronay
and Keith Wilson, eds., The Political Re-Education of Germany and Her Allies after
World War II (Totowa, N.J.: Barnes and Noble Books, 1985).
11. Rob Kroes, If You’ve Seen One, You’ve Seen the Mall: Europeans and American
Mass Culture (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1996), 178. In
Kroes’s view, European intellectuals “turned feelings of envy and inferiority toward
America, the country that had twice saved Europe from its worst excesses, into a sense
of intellectual superiority” (182).
12. Kroes, If You’ve Seen, 173.
13. Roger Rollin, “Introduction. On Comparative Popular Culture, American
Style,” The Americanization of the Global Village, ed. Roger Rollin (Bowling Green,
Ohio: Bowling Green State University Popular Press, 1989), 1.
14. Rollin, “Introduction,” 2.
15. Stephen Haseler, The Varieties of Anti-Americanism: Re¶ex and Response (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1985), 21. Another book in the same
series is Uwe Siemon-Netto’s On the Brink: The Myth of German Anti-Americanism.
16. Paul Hollander, Anti-Americanism: Critiques at Home and Abroad 1965–1990
(New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), xi. Hollander mentions the
“tradition of romantic anti-modernism” as one reason behind the German critique of
the American model (383).
17. Hollander, Anti-Americanism, 468. My emphasis.
18. For some Germans, the possibility has already become reality. One study done
for the European Commission shows that there are now approximately 490,000
homeless people in reuni¤ed Germany. See Henning Lohse, “Deutschland hat die

Notes_ne.fm Page 247 Friday, August 25, 2000 1:52 PM

Notes to Pages 143–144 ///

247

meisten Obdachlosen. Hier lebt fast jeder zweite wohnungslose Europäer—Immer
mehr jungen Leuten fehlt ein Dach über dem Kopf,” Die Welt, October 21, 1995.
19. Dan Diner, Verkehrte Welten. Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland. Ein historischer
Essay (Frankfurt am Main: Eichborn, 1993). The citations above are taken from the
American translation: America in the Eyes of the Germans: An Essay on Anti-Americanism,
with an introduction by Sander L. Gilman (Princeton: Markus Wiener, 1996). One
wonders to what extent Diner shares Gilman’s view of the Germans as expressed in the
introduction: “the Nazi identity, accepted by most, internalized by all; . . . the socialist
identity of the GDR, prized by few, accepted by most” (xvii). (My emphasis.)
20. See for example the following two volumes edited by Diner: Ist der Nationalsozialismus Geschichte? Zu Historisierung und Historikerstreit (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1987); Zivilisationsbruch. Denken nach Auschwitz (Frankfurt am Main:
Fischer, 1988).
21. Together with Armin Mohler, Schrenck-Notzing founded the right-wing
journal Criticón in 1970.
22. It is interesting to contrast this analysis with another observer’s comment that
in France, anti-Semitism and anti-intellectualism are “never far apart.” [My emphasis.] See Jeremy Jennings, “Of Treason, Blindness and Silence. Dilemmas of the Intellectual in Modern France,” Intellectuals in Politics: From the Dreyfus Affair to
Salman Rushdie, ed. Jeremy Jennnings and Anthony Kemp-Welch (London and
New York: Routledge, 1997), 69. In France, many intellectuals are highly critical of
American mass culture, and not a few of these intellectuals are Jewish.
23. See Rolf Winter, Ami go home. Plädoyer für den Abschied von einem gewalttätigen Land (Hamburg: Rasch und Röhring, 1989).
24. This passage is taken from the essay “Über die Schwierigkeiten, ein Inländer
zu sein,” Deutschland, Deutschland unter anderem. Äußerungen zur Politik (Frankfurt
am Main: Suhrkamp, 1968), 12.
25. See for example the following: “Der neue Kulturnationalismus,” Die Zeit, no.
34, 1993; (with Hannes Stein) “Hiroschima gleich Auschwitz?” Der Spiegel, no. 31,
1995, 146–149; “Die Moral als Sahnehäubchen,” Die Zeit, no. 40, 1996; “In der Gemeinschaftsfalle,” Die Zeit, no. 15, 1997; “Böse ist das Nicht-Denken,” Der Tagesspiegel, July 22, 1997; “Gutmenschen in Talkshow-gewittern,” Der Tagesspiegel,
September 19, 1997. See also Herzinger’s memorial essay for Isaiah Berlin, “Wider
die Einhegung der Freiheit,” Der Tagesspiegel, November 9, 1997.
26. Richard Herzinger and Hannes Stein, Endzeit-Propheten oder Die Offensive der
Antiwestler (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1995). Page references in the body of the text. Herzinger was born in 1955, Stein in 1965, making both of them representatives of post1968 generations.
27. Herzinger and Stein provide a German translation of this passage. This is my
retranslation back in to English.
28. Among the targets are Rousseau, Herder, Fichte, Novalis, Nietzsche, Georges
Sorel, Oswald Spengler, Moeller van den Bruck, Carl Schmitt, Martin Heidegger,
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Ernst Jünger, Arnold Gehlen, Ernst Nolte, Rudolf Bahro, Christa Wolf, Heiner
Müller, Günter Grass, Edgar Reitz (and his epic ¤lm Heimat), Botho Strauß, Alice
Schwarzer, Luise Rinser, Simone de Beauvoir, Frantz Fanon, Jacques Derrida, Alain
de Benoist, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Eugen Drewermann, Louis Farrakhan, Patrick
Buchanan, and even German-American Germanist Jost Hermand.
Herzinger and Stein deny that they “throw cultural-elitist hotheads, cold-blooded
intellectual historical revisionists and extremist murders into one pot.” They are, they
assert, merely interested in the “common ferment around which a new discourse is being formed in Europe” (17). In the book, they are anything but disinterested analysts.
29. Israel is not described as a “paradise on earth” (42)—discrimination against Palestinian Israelis and the torture of prisoners is criticized—but its status as an “open society” is emphasized. The authors are pleased that the original Zionist dream of
creating the “new man” and realizing socialism in the desert (43) did not succeed.
In another passage, the relationship between the U.S. and Israel is reversed: “The
fundamental American idea, universalism, is a necessary consequence of Jewish monotheism” (39).
30. The authors relate a joke told by Allen: He never attends a performance of a
Wagnerian opera, because afterwards, he always feels “an irresistible urge to march
into Poland” (69). This retelling speaks volumes about the authors’ relationship to
German culture.
31. Herzinger and Stein sound like Goldhagen (whose book appeared a year after
their own) when they say the following: “National Socialism . . . was the most extreme, the most extremist culmination of a project anchored deep in German intellectual history” (167).
32. Roland Bubik (cf. Die selbstbewußte Nation) might have been the real-life
model for this passage. In a 1996 interview, a former comrade described his life style:
“Bubik as the big anti-Americanist eats at McDonald’s every day, and his brand of
cigarettes is Western. That’s what I never have been able to understand about Bubik—how he can write these articles and live very differently.” “Auf eine Art wollte
ich Ernst machen” (Interview with Gerlinde Gronow), tageszeitung, June 8, 1996.
33. A very different interpretation of this world is found in Ariel Dorfman, How
to Read Donald Duck: Imperialist Ideology in the Disney Comic (New York: International General, 1975). The title of the Spanish original is Para leer al Pato Donald.
34. Their image of the U.S. needs updating, however. They seem to think that the
civil rights movement has removed all obstacles to a race-blind society, and they have
the impression that multiculturalism has been accepted by almost everyone (108–109).
35. There is of course a historical dimension to the Herzinger/Stein position as well.
It has been said of earlier critics of modern Germany that “[a]bove all, these men loathed
liberalism.” See Fritz Stern, The Politics of Cultural Despair: A Study in the Rise of the Germanic Ideology (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1965), 2. Stern is referring to Lagarde,
Langbehn, and Moeller van den Bruck. His own position is clear: “As moralists and as
the guardians of what they thought was an ancient tradition, they attacked the progress
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of modernity—the growing power of liberalism and secularism” (1; my emphasis).
Herzinger himself has published a longer work on the nature of liberalism. See Richard Herzinger, Die Tyrannei des Gemeinsinns. Ein Bekenntnis zur egoistischen Gesellschaft
(Berlin: Rowohlt, 1997). The title is characteristically tongue in cheek.
36. Gustav Sichelschmidt, Deutschland—eine amerikanische Provinz. Der große Seelenmord (Berg: VGB-Verlagsgesellschaft, 1996). Page references in the body of the text.
37. Sichelschmidt (b. 1913), a retired librarian, is the author of over sixty books.
He is a member of the editorial staff of the right-wing journal Nation. Das politische
Magazin für Deutschland. He has been characterized as a “neofascist journalist” (see
Antifaschistische Nachrichten 4[1998]). Among his books are Verblöden die Deutschen?
Analyse und Bilanz eines Niveauabstiegs (Herford: Nicolai, 1969) and Deutschland
verblödet. Wem nutzt der dumme Deutsche? (Kiel: Arndt-Verlag, 1995). Both books lament German culture’s descent into mediocrity. See also Der ewige Deutschenhaß.
Hintermänner und Nutznießer des Antigermanismus (Kiel: Arndt, 1992) and his study
of patriotic literature: Verschwiegen und vergessen. Nationale deutsche Autoren im 20.
Jahrhundert (Berg: VGB-Verlagsgesellschaft, 1997). His publisher VGB is categorized as “right-wing extremist” by the German Of¤ce for the Protection of the Constitution. Sichelschmidt has also written for the Deutsche National-Zeitung,
published by the DVU’s Gerhard Frey. See Jens Mecklenburg, ed., Antifa Reader.
Antifaschistisches Handbuch und Ratgeber (Berlin: Elefanten Press, 1996) 127.
38. Heimo Schwilk, Was man uns verschwieg. Der Golfkrieg in der Zensur (Frankfurt am Main, Berlin: Ullstein, 1991). Page references in the body of the text. Ullstein was also the publisher of Die selbstbewußte Nation.
39. It is instructive to compare the rhetorical styles of a Schwilk and a Sichelschmidt, however. Whereas the former portrays General Schwarzkopf as a cynic
(120), the latter says that he is “equipped with the belly of an oil sheik and the jaw of
a professional brawler” (113). This does not necessarily mean that Schwilk is more familiar with the U.S. He refers to CBS as the “Central Broadcasting Service” (67) and
calls the commanding general “Stormy [instead of Stormin’] Norman” (120).
40. This stance is changing ever so slowly, as evidenced by the debate in the Green
Party about using the Bundeswehr, or at least air support and medical teams, in Bosnia. In 1999, the SPD-Green coalition government survived a heated debate about
whether to send German ground troops to Kosovo. The debate did leave deep divisions within the Greens, however.
41. This word is part of the title of yet another recent book condemning the U.S.:
Karlheinz Deschner, Der Moloch. Eine kritische Geschichte der U.S.A. [The moloch: a
critical history of the USA] (München: Heyne, 1992). Deschner explains how he
came to write such a book: “I never had thought of writing a history of the United
States, even though I had occasionally concerned myself with the topic while pursuing other projects. It was only the Gulf War that drove me to it, whether I wanted to
or not; [it was] perhaps less its barbarism, as bad as it was, than the outrageous hypocrisy with which it operated. At ¤rst, I wanted to write a diary of the Gulf War, but
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events came too thick and fast. Also, it soon seemed to me to be more illuminating
to for once show the entire gruesome weave of violence and mendacity in the context
of its history” (“Why?” [9]).
When another critical book appeared in 1997, a reviewer began his comments
with the following statement: “There is probably hardly another country that suffers
so much from [emulating] its great model America as Germany does.” Jürgen Scheunemann, “Das Land der Vorbilder,” Der Tagesspiegel, April 6, 1998. The book is Peter
Loesche’s Die Vereinigten Staaten. Innenansichten. Ein Versuch, das Land der unbegrenzten Widersprüche zu begreifen (Hannover: Fackelträger, 1997). In this title, the
U.S. is transformed from the “land of endless opportunities” to the “land of endless
contradictions.”

Notes to Conclusions & Prospects
1. Jonathan Sperber, The Kaiser’s Voters. Electors and Elections in Imperial Germany
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 1.
2. See the dpa/eu dispatch “Hooligans wecken in Frankreich Erinnerungen an
¤nstere Vergangenheit,” June 27, 1998. Distributed by Germany Live. The dispatch
contains the following assessment of skinhead violence from the conservative French
newspaper Le Figaro: “The German brutes who on Sunday terrorized Lens and seriously injured a policeman are the heirs of a minority, but tolerated neo-Nazi ideology.”
This was not the only such news on that day: At about the same time, but much
closer to home, about a dozen right-wing youths, armed with chains and bottles, attacked the guests at a garden party in Oebisfelde (Sachsen-Anhalt), injuring ¤ve. See
dpa/eu, “Rechtsextremistische Jugendliche über¤elen Gartenparty,” June 27, 1998,
Germany Live. In Saal (Mecklenburg-Vorpommern), a twenty-year-old asylum seeker
from Algeria was beaten by six youths as he left a discotheque with friends. See dpa/eu,
“20jähriger Algerier in Ostdeutschland niedergeschlagen,” June 27, 1998, Germany
Live. The day afterward, young supporters of the right-wing NPD—who were outnumbered by protesters—staged a demonstration in Berlin. See dpa/eu, “NPDAufmarsch in Berlin unter großem Polizeiaufgebot,” June 27, 1998, Germany Live.
3. Not all Europeans would agree with Brigitte Seebacher-Brandt, for example:
“The Germans do not have it in their power to make themselves smaller and poorer
than they really are and to be spectators at the great global theater.” See SeebacherBrandt, Die Linke und die Einheit (Berlin: Corso bei Siedler, 1991), 80. She sees powerful nations as a prerequisite for a powerful United Europe.
4. Stefan Breuer, Anatomie der Konservativen Revolution (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1993). Page references in the body of the text.
5. Rolf Peter Sieferle, Die Konservative Revolution. Fünf biographische Skizzen
(Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1995). Page references in the body of the text.

Notes_ne.fm Page 251 Friday, August 25, 2000 1:52 PM

Notes to Pages 155–160

/// 251

6. Michael Rupprecht, Der literarische Bürgerkrieg. Zur Politik der Unpolitischen in
Deutschland (Frankfurt am Main: Knecht, 1995). Page references in the body of the
text. The design of the book cover includes photographs of Botho Strauß, Günter
Grass, Thomas Mann (in the middle), Ernst Nolte, Ernst Jünger, and Martin Heidegger.
7. Kurt Lenk, Günter Meuter, and Henrique Ricardo Otten, Vordenker der Neuen
Rechten (Frankfurt am Main and New York: Campus, 1997). Page references in the
body of the text.
8. Jürgen Habermas, A Berlin Republic: Writings on Germany, trans. Steven Rendall
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), 81. This is a translation of the 1995
book Die Normalität einer Berliner Republik (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp).
9. Iris Weber, Nation, Staat und Elite. Die Ideologie der Neuen Rechten (Köln:
PapyRossa, 1997). Page references in the body of the text.
10. See also Johannes Klotz and Ulrich Schneider, eds., Die selbstbewußte Nation und
ihr Geschichtsbild. Geschichtslegenden der Neuen Rechten (Köln: PapyRossa, 1997). In
the preface to this volume, the authors—after quoting from Die selbstbewußte Nation
—offer the following statement of purpose: “[C]onservative and new-right historians
and journalists are rewriting history: historicization of National Socialism and relativization of its crimes, description of the Federal Republic from 1949 to 1989 as a special
path, etc. The point of this is to systematically revise the insights that have been developed and painstakingly established by critical historiography. Their place is to be taken
by a view of history according to which it would be a return to normalcy if Germany
would ¤nally emerge from the shadow of the past, take on its responsibility as a major
power, and once again play the international role that it is entitled to—also in a military
sense. In order to counter such regression, the debate with the apologists of the selfcon¤dent nation and their view of history must ¤nally be carried out.” (“Vorwort,” 7.)
11. Dirk von Petersdorff, “200 Jahre deutsche Kunstreligion!” Neue Rundschau
108.4 (1997): 67–87. Page references in the body of the text.
12. See Stefan Breuer, Ästhetischer Fundamentalismus. Stefan George und der deutsche Antimodernismus (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1995). I did
not obtain a copy of this book until after ¤nishing my own study. Breuer actually rejects the religion of art without denying that some of its insights (about environmental destruction, for example) are well worth considering. (There are parallels to Karl
Heinz Bohrer’s Die Ästhetik des Schreckens here, although Breuer does not list the
Bohrer book in his bibliography.) In his introduction, Breuer expresses his disgust
with those critics of Botho Strauß’s “Impending Tragedy” who mindlessly make use
of the “fascism club” rather than engaging in a historically based analysis.
13. Grass’s advocacy for asylum seekers and his support for critical Turkish writer
Yasar Kemal are documented in Zeit sich einzumischen. Die Kontroverse um Günter
Grass und die Laudatio auf Yasar Kemal in der Paulskirche, ed. Manfred Bissinger and
Daniela Hermes (Göttingen: Steidl, 1998).
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Elfriede Jelinek, the 1998 winner of the prestigious Büchner Prize, would be a
¤tting heir to Grass, except for the fact that she is still, at age ¤fty-two, more interested in confrontation and polemics than dialogue. See the following interview done
after the announcement of the prize: Peter von Becker, “Alles ist ein Spiel um den
blutigen Ernst,” Der Tagesspiegel, May 20, 1998.
14. Breuer, Anatomie, 28. In the American context, Todd Gitlin’s recent defense of
the humanities as a vital component of democracy was given a rather cold reception:
“The Liberal Arts in the Age of Info-Glut,” The Chronicle of Higher Education, May
1, 1998, and the letters to the editor about Gitlin in the June 5 edition.
15. Hermann Rauschning, Die Konservative Revolution. Versuch und Bruch mit
Hitler (New York: Freedom Publishing, 1941), 63. Further page references in the
body of the text. See also the author’s analysis of Nazism in The Revolution of Nihilism: Warning to the West (New York: Alliance Book Corporation, 1939).
16. According to historian Lothar Kettenacker, a meeting of minds has already occurred. He calls it “a curious alliance of right- and left-wing critics against the socalled ‘Coca-Cola’ or ‘McDonalds’ culture”: Germany Since 1945 (Oxford and New
York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 172. Kettenacker’s aim here, one close to
Herzinger/Stein, is to discredit all criticism of the American model. The use of the
word “curious” demonstrates that he has not given much thought to the various critiques of Westernization since Romanticism. Like Pells, he states: “The so-called
Americanization of West Germany is a very super¤cial description, which does not
stand up to scrutiny” (172).
17. He also adds that the contributions of the German Jews are in no way a “foreign in¤ltration” (“Überfremdung”) of the German mind (240).
18. One critic may have exaggerated, however, when he declared, in a review of the
Schacht/Schwilk volume Für eine Berliner Republik, that the movement was already
moribund. See Jan Ross, “Das schnelle Altern der Neuen Rechten,” Berliner Zeitung,
February 14–15, 1998. This political obituary was written two months before the
state elections in Sachsen-Anhalt (seen below).
19. Those who wish to get a taste of this activity should begin with the “Thule-Netz”
(<http://www.thulenet.com>). Among the offerings are a chat room for “discussion
among nationalists.” According to information provided on the website, over 171,000
visitors called up more than three million web pages between July 5, 1996, and April 4,
1998. A listing of right-wing sites on the web is provided in “Die Rechten im Internet”
(<http://www.bnr.de/rechts.htm>). See also the contribution by Christian Flatz, “Rechtsextremismus im World Wide Web” (<http://www.gfpa. uibk.ac.at/art/0007.htm>).
20. The rising popularity of the populist Danish Folkeparti in a country so proud
of its progressive policies and tolerance is especially troubling. The results of the
March 1998 national elections in Denmark are summarized and analyzed in Politiken Weekly, March 18, 1998.
For a general introduction to the politics of the New Right in Europe, see Geoffrey
Harris, The Dark Side of Europe: The Extreme Right Today (1990; Edinburgh: Edin-
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burgh University Press, 1994). See also Mark Wegierski, “The New Right in Europe,” Telos 98–99 (Winter 1993–Spring 1994): 55–69; Martina Kirfel and Walter
Oswalt, eds., Die Rückkehr der Führer. Modernisierter Rechtsradikalismus in Westeuropa, 2nd rev. ed. (Wien and Zürich: Europaverlag, 1991).
21. Evelyn Roll, “Demokratiefreier Raum im Osten,” Süddeutsche Zeitung,
May 9, 1998.
22. For an example of Benoist’s writing in English translation, see “Confronting
Globalization,” Telos 108 (1996): 117–137. See also Telos 98–99 (Winter 1993–
Spring 1994), special double issue on “The French New Right.” It is puzzling that
students of French culture can ignore the impact of Benoist. There is, for example,
not a single reference to him in French Cultural Studies: An Introduction, ed. Jill
Forbes and Michael Kelly (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
In general, very little attention is paid to conservative intellectuals in this volume. Le
Pen is also only mentioned once (6).
23. It is ironic that this institution is misspelled in the program: “Akadémie
francaise.”
24. For a brief, but thoughtful recent contribution to this discussion about the comparative horror of the gulag and the death camps, see Timothy Garton Ash’s review of
the French Black Book of Communism (1997) that appeared in the British journal Prospect in June 1998 (Online edition). For the response of a German historian to the German edition of the Black Book, see Manfred Hildermeier, “Das ‘Schwarzbuch des
Kommunismus’ und die Fakten der historischen Forschung,” Die Zeit, no. 24, 1998.
25. There is no objection to food shipments used to combat hunger in the “Third
World,” however.
26. For a thought-provoking discussion of Buchanan et al., see Michael Lind,
“Why Intellectual Conservatism Failed,” Dissent (Winter 1995), 42–47.
27. There is of course also a large number of unemployed young females in the
former GDR, but they are less inclined to resort to violence as a way to vent their
anger.
28. See the dpa dispatch “Katholikentag—Kritik an ungehemmten und schamlosen Egoismus,” June 12, 1998. Distributed by German Live on the Internet.
Merkel is now the CDU party chairperson (the first woman in this post), and Fischer is the foreign minister.
29. See the following reports about Habermas’s support for the SPD and his theses
about global democracy: Ullrich Fichtner, “Verschwommene Thesen, aber jede
Menge Wirkung,” Frankfurter Rundschau, June 6, 1998; Dieter Rulff, “Das Wagnis
namens Habermas,” tageszeitung, June 6, 1998; Günter Hofmann, “Der Philopolitiker,” Die Zeit, no. 25, 1998.
30. Sibylle Tönnies, Die Feier des Konkreten. Linker Salonatavismus (Göttingen:
Steidl, 1996), 122, 128. The bulk of this book consists of a critique of the “leftist atavism” of Adorno and its purported similarities with “rightist atavism.”
31. See Sibylle Tönnies, “Gemeinschaft von oben. Der amerikanische Kommuni-
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tarismus, eine antiliberale Bewegung?” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, December 30, 1994. In this article, Tönnies asserts that an attack on liberalism would play
into the hands of the New Right and its project of political restoration. Instead, she
proposes the following: “We really need a reawakened sense of the value of the family,
true friendship, [and] unquali¤ed, spontaneous attention to one another. We need a
new sense of the value of all that which is not connected to money, but rather to the
heart.” See also her recent article calling for the Germans to ¤nally shed their fear of
the state, one based on the (misinterpreted) experience of National Socialism: Sibylle
Tönnies, “Save the Whale! Rettet den Leviathan!” tageszeitung, June 13, 1998. This
article is part of a series on the left’s relationship to the state.
32. Antonia Grunenberg, Der Schlaf der Freiheit. Politik und Gemeinsinn im 21.
Jahrhundert (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1997), 242–243. This book was selected as the non¤ction book of the month by the Süddeutsche Zeitung and the Norddeutscher Rundfunk in August 1997. In a brief positive review, Rita Süssmuth, the then president of
the German parliament, characterized the book as being “against the grain of the
spirit of our time” (“quer zum Zeitgeist”). “Der Schlaf der Freiheit,” Der Tagesspiegel,
October 15, 1997.
33. Benjamin Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld (New York: Random House, 1995), 6, 8.
My emphasis. Barber’s comments on reuni¤ed Germany, which are found in a chapter entitled “The Colonization of East Germany by McWorld,” are hardly music to
the ears of the (West) German political establishment: “[W]hat the German case suggests is exactly what the Russian case establishes: that McWorld’s markets, tied here
to the West German political and economic leviathan, have not and probably cannot
produce a democratic civil society; indeed, in East Germany, they helped to destroy
one in its infancy. McWorld is the problem, not the solution” (267). This chapter
should be required reading for Germanists, even though Barber makes one small error, namely the inclusion of apparatchik writer Hermann Kant in a list of dissident
authors (266).
34. Tönnies, Die Feier des Konkreten, 128. A similar, but not identical vision is
found at the end of Christophe Charle’s study Vordenker der Moderne. Die Intellektuellen im 19. Jahrhundert (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1997): “The new idea of the
coming century is possibly that of the European intellectual: the emancipatory claim
of the early nineteenth century, complemented by the cosmopolitanism of the Enlightenment and the strict rationalism of the late nineteenth century, but freed from
the dogmatism that put its stamp on the ¤rst half of the twentieth century” (217).
35. It will, however, be interesting to follow the career of Bodo Morshäuser (b.
1953), who has taken it upon himself to examine both xenophobic violence in reuni¤ed Germany and the left’s reaction to it: Hauptsache Deutsch (Frankfurt am
Main: Suhrkamp, 1992) and Warten auf den Führer (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp,
1993).
36. Matthias Altenburg, “Lullaby vor der Schlacht,” Der Spiegel, no. 52, 1994,
151. This essay appeared not quite two years after Strauß’s “Impending Tragedy.”
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37. For a summary of these and a differentiated portrayal of Syberberg, see Leonardo Quaresima, “Hans Jürgen Syberberg: Die neue ‘Aura’ des Films,” Neonationalismus. Neokonservatismus, ed. Michael Kessler et al., 127–140.
In A Dubious Past, Elliot Neaman is more critical of Syberberg than I am. Neaman
views Syberberg’s 1990 book Vom Unglück und Gluck der Kunst in Deutschland nach
dem letzten Kriege (München: Matthes und Seitz) as “openly anti-Semitic” (220).
Syberberg does say, however, that “Auschwitz and the exodus of the European Jews
to Israel and America” must be one of the central themes of art in our time (Vom Unglück, 33). Neaman’s assessment of Syberberg appears to have been in¶uenced at least
in part by his reading of Eric Santner, to whose book Stranded Objects: Mourning,
Memory, and Film in Postwar Germany (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press,
1990) he refers. See Santner’s chapter “Allegories of Grieving: The Films of Hans Jürgen Syberberg” (103–149).
38. Hans Jürgen Syberberg, Die freudlose Gesellschaft. Notizen aus dem letzten Jahr
(München, Wien: Hanser, 1981). Page references in the body of the text.
39. One forerunner who proposed an “International of the Religious Intelligentsia” was author, essayist, and Dadaist Hugo Ball (1886–1927). See Hugo Ball, Zur
Kritik der deutschen Intelligenz (1918; Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1991), 10. In
that same volume, Ball sees a “German mentality” that consists of a lack of “principles, feeling, logic and precision [and] instinctive morality” (12). He agrees with
Bakunin that “if a tenth of their [the Germans’] rich intellectual consciousness had
found its way into their lives, they would be glorious people” (32). Ball was a leftist
who often sounded like a rightist, and he was not free of anti-Semitism. Anson
Rabinbach examines the pitfalls inherent in Ball’s “inverted nationalism” in In the
Shadow of Catastrophe: German Intellectuals between Apocalypse and Enlightenment
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 66–96. His analysis was originally
published as the introduction to the English translation of Ball’s work: Critique of the
German Intelligentsia (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
See also Seth Taylor’s discussion of Ball’s Critique in Left-Wing Nietzscheans, 183–186.
In my opinion, the way in which the East German dramatist Heiner Müller (1929–
1995) and the theater director Frank Castorf (both associated with the cultural left)
toyed with the ideas of Ernst Jünger in recent years is hardly an intellectual or political
path worthy of emulation. For background on this, see the following: István Eörsi,
“‘Massaker als Sinnsuche.’ Über die seltsame Allianz von Heiner Müller und Botho
Strauß,” Der Spiegel, no. 37, 1994, 215–220; Peter Zadek, “‘Den Killern ein Alibi.’ Über
Frank Castorf, Heiner Müller und andere rechte Linke,” Der Spiegel, no. 4, 1995, 183;
Stephan Lebert, “Der Fall Frank Castorf: Verwirrende Rollenspiele eines deutschen Intellektuellen,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, February 20, 1995; “‘Theater ist feudalistisch.’ Dramatiker Heiner Müller über das Berliner Ensemble, DDR—Nostalgie und Rechtslinks-Verwirrungen,” Der Spiegel, no. 12, 1995, 224–226. In this interview, Müller denies that he and Castorf ever were involved in “anything like neo-Nationalism” (225).
Richard Herzinger has described the intention of Müller’s critique of civilization
as “mobilization of resistance against a Westernization that is portrayed as a danger
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that threatens the development, even the existence of the human race.” He shows
that Müller “explicitly and implicitly links up with traditional modes of thought of
the German critique of ‘Western civilization.’” See Masken der Revolution. Vitalistische
Zivilisations- und Humanismuskritik in Texten Heiner Müllers (München: Fink, 1992),
15–16.
40. For a reaction from the U.S., see David Binder, “Ernst Jünger, Contradictory
German Author Who Wrote about War, Is Dead at 102,” New York Times, February 18, 1998. This obituary is free of glossing over, unlike many of the German ones.
41. One could also postulate that Kohl, in expressing his respect for Jünger, knew
that he would be applauded by those extremely conservative voters that the Christian
Democrats invariably court in election years.
42. The views of Waigel and Lafontaine were reported by Germany Live (“Stimmen zum Tod von Ernst Jünger”) on February 18, 1998.
43. See “Stimmen zum Tod von Ernst Jünger,” Germany Live, February 18, 1998.
Gadamer’s comments were originally published in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, February 18, 1998.
44. For Libération and Le Figaro, see “Ausländische Presse würdigt Ernst Jünger:
‘Nationalist, aber kein Nazi,’” Germany Live, February 18, 1998. For Mitterand,
Lang, and Tournier, see Jochen Hehn, “Ein Freund Frankreichs: Ernst Jünger,” Die
Welt, February 19, 1998.
45. Cited in Martina Meister, “Ungebrochen. Frankreichs Reaktionen auf den
Tod Ernst Jüngers,” Frankfurter Rundschau, February 19, 1998. Le Pen’s opposite
number, André Glucksmann, who has been extremely critical of Hans Magnus Enzensberger, brought Jünger’s War as an Inner Experience to the attention of publisher
Christian Bourgois and wrote the preface to the French edition. See Christian Bourgois, “Von Dauer,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, February 18, 1998.
46. Cited in “Stimmen zum Tod von Ernst Jünger,” Germany Live, February 18,
1998.
47. Ernst Jünger, “‘Wer hat nicht Fehler gemacht im Leben,’” Süddeutsche Zeitung, February 21, 1998. See also Klaus Podak, “Immer bereit zu neuen Ausfahrten.
Zum Tode von Ernst Jünger,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, February 18, 1998.
48. Curt Hohoff, “Ein Augenmensch, der bis ins Innerste sehen wollte,” Die Welt,
February 18, 1998.
49. Harro Segeberg, “Wege und Irrwege einer Epochenaneignung,” Frankfurter
Rundschau, February 18, 1998.
50. Wolfram Schütte, “Jahrhundert-Gestalt. Zum Tode Ernst Jüngers,” Frankfurter Runschau, February 18, 1998.
51. Thomas Assheuer, “Der beste Feind der Moderne,” Die Zeit, no. 9, 1998. The
online edition of Die Zeit offers a collection of materials about Jünger at
<www.zeit.de/links/juenger_ernst.html>.
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52. Rolf Schneider, “Er war niemals besser, als wenn er nur über sich selber
schrieb,” Die Welt, February 21, 1998. The only thoroughly negative eulogy that I
discovered was printed in the Viennese daily Die Presse. It was excerpted in Germany
Live on February 18, 1998.
53. How can one write—and correctly so—that democracy needs “intellectual deviation” to survive and then set up Ernst Jünger as a model of such deviation? See the
comments from the February 21, 1998, edition of the Berliner Zeitung on the occasion of Jünger’s funeral as excerpted by Germany Live on the day of their publication.
As stated previously, “leftist deviation” has never been truly acceptable in Germany.
54. Gerhard Schulz, Romantik (München: Beck, 1996), 136. Further page references in the body of the text.
55. Werner Schneiders, Das Zeitalter der Aufklärung (München: Beck, 1997), 86.
Further page references in the body of the text.
56. On this topic, see also W. Daniel Wilson, “Enlightenment’s Alliance with
Power: The Dialectic of Collusion and Opposition in the Literary Elite,” Impure Reason, 364–384.
57. Annemarie Pieper, Gut und Böse (München: Beck, 1997), 121. This does not
mean that the search for explanations is fruitless, she adds. Page references in the
body of the text.

Notes to Epilogue
1. Anne Sa’adah, Germany’s Second Chance: Trust, Justice, and Democratization
(Cambridge, Mass., and London: Harvard University Press, 1998), ix. Sa’adah goes
on to amplify this opening statement from her preface: “When I was a graduate student, Nazi Germany was not where I wanted to be late at night; even living in the
shadow of the Third Reich seemed depressing. . . . Some of my closest friends now
are German, but we sometimes come up hard against a wall of misunderstanding that
can be explained only by radically different political experiences and cultures. And
yet I now occasionally slip into the ¤rst-person plural when I speak about the problems and possibilities of contemporary Germany. The Federal Republic is indeed ein
schwieriges Vaterland [a dif¤cult fatherland], but it is a country in which I feel implicated” (ix-x). My own feelings are quite similar, even though I did ponder Nazi
Germany—and several other manifestations of Germanness—as a graduate student,
both “late at night” and during the day.
2. Schröder was never a “street ¤ghting man,” although photos from the 1970s
show him in the requisite leather jacket with beer in hand. Unlike many more radical
leftists, he comes from rather humble circumstances, and he grew up in a household
devoid of the cultural artifacts of the Bildungsbürgertum. He thus did not rebel by rejecting bourgeois culture out of hand. In this, he resembles Bill Clinton more than
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Tony Blair, with whom he has been compared. It was hardly a political statement
when he gave an interview to the Washington Post while “puf¤ng on a Cuban cigar.”
See “Schroeder: ‘Decision to Stay Is . . . Right’,” Washington Post, April 18, 1999.
3. Mathias Döpfner, “Sieg der Achtundsechziger,” Die Welt, September 28, 1998.
It has been said that Schröder was “not a ’68er himself, but a sympathizer of this
movement that ranged from rebellious to revolutionary.” Gerfried Sperl, “Der große
Wechsel,” Der Standard, September 28, 1998.
4. I am translating here from excerpts published by the Süddeutsche Zeitung and
the Frankfurter Rundschau (both of November 11, 1998).
5. One observer has put it this way: “The passages in the Regierungserklärung about
cultural policy were the colorful prospectus of a Social-Democratic enterprise whose
products are to be quickly put on the market.” Christian Thomas, “Be Er De. Gerhard
Schröders ‘Republik der Neuen Mitte,’” Frankfurter Rundschau, November 12, 1998.
6. Heribert Prantl, “Der große Kommunikator,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, November
11, 1998. Prantl’s title is an homage to Ronald Reagan, whose ability to speak directly
to the people is shared by Schröder, he thinks.
7. Richard Meng, “Aufbruch wohin?” Frankfurter Rundschau, November 11, 1998.
8. As reported by Robin Alexander and Eberhard Seidel-Pielen, “Rechte mußte
draußen bleiben,” tageszeitung, September 29, 1998. Few reports focused on this aspect of the election. Typical headlines were “The ghost of the right is done for” (Jens
Schneider, “Aus für das rechte Gespenst,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, September 29, 1998)
or “No extreme-right parties in the German parliament” (“Keine rechtsextremen
Parteien im deutschen Parlament,” dpa dispatch distributed by Germany Live, September 27, 1998). Paul Geitner’s article in the Washington Post (September 27, 1998)
was entitled “Extremists Run Strong in E. Germany,” but Geitner was referring to
the PDS, the successor to the East German communists, who barely overcame the 5
percent hurdle in 1998.
9. As reported by Ada Brandes, “Schily besorgt über den Zulauf zur rechten Szene.
Innenminister stellt Verfassungsschutzbericht vor . . .” Berliner Zeitung, March 25,
1999. In the Of¤ce’s report, the number of left-wing extremists prone to violence is
set at 7,000. See also the following articles: hjh, “Zulauf bei rechtsextremen Organisationen,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, March 26, 1999; Thorsten Denkler, “Verfassungsschutzbericht vorgelegt,” tageszeitung, March 26, 1999; Martina Fietz, “Zulauf für
Rechtsextreme. Aber mehr linke Gewalt,” Die Welt, March 26, 1999. A later article
about the report ran under a headline that was a true slap in the face for East Germans: Peter Blechschmidt, “Im Osten nichts Neues,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, May 4,
1999. This is a variation of the title of Erich Remarque’s famous novel “Im Westen
nichts Neues.” The article suggests the opposite of what would be the English translation of the headline, i.e.: “All Quiet on the Eastern Front.”
In Brandenburg, the federal state that surrounds Berlin, the number of attacks
against foreigners went up almost 30 percent in 1999, even though the total number
of crimes perpetrated by right-wing extremists went down somewhat. During the same
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year, the DVU increased its membership from 200 to 400, the NPD from 50 to 200.
Only the Republicans lost members. See Jan Thomsen, “Fremdenfeindliche Gewalt
nahm 1999 stark zu,” Berliner Zeitung, May 13, 2000. The increase in xenophobic violence comes at a time when the number of people requesting asylum in Germany is
at its lowest point since 1988. This means that there is a gap between the perception of
the foreign presence and the actual social reality. See “Asylanträge. Tiefster Stand seit
1988 - Meiste Bewerber aus Jugoslawien,” Der Tagesspiegel, May 13, 2000.
10. Cited by Helmut Lölhöffel, “Verfassungsschutz registriert starken Zulauf bei
Rechtsextremisten,” Frankfurter Rundschau, March 26, 1999. That edition of the
newspaper contained an editorial by the same author (“Auffallende Neuerung”) criticizing the continuing surveillance of the PDS by the Of¤ce.
Those critical of the provincialism and racism found in the East tend to downplay
the fact that half of the violent attacks on foreigners do take place in the old West
Germany. There are fewer per capita, to be sure, but one could argue that the ones
that take place in a stable democracy are even more troubling.
11. A compilation of the most egregious acts from January 1996 to March 1999
can be found in an Associated Press dispatch of March 29, 1999, that was distributed
by the online service Pipeline. More abbreviated summaries were printed in the Berliner Zeitung of February 16, 1999, and Die Welt of February 15, 1999.
12. Maku, “Dann geh doch gleich rüber!” Süddeutsche Zeitung, April 28, 1999.
See also “Ghanaische Autorin auf Rügen angegriffen,” Frankfurter Rundschau, April
27, 1999. In May, Darko returned to Mecklenburg-Vorpommern to ¤nish her reading tour, after she was asked to do so by the state parliament (Landtag). The original
incident was clearly an embarrassment to the area. It was reported that skinheads had
imitated monkeys and called her “nigger.” See adi, “Afrikanische Autorin Darko setzt
Lesereise fort,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, May 22, 1999.
13. “Ausländische Studenten in Greifswald angegriffen,” Frankfurter Rundschau,
April 30, 1999.
14. Ute Frings, “‘Bündnis gegen Fremdenhaß.’ Bonn will sich für Toleranz und
Demokratie stark machen,” Frankfurter Rundschau, April 30, 1999. Already in the
fall of 1998, the government of Brandenburg had unveiled a new action program entitled “Tolerant Brandenburg.” See Otto Jörg Weis, “Stolpe zeigt Flagge gegen
rechts,” Frankfurter Rundschau, October 7, 1998. In this context, it is interesting to
note that Brandenburg had the highest rate of economic growth in the former GDR
in 1998. See the ADN dispatch “Brandenburg ein Spitzenreiter im Wirtschaftswachstum” reprinted in the Frankfurter Rundschau of April 14, 1999.
15. “Sie hetzten ihn zu Tode,” Bildzeitung, February 15, 1999. See also “Algerier
von Neonazis zu Tode gehetzt,” tageszeitung, February 15, 1999; Otto Jörg Weis,
“Rechtsextreme hetzen Asylbewerber in den Tod,” Frankfurter Rundschau, February
15, 1999; Karin Zimmermann and Jürgen Schwenkenbecher, “Entsetzen nach dem
Tod eines Asylbewerbers in Guben,” Berliner Zeitung, February 15, 1999; Dorit
Kowitz, “Jetzt hat der Helfer Angst,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, February 15, 1999.
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16. See Claus-Dieter Steyer, “Der Trauerzug fand unter Polizeischutz statt,” Der
Tagesspiegel, February 15, 1999. In November 1998, the efforts of the two towns were
singled out for recognition by the EU Commission. Additional social workers were
hired in the early 1990s after a series of attacks on Poles. In March 1999, the Department of Economic and Social History at the Europa-Universität Viadrina in Frankfurt/Oder advertised a half-time position for a historian to work on the section
“Guben/Gubin (1945–1990)” in the project “History of the German-Polish Border
Region in the European Framework.” Given recent events, an extension of the
project’s scope to include the present day would not be dif¤cult to justify.
17. “‘Vertrauen in Rechtsstaat unterentwickelt.’ CDU-Landeschef Schönbohm
zweifelt am Konzept für tolerantes Brandenburg,” Der Tagesspiegel, February 15, 1999.
18. “Fremdenfeindlichkeit verprellt Investoren,” dpa dispatch printed in the Frankfurter Rundschau, February 18, 1999.
19. Hans-Joachim Maaz, “Über den Nutzen des häßlichen Ostlers. Die wachsende
Gewalt im Osten ist ein Hinweis auf die Verhältnisse in ganz Deutschland,” tageszeitung,
April 12, 1999. Maaz was reacting to the theses of the West German criminologist
Christian Pfeiffer about socialization and the causes of xenophobia in the former GDR.
See “Familienkultur der Intoleranz und des Hasses” [interview with C. Pfeiffer], tageszeitung, March 22, 1999; and Nick Reimer, “Angriff auf die ostdeutsche Volksseele,”
tageszeitung, March 25, 1999. For Maaz’s analysis of the East German mentality, see HansJoachim Maaz, Gefühlsstau. Ein Psychogramm der DDR (Berlin: Argon Verlag, 1990).
20. Quoted in Ulrich Clewing, “Sir Foster hilft nicht beim Aufbau des Sozialismus,” tageszeitung, August 19, 1998. The tongue-in-cheek title refers to the decision
by Sir Norman Foster, the architect of the renovated Reichstag, not to participate. He
was bothered by the partisan (i.e., pro SPD) nature of the event.
21. Given the immediate goal of unseating Kohl, it is no surprise that the question
of Helmut Schmidt’s coolness toward the literati was not emphasized. Willy Brandt’s
successor was no more prone to ¤reside chats with critical intellectuals than Ludwig
Erhard, famous for his dismissal of activist writers.
One intellectual who praised Kohl’s in¶uence on cultural affairs was Christoph Stölzl,
the founding director of the German Historical Museum in Berlin: “Kohl tut wohl,” Die
Zeit, no. 40, 1998. In 2000, Stölzl became the head of cultural affairs in Berlin.
22. “Eurovisionen” [Interview with Jack Lang], Die Zeit, no. 40, 1998. Lang also
recalled how he had engaged in discussions with Hollywood executives: “One has to
hammer into such people again and again that we [i.e., the Europeans] exist, and that
they cannot do what they want in Europe without respecting certain rules.” Criticism of the U.S. was not absent from the “Eurovisions” meeting either. See Jakob
Augstein, “Ist Montesquieu in der SPD? Wie die Sozialdemokraten nach ‘Eurovisionen’ suchten,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, August 21, 1998.
23. Cited in Moritz Rinke, “Vom Training des aufrechten Gangs,” Der Tagesspiegel,
August 21, 1998. Rinke, for one, found Schröder to be “pleasantly unpretentious,”
since he did not “constantly quote Ernst Jünger [!] or claim to be a bookworm.”
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24. Walser has been a visiting professor at Middlebury, Texas, West Virginia, Dartmouth, and Berkeley.
25. It was reported in a dpa dispatch that Walser had chosen Schirrmacher himself. This does not necessarily mean that Walser agreed in toto with the cultural-political agenda of his younger admirer. See “Friedenspreis an Walser—Gnade für TopSpion ‘Topas’ gefordert,” distributed by the online service Germany Live, October 12,
1998.
26. My translations refer to the online version of Schirrmacher’s talk (entitled
“Sein Anteil” [“His Share”], which was distributed by the Börsenverein des deutschen Buchhandels on its website: <http://www.boersenverein.de/fpreis/fs_laude.
htm>. Walser’s own talk—“Erfahrungen beim Verfassen einer Sonntagsrede” [“Experiences While Writing a Sunday Speech”]—will also be cited according to the version on the same website: <http://www.boersenverein.de/fpreis/mw_rede.htm>. For
book versions, see Friedenspreis des deutschen Buchhandels 1998. Martin Walser
(Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Buchhändler-Vereinigung, 1998) and Erfahrungen beim
Verfassen einer Sonntagsrede. Friedenspreis des deutschen Buchhandels 1998 (Frankfurt
am Main: Suhrkamp, 1998). Lengthy excerpts from Walser’s speech were also published in the Frankfurter Rundschau, the Süddeutsche Zeitung, the tageszeitung, and
many other dailies on October 12, 1998. Two brief passages that Walser did not read
in Frankfurt are included in the version found in the journal Universitas, December
1998, 1122–1132. The extra passages are brie¶y discussed by the editors on p. 1132.
After this epilogue was completed, the following collection appeared: Frank
Schirrmacher, ed., Die Walser-Bubis-Debatte. Eine Dokumentation (Frankfurt am
Main: Suhrkamp, 1999). The volume contains the speeches by Walser and Bubis,
numerous responses to both (including personal letters), and the transcript of the
December 13, 1998, meeting of Walser and Bubis at the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. The collection is organized chronologically, with one exception: The ¤rst document is not Schirrmacher’s speech introducing Walser, but rather the honoree’s
Peace Prize Speech. This will probably be viewed by most German observers as an example of false modesty.
27. Martin Walser, Ein springender Brunnen (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp,
1998).
28. Here are just two examples: In “Praktiker, Weltfremde und Vietnam” [“Practical
Types, Otherwordly Ones and Vietnam”—Munich, 1966], he said: “[I]f we can’t do
anything about the decline of the U.S.A. and against our own enslavement to this system that has been rapidly decaying for ten years, then it can’t be meaningless to at least
speak of this decline [Verfall] and our enslavement [Verfallenheit]. . . . It can’t be meaningless to call a crime a crime. . . . I call upon the parties represented in parliament to
place Vietnam on the agenda of the German Bundestag.” In “Amerikanischer als die
Amerikaner” [More American than the Americans—Munich, 1967], he declared: “We
have obviously chosen to put up with watching this brutalization of America like
drugged sycophants. A Europeanization of our politics is no longer conceivable, although that would perhaps help the better America in its battle against the lousy and
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bloody Texas style [of politics].” These passages are found in Martin Walser, Ansichten,
Einsichten. Aufsätze zur Zeitgeschichte, Werke in zwölf Bänden, ed. Helmuth Kiesel
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1997)11:182, 186, and 259.
29. In a 1995 interview, Walser criticized the “glori¤cation of violence” on television and said that he could no longer watch “certain American ¤lms” because of their
depiction of brutality. These comments put his reference to television in the Frankfurt speech in a different light. See “‘Man bleibt wunschbereit’” [interview with Martin Walser], Der Spiegel, no. 36, 1995, 209. Ignatz Bubis claimed that Walser had
never become agitated about violence in “advertising or crime shows,” so his opposition to violent documentaries about the Holocaust had nothing to do with violence
and everything to do with his desire to make the Holocaust disappear. See “‘Walser
will, daß der Holocaust verschwindet.’ Gespräch mit Ignatz Bubis und Peter
Schneider,” Die Welt, October 14, 1998.
30. See for example “Unser Auschwitz” (1965) and “Auschwitz und kein Ende”
(1979). Both have been reprinted in Ansichten, Einsichten, 158–172 and 631–636.
31. Compare the feelings of Anne Sa’adah as quoted at the beginning of this epilogue.
32. There is a linguistic “slip” in this passage of which the author might not have
been aware: “Everyone knows our historical burden, the interminable shame. [N]ot
a day [passes] on which it is not held up before us. Could it be that the intellectuals
who hold it up before us . . . for a second succumb to the illusion that they . . . are
for a moment closer to the victims than to the perpetrators?” In this construction, the
“intellectuals” are not part of the German people, but rather outside agents. This is
too close to the fascist viewpoint for comfort.
33. See Martin Walser, “Über freie und unfreie Rede,” Der Spiegel, no. 45, 1994.
On that occasion, Walser spoke at the University of Heidelberg to express his gratitude for the Dolf-Sternberger-Preis. Pre¤gurations of the Frankfurt comments on the
nature of conscience can be found in that speech: “For my part, I would rather be
ashamed without being asked rather than after being asked. I do not blush on command. . . . Cultivating taboos in the service of enlightenment. Exercise of power that
regards itself as enlightenment” (138). The full text of the speech was published in
Ansichten, Einsichten, 1046–1061.
34. Schröder was one of the few dignitaries not to attend Walser’s speech. In a later
interview, he said that it was not his place to provide a public commentary on the
speech. He did, however, deny that Walser wanted to provide ammunition for those
who would rather forget the past (“den Verdrängern”). Although he thought that some
of Walser’s formulations were “exaggerated” (“überspitzt”), he defended their use: “A
poet can do things like that. I would not be permitted to [do so].” See “Eine offene Republik” [interview with Gerhard Schröder], Die Zeit, no. 6, 1999. In Frankfurt, Walser
expressed his hope that he would not be giving succor to “contemporary obscurantists
with an aversion to guilt feelings.” Such a statement shows that he was hardly as naïve
as the Strauß of “Impending Tragedy” or the Handke of Justice for Serbia.
35. He uses the term “Denkmal” rather than “Mahnmal,” ignoring usage in the
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debate about the edi¤ce. The former is a neutral word, whereas the latter has only
negative connotations with regard to admonishing present and future generations.
Already in September 1998, Walser had referred to the project as a “monument of
shame” and “a monument as big as a soccer ¤eld.” See “Martin Walser gegen Holocaust-Denkmal,” Der Tagesspiegel, September 8, 1998.
For an anthology of contributions to the debate about the memorial, see Michael S.
Cullen, Das Holocaust-Mahnmal. Dokumentation einer Debatte (Zürich: Pendo-Verlag,
1999). In an article about this debate, Cullen stated that it had at times “been enriched
and simultaneously blanketed by the Walser-Bubis dispute.” See Michael S. Cullen, “Aller Anfang ist lang,” Der Tagesspiegel, January 6, 1999.
36. Before the publication of Goldhagen’s book, Walser had used a similar formulation about the relationship between German and Jews. See Martin Walser, “‘Wir
werden Goethe retten,’” Der Spiegel, no. 52, 1995, 143. This article discusses Victor
Klemperer’s diaries, which were discovered by Walser in the Saxony State Library
(Dresden) in the fall of 1989. He not only praises the diaries as the best vehicle for
“making the reality of the NS dictatorship more comprehensible to us” but also
agrees with Klemperer’s view of the conscience: “One can learn from Klemperer how
to deal with one’s own conscience instead of paying attention to that of other people”
(146). A German journalist has postulated that Klemperer’s diaries will affect the
American view of Nazi terror more than Goldhagen’s book. See Robert von Rimscha,
“Der Holocaust auf Augenhöhe,” Der Tagesspiegel, January 13, 1999. For Klemperer
in English, see I Will Bear Witness: A Diary of the Nazi Years, 1933–1941 (New York:
Random House, 1998). The New York Times published not one, but two reviews of
this book: Richard Bernstein, “How the Little Things Add Up to Horror,” November 11, 1998, and Peter Gay’s assessment in the New York Times Book Review of November 22, 1998 (featured on the cover).
37. See Ignatz Bubis (with Peter Sichrovsky), “Damit bin ich noch längst nicht fertig.” Die Autobiographie (Frankfurt and New York: Campus, 1996), 134. In another
book, Bubis described the Fassbinder work as “a bad play” and the author as a “prime
example of leftist anti-Semitism,” even a “protofascist leftist.” Ignatz Bubis, Juden in
Deutschland (Berlin: Aufbau, 1996), 41, 45.
Fassbinder’s play has never been performed in Germany (a planned production at
the Maxim Gorki Theater in Berlin was cancelled in the autumn of 1998); it had its
premiere in New York and has been performed in Denmark and Sweden. A performance in Milan in November 1998 was not controversial. See Henning Klüver, “Alles
nur Verlierer,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, November 20, 1998. When a small theater in Tel
Aviv put it on in April 1999, the assistant director was quoted as saying: “After all, it is
not the play itself that propagates anti-Semitism, but the situation in which it is set.”
Fassbinder himself had said that the characters in the play “do not express the views of
the author.” Both citations are taken from Thorsten Schmitz, “Der Müll, die Stadt und
ein anderer Ort,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, April 6, 1999. The successful 1985 protest has
been described as “the only big theater scandal that has happened in the Federal Republic . . . the only case in which the principle of artistic freedom was not upheld.” See
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Stephan Speicher, “Ein reicher Jude. Ist Fassbinders Der Müll, die Stadt und der Tod antisemitisch?” Berliner Zeitung, September 2, 1998. To my knowledge, there has never
been a successful protest against an anti-German play or ¤lm since 1945, even though
there has been no lack of symbolic German self-mutilation on the stage and screen.
This demonstrates that, at least in the cultural sphere, one cannot speak of a “normal”
situation. (The only other country in which performance of the play has been prevented is normally liberal Holland.) The ¤gure of the “rich Jew” in the play—which is
more grotesque than realistic—is a manifestation of every imaginable anti-Semitic stereotype, and the character who wishes that he had been gassed (Hans von Gluck) is also
hardly an appealing individual. As a whole, Fassbinder’s play may well disgust many
people, but it is hardly an example of anti-Semitic propaganda. See R. W. Fassbinder,
Der Müll, die Stadt und der Tod (Frankfurt am Main: Verlag der Autoren, 1981).
38. “Bubis beschuldigt Walser ‘geistiger Brandstiftung’,” Frankfurter Rundschau,
October 13, 1998. Educated Germans would associate Bubis’s choice of words with
Max Frisch’s 1958 play Biedermann and the Arsonists (Biedermann und die Brandstifter). That work is a warning against tyranny in general and fascism in particular. The
allusion was surely not lost on Walser.
39. This citation and others are taken from Ignatz Bubis, “Wer von der Schande
spricht” [“He who speaks of shame”], Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, November 10,
1998.
40. French intellectual Bernard-Henri Lévy has described Bubis as a “prototype . . .
of those German Jews [who are] more German than the Germans.” [“Prototype . . . de
ces juifs allemands, plus allemands que les Allemands.”] This dictum is found in Lévy’s
two-part series on Germany in the Schröder era. Although the tone is generally not polemical, the announcement of the series on the front page of Le Monde (“The New Germany of Gerhard Schröder or the Temptation to Forget”) and the inclusion of
gruesome photographs from the Wehrmacht Exhibition give it a strange ¶avor. See
Bernard-Henri Lévy, “Allemagne, Année Zero?” Le Monde, February 6, and 7–8, 1999.
At one point, Lévy says that “Schröder wants to change remembrance . . . [and Walser]
claims the right to change the channel” when he has seen enough images of the Shoah.
41. For a recent study of Jewish assimilation in the educated middle class, see Klaus
Kempter, Die Jellineks 1820–1955. Eine familienbiographische Studie zum deutschjüdischen Bildungsbürgertum (Düsseldorf: Droste 1998).
42. In 1994, Bubis drew attention to what he called the “phenomenon of intellectual right-wing radicalism.” At ¤rst, he put Strauß and Enzensberger in that camp.
When asked about the justi¤cation for this, he issued a retraction. He then maintained that he differentiated between the “mental arsonists” Frey, Schönhuber, and
Deckert on the one hand and the “spiritual trailblazers of intellectual right-wing radicalism” like Ernst Nolte. In November 1999, he did not hesitate to use the arsonist
label for Walser, only to retract it later (see below). See “‘Wegbereiter wie Nolte.’ Ignatz Bubis erläutert seine Intellektuellen-Schelte,” Der Spiegel, no. 16, 1994, 170. In
late 1998, he returned to Strauß and Enzensberger, claiming that they had a certain
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“national[istic] touch,” even though they were not “right-wing extremists.” See
“Bubis nennt Walser und Dohnanyi ‘latente Antisemiten,’” Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung, November 30, 1998. This headline was printed at the top of the ¤rst page
of that edition. (Writers are not usually given that kind of attention, even in the
FAZ.) The ability of a public ¤gure like Bubis to command attention in the media
despite his history of vacillation and ad hominem attacks is signi¤cant, because it
demonstrates how “abnormal” German society still is. No well-known non-Jewish
German would be taken seriously if he were to act as Bubis did. His special status was
a direct result of the of¤cial philosemitism, which restricts Jews to the status of
“other” in postwar Germany. Seen in this light, the criticism of Bubis by non-Jewish
Germans in the wake of the “Walser-Bubis debate” may well be a sign that a more
“normal” dialogue and dispute will be possible in the future.
43. Those who would like a brief summary with selected quotations should peruse
the materials assembled by Lutz Hagestedt in the online journal literaturkritik, no. 1,
1999 (<http://www.literaturkritik.de>). Der Spiegel published a long interview with
Ignatz Bubis and a provocative editorial by publisher Rudolf Augstein in no. 49,
1998, an interview with German-Jewish students in no. 50, and a fascinating collection of letters to the editor in no. 51. The journal Universitas dedicated most of the
December 1998 issue to the topic “Normales Deutschland?” including Walser’s
speech and several accompanying pieces (one of which was an interview with political scientist Antonia Grunenberg—see Conclusions and Prospects above.)
44. Klaus von Dohnanyi, “Eine Friedensrede. Martin Walsers notwendige Klage,”
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, November 14, 1998.
45. “‘Walser will, daß der Holocaust verschwindet.’ WELT-Gespräch mit Ignatz
Bubis und Peter Schneider,” Die Welt, October 14, 1998.
46. Probably the most frivolous and at the same time damaging answer came from
scholar Saul Friedländer, an expert on the Nazi period: “That I would have become
a member of a national resistance movement, seems to me not only conceivable, but
probable.” Saul Friedländer, “Über Martin Walsers Friedenspreis-Rede und die Aufgabe der Erinnerung,” Die Zeit, no. 49, 1998. Many members of the German generation of 1968 spoke in this way with their parents, whom they considered to have
been cowards, collaborationists, or worse. The actual reality was, at least in many
cases, much more complicated.
47. See Ignatz Bubis, “Ich bleibe dabei,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, November 16, 1998.
48. See Elie Wiesel, “Ohne Schande. Offener Brief von Elie Wiesel an Martin
Walser,” Die Zeit, no. 51, 1998: “Do you not understand that you have opened a
door through which others can storm in who pursue completely different political
ends and are dangerous in a very different way?” This was also Bubis’s main criticism
of Walser. Outside observers would have the impression that the “hordes” are simply
waiting for the right signal before unleashing their wrath.
49. “Primor fordert Klarstellung von Walser,” Die Welt, December 7, 1998.
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50. Richard von Weizsäcker, “Der Streit wird gefährlich. Mußte Walser provozieren?” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, November 20, 1998. A short article on the
front page of that edition had the title: “Weizsäcker: Streit um Walser gerät außer Kontrolle.” The phrase “out of control” could be interpreted as signifying a situation in
which certain codes and taboos were no longer being maintained, and that is exactly
what happened. From whose perspective was this “dangerous”? Aiming to avoid more
controversy, the German Book Trade Association announced that the winner of the
1999 Peace Prize would be German-Jewish-American historian Fritz Stern. He has the
advantage of being not only Jewish, but also having advocated the reuni¤cation of Germany, an “intellectual Bubis” as it were. See Ulrich Raulff, “Eine Chance. Friedenspreis
für Fritz Stern,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, April 30, 1999.
51. “Wir brauchen eine neue Sprache für die Erinnerung. Das Treffen von Ignatz
Bubis und Martin Walser: Vom Wegschauen als lebensrettender Maßnahme, von der
Befreiung des Gewissens und den Rechten der Literatur,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, December 14, 1998. Another article summarizing the main points of the discussion appeared at the top of the front page.
52. “Rede von Bundespräsident Roman Herzog bei der Gedenkveranstaltung aus
Anlaß des 60. Jahrestages der Synagogenzerstörung am 9./10. November 1938
(‘Reichskristallnacht’),” Die Welt, November 10, 1998.
53. One of the quirkiest aspects of the peace-prize speech was Walser’s appeal to President Herzog to pardon the “idealistic” East German spy Rainer Rupp, who supposedly
had only engaged in espionage in order to help maintain the peace in Europe.
54. The only other case of abrasiveness came when Bubis declared that he was satis¤ed with Walser’s clari¤cations and would now retract the accusation of “mental arson.” Walser, who had earlier said that he would not speak with Bubis unless he made
such a retraction, now said that Bubis did not need to do so. Walser’s arrogance in this
instance might well have been no more than a mask hiding his insecurity. One sign of
this is the fact that he made a point of citing four Jews (Salomon Korn, writer Rafael
Seligmann, religious scholar Jakob Taubes, and journalist Henryk M. Broder) who, he
asserted, shared his views about the dangers of over-ritualized remembrance.
Bubis’s successor as president of the Central Council of Jews in Germany, Paul
Spiegel, has said that the consequences of Walser’s speech are enormous (“unübersehbar”), and that Bubis did not have to retract his accusation of “mental arson.” Spiegel
has even gone one step further, claiming that Walser has ignited a “wild¤re” [Flächenbrand] in Germany. This type of rhetoric could hardly be characterized as a contribution to the promotion of German-Jewish dialogue. See ing, “Paul Spiegel rügt den
Chef der Unionsfraktion,” Frankfurter Rundschau, May 13, 2000.
55. Despite other disagreements, Walser and Goldhagen share the belief that contemporary Germany has nothing to do with this past.
56. It must be said, however, that the paci¤stic left often ignored con¶icts outside
of Europe (e.g., in Afghanistan) or idealized “wars of liberation” in the Third World
(as it was called then).
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57. Fischer was splattered with red paint before he took the podium, but he went
on speaking anyway.
58. See “Rede an meinen Sohn,” Der Stern, no. 17, 1999, 36 and 38.
59. “Ein Territorium des Hasses” [collected statements by German writers about
the NATO bombing], Der Spiegel, no. 15, 1999, 264. On the same page, one ¤nds
a rather strange statement by Walser: “A policy that leads to a war must have been a
completely wrong policy. One cannot win a war, especially not this one—just as one
could not win the Vietnam War.” Contrast this with Enzensberger’s praise for the allies in World War II!
60. “Grass billigt Nato-Einsatz,” Focus Online, May 13, 1999.
61. Reinhard Mohr, “Krieg der Köpfe,” Der Spiegel, no. 15, 1999, 258–259.
62. See “Die Nato-Bomben und die Intellektuellen,” Der Standard, April 17–18,
1999.
63. See for example the article by novelist Gerhard Köpf, “In den Schuhen des Fischers. Der Prediger, der uns die Leviten liest—Eine Einführung in die geistliche
Rhetorik des Schriftstellers Martin Walser,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, October 10, 1998.
Note that this piece was written before Walser’s peace-prize speech.
Richard Herzinger seems puzzled that the Germans still enjoy the “anarchistic ritual”
of sermonizing writers, dubbing it “an ancient burden that one has become fond of,
[one] that weighs down the otherwise unbearable lightness of postmodern existence.”
See Richard Herzinger, “Sinn um Untergang? Identitätsstiftung in der Literatur,”
Universitas, March 1999, 220. In this article, he rejects Walser’s supposed Heideggerian conservative cultural criticism, but does so with much irony. His coauthor
Hannes Stein (see the Excursus above), who also criticizes Walser, uses not a rapier,
but a club, and his methods are questionable, to say the least. Stein has discovered
that Walser is a character (“Christoph”) in Ruth Klüger’s ¤ctionalized autobiography
Weiter leben, and he presents us with harsh judgments about this character. Aside
from the fact that this is “Christoph,” and not Walser, Stein ignores more positive aspects about the character. Klüger writes for instance: “What I am writing here, simpli¤es [matters]. We [i.e., the narrator and “Christoph”] were not at all that
different.” See Ruth Klüger, Weiter leben (Göttingen: Wallstein, 1992), 213. Stein
also sees similarities between Walser as a “raving old man” (“polternder Greis”) and
as an “insolent young man” (“Schnösel”) in the postwar years. The use of such language is no credit to the commentator. See Hannes Stein, “Geübt im Wegdenken.
Wie sich Martin Walser treu blieb. Der Auftritt des Schriftstellers in einer Nachkriegserinnerung,” Berliner Zeitung, November 16, 1998.
64. “Handke’s defenders like to emphasize that ‘poets know better,’ as Bob Dylan
once put it: that their fresh view enables us to see through journalistic manipulation.
But if there is any lesson from the Balkan war, then it is that poets don’t know better.”
Slavoj Zizek, “Der Balkan im Auge. Was Peter Handke nach Ruritanien treibt,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, March 17, 1999.
65. According to Stern Online (May 16, 1999), the Süddeutsche was to publish
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Handke’s essay about his trip to Serbia on May 29, 1999. It actually appeared a week
later. See Peter Handke, “Der Krieg ist das Gebiet des Zufalls,” Süddeutsche Zeitung,
June 5–6, 1999. The essay, consisting of excerpts from a larger piece, appeared after
the completion of this epilogue. It has now appeared in book form: Peter Handke,
Unter Tränen fragend. Nachträgliche Aufzeichungen von zwei JugoslawienDurchquerungen im Krieg, März und April 1999 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp,
2000). Handke has also written a play about the Balkans, which had its premiere performance at the Viennese Burgtheater in June 1999. For a book version, see Peter
Handke, Die Fahrt im Einbaum oder Das Stück zum Film vom Krieg (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1999). The play cannot be discussed here. Suf¤ce it to say that, as in the case
of Botho Strauß’s Ithaka, the text caused a scandal long before its ¤rst performance.
Despite all legitimate criticism of Handke’s political utterances, his literary works
should not be read as mere editorials.
66. Cited in Nataly Bleuel, “Mars attacks!” Spiegel Online, April 1, 1999.
67. Handke’s letter was printed in Focus, March 15, 1999, 290. I am quoting from
a report about it (“Peter Handke zieht umstrittene Aussage zurück”) in the Berliner
Zeitung of March 15, 1999. In Focus, he had asserted: “My place is in Serbia if the
NATO criminals bomb the country.” Cited in “Aroma des Krieges,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, April 3, 1999.
68. Cited in “Handke, Serbien, Marsianer,” Die Presse, March 27, 1999.
69. Cited in “Ritter Handke,” Die Presse, April 3, 1999.
70. See for example his dispute with Jürgen Habermas about using bombs to guarantee human rights. In the interview cited in note 72 below, Handke accuses Habermas of being an apologist of “raging violence.” The philosopher had expressed the
hope that the war in Kosovo could accelerate the transition from the “classic international law of the states to the cosmopolitan law of a global civil society.” See Habermas, “Bestialität und Humanität. Ein Krieg an der Grenze zwischen Recht und
Moral,” Die Zeit, no. 18, 1999. He answered Handke’s sharp criticism in “Zweifellos.
Eine Antwort auf Peter Handke,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, May 18, 1999.
71. “Handke im Interview,” NEWS [Austria], May 11, 1999. Further quotations
in the body of the text.
72. Willi Winkler, “Moral ist ein anderes Wort für Willkür” [Interview with Peter
Handke], Süddeutsche Zeitung, May 15, 1999. In this interview, Handke refers to the
’68ers again: “Does not all the suffering of [this] war stem from the fact that the
’68ers are in power in the entire Western world?
73. See “Wer sind die willigen Vollstrecker? Ein Interview mit Daniel Goldhagen
zum Krieg im Kosovo,” Frankfurter Rundschau, April 20, 1999. For a description of
a heated debate between Goldhagen and German intellectuals (moderated by American Andrei Markovits), see “Wie im ‘Dritten Reich?’ Goldhagens Holocaust-Vergleich,”
tageszeitung, May 10, 1999. When Goldhagen published his essay on Serbia in the
Süddeutsche, the paper took the unusual step of adding an editorial critical of his the-
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ses. See Daniel J. Goldhagen, “Eine ‘deutsche Lösung’ für den Balkan,” and jj, “Die
unwilligen Vollstrecker,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, April 30, 1999. Echoing his book,
Goldhagen calls Milosevic’s policies “eliminatory” and describes the Serbs as being
just as “fanatical” as the Germans and Japanese once were.
74. The full passage reads: “Reeducate Serbia? No, reeducate America together
with its chairman and the Pimpf Goldhagen.” Another advocate of Serbian reeducation is the Albanian author Ismail Kadaré. See “‘Ein unheilbarer Haß mit tiefen Wurzeln’” [Interview with Ismail Kandaré], tageszeitung, May 26, 1999.
75. For now, analysis is taking a back seat to polemics. Handke has been denounced
by such well-known ¤gures as Salman Rushdie, Susan Sontag, and Alain Finkielkraut.
Handke responded to Rushdie in “Une lettre de Peter Handke,” Le Monde, May 20,
1999. To emphasize his—splendid—isolation, Handke signed the letter “ecrivainsans-parlament.” (Rushdie is president of the Parliament of European Writers.) Rushdie’s pairing of Handke with National Ri¶e Association president Charleton Heston
is witty, but a bit far-fetched. See Salman Rushdie, “De Pristina à Littleton,” Le
Monde, May 11, 1999. Susan Sontag’s essay in support of the NATO bombing contains a passage that could have been taken from Botho Strauß’s “Impending Tragedy”:
“How helpless ‘our’ Europe feels in the face of all this irrational slaughter and suffering
taking place in the other Europe.” See Susan Sontag, “Why Are We in Kosovo?” The
New York Times Magazine, May 2, 1999.
76. See the following reports about the vote: Peter Pragal and Christine Richter,
“Bundestag beschließt Bau des Holocaust-Mahnmals in Berlin,” Berliner Zeitung,
June 26, 1999; Wulf Schmiese, “Das Parlament hat gesprochen, die Sache ist
entschieden,” Die Welt, June 26, 1999; Hermann Rudolph, “Das Mahnmal: Ein
Kraftakt ohne Kraft,” Der Tagesspiegel, June 26, 1999; “Bubis: Eine Entscheidung des
deutschen Volkes,” Der Tagesspiegel, June 26, 1999; Roderich Reifenrath, “Das
Mahnmal,” Frankfurter Rundschau, June 26, 1999; Stefan Reinecke, “Ein Spiegel,
keine Antwort. Der Bundestag votiert für Eisenmans Stelenfeld,” tageszeitung, June
26, 1999; Claus Leggewie, “‘. . . denn, Entschuldigung, der Bundestag ist ja souverän.’ Ein deutsches Denkmal: Das Parlament in Bonn und die Abstimmung über
das Holocaust Memorial in Berlin,” Frankfurter Rundschau, June 24, 1999.
77. See hjh, “Bundesrat billigt neues Staatsbürgerschaftsrecht,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, May 22, 1999. The law took effect on January 1, 2000.
78. “Rechtsextreme preisen den Holocaust,” Stern Online, May 24, 1999.
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